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This study exam ines the theory and praxis o f colonial discourse analysis and the validity 
o f its conception of ‘the colonising (white, European, W estern) subject’ via a 
H eideggarian interpretation o f colonial fiction.
The Introduction provides a brief review  of colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial 
studies since Edward Said’s O rientalism  in 1978 and isolates the m ain themes to be 
examined.
The First Chapter examines in detail the problem s which adhere to the concept of 
colonial discourse and its theoretical hom ogenisation, un-worlding and de-hum anisation 
o f the fictional and historical coloniser as understood in relation to H eidegger’s 
description o f “Enfram ing”.
The Second Chapter sets out the basic structures o f D asein’s existential-ontological 
constitution as described by Heidegger in Being and Time and introduces the principle 
criterion for the critical analysis which follows.
The Third Chapter re-defines colonial discourse, as “idle talk”, in terms o f the 
tem porality of Dasein and exam ines the various ways in which certain fictional 
colonisers, w hen understood as “beings in T im e”, reflect the fact that D asein’s 
individuality is always already ontologically grounded and made m anifest in its 
“authentic potentiality-for-B eing-its-Self’.
The Fourth Chapter discusses the them e of death, as “Being towards death”, in the life 
and w ork o f Rudyard Kipling, and suggests that death, as both a profoundly significant 
environm ental factor and as a fundam ental temporal orientation can be understood to 
bring Dasein before itself as a ‘B eing in the w orld’.
The Fifth Chapter examines anxiety and boredom  in certain works o f colonial literature 
in term s o f the intentional com portm ents o f D asein’s “care” and as those ontological 
“states-of-m ind” w hich deliver the individual Dasein and the world (as “Being-in-the- 
w orld”) over to Dasein.
The Final Chapter investigates the cultural phenomenon of ‘colonial heroism ’ in terms 
o f the ontological constitution o f the hero, the writer and the reader, as Dasein, and in 
relation to Joseph C onrad’s Lord  Jim .
M y Conclusion offers a summary o f each o f the previous chapters before considering 
som e of the broader ram ifications o f the arguments which have been advanced.
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INTRODUCTION
With colonialism it’s easy to tell the good guys from the bad guys.
Robert Young, White Mythologies^
Who is ‘the colonising subject’ of colonial discourse analysis? Who is ‘the white man’? Who is 
‘the European’ or ‘the Westerner’? As Robert Young’s, less than serious, observation implies, 
we all seem to know who the “bad guys” are. But does this automatically mean that it is 
subsequently “easy” to know and explain what and how the “bad guys” are, as “bad guys”? If 
we drop the unhelpful moral epithet and speak more plainly, does this mean that it is “easy” to 
know what and how the ‘the white man’, ‘the European’ or ‘the Westerner’ as ‘the colonising 
subject’ isl In short, what do we mean when we use ‘the colonising subject’ as a theoretical 
category and a descriptive term in our analysis of the history, people, culture and, most 
specifically, literature of the colonial era?
In the twenty years since Edward Said’s Orientalism, colonial discourse analysts have, among 
other things, drawn attention to the ways in which ‘white Western’ writers, politicians, scientists 
and colonialists have described themselves, their race and civilisation. In philosophical and 
political tracts, ethnographic studies, novels and poems, ‘the white Western Male’ has 
elucidated and elaborated the supposedly inherent, and eminently noble, attributes of Western 
society. According to Lord Cromer, speaking as a former consul-general of Egypt:
[T]he European is a close reasoner; his statements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; he 
is a natural logician. ^
And, as postcolonial commentators and colonial discourse analysts have shown, this confident 
identification of the innate characteristics of the ‘white Western European’ is all too often, if not 
inevitably, conducted in opposition to the ‘Black’, ‘Eastern’, ‘Oriental’ or colonised ‘Other’.
[Wjhat can be more irreducibly “other” to Western thought, and to those developments 
which problematize it, than the colonized body?^
 ^ Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing H istory and the West (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 5.
 ^Quoted by Edward Said in Orientalism  (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1995), p. 38.
 ^ Annamaria Carusi, ‘Post, Post and Post. Or, Where is South African Literature in All This?’ in Ian 
Adam and Helen Tiffin (eds.), P ast the Last Post: Theorizing Post-Colonialism and Post-Modernism
(Hemel Hempstead; Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 103.
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Lord Cromer, again obliges us with an exemplary case in point, when he concludes his earlier 
line of reasoning with the equally confident assertion that
...the mind of the Oriental, on the other hand, like the picturesque streets, is eminently 
wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description.'^
For Said, Cromer’s statement plainly articulates the Orientalist fiction that “Orientals were 
almost everywhere nearly the same”.^  And it is this mode of disparaging and fundamentally 
racist categorisation which Said notes and describes as “Oriental discourse”:
[That] laiowledge of the Orient that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or 
manual for scrutiny, study, judgement, discipline, or governing.'’
However, in stating his case against Oriental discourse as “a Western style for dominating, 
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient”,^  Said joins Cromer in providing us with 
some equally confident, albeit significantly less flattering, ideas concerning the inherent 
attributes of “the European”:
For any European during the nineteenth century -  and I think one can say this almost 
without qualification -  Orientalism w as...a system of truths, truths in Nietzsche’s sense 
of the word. It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the 
Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric...^
By suggesting that it is “correct” that racism, imperialism and ethnocentrism are fundamentally 
intrinsic to “every European”, Said can thus be seen to duplicate the homogenising 
methodology employed by Cromer; and as such, imply that “Europeans” were almost 
everywhere nearly the same.^ But why is this important? And what are the problems which this 
theoretical homogenisation of ‘the European’ raises in the context of Said’s argument as a 
whole? What does it raise in the context of his interpretation of colonial literature in particular? 
Furthermore, to what extent can the problems associated with Said’s deployment of ‘the
" ibid..
 ^ ibid., p. 38.
ibid., p. 41.
 ^ ibid., p. 3.
 ^ ibid., pp. 203-204, (my emphasis). Nor is this an isolated instance; elsewhere he maintains that “a white 
middle-class Westerner believes it is his human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but 
also to own it, just because by definition ‘it’ is not quite as human as ‘w e’ are” (p. 108).
In his influential essay ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory’, Abdul JanMohamed goes one step 
further, and unwittingly employs “a generic” construction in his own critique of such employments; "'The 
European writer commodifies the native by negating his individuality, his subjectivity, so that he is now 
perceived as a generic being that can be exchanged for any other native (they all look alike, act alike, and 
so on).” ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in Colonialist 
Literature’, Criticallnquiry  12, 1 (1985) in Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (ed.), “R ace”, Writing And Difference 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 83 (my emphasis).
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European’, ‘the white’ and ‘the Westerner’, be seen to endure in the work of postcolonial critics 
in their interpretation of colonial literature and the fictional coloniser today?
In the two decades since Said’s most influential work, postcolonial studies has scrutinised, de­
coded and sought to explain European colonialism and Western imperialism, past and present 
and has diversified across every conceivable field of scholarly endeavour. As Bart Moore- 
Gilbert notes, postcolonial criticism and theory
.. .comprise a variety of practises, performed within a range of disciplinary fields in a
multitude of different institutional locations.
This is one of the most crucial reasons why any casually generalised conception of postcolonial 
theory and postcolonial criticism (or indeed, ‘postcolonialism’), must be avoided.” The 
“variety,” “range” and “multitude” of practises, fields and locations, means that a thorough 
exposition of the history, and the positions adopted by various schools and commentators across 
the full spectrum of postcolonial thought, would take us far beyond the limits of a reflection 
upon the ‘colonising subject’.^  ^ A broad, and therefore incomplete, review of the larger 
theoretical, disciplinary and regional sub-divisions which have emerged in the wake of 
Orientalism will, however, seive to introduce and contextualise many of the key texts and 
themes to which I will refer in the following study.
Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics (London: Verso, 1997), p. 5 
(my emphasis).
” See, for example, the questions raised by Anne McClintock in her essay, ‘The Angel o f Progress: 
Pitfalls of the Term “Post-Colonialism”’, Social Text 31/32 (Spring 1992), pp. 1-5; and Vijay Mishra and 
Bob Hodge’s ‘What is Post(-)colonialism?’, Textual Practice 5, 3 (1991), pp. 399-414. For perhaps the 
most comprehensive study on the history of postcolonialism, see Robert Young’s Postcolonialism: A 
Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).
”  For a more detailed review of the history of postcolonial theory and criticism, see, Moore-Gilbert’s 
concise first chapter in Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practises, Politics, pp. 5-33. More exhaustive 
surveys are conducted by Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin in The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice 
in Post-Colonial Literatures (London: Routledge, 1989), Peter Childs and Patrick Williams in An 
Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1997) and A lia  Loomba in 
Colonialism/Postcolonialism  (London; Routledge, 1998). Among the many collections of key 
postcolonial essays and articles available, see, for example, Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret 
Iverson, and Diana Loxley (eds.), Europe and Its Others, 2 vols. (Colchester: University of Essex, 1985); 
Nicholas Dirks (ed.), Colonialism and Culture (Ann A bor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); Francis 
Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iverson (eds.), Colonial Discourse! Postcolonial Theory (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1994); Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (eds.). The Post- 
Colonial Studies Reader (London: Routledge, 1995); Padmini Mongia (ed.), Contemporary Postcolonial 
Theory - A Reader (London: Arnold, 1996); and, Laura Chrisman and Benita Parry (eds.), Postcolonial 
Theory and Criticism  (Cambridge; Brewer, 1999). A. L. Macfie (ed.). Orientalism: A Reader (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000) is perhaps the best introduction to the debates which have arisen in the 
wake of Said’s Orientalism  with additional excerpts from writers and thinkers on the Orient back to Marx 
and Hegel. See also, .Tohn MacKenzie, Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1995), and for an overview of the debates surrounding the life and work of 
Edward Said, see Michael Sprinkler (ed.), Edward Said: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
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After Said, the most influential theorists in postcolonial studies have undoubtedly been Homi K. 
Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Bhabha’s contribution has largely centred upon his 
Lacanian psychoanalytical explanation of the inherent ambiguity of colonial and national 
discourses. His key concepts of ‘hybridity’, ‘sly civility’ and ‘mimicry’ in relation to the 
economy of the colonial psyche, though undoubtedly contested, are now common currency.”
In her deconstructive, psychoanalytical, feminist and Marxist readings of the ‘epistemic 
violence’ of colonial discourse, and the historiographical collaborations with the Subaltern 
Studies group”  (which includes, among others, Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatteijee and Dipesh 
Chakrabarty), Spivak has consistently called into question the philosophical, institutional and 
critical assumptions of the postcolonial critic and postcolonial analysis itself. Yet, as Robert 
Young has observed:
Spivak shares the assumption with Bhabha that imperialism was not only a territorial and 
economic but inevitably also a subject-constituting project.”
Spivak’s meticulously self-conscious assessment of the constitution of the subaltern”  and 
Bhabha’s comprehensive description of the colonised “Mimic man””  are a testament to the 
difficulties involved in the attempt to articulate this assumption. It is an assumption that 
underpins and informs the work of a range of theorists and commentators in postcolonial studies
” “Hybridity is the revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of 
discriminatory identity effects. It displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of 
discrimination and domination. It unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power, but re­
implicates its identifications in strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon 
the eye of power”. Bhabha, ‘Signs Taken For Wonders: Questions of ambivalence and authority under a 
tree outside Delhi, May 1817’, in Location o f Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 112. See also, 
Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity, Theory, Culture and Race (Routledge: London, 1995).
”  A  good introduction to the work of the Subaltern Studies Group is Ranajit Guha’s ‘On Some Aspects of 
the Historiography of Colonial India’, in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian  
History and Society (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982). See also, Gyan Prakash, ‘Writing Post- 
Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography’, Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 32, 2 (1990), pp. 383-408; and, the collection of essays Guha has edited with 
Spivak, Selected Subaltern Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
 ^ Young, White Mythologies, p. 159. In contrast, Benita Parry, in ‘Problems in Current Theories of 
Colonial Discourse’ (Oxford Literary Review  9, 1 and 2, 1987, pp. 27-58) has drawn attention to the 
profound theoretical differences in Bhabha’s and Spivak’s respective assessments of this ‘project’ and, in 
particular, criticises Spivak’s denial o f the possibility of there being a resistant subaltern voice.
See, Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ from Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds.), Marxism  
and the Interpretation o f Culture (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 271-313; and, ‘A  Literary 
Representation of the Subaltern’, in Spivak, In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (London: 
Methuen, 1987), pp. 241-268.
”  Bhabha, ‘Mimicry And Man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse’ in The Location o f Culture, pp. 
85-92.
4
and colonial discourse analysis from Abdul JanMohamed”  to Ashis Nandy,”  from the 
examination of the discursive formations of n a tio n a li ty to  the critical analysis of the raciaf^ 
and sexuaP  politics which are held to be implicit in colonialism’s appropriation of the Other.
”  For example, JanMohamed, Manichean Aesthetics: The Politics o f Literature in Colonial Africa 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983).
”  For example, Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery o f Self under Colonialism  (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1983).
See, for example, Benedict Anderson’s important early work in this field Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism  (London and New York: Verso, 1983); and E. J. 
Flobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.). The Invention o f Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983); R. Samuel (ed.), Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking o f British National Identity, vol. 1, 
History and Politics (London: Routledge, 1989); Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration  (London: 
Routledge, 1990); Terry Eagleton, Frederic Jameson and Edward Said (eds.), Nationalism, Colonialism, 
and Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1990); Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), Mapping  
the Nation  (New York: New Left Books, 1996); Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: 
Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1993); Sukumar Periwal 
(ed.). Notions o f  Nationalism  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and, Geoffrey Hosking and 
George Schopflin (eds.). Myths and Nationhood  (New York: Routledge, 1997).
Henry Louis Gates, jr.’s (ed.) “R ace”, Writing And Difference is still perhaps the most complete and 
influential volume of essays available on the subject of race in literary studies and critical theory. See 
also, the huge range of essays and extracts collected in Martin Bulmer and John Solomos (eds.). Race 
(Oxford: Oxfords University Press, 1999); and, Herbert W. Harris, Howard C. Blue and Ezra E.H. 
Griffith (eds.), Racial and Ethnic Identity: Psychological Development and Creative Expression (London; 
Routledge, 1995); as well as, for example, V. G. Kiernan, The Lords o f Human Kind: European attitudes 
towards the outside world in the Imperial World (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969); Paul 
Gilroy’s important, “There A in ’t N o Black in the Union Jack” (London: Hutchinson, 1987); K. Malik’s 
The Meaning o f Race: Race, History and Culture in Western Society (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); J. 
Solomos and L. Back’s Racism and Society (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996). For studies of race in 
English literature, see, for example, Brian Street, The Savage in Literature: Representations o f  ‘Prim itive’ 
Society in English Fiction 1858-1920  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975); the essays colleted in 
David Dabydeen (ed.). The Black Presence in English Literature (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1985); Dorothy Hammond and Alta Jablow, The Africa That Never Was: Four Centuries o f British 
Writing about Africa (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1978).
See, for example, the essays collected in Nupur Chaudhuri and Margaret Strobel’s (eds.), Western 
Women and Imperialism: Complicity and Resistance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); 
Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti and Ella Shohat (eds.), Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and 
Postcolonial Perspectives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), as well as Sandra Gilbert 
and Susan Gubar, No M an’s Land: The place o f  the woman writer in the twentieth century, vol. 2, 
Sexchanges (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Sara Suleri, M eatless D ays (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1989); Laura E. Donaldson, Decolonizing Feminisms: Race, Gender, and Empire- 
Building (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Jenny SbRvyi, Allegories o f Empire: The 
Figure o f  Woman in the Colonial Text (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); 
Laura Brown, Ends o f  Empire: Women and Ideology in Early Eighteenth-Century English Literature 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Antoinette Burton, Burdens o f History: British Feminists, Indian 
Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915  (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 
1994); Deirdre David, Rule Britannia: Women, Empire, and Victorian Writing (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1995); Kumari Jayawardena, The White Woman’s Other Burden: Western 
Women and South Asia during British Rule (New York and London: Routledge, 1995); Sarah 
McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1995); Reina Lewis, Gendering Orientalism: Race, Femininity and Representation 
(London: Routledge, 1995); Inderpal Grewal, Home and Harem: Nation, Gender, Empire, and Cultu7-es 
o f Travel (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996); Claire Midgley, Gender and Imperialism  (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998); Nancy L. Paxton, Writing Under the Raj: Gender, Race, and Rape in 
the British Colonial Imagination, 1830-1947  (New Brunswick [NJ]: Rutgers University Press, 1999); 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism’, in Race, Writing, 
and Difference, pp. 262-80; Sara Suleri, ‘Woman Skin Deep: Feminism and the Postcolonial Condition’, 
Critical Inquiry 18, 4 (Summer 1992), pp. 756-69; Chandra Talpade Mohanty, ‘Under Western Eyes:
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Such an assumption is even implicit in the contentious arguments put forward by Helen Tiffin, 
Stephen Slemon and Linda Hutcheon, among others, for the recognition of the ‘post-colonial’ 
status of the ‘white settler’ in Australia, Canada and South Africa/^ More pertinently, in 
conjunction with these various ideological, theoretical and regional perspectives, the 
fundamental assumption that colonialism actually posits a ‘colonial subject’ can be seen to 
influence the interpretation of fictional character which takes place in the ever-increasing 
archive of postcolonial literary criticism.
Said’s original argument in Orientalism, that Western literature has and continues to function in 
discursive complicity with the exercise of colonial power, opened up and accelerated a series of 
high-profile debates within literary studies. The most heated and unremitting of these disputes 
have been concerned with the status of the Western canon and the role it played in the 
maintenance of colonial power.”  In the self-assumed authority of the Western academy; the 
validity of ‘Commonwealth’ literature studies as a sub-disciplinary field; and the problems 
surrounding the consumption of postcolonial literatures in the metropolitan West. While the 
complex political and theoretical problems that have arisen in the wake of these debates are, as I 
have noted above, nowhere more self-consciously fore-grounded than in the work of Gayatri 
S p iv a k ,th e y  can also be seen to inform the undoubtedly more accessible literary critiques of
Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses’ in Chandra Mohanty, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres 
(eds.), Third World Women and the Politics o f Feminism  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). 
Works which examine the construction and character of colonial masculinities include, Martin Green, 
Dreams o f Adventure, D eeds o f  Empire (London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980); the essays 
by James Walvin, Allen Warren and John M. Mackenzie in J. A. Mangan and James Walvin (eds.), 
Manliness and Morality: M iddle-class masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940 (Manchester: 
Manchestre University Press, 1987); Ronald Hyam, Empire and Sexuality, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1990); Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining 
of Masculinities (London: Routledge, 1994); Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The “Manly 
Englishman” and the “Effeminate B engali” in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995); and, Christopher Lane, The Ruling Passion: British Colonial A llegory and the 
Paradox o f Homosexual D esire (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).
The broad range of different perspectives which exist within this field can be seen from the essays by 
these writers and others that are collected in P ast the Last Post: Theorizing Post-Colonialism and Post- 
Modernism; and, Chris Tiffin, and Alan Lawson (eds.), De-Scribing Empire (London: Routledge, 1994).
See, for example, Gauri Viswanathan, Masks o f Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India 
(London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1990); Harish Trivedi, Colonial Transactions: English literature and India 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); and, the essays collected in Rajeswari Sunder Raj an 
(ed.), The Lie o f the Land: English Literary Studies in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992) and 
Karen Lawrence (ed.), Decolonizing Tradition: N ew Views o f Twentieth Century “British” Literary 
Canons (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992).
See, for example, Spivak, ‘Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism’, in “R ace”, Writing 
And Difference. See also, Henry Louis Gates, jr.’s own assertion that, “to attempt to appropriate our own 
discourses by using Western critical theory uncritically is to substitute one mode of neocolonialism for 
another” ( ‘Editor’s Introduction’, “R ace” Wiiting and Difference, p. 15).
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Benita Parry, Patrick Brantlinger, Sara Suleri, Bart Moore-Gilbert, Joseph Bristow, Sarah 
McClintock and Balachandra Rajan.”
That said, 1 will be concentrating in this study, upon the various ways in which these critics and 
others, have employed ‘the colonising subject’ as ‘discursive subject’ in their interpretations of 
colonial literature, and examining the fundamental problems which arise in its wake. More 
specifically, I will argue that the theoretical structures within which ‘the colonial subject’ is 
understood to function and have meaning -  the theoretical structures of colonial discourse -  
constitute a theoretical structuring of reality, and that the characters of colonial fiction are 
primarily assessed in such a way as to both corroborate and refine this structuring.”
\
Following Said, practitioners of colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial critics of colonial 
(and postcolonial) literature, have broadly understood colonial discourse to be the Foucauldian 
“regime of truth” ®^ or episteme which determines what “is thought, said, or even done about the
”  See, Benita Parry, Delusions and Discoveries: India and the British Imagination, 1880-1930, New  
Edition with Foreword by Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1998); Patrick Brantlinger, Rule o f  
Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism, 1830-1914  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Sara 
Suleri, The Rhetoric o f English India (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1992); Joseph Bristow, 
Empire Boys: Adventures in a M an’s World (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991); Balachandra 
Rajan, Under Western Eyes: India fi'om Milton to Macaulay (Durham [NC]: Duke University Press, 
1999). In addition to these works, see also, Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism  (New York: 
Vintage, 1994); Daniel Bivona, D esire and contradiction: Imperial visions and domestic debates in 
Victorian literature (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); Ronald Inden, Imagining India 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Suvendrini Perera, Reaches o f  Empire: The English Novel from Edgeworth to 
Dickens (New York: Colombia University Press, 1991); Jyotsna G. Singh, Colonial NarrativeslCultural 
Dialogues: "Discoveries" o f  India in the language o f Colonialism  (New York: Routledge, 1996); Firdouz 
Azim, The Colonial Rise o f  the Novel (London: Routledge, 1993); Nigel Leask, British Romantic Writers 
and the East: Anxieties o f  Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For works which 
concentrate upon only one or several authors see, for example: Wendy R. Katz, Rider Haggard and the 
Fiction o f Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Parama Roy, Indian Traffic: 
Identities in Question in Colonial and Postcolonial India (Berkley: University of California Press, 1998), 
chapters 1-3; Bart Moore-Gilbert, Kipling and Orientalism  (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1986); Zohreh 
T. Sullivan, Narratives o f Empire: The Fictions o f Rudyard Kipling  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993); Laura Chrisman, ‘The Imperial Unconscious? Representations of Imperial Discourse’, 
Critical Quarterly, 32, 3, 1990, pp. 38-58. For postcolonial critical studies of other literary forms, see for 
example, Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculluration (London: Routledge, 
1992); David Spurr, The Rhetoric o f Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and 
Imperial Administration  (Durham [NC]: Duke University Press, 1993). Bart Moore-Gilbert, Gareth 
Stanton, William Maley’s (eds.). Postcolonial Criticism  (London: Longmans, 1997) is a good collection 
of many of the most important postcolonial critical articles and essays available. For the relationship 
between literary modernism and empire, including essays on Joyce, Yeats and Kipling, among others, see 
Howard J Booth and Nigel Rigby (eds.), Modernism and empire (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000).
”  A id  in this regard it is perhaps interesting to note Said’s assertion that the texts of Orientalism “can 
create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe” {Orientalism, p. 94).
^  Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and power: an interview with Alessandro Fontano and Pasquale Pasquino’, in 
Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton (eds.), Michel Foucault: PowerITruthlStrategy (Sydney: Feral 
Publications, 1979), 28-48, p. 46.
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Orient””  (the colony or ‘the native’). As such, in the course of their analyses; the historian, the 
statesman, the author, the soldier and, most importantly in the context of this study, the fictional 
character of colonial literature, have all been identified and interpreted as the paradigmatic 
‘colonising subject’. In other words, each of these fictional and historical figures have been 
shown to exhibit the preferred behaviourisms; articulate the preferred opinions; and testify to 
the accuracy of ‘the colonising subject’ which is posited in the theoretical models of colonial 
subject relations in postcolonial theory. The ‘colonising subject’ of colonial fiction and the 
‘colonising subject’ of material reality can thus be seen to exist in colonial discourse analysis as 
interchangeable quantities. The justification for this interchangeability is to be found in colonial 
discourse itself, and nowhere more so than in Leonard Woolf’s now famous, and much cited, 
observation that
The white people were also in many ways astonishingly like characters in a Kipling story. 
I could never make up my mind whether Kipling had moulded his characters accurately 
in the image of Anglo-Indian society, or whether we were moulding our characters 
accurately in the image of a Kipling story.”
What we have then, is something like a ‘discursive subject’. For, if history is now a text or 
narrative,”  Richard Burton is as much a textual construction as Kipling’s Strickland; and this 
means that a common analytical criteria can be used to examine both. What is more, it means 
they can both be understood to function in their worlds in a similar, even identical, way.^^
In order to grasp the fundamental problems which adhere to this theoretical conflation, I will 
argue that we must recognise ‘colonial discourse’ and postcolonial models of colonial 
subjectivity as quasi-scientific constructions. For, in the light of Said’s important open question 
regarding the whereabouts, and the nature, of the position from which one can study another 
culture,^^ I will argue that the nature of the position assumed by colonial discourse analysts is
”  Orientalism, p. 13.
Leonard Woolf, Growing: An Autobiography o f  the Years 1904-1911, p. 46, quoted by C. C. Eldridge 
in The hnperial Experience: From Carlyle to Foi ster (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 58, See 
also, Charles Allen (ed.). Tales From The D ark Continent: Images o f British Colonial Africa in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Macdonald Futura Publishers, 1980): “Most of us had seen a film called 
Sanders o f the River, based on Edgar Wallace’s book, before we went out and suddenly here was the 
thing, it was real; one was walking behind a long line of porters and the sun got up in the morning 
glinting on the spears of the porters -  and it was just like the films” (p. 94).
See, for example, Bhabha’s Introduction, ‘narrating the nation’, and his ‘DissemiNation: time, 
narrative, and the margins of the modern nation’, in Nation and Narratioit.
And it is this understanding which is implicit in Abdul JanMohammed’s influential assertion that “the 
ideological function of all ‘imaginary’ and some ‘symbolic’ colonialist literature is to articulate and 
justify the moral authority of the colonizer and -  by positing the inferiority of the native as a metaphysical 
fact -  to mask the pleasure the colonizer derives from that authority” ( ‘The Economy of Manichean 
A legory’, p. 87).
See, Orientalism, pp. 45-46.
essentially that of the ‘scientist’ described by Martin Heidegger in his 1954 lecture ‘Science and 
Reflection’ and his 1955 lecture series, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’.
Following Heidegger’s definition of “modern science’s way of representing” as “Enframing” 
(Ge-stell), I will show that in advancing colonial discourse and variously affiliated models of 
colonial subjectivity, colonial discourse analysts engage in a mode of representation akin to that 
which Heidegger calls the pursuit and entrapment of nature as “a calculable coherence of 
forces”.”  In other words, they enact an ordering and systematising of colonial reality, whereby 
“the real becomes survey able and capable of being followed out in its sequences”. A n d  that 
which is represented within these sequences, that being which is pursued and entrapped in the 
exegesis of the discursive formations of colonial discourse analysis, the ‘colonising’ and 
‘colonised subject’, becomes that which Heidegger calls the “standing-resei-ve” (Bestand). This 
means that, that which is represented in ‘the science of colonialism’ known as colonial 
discourse analysis, “becomes secured in its objectness”” : it is, in short, constituted, first and 
foremost, by the role that it is held to play within the ordering system.
In the wake of these observations, I would argue that the pursuit and entrapment of the object in 
colonial discourse analysis can be described in terms of an hermeneutical drive towards the 
establishment of the object’s discursive functionality. Moreover, the drive towards establishing 
the discursive functionality of the ‘colonising subject’ is, I will suggest, chiefly characterised by 
a series of problematically homogenising, un-worlding and de-humanising theoretical 
methodologies. And, it is as an homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised construction that 
‘the colonising subject’ is subsequently plugged into the complex ideological, psychoanalytical, 
semiotic, linguistic and political structures of colonial discourse.
I will examine each of these methodologies separately and in full detail after I have introduced 
and clarified certain fundamental aspects of Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic of 
Dasein. This clarification will involve an explanation of Heidegger’s description of the 
‘ontological difference’ between the universal ontological modes of Dasein’s Being and the 
various ontical characteristics of beings:
The ontology of Heidegger can be read as one of pre-existentiality, of an intimation of 
primordial being anterior to the particularities of the phenomenal.^^
Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ in The Question Concerning Technology 
and Other Essays, trans. by William Lovitt (New York; Harper & Row Publishers, 1977), p. 21.
”  Martin Heidegger, ‘Science and Reflection’ in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays,
p. 168.
ibid., p. 168.
”  George Steiner, Grammars of Creation (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), p. 94.
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It is this primary formulation which will form the basis of my critique of colonial discourse 
analysis’ theoretical homogenisation of the ‘colonising subject’. In particular, it will underpin 
my description of this homogenisation as an ontologisation o f the ontical, wherein the ontical 
characteristics of race, nation and colonial status are unquestioningly employed in the 
construction of conceptual models and discursive systems as universal categories. Furthermore, 
I will argue that the selection of these ontical characteristics over others as the principal 
determinants of ‘colonial subjectivity’ reveals the existence of what can only be called a 
hierarchy of ontical prioritisation within the ontologisation of the ontical.
By this, I mean that there is an explicit theoretical assumption that the ontical category of, for 
example, race, always, everywhere and in every instance exists as the primary determinant of 
what and how a person is at every level of its Being in colonial society. More importantly, I 
mean that the possibility of a whole set of equally significant localised and specific alternative 
ontical determinants -  class/caste, sexual, religious, regional or occupational variations, 
interests and conflicts -  is never sufficiently recognised or accounted for.^ ® As a result, I will 
argue that, the assumption that colonialism is a ‘subject-positing project’ and the employment of 
‘the colonising subject’ as a fundamental analytical unit, constitutes a scientific entrapment of 
nature as the “standing reserve” (Bestand).
In addition, I will demonstrate the ways in which the employment of ‘the colonial subject’ as 
“universal-humanoid abstraction”^^  in colonial discourse analysis and, certain key works of 
postcolonial literary criticism, constitutes the theoretical transferral of the coloniser into a 
conceptual world of colonial meaning, a world of artificially prioritised, exaggerated and 
exclusive cultural, political and racial meaningfulness.
In other words, the critical examination of the individual historical coloniser -  exclusively in 
terms of models and systems of colonial subject-formation and subject relations -  effectively 
translates the essential nature of that coloniser’s engagement with its world into an artificially 
reified, and rigidly defined, process of predictable discursive meaningfulness. The predictability
Something like an acknowledgement of the problems which inevitably arise in the wake of this overly 
simplistic prioritisation is to be found in Aria Loomba’s observation, when discussing the works of 
Spivak, Tharu and Lalita, that “[SJubaltern agency, either at the individual level or at the collective, 
cannot be idealised as pure opposition to the order it opposes; it works both within that order and displays 
its own contradictions” (ColonlallsmlPostcolonialism, p. 237). The point I would make here, is that this 
realisation as to the more complex configurations o f ‘colonial subjectivity’ has almost exclusively been 
restricted to ‘the subaltern’, ‘the native’ and ‘the black’. And that this understanding must necessarily 
include ‘the coloniser’, ‘the European’ and ‘the white’.
The phrase is Wole Soyinka’s and is quoted by Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin in their Introduction to Past 
the Last Post, p. xiv.
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of this process, is largely ensured by the fact that because a great many of the practitioners of 
colonial discourse analysis confine the rules of their investigations to, among other things, a 
semantics of ‘colonial desire’, it comes as no surprise that proof of the discursive functionality 
of these characters, however ambiguous or contradictory, is almost always obtained.
More worryingly, the psychoanalytical systemisation of colonial subjectivity in various forms of 
colonial discourse analysis has enabled critics like Sara Suleri to posit theories about “the 
psychic disempowerment signified by colonial encounter”, and to elaborate upon “a colonial 
homoerotic imperative” This mapping of a peculiarly colonial consciousness and the neat 
attribution of various colonially-determined psychological imperatives, syndromes and 
complexes to authors, explorers, scholars, soldiers, civil seivants and their fictional equivalents, 
is perhaps the most explicit articulation of that mode of scientific representation that Heidegger 
calls “Enframing”. A  mapping and attribution which effectively reduces the coloniser to little 
more than a socio-psychologically predetermined automaton -  ‘the colonising subject’.
The question which thus presents itself, is whether or not an interpretative approach can be 
found for consideration of the fictional and historical coloniser that will not merely secure them 
in “objectness” as the “standing-reserve”. In exploring this question I would suggest that an 
essential preliminary adjustment must take place in our thinking. That is, we must relinquish the 
scientific desire to categorise, order and constitute these colonisers within abstract theoretical 
systems - systems that are predicated upon the ontical (and therefore inherently and indefinitely 
diverse) classifications of race, class, nationality and colonial status. This adjustment, I will 
argue, far from being a deliberate neo-colonialist ploy to suppress the racial and political 
injustices of colonialism, or a strategic denial of the very real ideological abuses which existed 
in the era of colonial expansion, is in fact the first step towards the possibility of a more 
authentic understanding of these injustices and abuses. For, it is only when we dispense with the 
artificially (and conveniently) homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised ‘colonising subject’ 
of colonial discourse analysis and attempt to understand the historical subject as an individual 
human being in the world of its experiences that we can begin to understand colonialism as the 
fundamentally contradictory, multifarious, confusing, opaque and irrational creation of the 
fundamentally contradictory, multifarious, confusing, opaque and irrational people that we 
ourselves are.
But what is this ‘individual human being in the world of its experiences’? It is certainly not the 
autonomous Cartesian subject of Western Enlightenment ‘discourse’. No, it relates to
”  Suleri, The Rhetoric o f English India, pp. 4, 116.
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Heidegger’s phenomenological description of the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein 
as laid out in Being and Time; the existential-ontological definition of man as a being in time 
and always already in the world.
For Heidegger:
The existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology or anthropology, and
certainly before any biology
It does not act as a replacement of psychology, anthropology or biology, but as the vital a priori 
clarification as to what it is that is being examined in these sciences. A clarification which 
brings with it a fundamental re-definition of discourse itself; a re-definition of the nature of 
hegemony, propaganda, ideology and opinion which is founded in an understanding of the 
meaning of the Being of Dasein.
Moreover, Heidegger’s description of the ontological constitution of Dasein and the most 
fundamental modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” -  “Being in Time” (In Zeit Sein), “Being- 
towards-death” {Sein zum Tode), “Anxiety” {AngstlUnheimlichkeit) and “Boredom” 
(Langeweile) — can be seen to provide us with important insights into the experiences of the 
historical coloniser. Which is not to say, that these fundamental modes of Being are, in the 
manner of colonial discourse analysis, to be understood as being inherently colonial. This is 
because, from the outset, these modes of Being are to be understood as being universally 
applicable; as pertinent to people in London, Manchester and Newcastle as they are to those in 
Lahore, Ladysmith and Khartoum. In addition, the universality of authentic ontology also means 
that the Self/Other dynamic which Heidegger describes in terms of a “Being-with-others-in-the- 
world” is not predicated upon racial, national or political lines of difference. It is necessarily 
stripped of the inevitable variousness of these ontical categories, and it is this ‘stripping’ which 
necessarily legitimizes its claim to being universally applicable as ontology. The important 
point is that, the Other in Heidegger is, as a result of this ontical ‘stripping’, just as likely to be 
the brother, the captain or the district officer as it is to be ‘the native’, ‘the black’ or ‘the Hindu’. 
As such, it could be argued that Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic of Dasein 
constitutes an attempt to evade, ‘explain away’, or suppress the social, racial and political 
differences and dynamics of colonial society, and condemned by postcolonial theorists as a neo­
colonial strategy. In response to this potential criticism, I must again return to the fact that this 
type of complaint is itself founded upon a misguided ontologisation of ontical differences and.
Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
1962), p. 71 (my emphasis). All future references to Being and Time will be given with Macquarrie and 
Robinson’s pagination.
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more significantly, exhibits a fundamental failure to relinquish the misguided belief in their 
theoretical ontologisability.
It should therefore be made clear, that my adoption of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein as an 
authentic ontology with which to assess the fictional subject in the works of Rudyard Kipling,
H. Rider Haggard, A.E.W. Mason and Joseph Conrad, is not to be compared to, or taken as an 
attempt to replace, the various theoretical models of colonial subjectivity that are posited in 
colonial discourse analysis. In turning to Heidegger, I am rejecting the implicit ontologisation of 
the ontical, and the “technological” conceit, upon which these models, and the project which 
makes them possible, are based. Instead, in using Heidegger’s description of the fundamental 
ontological modes of “Being-in-the-world” (“Being in time”, “Being towards death” and 
“Being-anxious-in-the-face-of-death”) to examine characters in a number of works of colonial 
fiction, I will argue that these characters, when understood in terms of an ontologically 
constituted plane of correspondence, can provide us with important insights into, and alternative 
ways of thinking about, the nature of the colonial experience. Insights and ways of thinking 
which are simply ignored or distorted (and in some cases, prohibited) by colonial discourse 
analysis’ interpretation of these characters, and their historical equivalents, in terms of a 
discursively constituted plane of correspondence, as homogenised, un-worlded and de­
humanised ‘discursive subjects’.
That said, this Heideggarian interpretation of colonial fiction is not being advanced as the only 
legitimate, or indeed, comprehensive, critical interpretation of this material -  far from it. The 
ontological criterion of my investigation means that, I will on occasions, and on the one hand, 
necessarily overlook the ontical specificity of individual works, and on the other, necessarily 
focus upon certain themes, characters and incidents over others.
What this study is being advanced as, is an examination of the various ways in which those 
fundamental modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” which constitute Dasein as an individual 
human being in the world (that is, individualised, worlded and human) are reflected in colonial 
literature. And reflected in such a way as to raise serious questions about colonial discourse 
analysis’ homogenising, un-worlding and de-humanising understanding and interpretation of the 
historical coloniser in relation to this literature. Furthermore, it is advanced as an examination of 
the fact that it is only when we choose to approach the coloniser as an individual human being 
in the world that we can begin to make sense of an important phenomenon like ‘colonial 
heroism’. And this is not ‘colonial heroism’ as the unified and coherent object of postcolonial 
cultural studies, with its discursively constituted heroes, writers and general public but, as the 
fundamentally complex, contradictory and ambivalent phenomenon that it is, when the hero, the
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writer and general public are fundamentally recognised and understood as the beings that they 
themselves are.
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CHAPTER I: Colonial Discourse
Writing nearly ten years before the publication of Orientalism, Roland Barthes argued that the 
goal of structuralist theory is to “reconstruct an object in such a way as to manifest the rules of 
its functioning”:
[Sjtructure is therefore a simulacrum of the object, but a direct interested 
simulacrum,,.the simulacrum is intellect added to object, and this addition has an 
anthropological value, in that it is man himself, his history, his situation, his freedom, and 
the very resistance which nature offers to his mind.^
And despite the inevitable fact that colonial discourse analysis is not in any simplistic or easily 
generalisable sense wholly dependent upon conventional structuralist or, for that matter, 
poststructuralist theory and practise,^ this brief description of the structuralist’s activity 
nonetheless provides us with some important preliminary points of orientation with regard to the 
characterisation and examination of colonial discourse analysis as “Enframing” conducted in 
this chapter. In particular, I will focus upon the position of the critic him/herself and the nature 
of the relationship which exists between the critic and the object of scrutiny during the 
‘reconstruction’ of “the rules of its functioning”. For in suggesting that the product of this 
‘reconstruction’, the “simulacrum”, is “intellect added to object”, Barthes effectively 
acknowledges the fundamental presence of the critic’s ‘interest’ in the constitution of the 
simulacrum itself. The critic, as ‘reconstructer’, is thus in the position of reorganizing and 
restructuring the object so that “the rules of its functioning” become “manifest”.
So what does this ‘reconstruction’ involve? And how are these “rules” to be established? As 
Richard Kearney has observed, Barthes employs
...the techniques of structural decoding in order to “read” contemporary culture as an 
interlocking play o f signifying systems which determine the dominant myths and 
metaphors o f the social order^
 ^ Roland Barthes, ‘The Structuralist Activity’, Critical Essays (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1972) (213-20), pp. 214-5, quoted by Graham Huggan in ‘Decolonizing the Map’, in Past the Last Post, 
p. 129.
See, for example, Annamaria Carusi on the complex questions surrounding the influence of Lacan, 
Kristeva, Derrida and Deleuze in postcolonial thinking, ‘Post, Post and Post’, in Past the Last Post, p. 
103. See also. Young with regards to Said’s ultimate rejection of Foucault on the basis that his works 
could offer no grounds for resistance {White M ythologies, pp. 134-136).
 ^ Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 2'“^ Edition (Manchester University 
Press: Manchester & New York, 1994), p. 322 (my emphasis).
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Thus, for Barthes, the “rules” in question, and the ‘reconstruction’ through which they become 
“manifest”, are grounded in an understanding of culture as a complex of “signifying systems”, 
where the fundamental suppositions are:
(1) that every object in our world is a sign, (2) that every sign is linguistic or trans- 
linguistic to the extent that its signification always involves its structural relation to other 
signs and (3) that this relation is determined by the hidden codes of a language system /
Barthes’ famous analysis of the cover of Paris Match, which shows a black soldier saluting the 
French flag is, of course, especially interesting in this regard. For in his identification of first 
and second order significations -  the image itself and the concept of French Colonialism -  
Barthes can be seen to have provided an important precursor to modern postcolonial analyses of 
the ‘colonised subject’.^
So, if the “techniques of structural de-coding” have been employed by colonial discourse 
analysis in its reading of ‘the colonising subject’, what are the “rules” which are made manifest 
in this reading? And what is the nature of the simulacrum that results? I would argue that in the 
course of such a reading, ‘the colonising subject’ is necessarily homogenised, un-worlded and 
dehumanised. And following on from Barthes’ influential characterisation of the ‘structuralist 
activity’ as the attempt to make manifest the “rules” of the object’s “functioning”, I would, also 
maintain that we must seek to understand this homogenising, un-worlding and de-humanising in 
terms of colonial discourse analysis’ drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality.
1. The Drive Towards Discursive Functionality and Colonial Discourse Analysis as 
“Enframing”
The fundamental assumption at the heart of the explication of ‘the colonising subject’ in 
colonial discourse analysis is the functionality of that ‘subject’ in colonialism and colonial 
discourse.
This is not to say, however, that this functionality is confined to ‘the colonising subject’; the 
same hermeneutic can also be seen to underpin postcolonial analyses of geography^ and law,^
ibid., p. 320.
 ^ See Roland Barthes, ‘Myth today’, in Mythologies, trans. by Annette Lavers (Hill & Wang: New York, 
1972), pp. 115-131.
See, for example, Graham Huggan’s ‘Decolonizing the Map’ in Past the Last Post, pp. 125-138; and, 
Elizabeth Ferrier’s ‘Mapping the Space of the Other: Transformations of Space in Postcolonial Fiction 
and Postmodern Theory’, Unpublished PhD dissertation. University of Queensland, 1990.
’ See, for example, Parama Roy’s examination of British legislation in the suppression of Thuggee in 
India, ‘Discovering India, Imagining Thuggee’ in Indian Traffic.
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medicine and science,® education/ journalism/^ h i s t o r y a n d  even western mathematics/^ In 
each and every case, the ‘colonising subject’ included, those conceptual configurations and 
ideological components, traces, principles and practises that are held to be symptomatic of, or 
synonymous with, colonial discourse are sought out and elaborated upon. So what is it that all 
these so eagerly sought out factors, traces and components actually prove? And what is the 
nature of this discourse in which they are understood to function? If the answers to these 
important questions are to be found at all, then they are to be found in Edward Said’s 
foundational 1978 definition of Orientalism:
Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by 
culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about 
the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious “Western” imperialist 
plot to hold down the Oriental world. It is rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness 
into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an 
elaboration not only of basic geographical distinction...but also of a whole series of 
“interests” which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, 
psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also 
maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some 
cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or 
alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, 
corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and 
exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the 
exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power 
intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics and or anatomy, or any 
of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, 
texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do 
or understand as “we” do). Indeed, my real argument is that Orientalism is -  and does not
® See, for example, Sandhya Shetty’s ‘(Dis)Locating Gender Space and Medical Discourse in Colonial 
India’, Genders 20 (1994), pp. 188-230; David Arnold’s Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and 
Epidemic D isease in Nineteenth-Century India (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1993); Zaheer 
Baber’s, The Science o f Empire: Scientific Knowledge, Civilization, and Colonial Rule in India (New  
York: State University of New  York Press, 1996); and, more recently, Alan Bew ell’s examination of the 
ways in which British culture, and the Romantic poets in particular, responded to colonial disease. 
Romanticism and Colonial D isease  (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
 ^ See, for example, Viswanathan, Masks o f  Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India; and the 
essays collected in J. A. Mangan (ed.). The Imperial Curriculum: Racial Images and Education in the 
British Colonial Experience (London: Routledge, 1993); and Jeffrey Richard (ed.). Imperialism and 
Juvenile Literature (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989); as well as, Michael Rosenthal’s 
examination of scouting in inculcating an imperial ethic, The Character Factory: Baden-PowelTs Boy 
Scouts and the Imperatives o f Empire (London: Harper Collins, 1986).
See, for example, David Spurr’s The Rhetoric o f Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel 
Writing and Imperial Administration  (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).
See, for example, Javed Majeed’s Ungoverned Imaginings: James MilTs The History o f British India 
and Orientalism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Balachandra Raj an’s ‘James Mill and the Case 
of the Hottentot Venus’ in Under Western Eyes: India from Milton to Macaulay (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1999), pp. 78-99; Tejaswini Niranjana, Sitting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, 
and the Colonial Context (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) and the important influence of 
Hayden White’s Metahistory: The H istorical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
See, for example, Alan J. Bishop’s ‘Western Mathematics: The Secret Weapon of Cultural 
Imperialism’, Race and Class 32, 2 (1990), pp.51-65, in The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, pp. 71-76.
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simply represent -  a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and 
as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with “our” world...! think it can be 
shown that what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps occurs 
within) certain distinct and intellectually knowable lines.^^
In this dizzying and complex series of assertions and qualifications, Said famously attempts to 
fuse Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony with Michel Foucault’s thesis of discourse and 
power and his conception of “Archaeology” as “discourses as practises specified in the element 
of the a r c h i v e . A n d  despite subsequent retractions, additions and developments, for example, 
the increased emphasis upon ambiguity and contradiction,^^ this definition has been adopted, 
and continues to seive, as the basic working model for Orientalist (and colonial) discourse in 
postcolonial studies.
But where is ‘the colonising subject’ in all this? If we accept Said’s claim that Orientalism “A, 
rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, 
manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world”, 
then ‘the colonising subject’ could perhaps be seen as a ‘certain’ embodiment of that “certain 
will or intention”. If so, this is only half the picture. Said’s insistence that this “will and 
intention” is “produced” by and “exists” in the “uneven exchange” with “power political,” 
“power intellectual,” “power cultural” and “power moral” in Oriental (and colonial) discourse, 
means that the possible role, conceptual scope and functional significance of ‘the colonising 
subject’ in that discourse is comprehensively inflated and extended. ‘The colonising subject’ is 
thus not simply the representation or simulacrum of postcolonial theory, but is instead the 
creator and product, conduit, agent and proliferator of a certain type of power (“ivi// and 
intention”); a power that is understood to constitute, and operate upon, a series of diverse but 
interrelated conceptual and material planes which are all viewed together under the all- 
encompassing aegis of Orientabsm (and colonialism). In short, all these various political, 
intellectual, cultural and moral planes upon which ‘the colonising subject’ is held to exist are 
conceived of, and structured, in terms of an explicitly prioritised Orientalist (and colonial) 
meaningfulness.
Orientalism, pp. 12-13.
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology o f Knowledge, trails, by A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 
1972), p. 131.
See, in particular, Homi K. Bhabha, ‘Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse’ in 
The Location of Culture, pp.85-92.
As Robert Young says, “Said’s major theoretical achievement, [is] the creation of an object of analysis 
called ‘colonial discourse’” {White Mythologies, p. 173). Among the many alternative variations, see, for 
example Peter Hulme’s description of colonial discourse as “an ensemble of linguistically based practises 
unified by their common deployment in the management of colonial relationships”. Colonial Encounters: 
Europe and the Native Caribbean: 1492-1797  (London: Methuen, 1986), p. 2.
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At the most basic level, ‘the colonising subject’ is necessarily read as the straightforward 
mouthpiece of colonial ideology; the articulator of what Homi Bhabha has called the 
“treacherous stereotypes of primitivism and d e g e n e r a c y a n d  as a result, is complicit in all the 
odious cultural and psychological affects of this articulation. Yet because ‘the colonising 
subject’ is simultaneously held to be the embodiment of the colonial stereotype of racial and 
national superiority, it is seen as the site of colonialism’s necessarily negative articulation of its 
colonised other, as in Bhabha’s assertion that
The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonised as a population of 
degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish 
systems of administration and instruction.,.^®
and its necessarily positive articulation of its colonising self. We can summarise the more 
precise nature of this double articulation as follows: firstly, colonialism’s positive articulation of 
itself, which is predicated upon, reflects and affirms (what it considers to be) the inherent 
superiority of ‘white’, ‘male’, ‘Christian’, ‘rational’, ‘civilised’ and ‘metropolitan’ Europe as 
the ‘centre’. Secondly, the negative articulation of its “other”, which is primarily predicated 
upon, reflects and affirms (what colonialism considers to be) the inherent inferiority of ‘black’ 
( ‘non-white’), ‘female’, ‘heathen’, ‘irrational’ and ‘savage’ colonies as the ‘margin’. This set of 
binary oppositions is, for Abdul JanMohamed:
[T]he central feature of the colonialist cognitive framework and colonialist literary 
representation: the manichean allegory -  a field of diverse yet inter-changeable 
oppositions between white and black, good and evil, superiority and inferiority, 
civilisation and savagery, intelligence and emotion, rationality and sensuality, self and 
Other, subject and object.’^
In the colonial text, as colonial discourse, evidence of these archetypal articulations are sought 
in, among other things, the imperial rhetoric of the book’s characters and plot, the author’s
Bhabha, ‘Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition’, ‘Foreword’ to Frantz Fanon, 
Black Skin, White Masks, trans. by Charles Lam Markham (London: Pluto Press, 1986), pp. vii-xxvi, p. 
xii.
Bhabha, ‘The Other Question: Stereotype, discrimination and the discourse of colonialism’, in The 
Location o f Culture, p. 70.
JanMohamed, ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory’ in “Race", Writing And Difference, p. 82. See 
also, Ranajit Cuba’s neatly categorised assertion regarding the fundamental dualism underpinning 
colonial articulations of difference: “Politically that difference was spelt out as one between rulers and 
ruled; ethnically between a white Herrenvolk and blacks; materially between a prosperous Western power 
and its poor Asian subjects; culturally between higher and lower levels of civilization, between the 
superior religion of Christianity and indigenous belief systems made up of superstition and barbarism -  
all adding up to an irreconcilable difference between colonizer and colonized”. ‘Dominance without 
Hegemony and Its Historiography’, Subaltern Studies 6 (1989), pp. 210-309, pp. 211-12, quoted by Parry 
in Delusions and Discoveries, p. 6.
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stereotypical representations and even the choice of narrative form. In the case of the latter, 
Said, once again, is a useful case in point;
Without empire, I would go so far as saying, there is no European novel as we know it, 
and indeed if we study the impulses giving rise to it, we shall see the far from accidental 
convergence between the patterns of narrative authority constitutive of the novel on the 
one hand, and, on the other, a complex ideological configuration underlying the tendency 
to imperialise.^®
The discursive functionality of ‘the colonising subject’ can thus, at one level, be seen to reside 
in the extent to which that ‘subject’ (as author, reader and fictional or historical character) can 
be perceived or shown to reflect, verify or maintain the fundamental binary formations of 
colonialism itself.
The most important theoretical model utilised by colonial discourse analysis in its examination 
of this double articulation is Lacan’s psychoanalytical conception of the necessarily ‘split’ 
subject. Taking their lead from Fanon, contemporary postcolonial theorists Idee Homi Bhabha, 
Gail Ching-Liang Low^^ and Rey Chow^^, among others, have adopted Lacan’s description of 
the formation of the ideal (“specular”) ego in the earliest stages of the child’s development 
during the “mirror phase” and have tailored it to explain the psychic economy of ‘the 
colonising’ and ‘the colonised subject’ in the colonial encounter and colonial discourse.
Lacan asserts that the chdd’s construction of an idealised “imago” is a response to its own lack 
of, and passionate desire for, the perceived coherence and stability of the other. The incoherent 
and unstable symbolising ego of the child’s unconscious is thus, Lacan argues, suppressed and 
denied in the child’s fixation with the idealised “imago” of the other, that which it imagines to 
be its self. Lacanian analysis is thus aimed at dissolving the contradictory nature of this fixation 
and revealing to the subject that the truth of desire lies in the inter-subjective space between self 
and other.^®
Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 82. See also, Firdous Azim’s The Colonial Rise o f the Novel 
(London: Routledge, 1993) In which she examines the ways in which the novel excludes women and 
people of colour; and Simon Gikandi’s, M aps o f Englishness: Writing Identity in the Culture o f  
Colonialism  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) which assesses the ways in which colonialism  
engendered narrative forms (for example, those employed by Trollope and Conrad) that changed the 
nature of Englishness.
See, for example, Gail Ching-Liang Low, White SkinslBlack Masks: Representations and Colonialism  
(London: Routledge, 1996).
See, for example, Rey Chow, ‘Where Have All the Natives Gone?’, from Angelika Hammer (ed.), 
Displacements: Cultural Identities in Question (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) pp. 125- 
51, in Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, pp. 122-146.
See, Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts o f Psycho-Analysis, trans. by Alan Sheridan 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1977), Chapter 8. Homi Bhabha adapts this formulation to the colonial 
environment when he maintains, in his ‘Foreword’ to Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, that “It is always
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In colonial discourse analysis, the influence of Lacan manifests itself most forcefully in the 
investigation and elaboration of the archetypal structures and mechanisms of ‘the colonial 
unconscious’ which are to be found in the metonymic and metaphoric rhetorical tropes of 
signification in that which is posited as ‘the colonial consciousness’/^ The ‘transindividuaT, 
and symbolic, unconscious language of the Id, which Lacan identifies with the Saussurean 
langue, is thus given priority over the conscious language of the individual Ego, which Lacan 
identifies with the Saussurean parole. And because meaning in Lacanian psychoanalysis is to be 
found less in what is actually said than in the way in which it is said, and most importantly, not 
said, postcolonial theorists have subsequently striven to uncover and extrapolate what they see 
as the ‘diacritical’, ‘elusive’ and ‘elliptical’ linguistic structures of colonial meaning which 
permeate Western culture.
In assuming the role of Saussurean de-coder, Foucauldian archaeologist or Lacanian analyst, the 
hypothetical ‘postcolonial literary critic’ thus interrogates the signifiers of ‘the colonial text’ and 
interprets them in terms of their peculiar function within that which the critic claims is an 
infinitely extending system of inter-related signifiers. But then again, it is important to realise 
that in postcolonial structuralist theory and discourse analysis this infinitely extending system of 
signifiers is not infinitely extending at all. It is, in contrast, ordered and restricted by an 
expbcitly prioritised coloniality. Furthermore, this peculiarly ordered system of colonially- 
restricted signifiers is entirely, and therefore unusually transparent to the de-coding eye of 
colonial discourse analysis; and, at least part of the explanation as to why this is the case is to be 
found in Said’s concluding assertion, from the extract quoted above, that
...what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps occurs within)
certain distinct and intellectually knowable lines.
Here Said gives voice to his conviction that these things (as signifiers), and the “rules of their 
functioning”, are genuinely transparent and that they can be brought to light within a coherent 
field of research and meaning. In a similar way, Gayatri Spivak’s later insistence that it is
in relation to the place of the Other that colonial desire is articulated” (p. xv). For a more elaborate 
synopsis of the ways in which Lacan has influenced postcolonial (and post-colonial) thinking, see Peter 
Childs and Patrick Williams, An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1997), pp. 130-133.
See, for example, Richard Terdiman’s insistence that, “The representations of relationships between 
East and West constantly take the figurai form of such metonymies. And indeed this metonymic operation 
inscribes within itself the full meaning which the Orient bears for orientalizing Europe: the womb, the 
origin”. Discourse/Counter-Discourse\ The Theory and Practise o f Symbolic Resistance in Nineteenth- 
Century France (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 237-238.
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possible to “track the mechanics of the construction of the self-consolidating o t h e r , b e a r s  
important witness to the fact that this positivism is alive and well in colonial discourse analysis’ 
assessments of human subjectivity. And it is precisely this mode of quasi-scientific positivism 
which can be seen to underpin the psychoanalytical ‘mapping’ of colonial subjectivities that I 
will examine in more detail at a later stage.
However, what 1 would emphasise here is the way in which the theoretical representation of a 
“knowable” Oriental and colonial reality, history and culture within the quasi-scientific 
framework that is colonial discourse, and the quasi-scientific conceit that is colonial discourse 
analysis, together affect to make sense of the relationships that exist between ‘the East’ and ‘the 
W est’, between ‘the coloniser’ and ‘the colonised’, the ‘black’ and the ‘white’. And as such, it is 
this drive towards ‘making sense’ which can be seen to replicate the quasi-scientific conceits of 
colonial “knowledge” which have been discussed at length in postcolonial theory in relation to 
the exercise of colonial power:
[Kjnowledge of subject races or Orientals is what makes their management easy and 
profitable; knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in 
an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control.^^
From the pseudo-sociological project of Katherine Mayo’s Mother India^^ to the gathering of 
census information^® and the recovery, preservation and exhibition of indigenous artefacts;^^ 
from William Jones’s researches into, and translations of, Sanskrit texts®® to the mapping of
Spivak, ‘The Rani of Sirmur’, in Europe and Its Others, I, 128-51, p. 131.
Orientalism, p. 36. See also his assertion, quoted earlier, that Orientalism is, “knowledge of the Orient 
that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or manual for scrutiny, study, judgement, discipline, or 
governing”(On‘e/ito//5m, p. 41).
See, for example, her ‘Psychological Glimpses through the Economic Lens’ in which she discusses the 
“depressed status” of “the Indian” and his conception of the “economic drains” upon his country under 
British rule. Mother India, 8‘® Edition (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), pp. 285-298.
See, John Keay, India D iscovered  (London: William Collins and Sons, 1988).
See, Tim Barringer, and Tom Flynn (eds.), Colonialism and the Object: Empire, M aterial Culture and 
the Museum (London: Routledge, 1998).
See, for example, Jones’s Institutes o f  Hindu Law: or, the Ordinances o f  Menu, according to the Gloss 
ofCulluca. Comprising the Indian System o f Duties, Religious and Civil (Calcutta: 1794).
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colonial possessions and the classification of racial diversity, colonial power is, it is argued, 
reliant upon and synonymous with ‘colonial knowledge’.32
That which defines the thinking of both conceits is the inability to renounce the belief that, in 
the words of Martin Heidegger:
[NJature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and
that it remains orderable as a system of information.®®
It is this inability to renounce a belief in the orderability and transparency of colonial reality 
which is, more especially, exhibited in the plethora of mechanistic explanatory systems, models 
and epistemologies which have characterised that which the black feminist critic Barbara 
Christian has called “the race for theory” in postcolonial theory and literary criticism over the 
last two decades.®'  ^ Indeed, such is the fortitude of this ‘inability’ that even the recent 
postmodernist and deconstructivist emphasis upon, and fetishization of, the inherent ambiguity 
and slippage of meaning and language®® has done little to change the fundamental conviction 
that the structures and dynamics of Oriental, Western and colonial discourse are essentially 
“knowable”: it merely changes the nature of that which is “known”.®® What this means is that
®' A  good, example of which is Robert Brown’s The Races o f Mankind: Being a popular description o f  
the characteristics, manners and customs o f  the principal varieties o f the human family (1873-79), which 
includes the frequently cited, ‘Tschudi table o f Peruvian Mongrelity illustrating the mongrel character o f 
the Spanish American population o f Peru’, wherein Brown contends that the official race of the children 
born of a “negro” father and a “chino” mother, for example, is “zambo-chino”. Quoted by Sara Mills in 
Discourse (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 57. Among the many other possible examples, see Robert 
Knox’s The Races o f  Men: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Influence o f  Race Over the Destinies o f  
Nations, 2nd ed. (London: Henry Renshaw, 1862).
See also, Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy o f Empire (London: 
Verso Books, 1993); N. Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government 
(London: Polity Press, 1994); B.S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms o f Knowledge: The British in India 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); and, the essays collected in Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, 
and Sherry B. Ortner (eds.), CulturelPowerlHistory: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
®® Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 23.
Christian summarises some of the problematic ramifications of these developments as follows: “The 
race for theory, with its linguistic jargon, its emphasis on quoting its prophets, its tendency towards 
“Biblical” exegesis, its refusal even to mention specific works of creative writers, far less contemporary 
ones, its preoccupations with mechanical analyses of language, graphs, algebraic equations, its gross 
generalizations about culture, has silenced many of us to the extent that some of us feel we can no longer 
discuss our own literature, while others have developed intense writing blocks and are puzzled by the 
incomprehensibility of the language set adrift in literary circles.” ‘The Race for Theory’ from Cultural 
Critique 6 (1987), pp. 51-63, in The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, pp. 457-464, p. 458.
What Bhabha calls the “current fashions for claiming the heterogeneity of ever-increasing ‘causes’, 
multiplicities of subject positions, endless supplies o f subversive ‘specificities’, ‘localities’, ‘territories’.” 
‘Race’, time and the revision of modernity’, in The Location o f Culture, p. 245.
Far from undermining the foundations, coherence and legitimacy of colonial discourse as a theoretical 
field, the contemporary postcolonial pre-occupation with reading all things as necessarily hybrid and 
multivalent -  whether it be in terms of, for example, Derridean slippage or Bakhtinian carnival -  has, 
instead, resulted in a redefinition of colonial discourse as being, itself, characteristically various, unstable 
and contradictory, but nonetheless still fundamentally “knowable” and capable of (to paraphrase Said)
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the fictional and historical coloniser may well be recognised by contemporary postcolonial 
theorists, like Bhabha, as being fundamentally contradictory and fractured, especially in 
psychoanalytical terms; but the coloniser is, paradoxically, no less “knowable” or transparent as 
a result. It is, instead, simply accommodated within existing discursive structures and 
homogenised as being contradictory and fractured.®^
This accommodation and systemisation of the elusive and the ambiguous in colonial discourse 
analysis is grounded in the nature of the relationship which pertains between the analyst and the 
subject matter -  not the subject matter itself. In other words, the way in which that subject 
matter is approached and subsequently represented, ‘reconstructed’, ‘read’ or ‘decoded’, is, to a 
very great extent, dictated by the inability to renounce the belief in its orderability. And as a 
result, the representation of that subject matter as colonial discourse, however ambivalent or 
contradictory, can be seen to constitute what Heidegger calls, the representation of the world as 
“picture”:
What belongs properly to the essence of the picture is standing-together, system. By this 
is not meant the artificial and external simplifying and putting together of what is given, 
but the unity of structure in that which is represented \im Vorgestellen] as such, a unity 
that develops out of the projection of the objectivity of whatever is...W here the world 
becomes picture, the system, and not only in thinking, comes to dominance.®®
The “unity of structure” in colonial discourse analysis is that colonial meaningfulness toward 
which everything is invariably directed and in terms of which everything is invariably held to 
have significance. In other words, the “projection of the objectivity of whatever is” in the 
concept of colonial discourse is entirely constituted by a preconceived and structured
controlling, manipulating and incorporating “what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) 
world”. A  key text in this respect is Richard Terdiman’s DiscourselCoimter-Dlscourse which traces the 
“variety of strains of opposition to the modes of perception and assertion which writers and artists in the 
nineteenth century experienced as the dominant discourse” (p. 13). See also, Graham Pechey’s 
observation that, in Bakhtinian translinguistics, “Any socio-political project o f centralisation or hegemony 
has always and everywhere to posit itself against the ubiquitously decentralising (centrifugal) forces 
within ideology”. ‘On the borders of Bakhtin: dialogisation, decolonisation’, in Ken Hirschkop and David 
Shepherd (eds.), Bakhtin and cultural theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 39- 
67, p. 43. See, Mikhail Bakhtin, The D ialogic Imagination, trans. by Caryl Emerson and Michael 
Holquist (ed.) (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).
®^ On the increasingly complex nature of the on-going investigation of colonial discourse, Balachandra 
Raj an has argued that we can now differentiate between, among other things, the “differential (Jameson), 
contrapuntal (Said), and interruptive (Spivak) interrogations of discourse” (Under Western Eyes, p. 20). 
In addition to this list, which is actually taken from Bhabha (Location o f  Culture, p. 174), Raj an adds his 
own category of “contestational interrogation” which he argues, “rests upon a parity between the 
totalizing drive toward the whole and the separatist energy of the fragment” (p. 20).
®® Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
Appendix 6, p. 141.
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coloniality. This coloniality can thus be seen to constitute, what Heidegger calls, the “ground 
plan of the objective-sphere”.®®
But if the concept of colonial discourse constitutes the representation of colonial ‘reality’ as 
“picture”, the practise of colonial discourse analysis can be seen to conform to that mode of 
thought that Heidegger, in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, calls “Enframing” (Ge- 
stelF):
Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand 
there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this 
way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]. The word expresses 
here something more, and something more essential, than mere “stock.” The name 
“standing-reserve” assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates nothing less than 
the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging revealing. 
Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as 
object.
From Said’s ‘latent’ and ‘manifest’ Orientalism to JanMohamed’s Manichean ‘Allegory’ and 
Homi Bhabha’s theory of ‘mimicry’, in colonial discourse analysis colonial reality is ordered to 
“stand by” (as “Icnowable”) and rendered “orderable as a system of information”. And for 
Heidegger, this ordering of information -  which is characterised by a “challenging revealing” 
(or a “challenging-forth”) as a “setting-upon” -  subsequently transforms everything into the 
“standing-reseiwe”; that is, it constitutes everything that it orders in terms of its orderability 
within the system.
However, we cannot fully understand the nature of this process and the problems inherent in it 
until we have grasped what Heidegger means when he says that “technology” is predicated 
upon, or indeed, constitutes, a “challenging (herausfordern) revealing”. William Lovitt in the 
Translator’s Introduction to The Question Concerning Technology succinctly explains that, for 
Heidegger:
Being may perhaps best be said to be the ongoing manner in which everything that is, 
presences; i.e., it is the manner in which, in the lastingness of time, everything encounters 
man and comes to appearance through the openness that man provides."^^
®‘^ ibid., p. 121.
Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p .l7 . As Lovitt usefully points out in a footnote, 
“Stellen embraces the meanings of a whole family of verbs: bestellen (to order, command; to set in order), 
vorstellen  (to represent), sicherstellen (to secure), nachstellen (to entrap), verstellen  (to block or disguise), 
herstellen (to produce, to set here), darstellen  (to produce or exhibit), and so on. In these verbs the 
various nuances within stellen are reinforced and made specific. All these meanings are gathered together 
in Heidegger’s unique use of the word that is pivotal for him, Ge-stell (Enframing)” (p.l5n).
Lovitt, ‘Introduction’ to The Question Concerning Technology, p. xv.
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This definition of Being constitutes the central philosophical concern in Heidegger’s thinking; 
for it is the phenomenological study of “presence” (Anwesenheit ) as the disclosedness or 
unconcealment of alçtheia which characterises, shapes and informs Heidegger’s thought from 
the meaning of Dasein’s Being in Being and Time, through the “turning” (Kehre) in the 1930’s 
and on into his later, more poetically inclined, work on the meaning of Being after the war/^ 
The “challenging revealing” which Heidegger describes in T he  Question Concerning 
Technology’ can thus be understood as a fundamental distortion of that original “presencing” 
(anwesen). And it is this distortion (as “Enframing”) which constitutes the essence of the 
“technological consciousness” that dominates our thinking in the modern age/® This is not to 
say that Heidegger is a modern-day William Blake railing against technological progress; at no 
point in his lecture does he condemn the need for, or the fruits of, scientific research. No, what 
Heidegger is primarily concerned with here is a bringing to light of the fundamental way in 
which
The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to 
enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal 
truth.'^ '^
Following this concern of Heidegger’s, I am proposing that colonial discourse analysis’ 
“Enframing” of the coloniser as ‘the colonising subject’ in colonial discourse denies the 
possibility of “a more original revealing” of that coloniser. The possibility of an entry into “a 
more original revealing” which will form the ever-present logic behind the examination of 
fictional colonisers in colonial literature conducted in the following chapters.
That said, it is necessary to establish the more precise nature of colonial discourse analysis’ 
“Enframing” of ‘the colonising subject’. For it is only when we have fully understood the 
fundamentally homogenising, un-worlding and de-humanising character of that “Enframing”, in 
its drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality, that we will be able to grasp the 
appropriate criterion for an alternative approach.
As David Farrell Krell has pointed out, “Heidegger’s thought circles about a double theme: the 
meaning of Being and the propriative event (Ereignis) of disclosure. Sein and cdgtheia remain the key 
words, Sein meaning coming to presence, and alçtheia the disclosedness or unconcealment implied in 
such presence”. ‘General Introduction’ to David Farrell Krell (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, 
Revised Edition (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 32. See also, Frederick A. Olafson’s ‘The unity of 
Heidegger’s Thought’ in Charles Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 97-121.
‘‘® Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 48. 
ibid., p. 28.
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2. The “Enframing” of ‘the colonising subject’
(a) Homogenisation
In the first chapter of Orientalism, Said describes what he sees as “the main intellectual issue 
raised by Orientalism”;
Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, 
into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the 
consequences humanely?"^®
This “intellectual issue” is not, however, only raised by or confined to Orientalism. It is, 1 would 
argue, perhaps the single most important question which must be asked of colonial discourse 
analysis and cultural studies as a whole, and even then, it is less to do with whether or not one 
“can” make these distinctions or “survive the consequences humanely”; it is to do with the 
theoretical and intellectual validity of these divisions themselves and the results of the analysis 
which is predicated upon them. So, while Said pays lip service to the problems which attend the 
polarisation of the distinction which accompanies the use of categories like ‘the Oriental’ and 
‘the Western’ as “both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy,”'^ ® he 
never seriously addresses the important role and the worrying consequences of these 
distinctions in his own work. In fact, as we have already seen, in maintaining that “every 
European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and 
almost totally ethnocentric”,"^  ^Said replicates that same mode of homogenisation of which he is 
so rigorously critical in his review of Oriental discourse; that mode of colonial homogenisation 
which Albert Memmi called the “mark of the plural”, wherein:
The colonised is never characterized in an individual manner; he is entitled only to drown 
in an anonymous collectivity (“They are this”; “They are all the same”)."'®
Nor is this an isolated instance, or even an early oversight in Said’s thinking, for fifteen years 
later, in Culture and Imperialism, he is still adopting these divisions and, what is more, issuing 
broad-gauged judgements about them. For example, when discussing the Indian 
Mutiny/Rebellion of 1857, Said maintains that
"'® Orientalism, pp. 45-46. 
ibid.
Orientalism, p. 203 (my emphasis).
Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized  (Boston [MA]; Beacon Press, 1967), p.
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...to be an Indian would have meant to feel natural solidarity with the victims of British 
reprisal. To be British meant to feel repugnance and injury -  to say nothing of righteous 
vindication."'®
What does Said mean when he says “to be an Indian” or “to be British”? Leaving aside the 
significant specification of an individual “Indian” and a collective “British”, in what realm of 
significance does Said understand this assertion to have meaning? Is it a description of historical 
reality? A serious socio-psychological, or even ontological, diagnosis? And if so, what is the 
basis of this description, of this diagnosis? In short, who is Said talking about?
Finding an answer to this last, and possibly most important, question becomes increasingly 
more difficult when we recognise that the two quantities which Said employs here can only be 
viewed as unproblematically coherent if we deliberately choose to ignore the obvious fact that 
each of them (the “British” and the “Indian”) are profoundly heterogeneous and incontestably 
diverse. But, this is precisely what Said and a great many postcolonial critics and theorists 
actually do. In other words, their adoption of the homogenous classifications of cultural analysis 
automatically and unavoidably constitutes an elision of the fundamental heterogeneity of the 
subject matter. So, despite Said’s claim in his 1995 ‘Afterword’, that Orientalism
...is explicitly anti-essentialist, radically sceptical about all categorical definitions such as 
the Orient and Occident, and painstakingly careful about not “defending” or even 
discussing the Orient or Islam.. .®®
in constructing his argument, he nonetheless makes consistent and explicit use of a whole range 
of essentialist references to the ‘Occident’ and the ‘West’. For example, he insists that 
Orientalism is “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the 
Orient”.®' But, what is a “Western style” if not an essentialist construct? What are we to make of 
his claim that spatial abstractions put
...the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever
52losing him the relative upper hand?
How else are we to understand the assertion that, “the imaginative examination of things 
Oriental was based more or less exclusively upon a sovereign Western consciousness”!^  ^
Indeed, this last formulation is particularly interesting and ironic given Said’s righteous 
indignation, in a later essay, ‘Ideology and Difference’, at
Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 178 (my emphasis). 
Orientalism, p. 321.
51 ibid., p. 3. (my emphasis) 
®^ ibid., p. 7 (my emphasis). 
®® Ibid., p. 8 (my emphasis).
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...such supposedly real and stable objects as the Arab mind, the Arab temperament, and 
Arab cultural weakness.®"'
This essentialising constitutes the classification and ordering of the colonial world; and as a 
result, this colonial world, divided along the lines of ‘East’ and ‘W est’, ‘European’ and 
‘Oriental’, coloniser and colonised, becomes that which Heidegger called “the structured 
image” (GeBild):
...the structured image that is the creature of man’s producing which represents and sets 
before.®®
What this means is that the world, as “structured image”, is peopled with conveniently 
categorised agents who are themselves ‘structured images’ and who are interpreted as such in 
colonial discourse analysis. To put it another way, and following Heidegger’s discussion of 
Plato’s famous cave metaphor, this mode of “producing” in colonial discourse analysis can be 
understood more simply as the observance of the shadows upon the wall.®®
Moreover, this interpretation of ‘the colonial subject’ sets out to, as Barthes says, “manifest the 
rules of its functioning”. In the process, the considerable difficulties which arise in the wake of 
Said’s well-intentioned question regarding whether or not reality can be split into “clearly 
different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races”, are discreetly and necessarily 
overlooked. As we have already seen, they are overlooked by Said himself when he issues his 
absolutist declarations upon what it means to “be an Indian” or to “be British”; but they are also 
overlooked by Sara Suleri when she asks, “To what extent is the British woman implicated in 
the structures of colonialism [?]”;®® and by Abdul JanMohamed when he describes how “the 
European writer commodifies the native by negating his individuality”.®® In fact, they are 
overlooked every time a critic, commentator, theorist or analyst makes use of these terms in 
their interpretation of colonial reality, history and culture.
The obvious question which now presents itself is: to what do all these various homogenisations 
actually amount? What is actually being said when Said, Suleri, JanMohamed, or anyone else, 
offers us their authoritative theoretical synopses upon ‘the European’, ‘the white man’ and ‘the
Said, ‘Ideology and Difference’ in “Race", Writing and Difference, pp. 43-44.
Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, p. 135.
See Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’, trans. by Thomas Sheehan, in Martin Heidegger, William 
McNeill (ed.), Pathmarks, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 155-182 
®^ Suleri, The Rhetoric o f English India, p. 76 (my emphasis).
®® JanMohamed, ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory’ in “R ace”, Writing And Difference, p. 83 (my 
emphasis).
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coloniser’? Are they pretending to describe every “British woman” and every “European 
writer”? Certainly Said is apparently content to make such a claim and this is why Aijaz 
Ahmad, in In Theory, is right to describe Said’s conception of Orientalism as “something of an 
original ontological flaw in the European psyche”/® By suggesting that “every European” 
was/is imperialist, racist and ethnocentric, Said is arguing that “Europeans” are ontologically 
constituted as imperialists, racists and ethnocentrists in their being “European”. This, once 
again, is exactly what he criticises Orientalism for doing in its depiction of “Orientals as a 
phenomenon possessing regular characteristics,”®® wherein a national, racial or political 
grouping is collectively held to exhibit a set of universally applicable character traits. In both 
cases, the ontical characteristics of beings are confused with the ontological character of Being; 
or more accurately, the ontical, and therefore various, categories of race and nation are posited 
within the context of a pseudo-ontological (and therefore pseudo-universal) scope and 
significance.
The fundamental problem with this ontologisation of the ontical is that it can be seen to 
constitute the artificial (and distorting) assemblage of human heterogeneity within artificially 
ontologised categories. And this ‘assembling’ is also an important characteristic of the 
“structured image”, or GeBild (which “represents and sets before”). The prefix Ge-, in the 
words GeBild, Ge-stell (“Enframing”) and Gestellt (“Set in place”)®' expresses a ‘gathering’ or 
a bringing together into system.®^ And this is precisely what is involved in colonial discourse 
analysis’ employment of ‘the colonising subject’ and, for that matter, ‘the colonised subject’. In 
its ontologisation of the ontical category of colonial status, colonial discourse analysis ‘gathers’ 
each and every ‘European’, every ‘white’ and every ‘Westerner’ (as the “standing-reserve”) into 
the theoretical system of colonial (Oriental and Western) discourse, as well as all the various 
models which affect to capture the psychic economy of ‘the colonising’ and ‘the colonised’ 
subject.®® And, of course, the theoretical purpose that this homogenisation as ‘gathering’ serves
®® Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London: Verso, 1992), p. 197. See also, 
Biodun Jeyifo’s identification of the “racialization” and “veritable ontologisation of the critical 
enterprise” when discussing the Africanist school of Senghor and Chinweizu. ‘The Nature of Things: 
A rested Decolonization and Critical Theory’, Research in African Literatures 21 (1990), pp. 33-47, in 
Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, pp. 158-171, p. 161.
®® Orientalism, p. 42.
®' See, Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, p. 127.
®^ As Lovitt explains, “Enframing is fundamentally a calling-forth. It is a “challenging claim,” a 
demanding summons, that “gathers” so as to reveal. This claim enframes in that it assembles and orders. 
It puts into a framework or configuration everything that it summons forth, through an ordering for use 
that is forever restructuring anew” ( ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 19n).
®® In addition, I would argue that this ‘gathering’ into system is also in evidence in the absolutist claims of 
critics like Patrick Brantlinger that “Imperialism, understood as an evolving but pervasive set of attitudes 
and ideas toward the rest of the world, influenced all aspects of Victorian and Edwardian culture”. Rule of 
Darkness, p. 8 (my emphasis). To this we can add Said’s inability to conceive of a Western text that is not 
inherently racist, imperialist or Qrientalist: in fact, Denis Porter makes just this point in his essay,
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is the self-perpetuation of a more easily organizable, and increasingly comprehensive, subject 
matter for the more important explication of colonialism at large.
But in conclusion, it is crucial for us to note that it is not just colonialists like Cromer or 
colonial theorists like Said whose understanding and interpretation of people exhibit this 
‘gathering’: in The Thousand Nights and One Night, for example, we hear “the notorious truth” 
thafc when Allah distributed His gifts to men, “H e plantai qualities and defects in the soil which 
bred them”:
Thus the people of Caiio have wit and polish, the men of Upper Egypt great copulative 
force, the Arabs a love of poetry, the riders of the middle kingdom a steadfast courage, 
the dwellers in Irak civic genius, the wandering tribes a  generous hospitality, the Syrians 
a low and greedy cunning together with a plentiful lack of any charm.®"'
In A SentimentalJourney, Sterne’s Mr Yorrick contends, albeit ironically, that the French
...are a loyal, a gallant, a generous, an ingenious, and good tempered people as is under 
heaven -  if they have a fault -  they are too serious.®®
In The Importance o f Being Earnest, Algernon Moncrieff famously insists that “All women 
become like their mothers”®® and F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Nick Carraway observes that
Americans, while willing, even eager, to be serfs, have always been obstinate about being 
peasantry.®^
And as such, it is one of the main objectives of this study to highlight the ways in which this 
type of understanding and interpretation is in no way confined to the exercises of colonial 
power, or any affiliated racial, sexual or class debate; it is, instead, a characteristic way in which 
Dasein understands and interprets itself and other people -  from those of the opposite sex to 
those of a different class or profession, region or colour, they all become “the standing reserve”; 
they are aft assumed or posited as being, in Said’s words, “almost everywhere nearly the same”.
‘Orientalism and its Problems’, when he says that, “Said does not seem to envisage the possibility that 
more directly counter-hegemonic writings or an alternative canon may exist within the Western 
tradition”, in Colonial D iscourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader, p. 153. And finally, we can, of 
course recognise this ‘gathering’ into system as that which fundamentally underpins and is made manifest 
in the broad-gauged pronouncements of cultural theory on reader-response and public opinion.
^  The Book o f The Thousand Nights and One Night, 4 vols., S*® Edition, rendered into English from the 
literal and complete French translation of Dr. J.C. Mardrus by Powys Mathers (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951), vol. 4, p. 323.
®® Laurence Sterne, A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 
Ltd., 1978) pp. 114-115
®® Oscar Wilde, The Importance o f Being Earnest, in The Complete Plays, Poems, Novels and Stories o f  
Oscar Wilde (London: Magpie Books, 1993), p. 334.
®'’ F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1986), p. 86.
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(b) Un-worlding
With the coloniser always already homogenised as “the standing-reserve”, colonial discourse 
analysis can proceed to elaborate upon the various ways in which it functions within the 
controlling, manipulating and incorporating project of colonial discourse. This explication of the 
discursive functionality of ‘the colonising subject’ is entirely determined by the “Enframing” 
character of colonial discourse as “an explicable and survey able nexus of actions and 
consequences”.®® More accurately:
Where Enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-resei-ve mark all
69revealing.
The ‘regulation and securement’ of the coloniser, as ‘the colonising subject’, can thus be seen to 
signify something like its theoretical management and manipulation in the process of its being 
“revealed”.
So how is this ‘regulation and securement’ of ‘the colonising subject’ conducted in colonial 
discourse analysis? At the most basic level, this is achieved, or at least conducted, by way of the 
decoding practises of structural linguistics and, in particular, the theoretical translation of the 
coloniser as ‘the colonial subject’, his/her world, and everything in it, into an allegorical realm, 
or signifying system, of colonial meaningfnlness.™ The colonial meaningfulness of an 
individual, a world or an object can, of course, be assumed by ‘the postcolonial critic’ as self- 
evident from the outset; but more commonly, it is ‘reconstructed’ and secured through the 
employment of various theoretical models or methodologies. A good example of this is the 
(quasi-Freudian) Bahktinian thesis of projection,®"' wherein, for instance, “Victorians” are 
understood to have “displaced their repressed sexual desire and guilt for imperial domination 
onto the dark places of the earth”^^ :
Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, p. 123.
Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 27 (my emphasis).
™ A  translation made explicit in Richard Terdiman’s description of what he calls, “Flaubert’s hoped-for- 
absorption in the Oriental referent” {Discourse/Counter-Discourse, p. 238, my emphasis).
See, for example, Simon Gikandi’s assertion that, “External reality is populated, to use Bahktin’s 
words, with the speaker’s intention”. ‘Narration in the Post-Colonial Moment: Merle Hodge’s Crick 
Crack M onkey’, in Past the L ast Post, p. 17. See also, Graham Dawson’s reading of Melanie Klein’s 
theory that, “Through projection, the “ego”, or self, invests in the social world (including other people) its 
own impulses and feelings that originate within the psyche. Through introjection it incorporates the social 
world” (Soldier Heroes'. British Adventure, p. 32).
Brantlinger, Rule o f Darkness, p. 205. See also, Benita Parry’s assertion regarding how “the repressed 
thoughts” of those “irreproachable matrons”, Maud Diver, B.M. Croker, Alice Perrin, F.E. Penny and 
I.A.R. Wylie, “were brought to the surface by India and were projected onto Indians as proof of their 
depravity” (Delusions and Discoveries, p. 102).
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This enforced recognition from the Other in fact amounts to the European’s narcissistic 
self-recognition since the native, who is considered too degraded and inhuman to be 
credited with specific subjectivity, is cast as no more than a recipient of the negative 
elements of the self that the European projects onto him/®
In either case, what is important is that the experiences of the coloniser, its encounters, the 
world about it, and even the fundamental ways in which it engages with that world, are firmly 
secured within colonially specific chains of meaning and significance. And it is this securement 
which results in an artificial onticalisation of the ontological. In other words, ontological factors 
like birth and death, time and space, as well as the fundamental nature of human perception, can 
be represented in colonial discourse analysis as being determined by ontical factors like colonial 
status, race and nationality. Sara Suleri, in The Rhetoric o f English India, argues that:
[T]he colonization o f temporality is one of the several ill-effects caused by the acquisition 
of empire, and Kipling is perhaps the most clairvoyant narrator of the temporal 
derangements dictated by such an abnegation o f temporality.
It doesn’t stop there: from “colonial logic”, to “the colonial gaze”, “colonial fear”, to “colonial 
astonishment”®"®, every conceivable emotion, perception and action is secured and discussed as a 
colonially-determined signifier.®"® As such, colonial discourse analysis, as “Enframing”, can 
once again be seen to ‘gather’ and order its subject matter in such a way as to facilitate the 
success of its own project; which for Suleri, is to explain the rhetoric of English India and to
®® JanMohamed, ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory’, p. 85.
Suleri, The Rhetoric o f  English India, p. 113 (my emphasis). Suleri defines this ‘imperial time’ as “less 
a recognizable chronology of historic events than...a contiguous chain of surprise effects” (ibid.). For 
other examples of the onticalisation of Time in colonial discourse analysis, see Bhabha, ‘Disennination: 
Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation’, in The Location o f Culture, and ‘Sly Civility’, in 
the same volume, p. 95; as well as Johannes Fabian, Time and The Other: H ow Anthropology Makes its 
Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). Other examples of a more general onticalisation of 
the ontical include, Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin’s assertion in the ‘Introduction’ to P ast the Last Post, that 
“an awareness of “referential slippage” was inherent in the colonial being” (p. x, my emphasis); and 
Ashcroft Griffiths and Tiffin’s argument that “Imperial conquest has always destroyed the land and often 
regarded the human occupants as disposable...But the conquerors themselves...could not feel at home in 
the place  colonized. Out of this sense of displacement emerges the discourse of place which informs the 
post-colonial condition”. The Empire Writes Back, p. 82 (my emphasis).
®"® Suleri, The Rhetoric o f English India, pp. 68, 62, 108, 117.
®^ These examples are only the very tip of the impressive iceberg which is Suleri’s fixation with rendering 
all things ‘colonial’: a brief selection of some of her more colourful formulations would include; the 
“colonial universe” (p. 3), “colonial trauma” (p. 5), the “colonizing mind” (p. 28), the “colonizing 
imagination” (p. 31), the “colonial spectator” (p. 39), “colonial w ill” (p. 70), “colonial incertitude” (p. 
76), “colonial apprehensions” (p. 85), “colonial arrival” (p. 87), “imperial calm” (p. 96), “the colonial 
moment” (p. I l l ) ,  “colonial loss” (p. 101), the “colonizing camera eye” (p. 110), the “colonial voice” (p. 
117), “colonial communication” (p. 123), “colonial desire” (p. 124), the “imperial epiphany” (p. 125), 
“colonial information” (p. 130), “colonial friendship” (p. 132), “colonial disappointment” (p. 141), the 
“colonial observer” (p. 143), the “imperial extraordinary” (p. 144) and “colonial travel” (p. 146).
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“manifest the rules of its functioning”/®" And when everything is constituted in terms of its 
coloniality, when everything is interpreted as synecdochical of that coloniality,®'® everything 
which is, in Said’s words, “thought, said, or even done” automatically becomes an archetypal 
colonial thought, speech or action. Moreover, it is this presumed or asserted, for lack of a better 
phrase, archetypicality, which facilitates the un-worlding of the coloniser as ‘the colonising 
subject’; for where does this colonial gazing take place? Where is this “enforced recognition 
from the Other” actually situated?; where is it that the native is “always on the alert”?; '^' the 
European “a close reasoner”?; or, for that matter, the Englishman, a lover of flowers, a stamp 
collector, pigeon fancier, amateur carpenter, coupon-snipper, darts player and crossword- 
puzzler?®° Where else, but in the “airless spaces of dead concepts and luxuriant abstractions”.®'
But more importantly, if we return to the coloniser, over and above the fact that, as Heidegger 
says:
Any psychical Objectification of acts, and hence any way of taking them as something 
psychical, is tantamount to depersonalisation...
what is more worrying here, is that because these things are posited as archetypal articulations, 
they begin to take on the qualities of inherency and universality. The same inherency and 
universality which Said notes in those ‘editorial asides’ in Kim in which Kipling describes how 
“Kim could lie like an Oriental”, insists that “all hours of the twenty-four are alike to Orientals”, 
or refers to the “the Oriental’s indifference to mere noise”.®®
In short, these articulations are posited as a priori modes of “Being-in-the-world” wherein 
various configurations of colonial (or ‘Oriental’) thought, speech and action are represented as
What we are talking about here is, in essence, a comprehensive inclusivity: and this is more than 
adequately expressed in Suleri’s reading of Kim  when she points out that “there are no quests that live a 
charmed life outside of colonial desire” (p. 122) and, with regard to A Passage to India, that “colonial 
friendship is never autonomous from the literal presence of the racial body”(p. 133).
See, for example, Suleri’s assertion in her discussion of the trial o f Warren Hastings, that, “The lie of 
the impeachment proceedings is thus its failure to admit that Hasting’s misdeeds were merely 
synecdochical of the colonial operation” (p. 52). However, not everything in the colonial context is 
deemed synecdochical by Suleri; there is a very significant, and somewhat hypocritical, exception; ‘the 
Indian’. For in her discussion of the photographs of Indians collected in The people o f India, Suleri 
maintains that, “the specificity of each image begs to be read as illustrative only of itself rather than as a 
representative of an ahistorical type”(p. 106). Why the individual Aiglo-Indians which she also examines 
do not “beg” to be read as such is left unexplained.
Franz Fanon, The Wretched o f the Earth, trans. by Constance Farrington (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 
1990), p. 41.
George Orwell, ‘England Your England’, in Inside the Whale and Other Essays (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books Ltd., 1964), 66.
Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. by J. Glenn Gray (New York: Flarper & Row, 1968), I. 
IX, p. 91.
Being and Time, I .l, p. 73.
Said, ‘Introduction’ to Rudyard lüpling’s Kim  (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1989), pp. 28-29.
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being fundamentally predetermined.^'^ And indeed, this colonial predeterminacy is made explicit 
in Suleri’s reference to what she believes is “the terrifying absence of choice in the operations of 
colonialism”/®
Furthermore, Suleri’s formulations, by drawing everything into her system of analysis, can thus 
be seen to exhibit what Said, in his early work Beginnings: Intention and Method, identified as 
that mode of structuralism which “does not seem to allow for either waste or incoherence”;
[I]t states, rather, that every item in a sign system is invested with the dignity of message- 
bearing capability...[T]he structuralist découpage ...is borne along by a kind of 
mathematical ambition to turn details into a coherent field  governed by a set whose 
function it is to operate systematically in linking all the details with one another.®®
While it is ironic that this selfsame “mathematical ambition to turn details into a coherent field” 
is, as we have seen, only too discernible in Said’s own Orientalism, published three years after 
Beginnings; his critique of “the structuralist découpage” nonetheless correlates with many of the 
points I have already raised with regard to postcolonial theory’s “Enframing” of colonial reality. 
In particular, Said’s description of the ‘functionality’ of the “set” which governs the “coherent 
field” in structuralist analysis closely resembles the discursive functionality which, I have 
argued, forms the fundamental interpretative dynamic of colonial discourse analysis. More 
specifically, in the light of this description of the structuralist turning of “details into a coherent 
field”, I would suggest that the coloniser (as ‘discursive subject’) is fundamentally un-worlded 
when he/she is interpreted as functioning in this “field”; un-worlded, when he/she is placed in a 
signifying system which “does not allow for either waste or incoherence”; where he/she is 
viewed as (pre)determined at every level of its Being in terms of its colonial status and where 
everything possesses a specifically colonial “message-bearing capability”. In short, and as a 
result, I would suggest that we are confronted with the crucial question as to whether or not this
This formulation can be seen to correspond with Catherine Betsey’s influential definition of the task of 
ideology as being the presentation of “the position of the subject as fixed and unchangeable, an element in 
a given system of differences which is human nature and the world of human experiences, and...possible 
action as an endless repetition of “normal” familiar action.” Critical Practise (London: Routledge, 1980), 
p. 90. See also, Graham Dawson’s description of how “the historical formation and “genealogy” of the 
Orientalist imaginative repertoire can be mapped across novels, poetry and the literature of travel; extends 
into sciences such as linguistics, phrenology, ethnology, anthropology and geography; recurs not only in 
written texts but in forms of painting and architecture; informs modes of colonial administration, and 
economic and military organization. This archive of narratives, images and other representations 
structures the framework o f possibilities within which Westerners in “the Orient” can locate themselves 
and their experiences, such that any encounter with actual “Orientals” is likely simply to reproduce 
historically predetermined expectations” (Soldier Heroes, p. 49, my emphasis).
Suleri, The Rhetoric o f English India, p. 116. See also, Suleri’s reference to “the imperatives that 
subcontinental colonial encounter generated between the cultural distinctiveness of race and gender” (p. 
134, my emphasis).
Edward W. Said, Beginnings: Intention and M ethod  (New York: Granta Publications, 1975), pp. 324 -  
325.
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radically over-determined and theoretically engineered representation of the world as “picture” 
(Bild) and “structured image” (GeBild) enables us to understand the world as it is, as the world, 
or the people in that world as they are, as people.
Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic in Being and Time shows that the basic state of 
Dasein is “Being-in-the-world”. It is this basic state which is altogether ignored in the 
“Enframing” of the coloniser as ‘the colonial subject’, colonial reality as colonial discourse, and 
the translation of that coloniser and its world into an artificially prioritised realm of colonial 
meaning. So, despite the fact that in the following chapter I will conduct a more thorough 
examination of Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic of Dasein in order to establish the 
interpretative criteria for my critique of the fictional coloniser, at this stage it is important that 
we anticipate that examination and critique so as to grasp the essential nature of the un- 
worldedness of ‘the colonising subject’ in colonial discourse analysis.
At the beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger argues that an extended interpretation of 
“Being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-sein) is imperative if we are to “set up our analytic of Dasein 
correctly”®^:
The theme of our analytic is to be Being-in-the-world, and accordingly the very world 
itself; and these are to be considered within the horizon of average everydayness 
[Durchschnittlichkeit] ~ the kind of Being which is closest to Dasein. We must make a 
study of everyday Being-in-the-world; with the phenomenal support which this gives us, 
something like the world must come into view.®®
This interpretation talces up almost the entire First Division of the book (‘Preparatory 
Fundamental Analysis of Dasein’), and, more specifically, involves Heidegger’s 
phenomenological “demonstration” (Ausweisung ) of the fact that the “world” is “something 
constitutive for Dasein”®'' and that Dasein is “that entity which in every case has Being-in-the- 
world as the way in which it is”."°
Being in Time, 1.2, p. 78.
®® ibid., 1.3, p. 94.
ibid., I .l, p. 77. “World is the manifestness of beings as such as a w hole...W e ourselves are 
comprehensively included in this “as a whole”, not in the sense of some component belonging to it that 
also happens to be there, but in different ways in each case and in possibilities belonging to the essence of 
Dasein itself, be it in the form of immersing ourselves in beings, or be it in the form of directly facing 
them, going along with them, being rebuffed by them, being left empty, being held in limbo, being 
fulfilled or being sustained by them...ways that are independent of subjective reflection or psychological 
experience.” Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f  Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. by 
William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 
11:6:75, p. 353. 
ibid., 1.2, p. 79.
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In History o f the Concept o f Time, presented as a lecture course two years before the publication 
of Being and Time, Heidegger offers the following useful summary:
The determination of Dasein as Being-in-the-world is a unified and original one. Three 
elements can be brought out in this basic constitutive state and traced more closely back 
to its phenomenal composition: 1) Being-in-the-world in the particular sense of world, 
“world” as the how of the being -  ontologically, the worldhood o f the world; 2) the entity 
as it is determined from the “who” of this Being-in-the-world and from the how of this 
being, how the entity itself is in its being; 3) in-being as such^^
In Being and Time, Heidegger conducts a detailed explication of the “world itself’ (as “the 
worldhood of the world”) D a s e i n ’s spatiality;"® and its “Being-with-others” (as “Being-one’s- 
self ’ and “Being-with” the “They”);""' before concluding the First Division with the definition of 
all of these various modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world”, and thus the definition of the 
Being of Dasein in general, as “care”(5orge)"®:
The ontological signification of the expression “care” has been expressed in the 
“definition”: “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as “Being-alongside entities 
which we encounter (within-the-world)”."®
This “definition” of “care” stands as the all-important bridge between the First and Second 
Divisions of Being and Time and leads us on to the second stage of Heidegger’s thesis in which 
he conducts a phenomenological explication of the ontological meaning of Dasein’s Being 
(“care”) as Temporality."^ In addition, in his later ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger explains 
that “care” is also that which expresses and constitutes Dasein’s “humanity”:
H eidegger,/fwto/y o f the Concept o f Time, 1:3:19, p. 157.
See, Being and Time, 1.3.14-18, 20.
See, Being and Time, 1.3, pp. 101-103, 134-148.
See, Being and Time, 1.4, pp. 153-168.
See, Being and Time, 1.5.39, 41-43.
Being and Time, II. 1, p. 293. See also, H istory o f the Concept o f Time, 1:4, and in particular, pp. 293- 
304. David Farrell ICrell summarises the meaning of “care” as “a name for the structural whole of 
existence in all its modes and for the broadest and most basic possibilities o f discovery and disclosure of 
self and world. Most poignantly experienced in the phenomenon of anxiety...“care” describes the sundry 
ways I get involved in the issue of my birth, life and death, whether by my projects, inclinations, insights, 
or illusions. “Care” is the all-inclusive name for my concern for other people, preoccupations with things, 
and awareness of my proper Being. It expresses the movement of my life out of a past, into a future, 
through the present”. ‘Editors N ote’, ‘Letter on Humanism’, Basic Writings, p. 223. Krell’s definition is, I 
believe, eminently preferable to Hubert Dreyfus’s unsatisfactorily brief, if not altogether misguided, 
description of “caring” as Dasein “making itself an issue”. Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A 
Commentary on H eidegger’s  Being and Time, Division I, 3‘® Edition (Cambridge [Mass.] and London: 
The MIT Press, 1992), p. 238,
It is important to note at this early stage, Heidegger’s differentiation between: (1) “time” (Zeit) as 
common “world-time” (namely clocks, calendars and the like), (2) “temporality” (Zeitlichkeit) as the 
“ontological condition of the possibility of the understanding of Dasein’s being and, (3) “Temporality” 
(Temporalitat) as indicating that “temporality” which “in existential analytic, represents the horizon from 
which we understand being.” The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, Revised Edition, trans. by Albert 
Hofstadter (Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988), 11:1, pp. 227-229.
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Where else does “care” tend but in the direction of bringing man back to his essence? 
What else does that in turn betoken but that man {homo) becomes human {humanus)f^
Nor is this a conventional Western humanism; indeed, it is precisely that conventional 
humanism which he rejects as being “stifled in metaphysical subjectivism and submerged in 
oblivion of Being”/"  In contrast, Heidegger’s “humanism”, “is a humanism that thinks the 
humanity of man from nearness to Being”.'""
We will return to these arguments in more detail in the following chapter, but what should 
already be clear, even from this briefest of summaries, is that a fundamental recognition of 
Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” as “care” is imperative if we are to grasp what and how the 
coloniser, as Dasein, is.
It follows, therefore, that any interpretation of Dasein which disregards its ontological 
constitution as ‘a being in the world’ -  or attempts to explain what or how it is in terms of 
abstract theoretical models in which it is artificially detached from its rootedness in the world -  
is necessarily flawed. Indeed, it is precisely in these terms that Michel Foucault’s proposition 
that
The world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence 
which disposes the world in our favour...'"'
can be seen as the antithesis of Heideggarian phenomenology. '
An important example of this structuralist disregard of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” in 
colonial discourse analysis is to be found in the work of Homi Bhabha. In fact, as Robert Young 
has noted, in his influential critique of Bhabha’s work in White Mythologies, one of the most 
serious problems which can be seen to exist in Bhabha’s models of colonial subjectivity is 
whether or not resistance and compliance
Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi, in Basic Writings, pp. 223-224.
"" ibid., p. 248.
ibid., p. 245.
Michel Foucault, ‘The order of discourse’ in Robert Young (ed.). Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist 
Reader (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 67.
This is despite the fact that Foucault himself maintained towards the end of his life that “Heidegger has 
always been the essential philosopher...My entire philosophical development was determined by my 
reading Heidegger”. From ‘Final Interview’, Raritan, Summer 1985, 8. ‘Le Retour de la Morale’, 
interview conducted by Gilles Barbadette, Les Nouvelles, 28 June 1984, quoted by Dreyfus in Being-in- 
the-world, p. 8. On the subject of the centrality of the world in phenomenology, see Merleau-Ponty’s 
insistence in the Preface to Phenomenology o f  Perception, that “the only pre-existent Logos is the world.” 
Phenomenology o f Perception, 10th Edition, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1999), p. xx.
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...can be discussed in terms of the positing of a general colonial subject (singular, a 
somewhat neutralized male, out o f time and space) within the demands of an overall 
schema of the conditions of colonial discourse.
Then again, following our clarification of “Being-in-the-world”, it is clear that it is not just the 
resistance and compliance of ‘the colonial subject’ that is at issue here; the far more urgent 
question for Bhabha, and colonial discourse analysis as a whole, is whether or not it is valid to 
posit “a general colonial subject” which is “out of time and space” to begin with.
(c) De-humanising
My on-going objective in this chapter is to question the nature of ‘the colonising subject’ that 
has been posited in colonial discourse analysis and to ask whether or not it represents, discloses 
or describes the coloniser as it is. Thus far, I have focused upon the problems which attend the 
homogenised and un-worlded character of this ‘colonising subject’; and while, to a great extent, 
these problems, in themselves, more than adequately demonstrate the dehumanisation of the 
‘subject’, they do so only in passing.
In order for us to grasp the more specific nature and significance of this dehumanisation, I 
would suggest that we turn our attention to the psychoanalytical profiling of the colonising 
psyche in colonial discourse analysis. For it is here, perhaps more than anywhere else, that ‘the 
colonising subject’ is represented and reconstructed as “the structured image”. In the 
postcolonial psychoanalytical models and critiques of colonial subjectivity, I will argue, the 
coloniser is not only homogenised and un-worlded; nor is it only posited as being transparent 
and “knowable”; it is also secured in its homogenised psychological transparency within a 
sophisticated and fundamentally un-worlding model of systemised and predetermined 
meanings. But more importantly, because these postcolonial models are themselves constructed 
upon orthodox psychoanalytical preconceptions about what human consciousness is, how it 
functions and the ways in which it can be ‘mapped’, it is important that we properly familiarise 
ourselves with the problematical nature of these preconceptions from the outset. This 
familiarisation is rendered all the more necessary when we recognise the importance of both the 
role that the critique of psychologism plays in the development of Heidegger’s thinking, and his 
later condemnation of Freudian psychoanalysis for “rendering the relationship to the present 
more difficult with contrived theories”.'""'
Young, White Mythologies, p. 152 (my emphasis).
Rudiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. by Ewald Osers (Cambridge 
[Mass.] and London: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 405. Safranski places this observation in the
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Before turning to Heidegger, it is necessary for us to be aware of the serious criticisms that have 
been levelled against ‘ ethnopsychological ’ and psychoanalytical approaches from within 
postcolonial studies itself. The most serious of these is the accusation that psychoanalysis owes 
too significant a debt to what are now seen to be the racist, masculinist and imperialist 
conventions of traditional Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Postcolonial commentators 
like Gayatri Spivak'"® and Anne McClintock'"® have, more specifically, drawn attention to what 
they see as the profoundly problematical nature of the division which exists between “European 
male adulthood, civilisation and rationality on the one hand” and “non-Europeans, children, 
primitivism and madness on the other...in Freudian and subsequent accounts of the human 
psyche”.'"®" In so doing, these commentators have highlighted the deeply problematic, if not 
‘neo-colonial’, nature of any uncritical postcolonial adoption of such accounts. And it is 
specifically in this regard that Ania Loomba asks:
Is it at all possible...to use psychoanalysis to think productively about colonial relations? 
If psychoanalytic theory and practice have been moulded by the histories of colonialism 
and imperialism, is it possible to appropriate their paradigms or are they too bound up 
with the colonialist ways of ordering culture and biology? Can we use the master’s tools 
to dismantle the master’s house?'"®
N evertheless, these accounts have been  adopted and continue to have currency w ithin  
contem porary p ostco lon ia l theory and criticism . In addition to the psychoanalytical studies o f  
w riters like Bhabha, the best indication  as to the continuing currency o f  psychoanalysis in 
colon ia l d iscourse analysis is the w idespread ex isten ce o f  w hat can only be called  a p seu do­
context o f the series of seminars which took place, between 1959 and 1969, at Zollikon, the home of 
Heidegger’s friend, Medard Boss. It is, however, important to note in this regard that despite Heidegger’s 
dismissal of Freudian psychoanalysis, phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not altogether 
irreconcilable. See, in particular, the work of the Swiss phenomenological psychologist Ludwig 
Binswanger (1881-1966) who was profoundly influenced by Heidegger and Husserl and established the 
school of Daseinanalyse. See, for example, Binswanger, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen 
Daseins (The Basic Forms and Cognition of Human Existence) (Zurich, 1942). For further information on 
phenomenological psychology, see Herbert Spiegelberg’s Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972); Raymond J. McCall’s Phenomenological Psychology: 
An Introduction: With a Glossary o f  Some K ey Heideggerian Terms (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1983); Keith Hoeller (ed.), H eidegger and Psychology (Special Issue of the Review o f Existential 
Psychology and Psychiatry. Seattle,1992); and, Hans Cohn, Heidegger and the Roots o f Existential 
Psychotherapy (London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002).
'"® See, for example, Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in Colonial D iscourse and Post-Colonial 
Theory, p. 92.
See, for example, McClintock, ‘The Return of Female Fetishism and the Fiction of the Phallus’, New  
Formations, 19, Spring 1993, pp. 1-22, p. 15.
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, pp. 137-138. In a similar fashion, Deleuze and Guattari have 
argued against the universality of the Oedipus complex and in doing so challenge the fundamental 
validity of one of the guiding principles in Freudian psychoanalysis. See, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 




psychoanalytical rhetoric. In other words, the idiom and thematic structures of a loosely defined 
and casually applied psychoanalytical thinking: a thinking which can be seen to inform, for 
example, Edward Said’s hypostatized conception of the “ambition” of Orientalism/"" his 
psycho-sociological interpretation of the master/slave dialectic within colonialism; and his 
construction of something called the “sovereign Western consciousness”."" A thinking which is 
evident too in Abdul JanMohamed’s introduction of the notion of guilt into the Manichean 
Allegory as a consequence of what he sees as the “pleasure” of colonial “authority”." ' A 
thinking which is exhibited in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman’s confident assertion that 
actual resistance to colonial rule “engendered defensiveness and fear within the colonial 
subject” and that
...as Rider Haggard’s texts suggest - the colonised other came to serve as a template for 
self-construction, being a model of the martial power to which the colonist aspired. That 
the colonial subject could be derivative from, as well as dominant over, the colonised, 
implies a set of dynamics which require further attention."^
In each of these, and any number of other examples, the language of psychoanalytical thinking, 
however vague, situates and configures the object under discussion -  be it an homogenous 
grouping of scholars or literary texts, a nation, or an individual -  within colonially restricted 
psychoanalytical structures of meaning and significance. When understood as the “structured 
image”, these things become the psychoanalytical “standing-reserve”; that is, they are 
represented âs functioning in ways which are psychoanalytically orderable and “knowable”. As 
such, they are posited in order to facilitate the larger project -  the explanation of colonialism, 
colonial discourse and “the rules” of their functioning.
In the case of the individual, this psychoanalytical situation and configuration necessarily 
involves a whole series of presuppositions with regard to what and how that individual, as an 
individual consciousness, fundamentally is. As Heidegger (following Husserl) argues, in The 
Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, these presuppositions about the constitution of the human 
consciousness are, from the outset, seriously compromised by the fact that
Orientalism, p. 109.
"" ibid., p. 8.
For example, “Troubled by the nagging contradiction between the theoretical justification of 
exploitation and the barbarity of its actual practice, it also attempts to mask the contradiction by 
obsessively portraying the supposed inferiority and barbarity of the racial Other, thereby insisting on the 
profound moral difference between self and Other”. JanMohamed, ‘The Economy of Manichean 
Allegory’, p. 103.
Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds.), ‘Editor’s Introduction’, Colonial Discourse and 
Postcolonial Theory, p. 17.
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Each psychology merely dreams about man and human existence, because it must 
necessarily make presuppositions about the constitution of the being of the human Dasein 
and of its way of being, which we call existence. These ontological presuppositions 
remain closed off for all eternity to psychology as an ontical science.^’^
As an “ontical science”, Heidegger sees psychology as being concerned with ‘beings’ rather 
than ‘existence’, while at the same time, entirely dependent upon “ontological presuppositions” 
about the nature of its ‘subject’, the “human Dasein”. And that which is foremost among 
psychology’s “presuppositions about the constitution of the being of the human Dasein” is its 
formulation of human consciousness itself; its traditional cognition-theory of subject/object 
dualism. As Safranski explains, Husserl had already proven to Heidegger that
There is no empty consciousness confronting objects with which it would fill its 
emptiness... Consciousness has no “within”; it is the “outside” of itself... [Indeed, it] is 
always “directed toward something.” This basic structure of consciousness he [Husserl] 
calls “intention.
And, in the History o f the Concept o f Time, Heidegger himself maintains that “all the relations 
of life are intrinsically defined” by “intentionahty,” that all acts (“perception, judgement, love 
hate”) “have the character of intentionality”.^ ^^  Taking perception as “the exemplary case,” 
Heidegger argues that “intentionahty” is “the structure of a comportment as comporting to, 
directing itself toward”, t h e  basic constitution of which is “a reciprocal belonging-together o f  
intentio and intentum”}^^ The “intentio” is the act of intention, and the “intentum” is the 
content of intention. That which is experienced phenomenally in “intentionahty” always already 
exhibits the character of a combined and simultaneous disclosure (of itself) and an apprehension 
(on the part of Dasein); and not as separate stages or in any sequential sense, but as the 
simultaneous thematic components of a single process. The relation between the “intentio” and 
the “intentum” should thus not be understood as that which exists between a psychical subject 
and a physical object; for, as Heidegger points out, even when a physical object which is 
thought to be there is revealed as an hallucination, or an optical illusion, the intentional 
character (the “directing toward”) of that perception remains the same."^ More importantly, the
Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, 1:1:9 (a), p. 54.
Safranski, Martin Heidegger, p. 77. For a more detailed analysis o f Husserl’s and Heidegger’s 
understanding of “intentionahty”, see Burt C. Hopkins, Intentionality in Husserl and 
Heidegger (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993).
Heidegger, H istoiy o f the Concept o f Time, p. 36.
’'Sbid., p. 37.
ibid., p. 46. Heidegger’s phenomenological rejection of the subject/object dualism of conventional 
metaphysics is perhaps most famously developed by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology o f Perception.
“The intentional relation does not arise first through the actual extantness of objects but lies in the 
perceiving itself, whether illusionless or illusory. Perceiving must be the perception-of something in order 
for me to be able to be deceived about something” (The Basic Problems o f  Phenomenology, 1:1:9 (b), p. 
60).
42
very notion of a thinking ‘subject’, like Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, “to whose so-called sphere 
intentional experiences are then supposed to belong”,"^ must itself be avoided if we are to 
achieve a proper understanding of “intentionality”. This is because, for Heidegger:
The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and 
is not yet outside it but encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the 
basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are.^^°
And, of course, this subjective sphere that Heidegger dismisses is, quite explicitly, the 
subjective sphere of psychology: “the usual separation between a subject with its immanent 
sphere and an object with its transcendent...the distinction between an inner and an outer is”, 
for Heidegger, “constructive and continually gives occasion for further constructions”, and as a 
result, he insists that he “will no longer speak of a subject, of a subjective sphere, but shall 
understand the being to whom intentional comportments belong as Dasein” In short, then:
The statement that the comportments of the Dasein are intentional means that the mode of 
being of our own self, the Dasein, is essentially such that this being, so far as it is, is 
always already dwelling with the extant.
And this closing emphasis upon “dwelling” brings us back to Heidegger’s phenomenological 
concern with the fundamental centrality of Dasein’s always already “Being-in-the-world”, 
discussed above. More importantly, for Heidegger what this means is that
With an adequate interpretation of intentionality, the traditional concept of the subject and 
of subjectivity becomes questionable. Not only does what psychology means by the 
subject become questionable but also what psychology itself as a positive science must 
presuppose implicitly about the idea and constitution of the subject and what philosophy 
itself has hitherto defined ontologically in an utterly deficient way and left in the dark.^^^
Heidegger’s phenomenological explication of Dasein’s “intentional comportments” does away 
with the subject/object dualism upon which psychology is f o u n d e d . B u t  in addition, and as we
Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, 1:1:9 (b), p. 64. Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s “there is no 
inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know him self’ {Phenomenology o f  
Perception, p. xi). 
ibid., p. 64.
ibid., p. 64. In the light of Heidegger’s rejection of “the distinction between an inner and an outer” 
(and in addition to his life-long concern with thinking the question of the meaning of Being), it becomes 
apparent that Edward Said’s succinct description of his “work” as being “an exploration of one German’s 
inner reality” is as misguided as it is understated. Edward Said, ‘Labyrinth of Incarnations: The Essays of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’, in Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays (London: 
Granta Books, 2001), p. 11. 
ibid., p. 64. 
ibid., p. 65.
For an extended analysis of the subject, see, Niels Ole Bernsen, H eidegger’s Theory o f Intentionality 
(Odense: Odense University Press, 1986).
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shall see in more detail in the following chapter, for Heidegger, the “intentional comportments” 
of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” (as Dasein’s basic state of Being), are fundamentally 
determined by Time, and it is the exclusion of Time from psychologism’s models of subjectivity 
and human consciousness which Heidegger sees as its most serious flaw.
All attempts to reckon existing reality morphologically, psychologically, in terms of 
decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological 
behaviour. That behaviour operates through the device of the enumerating o f symptoms 
whose standing-reserve can be increased to infinity and always varied anew.^^^
In the context of my own assessment of postcolonial psychoanalysis as an “Enframing” and 
dehumanising representation of the coloniser, Heidegger’s critique of psychology can thus be 
seen to provide us with two crucially important points of orientation. The first concerns 
subjectivity itself and the dissolution of psychology’s traditional subject/object dualism in terms 
of the phenomenological thesis of “intentionality”. The second, concerns Time and, in 
particular, the “extra-temporal” (or static) meanings that are applied in psychological models of 
human subjectivity. In order for us to bring the full significance of these arguments, and the 
formations which they describe, into sharper relief, we will now turn to perhaps the most 
conspicuous and influential postcolonial psychoanalytical model of the construction and 
constitution of colonial subjectivities: that is, Homi Bhabha’s account of the psychic economy 
of colonialism.
In his ‘Foreword’ to Franz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, Bhabha depicts the colonised and 
the coloniser face-to-face within the tense freeze frame of the colonial encounter and examines 
the role of ‘the Western gaze’, and the returning of that gaze from ‘the Other’, in the 
construction of ‘colonial selfhood’. H e  explains:
[T]he post-Enlightenment man [is] tethered to, not confronted by, his dark reflection, the 
shadow of colonised man, that splits his presence, distorts his outline, breaches his 
boundaries, repeats his action at a distance, disturbs and divides the very time of his 
being. This ambivalent identification of the racist world... turns on the idea of Man as his 
alienated image, not Self and Other but the “Otherness” of the self inscribed in the 
perverse palimpsest of colonial identity.
Heidegger, ‘The Turning’ in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p. 48. 
Heidegger continues, “Such analyses of the “situation” do not notice that they are working only according 
to the meaning and manner of technological dissecting, and that they thus furnish to the technological 
consciousness the historiographical-technological presentation of happening commensurate with that 
consciousness” (ibid.).
On the ‘Western gaze’ as surveillance and control, see, for example, Brantlinger’s identification of the 
recording Sahib in Meadows Taylor’s Confessions o f a Thug, as the archetypal colonial observer {Rule o f  
Darkness, p. 88).
Bhabha, ‘Foreword’ to Black Skin, White Masks, p. xiv.
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Bhabha offers us this stand-off as the fundamentally definitive episode in the construction of 
colonial identity. But to what extent is there a definitive episode in colonialism, and what are 
the consequences of positing a totalizing theory of psychic determination which is founded upon 
such an episode? Indeed, what are the consequences of, and what is the validity of, positing a 
totalistic theory of psychic determination?
Certainly, in Bhabha’s case, before we can begin to examine the substance of his thesis in detail, 
we are again confronted by the problems which adhere to his, now familiar, employment of 
abstract theoretical constructs to symbolise the two apparently homogenisable poles of colonial 
society (“post-Enlightenment man” and “colonised man”). Bhabha’s employment of these terms 
(as the ‘gathering’ of the “standing-reserve”), can be seen to constitute the theoretical 
substitution of that which he claims to be examining, the neatly homogenised and segregated 
identities of cultural theory for the factual human colonisers and colonised and the concrete 
world; in short, the theoretical substitution of what “applies” for what “is”. What “applies” for 
Bhabha is a “consciousness” that is entirely determined by its colonial status: in other words, 
and to paraphrase Said, for Bhabha, the coloniser is first a coloniser, second a human being, and 
last again a coloniser.
But more importantly, and as a result, Bart Moore-Gilbert has rightly pointed out that:
There is no recognition...that the question of psychic identification in the native subject 
might be complicated by questions of gender, region, ethnic origin, religion, caste or 
class. Instead, it implies that the structures of psychic identification and affect which he 
theorizes apply equally in terms of their operations and results to the Western-educated 
rajah and the “illiterate” female subaltern.^^^
Indeed, this observation is echoed by Ania Loomba in her recognition of the more general fact 
that
We cannot forge a template of a split colonised subject and then apply it to all colonised 
subjects...the processes of individual subject-formation cannot endlessly be expanded to 
account for social collectivities.
Orientalism, p. 102.
Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonialism: Contexts, Practices, Politics, p. 150. Moore-Gilbert’s criticism here 
can, in many ways, be seen to correspond to that made by Graham Dawson in his observation that Said’s 
“Britishness” (like his notion of a “sovereign Western consciousness”), constitutes a fundamental failure 
to recognise the fact that “The subjectivities o f “Britishness” were never constituted exclusively through 
the encounter with the Oriental as its other, but in relationship to a multiplicity of “external” others, both 
colonial and European, besides being “internally” fractured by social relations of class, gender, ethnicity 
and generation within Britain itse lf’ (Soldier Heroes, p. 50).
Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, p. 150. It is interesting to note here that Moore-Gilbert and 
Loomba both question the validity of these models exclusively from the perspective of the problems 
involved in their depiction of the native or the colonised.
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What Loomba is describing here is of course the ontologisation of colonial status/^’ And while 
her concerns are undoubtedly well-founded, they are, nonetheless, only raised in the context of 
the theoretical assessment of the “colonised subject”. The psychoanalytical utilisation of certain 
terms to denote “social collectivities” which Loomba rightly criticises has, however, continued 
unabated in colonial discourse analysis in the form of an explanation of the ‘social collectivity’ 
that is signified by ‘the colonising subject’; and this, despite the now common emphasis upon 
the rejection of such practises in relation to the theoretical assessment of ‘the colonised subject’.
In his own particular model of colonial subjectivity, which appeared long before concerns such 
as Loomba’s were raised, Bhabha sets out to explain how the coloniser and the colonised as 
‘discursive subjects’ come to understand who and what they are, in terms of Lacan’s theory of 
the “mirror stage”, discussed above. This primarily involves the detailed explication of the 
content, character and psychic significance of the meaningful glances which Bhabha 
understands to be at the heart of ‘the colonial encounter’:
[T]o exist is to be called into being in relation to an Otherness, its look or locus... This 
process is visible in that exchange of looks between native and settler that structures their 
psychic relation in the paranoid fantasy of boundless possession and its familiar language 
of reversal... It is always in relation to the place of the Other that colonial desire is 
articulated.^^^
With this “exchange of looks”, the “native” and the “settler” come to know themselves as 
“native” and “settler”. B u t  what is it in these looks which determines this knowledge? How 
does “the white man’s artifice” come to be “inscribed on the black man’s body”?^ '^^  And what is 
in a gaze that makes it ‘Western’? Bhabha’s failure to provide us with a satisfactory explanation 
as to the phenomenological mechanics of the perceptual processes which he describes comes as 
no surprise when we note that Heidegger warns against just this type of arbitrariness when 
discussing “The inadequacy of psychology as a positive science for the ontological elucidation 
of perception”.
Following Heidegger’s definition of “the ontological difference”, the only way in which an 
explanation of “social collectivities” can legitimately take place is when the arbitrary and various ontical 
characterisations of humankind’s existence (for example, colonial status, race, nation and creed) are 
phenomenologically bracketed off and the ontological character of Dasein as “Being-in-the-world” is 
recognised as the only authentic universal criteria.
Bhabha, ‘Foreword’ to Black Skin, White Masks, p. xv.
Cf. Spivak’s assertion in ‘The Rani of Sirmur’ that the colonisers “necessary yet contradictory 
assumption of an uninscribed earth...generates the force to make the native see himself as other” ( ‘The 
Rani o f Sirmur’, in Europe and Its Others, p. 133).
ibid., p. xvi.
See, Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology,.1:1:9 (a), pp. 49-55.
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Psychology takes its stand on the basis of facts...it is a positive science of a specific 
being.. .[And thus, when psychologists] make use of presuppositions about what is, about 
its ontological constitution, [they] leave these presuppositions unmoved, akinetous, do 
not run through them in philosophical knowledge, in dialectic. But for this they are 
fundamentally unqualified, since they are not capable of exhibiting what a being is in its 
own self. They are unable to give an account of what a being is as a being. The concept of 
being and of the constitution of the being of beings is a mystery to them.‘^ '’
And, from what we have seen above, I would argue that the concept of Being and the 
constitution of the Being of beings is a “mystery” to Bhabha as well.
Bhabha’s failure to provide us with a satisfactory explanation as to the essential nature of the 
perceptual processes which he describes can, in addition, be understood in terms of an important 
aspect of “Enframing” which we have not yet discussed; namely, “ongoing activity” (betrieb). 
In ‘The Age of the World Picture’, Heidegger describes this “industrious activity” as follows:
Ongoing activity becomes mere busyness whenever, in the pursuing of its methodology, 
it no longer keeps itself open on the basis of an ever-new accomplishing of its projection- 
plan, but only leaves that plan behind itself as a given; never again confirms and verifies 
its own self-accumulating results and the calculation of them, but simply chases after 
such results and calculations.
This “chasing” after “results and calculations” is, I would argue, a fundamental characteristic of 
Bhabha’s, and colonial discourse analysis’, self-verifying drive towards the establishment of 
discursive functionality. That we are left in the dark about the what and how of these “looks”, 
does not, however, disguise the fact that Bhabha has onticalised perception. As we noted in the 
previous section with regard to Suleri and “imperial time”, this onticalisation of the ontological, 
as a ‘gathering’ into system, posits the thought, speech or action as archetypal and therefore 
predetermined in the ‘subject’s’ being a colonising or a colonised subject. In the drive towards 
the establishment of a psychoanalytical discursive functionality, Bhabha’s “Enframing” (as a 
“challenging revealing”) of the “native” and the “settler” thus involves the ‘regulation and 
securement’ of their very “looks”.
More importantly, what we have here, is a perceiving ‘subject’ and a perceived ‘object’ -  as a 
“Self” and as an “Other” -  and as such, Bhabha’s ‘colonial subjects’ are configured in terms of 
the dogmatic epistemological preconception of the human ‘subject’ as an “empty consciousness 
confronting objects with which it would fill its emptiness”. B u t  then again, we must
Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, 1:1:9 (a), pp. 51-52. 
Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, p. 138 (my emphasis).
That this is the case is emphatically underlined in Bhabha’s agreement with, and quotation of Fanon’s 
assertion that, “The colonial subject is always “overdetermined from without”” ( ‘Foreword’ to Black 
Skin, White Masks, p. xiii). 47
remember that these are not the conventional taxonomies of traditional psychology and 
philosophy; they are, as we have already seen, the colonial “Self’ and colonial “Other” wherein, 
as Loomba says, “cultural difference is pathologised and psychic growth [is] understood in 
terms of cultural/racial difference” So despite Bhabha’s claim, in the extract quoted earlier, 
regarding
...the idea of Man as his alienated image, not “Self’ and “Other” but the “Otherness” of
the self... 140
here, the “S elf’ and the “Other” is, quite plainly, the “native” and the “settler” and they are 
clearly described as functioning as such. This “Otherness” is therefore not, as Bhabha would 
have us believe (i.e. “not Self and Other”), it is merely an attempt to provide an ambivalent 
gloss to his own retention of the “Self’ and the “Other” as the “native” and the “settler”. After 
all, the concept of “Otherness” still presupposes the existence of an “Other”, and we are left in 
no doubt as to whom that “Other” is. This is proven to be the case two pages later, when he 
asserts that
In the postcolonial text the problem of identity returns as a persistent questioning of the 
frame, the space of representation, where the image - missing person, invisible eye, 
Oriental stereotype - is confronted with its difference, its Other.
The various theoretical and epistemological contortions by which Bhabha attempts to defend 
what he believes is the essentially ambiguous nature of his colonial subjectivities, thus, at base, 
fail to hide the fact that they remain fundamentally rooted in a conventional “Self’/’’Other”, 
subject/object dualism. And it is this representation of the ‘colonial subject’ in terms of the 
conventional “S elf’/”Other” which results in the extra-temporality of that ‘colonial subject’. If 
we recall Lovitf s description of Heidegger’s understanding of Being as
...the ongoing manner in which everything that is, presences; i.e....the manner in which, 
in the lastingness o f time, everything encounters man and comes to appearance through 
the openness that man provides...
and combine this with Heidegger’s own description of the “intentional comportments” of 
Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” as the “the mode of being of our own se lf’, then it becomes clear
Loomba, ColonialismlPostcolonialism, p. 138.
Bhabha, ‘Foreword’ to Black Skin, White Masks, pp. xiv-xv.
Bhabha, ‘Interrogating Identity: Frantz Fanon and the postcolonial prerogative’, in Location o f  
Culture, p. 46
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that Dasein’s “intentional comportments” are themselves “the manner in which, in the 
lastingness o f time, everything encounters man and comes to presence”/"^  ^For Heidegger:
Temporality makes possible the Dasein’s comportment as a comportment toward beings,
whether toward itself, toward others, or toward the handy or the extant/'^^
Bhabha’s depiction of the colonial encounter between “post-Enlightenment man” and 
“colonised man” in terms of an “Enframing” subject/object dualism and his failure to 
understand that encounter in terms of the “intentionality” of Dasein’s comportments in the 
world, in effect, de-Temporalizes it; or as Heidegger would say, as a result of this “Enframing”, 
instead of “real thought processes occurring in time”, what we are left with is their “ideal extra­
temporal identical meaning”. Indeed, Bhabha’s model of colonial subjectivity can only ever be 
configured in terms of “ideal extra-temporal meaning”; for, in the conceptual landscape of 
Bhabha’s colonial encounter, there are only two theoretically reified colonial entities whose sole 
activity is the seamless exchange of meaningful glances in a perpetual present, with no clearly 
identifiable past and no clearly identifiable future.
For Heidegger, “the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied 
to him to enter into a more original revealing”. In this chapter I have argued that colonial 
discourse analysis, when understood as an “Enframing”, can be seen to deny the possibility of 
“a more original revealing” of the historical coloniser. As an integral characteristic of its drive 
towards the establishment of discursive functionality, and the attempt to “manifest the rules of 
its functioning”, colonial discourse analysis can be seen to posit a fundamentally homogenised, 
un-worlded and dehumanised representation of the coloniser as ‘the colonising subject’. And, it 
is specifically against this representation and all the diverse conclusions which are predicated 
upon it, that I will now proceed towards an alternative.
The fundamental criterion of this alternative representation, and the manner of my approach 
towards it, is of course the same criteria that has formed the basis of my critique of colonial 
discourse analysis: Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic of Dasein. For if colonial 
discourse analysis’ understanding of the coloniser is founded in a conception of that coloniser 
which is artificially homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised, then it follows that my own 
understanding must, in contrast, be founded in a conception of that coloniser as the 
fundamentally individualised, worlded and humanised entity that it itself is.
See Heidegger’s discussion of ‘Praesens as horizontal schema of the ecstasis of enpresenting’, in The 
Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, 11:1:21 (a), pp. 303-313.
Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, 11:1:22 (a), p. 318.
49
In his existential-ontological analytic of Dasein, Heidegger describes what and how Dasein is in 
the world and it is this description which will inform my examination of the fictional coloniser 
in colonial literature. For, as we shall see, the ontological modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the- 
world” that Heidegger describes, for example, “anxiety” {Unheimlichkeit), “boredom” 
(Langeweile) and “Being towards death” {Sein zum Tode), are not only reflected in the historical 
accounts of the colonial experience, by and about ‘real’ people, they are, more importantly, 
reflected in the literature of the colonial experience.
Before we can proceed to examine these reflections, we must first more fully clarify the 
ontological constitution and significance of these modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world”. It is 
to this clarification that we will now turn.
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CHAPTER II: Heidegger’s Existential-ontological analytic
The single most important problem in colonial discourse analysis’ “Enframing” {Ge-stelt} of the 
fictional and historical coloniser is its ontologisation of the ontical categories of colonial status, 
race and nationality. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the product of this false 
ontologisation, ‘the colonising subject’, is posited in the theoretical explication of colonial 
discourse and colonialism as a generalisable type that is fundamentally predetermined, at every 
level of its Being, by its ‘colonising’ (racial or national) status. Because this ontologisation of 
the ontical is frequently accompanied by an equally false onticalisation of the ontological -  in 
which ontological factors like time and space are posited as ‘colonial time’ and ‘colonial space’ 
-  the coloniser, its world, its perceptions, emotions, thoughts, speech and actions, is effectively, 
and comprehensively, locked up in the adamantine chains of a peculiarly colonial 
meaningfulness.
As I have argued in the previous chapter in relation to the work of Sara Suleri, the positing of a 
colonial ontology in colonial discourse analysis can be seen to result in a ‘colonising subject’ 
that is, as the “standing-reserve”, entirely (pre)determined and predictable in its ‘coloniality’. It 
is this artificial predictability which, more than anything else, (re)presents a fundamental 
closure of the coloniser’s ontological possibility for Being its self, as it is. In other words, the 
“Enframing” (homogenising, un-worlding and dehumanising) methodologies of colonial 
discourse analysis fundamentally distort what and how Dasein is ontologically as an individual 
human being in the world of its experiences. The drive towards the establishment of discursive 
functionality means that, colonial discourse analysis conceives of, or constructs, ‘a colonising 
subject’that must, first and foremost, be capable of junctioning in colonial discourse and 
colonialism, in such a way as to corroborate the general arguments that it itself makes about 
what colonialism and colonial discourse actually are, and how they work. What we have here, 
then, is an inverted methodological progression from  colonial discourse, and colonialism in 
general, to the human coloniser: wherein, in order to substantiate its arguments about the way 
colonial discourse (and colonialism) works, postcolonial theorists and colonial discourse 
analysts prioritise and ontologise colonial status and posit a custom-built ‘discursive subject’. 
This does not mean, however, that I will subsequently be attempting to reverse this 
methodological progression, and begin with the ‘human subject’: for as Heidegger explained in 
What is called Thinking?:
No way of thought, not even the way of metaphysical thought, begins with man’s 
essential nature and goes on from there to Being, nor in reverse from Being and then back
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to man. Rather, every way of thinking takes its way already within the total relation of
Being and man’s nature, or else it is not thinking at all,’
But then again, if, as I have argued, the ‘colonising subject’ of colonial discourse analysis must 
be understood as the artificially constructed theoretical product of a false ontology, why is this 
important? And why must colonial discourse analysis bother itself about ontology at all, given 
that what it is interested in is the examination of the historical and cultural, economic and social 
affects of European colonialism?
The fact of the matter is, colonial discourse analysis does ‘bother itself’ with ontology: it 
‘bothers’ itself with ontology by affecting to describe what and how ‘the colonial subject’ is. 
For example, in his examination of the characteristics of Orientalist discourse in Orientalism, 
Said maintains that
For all these functions it is frequently enough to use the simple copula is. Thus 
Mohammed is an impostor...No background need be given; the evidence necessary to 
convict Mohammed is contained in the “is”...^
It is ‘bothering itself’ with ontology in its deliberations upon the psychic mechanics of the
‘Western gaze’, for example, Balachandra Raj an in his discussion of E.M. Forster:
The multiple readings that constitute and undermine the project of a text that might be 
India are conveyed with extraordinary sensitivity, but the possibilities all fall within the 
gaze o f dominance^
And it is perhaps, most explicitly of all, ‘bothering itself’ about ontology in its critique of 
orientalism’s and colonialism’s ontologisation of racial/cultural difference: as when Said insists 
that, in the prose of Sir Walter Scott
...no matter how deep the specific exception, no matter how much a single Oriental can 
escape the fences placed around him, he is first an Oriental, second a human being, and 
last again an Oriental...'’
’ Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, I. VII, pp. 79-80. 
 ^Orientalism, p. 72.
Raj an, Under Western Eyes, p. 99 (my emphasis). Rajan’s book, as the title suggests, consistently draws 
attention to the inescapability of this gaze and his interpretation of English literature, from Milton to 
Macaulay, effectively posits that literature as its textual articulation.
Orientalism, p. 102. And this is indeed ironic given his earlier assertion with regard to how, “for a 
European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his 
actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second” 
(Orientalism, p. 11). In both cases. Said is discussing an ontological way of Being, “actuality”, but 
whereas the former is an example of the fiction that is Orientalism and appropriately condemned as such, 
the latter is stated as truth. See also, Heidegger’s analysis of “actuality” (“Wirklichkeit”) as the 
ontological constitution of the “actual” in The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, 1:3:13 (c), pp. 138-139.
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In all these cases colonial discourse analysis presupposes, or posits, a notion of Being. But in its 
drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality, colonialism comes to replace time, 
nature, God, reason or anything else, as the seat of that Being. So, while these ontological 
themes and structures are seldom referred to explicitly in postcolonial theory and colonial 
discourse analysis, they are, nonetheless, implicit in the quasi-scientific examinations with 
which it concerns itself. Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter with regard to psychology, 
for Heidegger every science of beings must necessarily make presuppositions about what and 
how these beings are. In the case of colonial discourse analysis, I am arguing that not only can 
its presuppositions be seen to be almost entirely configured in terms of its overall project, but 
that these presuppositions are, as a result, rendered questionable:
The more appropriately the Being of the entities to be explored is understood under the 
guidance of an understanding of Being, and the more the totality of entities has been 
Articulated in its basic attributes as a possible area of subject-matter for science, all the 
more secure wül be the perspective for one’s methodological inquiry.^
In short, and to paraphrase Sartre, if postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis is not to 
“degenerate into a non-human anthropology” then it must “reintegrate man into itself as its 
foundation”.^  And not just “man” in a merely tokenistic sense, but essentially, and in terms of 
the being that it itself is as “openness to Being”. As a result, I would argue that we must 
subsequently dispense with colonial discourse analysis’ artificially closed and falsely 
ontologised conception of the ‘colonising subject’ as the ‘subject-matter’ of our inquiry, and 
instead seek to understand this ‘subject-matter’, these ‘colonising subjects’, “under the guidance 
of an understanding of Being”.
1. Dasein and the Ontological Difference
In Being and Time Heidegger asks, and attempts to answer, what was for him the most 
fundamental question of philosophy; what is the meaning of “Being”(5'cm)? This is the central 
preoccupation of Heidegger’s work:
Everything we taUc about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we 
comport ourselves in any way, is being [“seiend”]; what we are is being, and so is how 
we are. Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in 
presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the ‘there is’.^
Being and Time, II.4, p. 413.
 ^ Jean-Paul Sartre, The Problem o f Method, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 1963), p. 179, 
Sartre makes this observation about Marxism.
 ^Being and Tune, Introduction I, p. 26.
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For Heidegger, the question of Being has priority over all other questions. And this is because, 
as he explains in his Introduction to Metaphysics, the question of Being (ontology)
...seeks a decision with respect to the ground that grounds the fact that what is, is in 
being as the being that it is.®
And the asker of the question, the inquirer after Being, is itself the entity which must be made 
transparent in the search for the answer:
This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the 
possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term “Dasein”.^
Dasein (“openness for Being”) is thus the subject of Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic 
of the meaning of Being and this is because Dasein has, what Heidegger calls, a “vague average 
understanding of Being”.”’ It is this (pre-ontological) “understanding” which marks out Dasein, 
more than any other, as the appropriate entity for the explication of Being. So, while
The task of ontology is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of entities stand out 
in full relief...”
because Dasein, as the subject of ontology, is of course a being, that is, it is ontical, “the roots 
of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately existentiell, that is ontical”.
Ontology has for its fundamental discipline the analytic of the Dasein. This implies at the 
same time that ontology cannot be established in a purely ontological manner. Its 
possibility is referred back to a being, that is to something ontical -  the Dasein.”
The distinction between Being (Sein) and beings (das Seiende) is what Heidegger calls the 
“ontological difference””  and it is this distinction which informs my description of colonial
® Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 3.
Being and Time, Introduction I, p. 27. The literal translation of “Dasein”, and the one adopted by 
Macquarrie and Robinson is “Being-there”, but as Heidegger himself explains in the later essay, ‘The Age 
of the World Picture’, “This openness-for-Being [Da-sein]” is to be “understood in the sense of the 
ecstatic and concealing of Being” ( ‘The Age of the World Picture’, Appendix 15, p. 154). And in 
addition, William Lovitt has pointed out that, “Heidegger has emphatically expressed his preference for 
“openness” and his disapprobation of “there” as a translation of da in D asein” (Translator’s Introduction, 
The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p. xxxvn).
”  Being and Time, Introduction I, p. 25.
” Ibid., Introduction II, p. 49 
”  ibid.. Introduction I, p. 34.
”  Heidegger, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, Introduction 2, p. 19.
”  See also, Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, 11:6:75, pp. 352-360; and, L. M. Vail, 
H eidegger and Ontological Difference (London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1972).
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discourse analysis’ ontologisation of the ontical. Moreover, if “the roots of the existential 
analytic” are ontical, then they must be sought in Dasein’s average “everydayness” 
(Alltaglichkeit)}^ In short, we must
.. .choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity [Dasein] 
can show itself in itself and from itself. And this means that it is to be shown as it is 
proximally and for the most part — in its average everydayness. In this everydayness there 
are certain structures which we shall exhibit -  not just any accidental structures, but 
essential ones, which in every kind of Being that factical Dasein may possess, persist as 
determinative for the character of its Being. Thus by having regard for the basic state of 
Dasein’s everydayness, we shall bring out the Being of this entity in a preparatory 
fashion. 16
Heidegger thus makes plain the necessity of observing Dasein as it is, in its everyday moods and 
relations in the world, and not in isolation from it as is the case with the reified or idealised 
‘subject’ of conventional metaphysics.”  This is a significant point in the context of our study, 
especially when we recall the homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised theoretical constructs 
which inhabit Bhabha’s psychoanalytical model of the ‘colonial encounter’. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, the basic state of Dasein is “Being-in-the-world” and it is specifically in terms 
of Dasein as “a being in the world” that Heidegger understands Dasein’s “everydayness” as the 
principal mode of this basic state. More importantly, the “way of access” that is chosen by 
Heidegger as the appropriate “kind of interpretation” for the analysis of Dasein’s 
“everydayness”, and hence, for “the science of the Being of entities -  ontology”,”  is 
“phenomenology” :
This expression does not characterise the what of the objects of philosophical research as 
subject-matter, but rather the how of that research. The more genuinely a methodological 
concept is worked out and the more comprehensively it determines the principles on 
which a science is to be conducted, all the more primordially is it rooted in the way we 
come to terms with the things themselves, and farther is it removed from what we call 
“technical devices, though there are many such devices even in the theoretical disciplines. 
Thus the term “phenomenology” expresses a maxim which can be formulated as “To the 
things themselves”[Sflc/ien selbst].^'^
” “This undifferentiated character of Dasein’s everyday ness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal 
characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being -  and back into it again — is all existing, such as it is. 
We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein “averageness” [Durchschnittlichkeit]” {Being 
and Time, I .l, p. 69).
”  Being and Time, Introduction II, pp. 37-38.
”  Among the many, not always useful comparisons, which Hubert Dreyfus draws between Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein, is his suggestion that the two “share the view that most philosophical problems can be 
(dis)solved by a description of everyday social practices” {Being-in-the-world, p. 7).
”  Being and Time, Introduction II, p. 61. See also, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, Introduction 
4, p. 17.
Being and Time, Introduction II, p. 50. See also, Introduction II, pp. 58-63.
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This call to return “to the things themselves” constitutes the only appropriate methodological 
articulation of Heidegger’s fundamental understanding of the coming to presence of beings in 
the world; in other words, “phenomenology” is how we attend to the how of Being. As such, we 
can see that phenomenology is diametrically opposed to those “Enframing” modes of 
“reckoning” and representation which we discussed in the previous chapter, and which 
Heidegger describes as being symptomatic of the “technological consciousness”.
This definition of the “methodological concept” in the existential-ontological analytic, does not, 
however, conclude Heidegger’s preliminary clarification of the question of the meaning of 
Being. The phenomenological explication of the Being of Dasein must, from the outset, be 
conducted and directed in relation to the fact that “the central problematic o f all ontology is 
rooted in the phenomenon o f time”
[T]he way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning 
determined primordially in terms of time, is what we call its “Temporal” determinateness. 
Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out 
the Temporality o f Being,
The first and perhaps most important step in this task comes with the identification that;
Entities are grasped in their Being as “presence”; this means that they are understood with 
regard to a definite mode of time -  the “PresenC [“die ‘Gegenwart’
Hence, Dasein itself, as the subject of the existential-ontological analytic must be grasped in its 
“presencing” (anwesen) as that which shows itself, in itself, in Time.^^ For as I have set out in 
the previous chapter, this “presencing” is the way in which “everything encounters man and 
comes to appearance through the openness that man provides.” '^’
2. The Ontological Analytic of Dasein -  authenticity and inauthenticitv
Heidegger begins the First Part of his ‘Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein’ with a 
reiteration of the crucial fact that, “We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of 
any such entity is in each case mine”}^ By “mine” Heidegger does not merely imply oneself; he
ibid.. Introduction II, p. 40. 
ibid.. Introduction II, p. 40.
ibid., Introduction II, p. 47.
C.f. note 42 in the previous chapter on the fundamental importance in Heidegger’s thinking of Being as 
the coming to presence, and cdgtheia.
William Lovitt, Introduction to The Question Concerning Technology, p. xv.
Being and Time, I .l, p. 67.
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is emphasising the way in which we ourselves “are delivered over” to our own B eing/’’ As 
Hubert Dreyfus explains, “this cannot mean that each Dasein has a private world of 
experience”:
Heidegger’s “mineness” must be sharply distinguished from what Husserl calls “the 
sphere of ownness.” When Heidegger describes Dasein as “owned” in a lecture course in 
1923, he warns, “Dasein as its own does not mean an isolating relativization to...the 
individual (solus ipse), rather “ownness” is a way of being.
The universal structures which are determinative for the Being of Dasein are characterised by 
the “mineness” (Jemienigkeit) of each particular Dasein as “a way of being”. And this remains 
the case despite the fundamental ontological oscillation between what Heidegger calls the 
“authentic” (eigentlich) and “inauthentic” (uneigentlich) modes of Dasein’s Being:
Because Dasein is in each case its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, “choose” 
itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only “seem” to do so. 
But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic -  that is, 
something of its own -  can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, 
authenticity and inauthenticity.. .are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever 
is characterised by mineness.”
So, how are we to differentiate between the two?”  For Fleidegger, the inauthentic is 
characteristic of, and is founded in, Dasein’s everyday immersion in the “they” (das Man). The 
“they” are those with whom Dasein is in the world. They are, as Heidegger explains, those who
...proximally and for the most part “are-there” in everyday Being-with-one-another 
[Miteinandersein]. The “who” is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, 
and not the sum of them all. The “who” is the neuter, the “they”?^
And it is interesting to compare this definition of the “they” with Bhabha’s thinly-veiled re­
articulation of Fanon’s original assertion that “the real Other for the white man is and will
”  ibid., I .l, p. 67. See also, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, I:3:15:(c), pp. 170-173.
”  Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world, pp. 25-26.
”  Being and Time, I .l, p. 68. We should perhaps add Heidegger’s qualification that “the inauthenticity of 
Dasein does not signify any “less” Being or “lower” degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its 
fullest concretion Dasein can be characterised by inauthenticity -  when busy, when excited, when 
interested, when ready for enjoyment” (ibid., I.l, p. 68).
See, Jay A. Ciaffa, ‘Toward an Understanding of Heidegger’s Conception of the Inter-Relation 
Between Authentic and Inauthentic Existence’, .Journal o f the British Society for Phenomenology, 18 
(January, 1987), pp. 49-59.
Being and Time 1.4, p. 164. It is important to note here that I have deliberately retained Macquarrie and 
Robinson’s translation of “das Man” as “the they” over Dreyfus’s preference for “the one” (Being-in-the- 
world, pp. 144-162), the justification for which is, I feel, seriously problematized by the extract just 
quoted from Being in Time.
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continue to be the black man. And conversely”. ’^ For Bhabha and Fanon, as with so many 
postcolonial theorists and colonial discourse analysts, the fundamental (ontological) “Other” is 
essentially defined in terms of the ontical categories of race and political status; in short, a very 
specific group of people are especially “Other”, and are theoretically generalised as such. 
Heidegger’s ontological definition, on the other hand, does not acknowledge such distinctions, 
and this is one of those aspects of Heidegger’s thinking, which is perhaps
...most offensive to today’s habits of idea-forming and most unsettling to the skilled 
acrobats of its empty astuteness.^^
This is because, for Heidegger, the “they” are strictly those who are not the particular Dasein in 
question. We are all the “they”, and any theorization of this primordial configuration in ontically 
categorised terms (for example, the ‘white Self’ versus the ‘black Other’) must be seen as a 
fundamental distortion.
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from 
the authentic Self -  that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way 
[eigens ergrijfenen]. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the 
“they”, and must first find itself.
This “dispersion” (zerstreuen) of Dasein into inauthenticity, as the “they-self’, can more 
specifically be seen to constitute a “distantiality”, an “averageness” and a “levelling down” or 
“publicness” (die Offentlichkeit).^^ But does this mean that we can subsequently make a direct 
correlation between, on the one hand, the authentic and the Dasein and, on the other, between 
the inauthentic and the “they”; in other words, is Dasein only ever authentic on its own, in 
isolation from the crowd? The previous extract would appear to suggest as much, but this 
prematurely oversimplifies the complexity of the relation between both authenticity and 
inauthenticity, and Dasein and the “they”. For as we shall see, at a later stage in his inquiry, 
Heidegger describes how Dasein can grasp its own authenticity in “anticipatory resoluteness” 
(Vorldufigkeit des entschliessens) and can authentically “be-with-one-another” 
(miteinandersein) .
Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 161; quoted by Bhabha in his ‘Foreword’, p. xix.. Bhabha actually 
criticizes Fanon for being “too quick to name the Other, to personalize its presence in the language of 
colonial racism” (p. xix); but as we saw in the previous chapter, this personalization is itself implicit in 
Bhabha’s own formulation. See also, Leopold Sédar Senghor’s ‘Negrititude: A  Humanism of the 
Twentieth Century’ from Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson (eds.). The Afi'ican Reader: Independent 
Africa (London: Vintage, 1970), pp. 179-92, in Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, 
|)p. 27-35.
Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, l.VII, p. 79.
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Being and Time, 1.4, p. 167. 
ibid., 1.4, p. 165.
For Heidegger, it is Dasein’s potential to grasp its own temporality that distinguishes its 
authentic and inauthentic modes of Being, and this means its potential to grasp the existential 
projection of its authentic “Being towards death” (Sein zum Tode) as “Being-towards-the-end” 
(Sein zumEnde). It is only in the “anticipatory resoluteness” of Dasein’s “Being towards death”, 
that Dasein can grasp its own “potentiality-for-Being-a-whole”. But it is not only in a futural 
sense that temporality (and thus authenticity) is to be understood; temporality is the 
comprehension of the future, present and having been, in “ecstatical unity”:
The unity of the horizonal schemata of future, Present, and having been, is grounded in 
the ecstatical unity of temporality. The horizon of temporality as a whole determines that 
whereupon factically existing entities are essentially disclosed. With one’s factical Being- 
there, a potentiality-for-Being is in each case projected in the horizon of the future, one’s 
“Being already” is disclosed in the horizon of having been, and that with which one 
concerns oneself is discovered in the realm of the Present.^’’
The question is, how are we to bring each of these separate factors into clearer significance with 
one another: “authenticity”, “ecstatico-horizonal temporality” and “anticipatory resoluteness”? 
For Heidegger, it is only in Dasein’s potential comprehension of its own temporality as 
“ecstatico-horizonal” and its subsequent “anticipatory resoluteness” in the wake of that 
awareness that Dasein can grasp its authentic “potentiality-for-Being-a-whole”.^ ’’ More simply, 
it is only when Dasein comes to recognise the certainty of its death within the time span of its 
own temporal existence, “future. Present and having been”, that it can escape the inauthenticity 
of its “everydayness” and the “they”.^ ’'
The future, the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal 
characteristics of the “towards-oneself’, the “back-to”, and the “letting-oneself-be- 
enooxmietcA-by”.. .Temporality is the primordial “outside-of-itself’ in and for itself. We 
therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, 
the “ecstases” of temporality.^®
ibid., II.4, p. 416.
“Holding death for true does not demand just one definite kind of behaviour in Dasein, but demands 
Dasein itself in the full authenticity of its existence” (ibid., II.1, pp. 309-310).
“\A\nticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the 
possibility o f being itself... but o f itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death -  a freedom  
which has been released from the Illusions o f  the “they”, and which is factical, certain o f itself and 
anxious” (ibid., II.1, p. 311). And it is this definition of “anticipation” which Roger Waterhouse, in A 
Heidegger Critique, overlooks in his hostile assault upon Heidegger’s notion of “authenticity”: for 
example, in his chapter ‘The Vacuity of Heidegger’s Authenticity’ (pp. 179-192), Waterhouse argues that, 
“The state of preparedness was not itself authenticity, nor did it involve any action. Rather it was a 
psychological attitude consequent upon withdrawal from the social world. Half a century later and 
transposed to California, Heidegger might have become a drug-using Jesus-freak.” A Heidegger Critique: 
A Critical Examination o f the Existential Phenomenology o f Marlin Heidegger (Brighton: Harvester Press 
Ltd., 1981), pp. 191-192.
Being and Time, II.3, p. 377.
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In the “ecstasis” of “anticipatory resoluteness”, Dasein is thus disclosed to itself as its authentic 
self in the present. But while it is, perhaps, easy for us to understand the futural projection as the 
anticipation of one’s own death, and hence, one’s own “Being towards death”, it is less obvious 
how the past, or as Heidegger says, the “having been”, comes to presence in this process.
For Heidegger, the “having been” possesses a double signification for Dasein. It can be the 
“having been” which is the recollection of one’s authentic “Being-a-whole” as opposed to the 
tranquillised everyday inauthenticity of the “they”; or it can be the recollection of that 
i nauthent i c i tyIn both cases Heidegger characterises it as “repetition” (Wiederholung). In the 
ecstasis of “anticipatory resoluteness”, “having been” constitutes a disclosure of the possibility 
for Dasein to escape from the everyday inauthenticity of the “they” and grasp itself as, and for, 
itself. Hence, the unity of “ecstatico-horizonal temporality” means that “anticipatory­
resoluteness” (as authentic “Being towards death”) triggers that recognition on the part of 
Dasein concerning what it “has been”. And this process makes manifest in the present Dasein’s 
authentic “potentiality-for-Being-a-whole” :
Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially fu tural so that it is free for its death and 
can let itself be thrown back upon its factical “there” by shattering itself against death -  
that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process o f  
having been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its 
thrownness and be in the m oment of v ision/or “its time”f^
3. Death
Dasein thus comes to understand what and how it fundamentally is, and that it is, in Time; and 
Death, or more accurately Dasein’s engagement with its own death, can clearly be seen to play a 
fundamental role in this understanding. But what is the existential-ontological character of death 
itself?
In Being and Time, Heidegger insists that the achievement of an existential-ontological 
conception of death, over and above any simple biological or psychological (ontical) 
conception, is imperative if we are to come to an understanding of Dasein’s “Being-as-a- 
whole”. But how are we to grasp the existential-ontological conception of death if, as Heidegger 
rightly points out at the beginning of his analysis;
In his later lecture series What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger develops this notion of Dasein’s 
recollection of its own Being in his examination of the assertion that “Memory is the gathering of 
thought” (1:1, p. 3).
Being and Time, II.5, p. 437.
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When Dasein reaches its wholeness in death, it simultaneously loses the Being of its 
“there”. By its transition to no-longer-Dasein, it gets lifted right out of the possibility of 
experiencing this transition and of understanding it as something experienced.'"
The answer would appear to lie in its experiencing the death of “Others”:
In this way a termination of Dasein becomes “Objectively” accessible. Dasein can thus 
gain an experience of death, all the more so because Dasein is essentially Being with 
Others. In that case, the fact that death has been thus “Objectively” given must make 
possible an ontological delimitation of Dasein’s totality.'’^
Heidegger has thus, it would seem, established the existential-ontological significance of 
experiencing the death of Others in terms of Dasein’s fundamental “Being-with-Others-in-the 
world”. But what is this death of Others that is experienced by Dasein? Heidegger describes the 
transition from life to death as one which involves the transition from “Being-in-the-world” to 
“Being-no-longer-in-the-world”. The difference between the living Dasein and the dead corpse 
is thus a difference in Being, wherein the entity ceases to be a Dasein and becomes something 
“present-at-hand” (vorhanden),^^ and is not merely “lifeless” like a stone, but becomes 
“unalive” (unlebendiges).^'^ But at the same time, can we assume that this “Being-with-the- 
dead” allows Dasein access to “the loss-of-Being as such which the dying man “suffers””? After 
all:
The dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at most we 
are always just “there alongside”.
And, for Heidegger, this is because:
45
Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very 
essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it “is” at all. And indeed death signifies a 
peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the very Being of one’s own Dasein is an issue.'”’
" ibid., II. 1, p. 281. 
ibid., II. 1, p. 281.
Heidegger differentiates between those entities which are “present-at-hand” {vorhanden) and those 
which are “ready-to-hand” (zuhanden): “The kind of Being which equipment possesses -  in which it 
manifests itself in its own right -  we call “readiness-to-hand”” {Being and Time, 1.3, p. 98). And we 
should stress that this is not restricted to the “tools of the trade” but everything that Dasein encounters in 
(or with) “concern”. In contrast, Heidegger explains that the “present-at-hand” are those “entities 
“belonging to the world” or “within the world”" that do not have the “kind of Being which equipment 
possesses” (Being and Time, 1.2, p. 79). See also, Graham Harman, Tool-Being: H eidegger and the 
Metaphysics o f  Objects (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 2002).
Being and Time, II. 1, p. 282. 
ibid., II. 1, p. 282. 
ibid., II. 1, p. 284.
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So, if death is always “mine” and it cannot be authentically grasped in the death of Others, why 
introduce the experiencing of the death of Others at all? In dismissing the possibility of an 
“Objectively” accessible ontological conception of death as a possible “delimitation of Dasein’s 
totality” Heidegger has steered us away from the premature conclusion that the existential- 
ontological conception of death is, or could be, anything other than “mine”. Hence, “In dying, it 
is shown that mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for death”/^
But given that Dasein is “essentially Being with Others” we cannot simply dismiss Dasein’s 
“Being with” as superfluous to Dasein’s relation to death, indeed, in one important respect it is 
determinative for that relation in terms of the role of the “they” in Dasein’s everyday dealing 
with death:
It is already a matter of public acceptance that “thinking about death” is a cowardly fear, 
a sign of insecurity on the part of Dasein, and a sombre way of fleeing from the world. 
The “they” does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face ofdeath!^^
Indeed, it is this “public acceptance” which Joseph Conrad described in ‘The Return’:
...and then came the idea, the persuasion, the certitude, that the evil must be forgotten -  
must be resolutely ignored to make life possible; that the knowledge must be kept out of 
mind, out of sight, like the knowledge of certain death is kept out of the daily existence of 
men.'’^
And as we shall see in the following section, this is especially important when we come to 
consider Dasein’s flight from the authentic disclosure of its own death as its own “Being 
towards death” and its retreat back into the security of the “they”.
After demonstrating the fundamental “mineness” of Dasein’s existential-ontological conception 
of death, Heidegger turns his attention to a more general analysis of death in terms of “care”, 
discussed in the previous chapter as Dasein’s “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-the-world”. In 
doing so, he attempts to uncover the existential-ontological nature of death as belonging to the 
Being of Dasein, by examining how Dasein is “within-the-world”. Thus, if we accept that death 
is “Being-at-an-end”, Dasein must always be “Being-towards-the-end”. In other words, death is
ibid., II. 1, p. 284. 
ibid., II.l, p. 298.
Joseph Conrad, ‘The Return’, in The Complete Short Stories o f Joseph Conrad (London: Hutchinson & 
Co. Ltd., 1935), p. 398.
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“something that stands before us -  something impending.” ®^ But not like a storm which may 
also be something which will happen. Death is, as we know, in each case “mine” and therefore 
Heidegger compares the impending character of death to something which Dasein itself can 
undergo; as something which Dasein itself can be:
Death [as impending] is a possibility-of Being which Dasein itself has to take over in 
every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for- 
Being...Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there.^’
Death as “no-longer-being-able-to-be-there” is also that in which Dasein reaches its 
“wholeness” (as “Being-a-whole”) : it is therefore not merely something in the future, something 
not yet and therefore removed from Dasein while it is. Death, in its certainty and inevitability 
and as the achievement of Dasein’s totality, is constitutive of Dasein’s Being in so far as Dasein 
is always already “Being towards death”, its own death.
Heidegger’s identification of “Being towards death” as the basic dynamic which underpins 
human existence is not, of course, original in itself: in The City o f God, St. Augustine had 
already observed that
...from the moment a man begins to exist in this body which is destined to die, he is 
involved all the time in a process whose end is death...the whole of our lifetime is 
nothing but a race towards death, in which no one is allowed the slightest pause or any 
slackening of the pace.^^
But, then again, for Augustine, death is God’s punishment for the transgression of Adam,^® and 
man’s fear of death is only resolved in the exercise of divine g r a c e . F o r  Heidegger, Dasein’s 
death is not offset against anything other than Dasein’s own possibility:
[D]eath, as the end o f Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility -  non-relational, certain 
and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of 
this entity towards its end.^^
Being and Time, II.l, p. 294. 
ibid., II.l, p. 294.
St. Augustine, The City o f God, trans. by Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1984), Book 
XIII, Chapter 10, p. 518.
See, for example, Romans, 5:12; “Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death 
through sin, in this way death spread to all men, because all sinned,”
For a comprehensive review of the theme of death in Western Philosophy, see Jacques Choron’s Deat/r 
and Western Thought (New York: Collier Books, 1963) and the writings collected in Herman Feifel (ed.), 
The Meaning o f Death  (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).
Being and Time, II.l, p. 303.
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This ontological conception of death as one’s “ownmost possibility” thus more fully clarifies 
the ontological context and role of death in the constitution of Dasein’s authentic and 
inauthentic modes of Being/*^ But our understanding as to how Dasein comes to comprehend its 
own Being as a “Being towards death”, remains incomplete until we have examined the 
ontological “state-of-mind” (Befindlichkeit ) which is constitutive of this comprehension/'^ For 
Heidegger:
[A] state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out o f which we can 
encounter something that matters to us. Indeed, from the ontological pom t o f view we 
must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to “bare mood”/®
And the “bare mood” (Stimmung) which discloses Dasein’s own “Being-in-the-world” as a 
“Being towards death” is “uncanniness” or, as Heidegger says, "Unheimlichkeit’,
4. Boredom and Anxiety
In Section 29 of Being and Time, Heidegger discusses how, “having a mood” and “how one is”, 
“brings Being to its “there””:
In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has 
been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being 
which, in existing, it has to be.
For a good overview of Heidegger’s conception of death, see Paui Edwards, Heidegger and Death a 
Critical Evaluation (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1979).
Once again, I have chosen to retain Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation, “state-of-mind”, over 
Dreyfus’s “affectedness”, which he interprets as “where-you’re-at-ness” and “being found in a situation 
where things and options already matter” {Being-in-the-world, p. 168). To my mind, this distorts 
Heidegger’s original meaning in precisely the direction against which his thought was progressing; 
namely, away from the idea of man being subject to “affects” from the outside.
Being and Time, 1.5, p. 177. See, also Heidegger’s description, in ‘What is Metaphysics?’, o f how “the 
founding mode of attunement [Befindlichkeit der Stimmung] not only reveals beings as a whole in 
various ways, but this revealing -  far from being merely accidental -  is also the basic occurrence of our 
Da-sein...[Thus] What we call a “feeling” is neither a transitory epiphenomenon of our thinking and 
willing behaviour nor simply an impulse that provokes such behaviour nor merely a present condition we 
have to put up with somehow or other”. ‘What is Metaphysics?’, trans. by David Farrell Krell, in Basic 
Writings, p. 100. See also, Michael Haar’s ‘Attunement and Thinking’, in Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison 
Hall Heidegger: A Critical Reader (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1992), pp. 159-172.
Being and Time, 1.5, p. 173. See also, The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology, where Heidegger 
explains the connection between mood and understanding within the context of “self-finding”; “In terms 
of fundamental ontology [the understanding of being] can also be expressed by saying that all 
understanding is essentially related to an affective self-finding which belongs to understanding itself. To 
be affectively self-finding is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect, and the like, 
which are constitutive for all comportment toward beings, although they do not by themselves alone make 
such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which gives its light to each 
mood, each passion, each affect” (11:1:20, p. 281). See also, Bruce W. Ballard, The Role o f  M ood in 
H eidegger’s Ontology (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990).
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“Mood” can thus be seen to rise out of “Being-in-the-world”, as a mode of Being, and disclose 
“Being-in-the-world” as a whole.® And in the “event philosophy” of his famous 1929-30 lecture 
series collected under the title Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, Heidegger explains that 
one of the most distinctive and important “moods” for Dasein is “boredom” (L angew eile ).As 
Safranski notes, for Heidegger, boredom is
The moment of pure lapse of time. Pure time, its pure presence...the moment when one 
notices that time is passing because it will not just then pass, when one cannot drive it 
away, make it pass, or as the saying goes, fill it meaningfully.^^
Dasein’s recognition of its own boredom is thus the acute recognition of its Being as a “being in 
Time” precisely because time appears to be standing still:
[T]he fundamental attunement of boredom constitutes an exceptional relationship to time 
in human Dasein....an inteivention into time as a confi'ontation with rime.®
In other words, in boredom, the stalling of time distracts us from our concerns and discloses us 
and our concerns in the world in an oppressive and unsettling moment of emptiness. In saying 
this, Heidegger is careful to note that something boring, for example, “a thing, a book, a play, a 
ceremony, yet also a person, a group of people, indeed even an environment or place” is not 
boredom itself.
The characteristic of “hoving”. . .belongs to the object and is at the same time related to 
the subject.^^
More specifically, in ‘What is Metaphysics?’, Heidegger explains that:
Boredom is still distant when it is only this book or that play, that business or this 
idleness, that drags on. It interrupts when “one is bored.” Profound boredom, drifting here 
and there in the abysses of our existence like a muffling fog, removes all things and
“We have seen that the world, Dasein-with, and existence are equiprimordially disclosed; and state-of- 
mind is a basic existential species of their disclosedness, because this disclosedness itself is essentially 
Being-in-the-world” (Being and Time, 1.5, p. 176). See also, William J. Richardson on mood as the 
“ontological disposition”, in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, (The Hague: Martin us 
Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 64-66.
In his enthusiastic analysis o f these lectures Safranski contends that “his findings in this respect are 
among the most impressive ideas ever put forward by Heidegger. Only very rarely, in the entire tradition 
of philosophy, has a mood been described and interpreted as in this lecture. Here boredom really becomes 
an event” (Martin Heidegger, p. 192).
® ibid., p. 192.
Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, 1:2:20, pp. 81, 96.
ibid., 1:2:21, p. 82.
“  ibid., 1:2:21, p. 84.
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human beings and oneself along with them into a remarkable indifference. This boredom 
reveals beings as a whole
The revelation of “beings as a whole” in the “interruption” of boredom is an important example 
of that “understanding of Being” which we have already referred to, and which constitutes and 
makes manifest Dasein’s “openness for Being”. Moreover:
Time entrances \bannt\ Dasein, not as the time which has remained standing as distinct 
from flowing, but rather the time beyond such flowing and its standing, the time which in 
each CRSG Dasein itself as a whole ix.®
Dasein is, in its Being, “openness to Being”, and it is in its various “states-of-mind” that this 
Being, the Being, as “Temporality” (Temporalitat) that it itself is, is delivered over to it. But 
what is the meaning of this revelation of “beings as a whole” in boredom?
As Heidegger explains, in his Introductio?i to Metaphysics, it is the question; “Why are there 
beings at all instead of nothmg?”:
[I]n a spell of boredom, when we are equally distant from despair and joy...when the 
stubborn ordinariness of beings lays open a wasteland in which it makes no difference to 
us whether beings are or are not.. .in a distinctive form, the question resonates once again: 
Why are there beings at all instead of nothing.^®
Or as Camus puts it:
It happens that the stage sets collapse. Rising, street-car, four hours in the office or the 
factory, meal, street-car, four hours of work, meal, sleep, and Monday Tuesday 
Wednesday Thursday Friday and Saturday according to the same rhythm -  this path is 
followed most of the time. But one day the “why” arises and everything begins in that 
weariness tinged with amazement.®
We will return to this “question”, and the consequences of its disclosure, at a later stage, but the 
important point for us here is Heidegger’s insistence that boredom as a “state-of-mind” is “by no 
means nothing ontologically”.™ Indeed, Heidegger’s phenomenological demonstration 
(Ausweisung ) of boredom illustrates, once again, the extent to which the existential-ontological 
analytic is founded in Dasein’s everyday “Being-in-the-world”. But at the same time, boredom is
Heidegger, ‘Wliat is Metaphysics?’, p. 99.
Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, 1:4:32, p. 147.
Heidegger, Introduction to M etaphysics, p. 2.
Albert Camus, The Myth o f Sisyphus, trans. by Justin O’Brien (New York: Vintage International,
1991), pp. 12-13.
™ Being and Time, 1:5, p. 173.
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not the “state-of-mind” which is most distinctive for Heidegger in the determination of Dasein’s 
authentic and inauthentic modes of Being, for that is “anxiety” (Angst).
Following my summary of Heidegger’s critique of psychology in the previous chapter, it is of 
course crucial that we sufficiently distinguish Heidegger’s ontological definition of “anxiety” as 
‘Unheimlichkeif from Freud’s psychoanalytical conception of Neurotic Anxiety as Angst (or 
indeed Adler’s psychoanalytical definition of anxiety in terms of the inferiority complex and 
Melanie Klein’s hypothesis on the inter-relations between anxiety and composure^^). Freudian 
anxiety, though similarly opposed to composure in its fundamental characteristics, essentially 
describes a very peculiar type of psychic disorder which is founded in the repression of libidinal 
desires; desires which, in turn, are understood to be constituted in terms of a conception of the 
human consciousness that is divided into the ‘ego,’ the ‘super-ego’ and the ‘id’7  ^ In his New 
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis in 1933 Freud summarised the fundamental character 
of anxiety as foUows:
Anxiety...is the reproduction of an old event which brought a threat of danger; anxiety 
serves the purposes of self-preservation and is a signal of a new danger; it arises from 
libido that has in some way become unemployable and it also arises during the process of 
repression; it is replaced by the formation of a symptom, is, as it were, psychically 
bound...
For Freud, the ego is the true seat of anxiety and the “three main species of anxiety”, the 
realistic, the neurotic and the moral are connected with “the ego’s three dependent relations -  to 
the external world, to the id and to the s u p e r - e g o . I t  is not necessary for us to go into any 
greater detail of Freud’s subsequent elaboration upon this inter-relation within the context of the 
Oedipus Complex and the Pleasure-Unpleasure Principle, for we are already at a significant 
remove from Heidegger’s conception of what the human consciousness is and how it actually
See, for example, Adler’s The Neurotic Constitution (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1926); 
and Klein’s ‘Our Adult World and Its Roots in Infancy’, in Our Adult World and Other Essays (London, 
Heinemann, 1963).
In Freud and M an’s Soul (London: Penguin Books, 1991), Bruno Bettelheim has argued persuasively 
that Freud’s use of the German terms Ich (“I”), uber-ich (“over-I”), es (“It”) which have been translated 
into English by the Latinate terms “ego,” “super-ego” and “id” profoundly distorts the original meaning 
of these crucial terms in Freud’s thinking. The bulk of Bettelheim’s critique is, however, centred upon the 
excision of Freud’s conception of the Soul (die Seele) in English translation and the examination of the 
dire effect that this has had on our understanding of Freud’s work in the English-speaking world: indeed, 
Bettelheim goes so far as to suggest that Freud’s essentially “pessimistic and tragic view of life .... has 
been mistranslated to fit American (cognitive) behaviourist theory” (p. 108). These important 
qualifications do not, however, alter the fact that we must still strive to differentiate Freud’s conception of 
human consciousness from that which is proposed by Heidegger.
Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, vol. II, trans. and ed. by James 
Strachey, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 32, ‘Anxiety and Instinctual Life’, p. 117.
ibid., p. 117. On Freud’s pre-World War One conception of anxiety in relation to unsatisfactory sexual 
practices and a good summary of the development of Freud’s thinking on anxiety in general, see J.A.C 
Brown in Freud and the Post-Freudians (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963), pp. 31-33.
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functions: a remove which George Steiner can be seen to have overlooked when he maintains 
that, “It is striking how closely Heidegger’s evocation of the uncanny resembles Freud’s famous 
use of the term.”^^
In the wake of our brief analysis of Heidegger’s ontological conception of death as “Being- 
towards-the-end”, a more detailed account of the fundamental way in which Dasein actually 
comes to grasp its own death is now required. And this account is made easier in the wake of our 
clarification of the ontological significance and importance of “mood”. For it is in anxiety, as a 
non-psychological phenomenon, that Dasein comes to understand itself as “Being-towards-the- 
end” (Sein zum E nde\  and for Heidegger, this anxiety, as “uncanniness” (Unheimlichkeit) is 
founded in the fact that “to be the uncanniest is the basic trait of the human existence”.^  ^ In his 
reading of the famous choral ode on Man in Sophocles’s Antigone (lines 332-375), Heidegger 
argues that, “man is the uncanniest”, and not only because human beings
...spend their lives essentially in the midst of the un-canny...but also because they step 
out, move out of the limits that first and for the most part are accustomed and homely, 
because as those who do violence, they overstep the limits of the homely, precisely in the 
direction of the uncanny in the sense of the overwhelming.^^
In contrast to Norman Brown’s confident assertion in Life Against Death, that
Apart from psychoanalysis there are no secular or scientific theories as to why man is the 
restless and discontented animal...
Heidegger’s analytic can thus be seen to ground human restlessness and discontentment in the 
existential-ontological constitution of the being that we ourselves are. For Heidegger, this 
anxiety is anxiousness (sichangsten) about something, and that something about which Dasein is 
anxious is an entity with the character of “threatening” (bedrohen). Moreover, “this entity” that 
threatens “has the same kind of being as the one that shrinks back”, this entity, “is Dasein 
itself’.'79
In order to unravel what Heidegger is getting at we must once again call to mind his emphasis 
upon the “mineness” of Dasein’s conception of its own “Being-in-the-world”, and thus its own 
“Being towards death”; and, at the same time, we must understand that anxiety as a “state-of-
George Steiner, Heidegger (London: Fontana Press, 1978), p. 100.
Heidegger, Introduction to M etaphysics, p. 161.
ibid., p. 161. It is the more precise nature of this overstepping that I shall be concentrating upon in what 
follows.
Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning o f  History (1959) (London: 
Sphere Books Ltd., 1970), p. 26.
Being and Time, 1.6, p. 230.
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mind” “brings Being to its “there””. But in saying that Dasein is anxious about itself Heidegger 
does not necessarily mean that Dasein shrinks in the face of itself as when it would see its own 
reflection in a mirror. Indeed, Heidegger does not even mean that the entity is Dasein itself, he 
says that it has the “same kind of being” as Dasein. Furthermore, for Heidegger, this entity is not 
even a definite entity “within-the-world”; in fact, “That in the face of which one is anxious is 
completely indefinite” So how are we, then, to define what it is? Especially when we read that 
that in the face of which anxiety is anxious
...is characterised by the fact that what threatens is nowhere. Anxiety “does not know”
what that in the face of which it is anxious is.^^
We would thus appear to have come to a dead-end before we have even started. But if we 
recognise that “that in the face of which” Dasein is anxious is, for Heidegger, “nothing and 
nowhere within-the-world”, “the world as such”®^ emerges as that (“threatening”) entity that we 
have been looking for; for as Heidegger says:
[T]he world as world is d i s c l o s e d and foremost by anxiety, as a state-of-mind,®^
The fundamental ontological significance of anxiety is thus revealed; but what is the character 
of this “world as world” which is disclosed?®^ And why does it make us anxious? Fleidegger 
once again insists that, “what oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of 
everything present-at-hand”; what it is, is, “the world itself’.®^ And because, 
“ontologically.. .the world belongs essentially to Dasein’s Being as Being in the world”, for 
Heidegger:
86Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face o f  which anxiety is anxious.
Hence, it is not the storm, the fire or the Other in themselves that anxiety is anxious about but the 
“threatening” disclosure of these things as the disclosure of “Being-in-the-world”. Anything can 
therefore project this “threatening”, but it is not the specific things themselves about which 
Dasein is anxious it is their disclosure to Dasein of Dasein’s own “Being-in-the-world”. More
ibid., 1.6, p. 231 (my emphasis), 
ibid., 1.6, p. 231.
ibid., 1.6, p. 232 (my emphasis), 
ibid., 1.6, p. 232.
It is interesting to note John Macquarrie’s observation that Heidegger’s emphasis upon the fundamental 
primacy of anxiety is in sharp contrast to Paul Ricoeur’s later emphasis upon the primacy of joy in 
Fallible Man (1960), trans. by Charles Kelbley (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965). John 
Macquarrie, Existentialism  (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1976), p. 172.
Being and Time, 1.6, p. 231. 
ibid., 1.6, p. 232.
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accurately, that which is disclosed by the “threatening” storm in this instance is not primarily the 
storm, it is the potential “Non-being” of Dasein, as “Being towards death”. The storm is thus not 
“Non-being”, it discloses “Non-being” to Dasein in its “threatening” and in Dasein’s anxiety.®^ 
Anything can have the character of this “threatening”, and anything can trigger the anxiety 
which discloses “Non-being”. As Forster notes in his summary of the causes of the 
discomforting acoustics of the Marabar Caves:
Whatever is said, the same monotonous noise replies, and quivers up and down the walls 
until it is absorbed into the roof, “Boum” is the sound as far as the human alphabet can 
express it, or “bou-oum”, or “ou-boum”, - utterly dull. Hope, politeness, the blowing of a 
nose, the squeak of a boot, all produce “boum”.®®
So while we can speculate upon those thmgs which are more likely to precipitate this chain of 
events, in doing so we run the risk of unintentionally transferring the primary existential- 
ontological significance to these things themselves (as cause) and away from Dasein and 
Dasein’s intentional comportment towards them.®  ^Anxiety can take place anywhere and “in the 
face o f ’ anything, not just, or even specifically, “in the face o f ’ the racial ‘Other’, or ‘India’ as is 
frequently implied in colonial discourse analysis. In fact what we must emphasise here is that the 
innocuous is just as likely to stimulate anxiety as the obvious in the sense that we have the 
potential to feel anxious “in the face o f ’ a young child just as much as a charging Zulu impi; the 
ruins of a once great city or, as Thomas Carlyle tells us, the pretension of an unspectacular 
dinner party:
The world looks often quite spectral to me; sometimes, as in Regent Street the other night 
(my nerves being all shattered), quite hideous, discordant, almost infernal. I had been at 
Mrs Austin’s, heard Sydney Smith for the first time guffawing, other persons prating, 
jargoning. To me through these thin cobwebs Death and Eternity sat glaring.^*^
The possible disclosure of “Non-being” in “Being towards death”, as an awareness of “Being-in- 
the-world”, is always with us, for this is what we are.
The nature of this disclosure/apprehension is, of course, grounded in the “intentional comportments” of 
Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” that we explained in the previous chapter; “a reciprocal belonging- 
together of intentio and intentum” (History o f the Concept o f Time, p. 46).
®® E. M. Forster, ri Passage to India (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1975), p. 145.
See, for example, George Batalille’s assertion that “What is disclosed in defilement doesn’t differ 
substantially from what is revealed in death -  the dead body and excreted matter are both expressive of 
nothingness”. On Nietzsche (London: The Athlone Press, 2000), p. 22. The potential for every and any 
sort of substance or circumstance to precipitate the disclosure/apprehension of “nothingness” in colonial 
literature will be discussed at more length in Chapter Four.
Thomas Carlyle, Life in London, vol. 1, p. 54, cited by Basil Wiley in Nineteenth Century Studies 
(Penguin Books Ltd.: Harmondsworth, 1973) p. 132.
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But, in saying this, are we not perhaps contradicting our earlier obseivation concerning the non- 
relationality of Dasein’s conception of “Being towards death”? In suggesting that storm, famine 
or war can trigger (or stimulate) anxiety, which discloses authentic “Being-in-the-world” as 
“Being towards death”, are we not implying, by default, that it is in, or because of, these things 
that Dasein comes to apprehend itself as itself, as it isl If we are to continue to maintain that 
“Being towards death” has the character of “mineness”, then we must now investigate the way 
in which the disclosure of Dasein’s authentic “Being-in-the-world” is founded in the 
phenomenon of Dasein which Heidegger calls “conscience” (Gewissen).
Conscience is the call of care from the uncanniness of Being-in-the-world -  the call
which summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty.^^
“Care” is, as we saw in the previous chapter, “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as 
Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world)”.^  ^“Conscience” as the “call of 
care” is thus grounded in Dasein’s “Being-alongside entities” in the world and this gives us a 
clue with regard to how “conscience” can summon Dasein’s “ownmost potentiality-for-Being- 
guilty”. Furthermore, if we remember the point made with regard to Dasein’s apprehension, in 
anxiety, of what it has been (p. 60), we can comprehend what Heidegger means by “guilt” 
(Schuld ). Dasein is made aware of its own immersion in the inauthentic world of the “they” by 
its own “conscience”. Its “conscience” calls Dasein to the potential realisation as to what it has 
been and thus, at the same time, to what it will be, namely “unalive” (unlebendiges).
“Conscience”, understood ontologically, is therefore that which facilitates Dasein’s ownmost 
potential comprehension of its own “potential-to-be-a-whole”. In other words, it introduces the 
“potentiality-for-Being-guilty” as a hypothetical intermediary point between anxiety and 
“anticipatory resoluteness”. At this hypothetical intermediary point, Dasein can either accept its 
own authenticity (which presupposes an acceptance of this “guilt”) or it can reject it and return 
to the “they”. Either way, with this clarification of “conscience”, the problem regarding the non- 
relationality of authentic “Being-in-the-world” has been resolved:
[Cjonscience, in its basis and its essence, is in each case mine -  not only in the sense that 
in each case the appeal is to one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, but because the call 
comes from that entity which in each case I myself am.‘'®
Being and Time, II.2, p. 335. See also, ‘The Existential Structure of Authentic Potentiality-for-Being 
which is Attested in the Conscience’, II.2, pp. 341-348.
Being and Time, II. 1, p. 293. 
ibid., II.2, p. 323.
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As we know, Dasein may not embrace this “call”. After all, the “call of conscience” is 
essentially anxiety, and hence, Dasein can retreat in the face of the “call” and return to the 
inauthentic Being of the “they”:
When falling we flee into the “at-home” of publicness, we flee in the face of the “not-at- 
home”; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein - in Dasein as 
thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its being.^ "*^
We already know that the “world” that is being disclosed here means Dasein’s “Being-in-the- 
world” and it is thus its own “Being-in-the-world” which Heidegger now tells us that Dasein 
“flees” (fliehen) from. This “fleeing in the face o f ’ or “falling” is therefore not what one would 
perhaps imagine it to be, namely, the introversion of the Dasein -  the reversion of the Dasein 
back to the Dasein and away from the “world” -  but the exact opposite. Dasein “flees in the 
face” of itself (as “Being-in-the-world”), and therefore does not flee to itself, but to the “they” 
and the “world of its concern”. This retreat of Dasein towards the “Being-at-home with all its 
obviousness - into the average everydayness of Dasein”, i s  Dasein’s attempt to escape the 
“not-being-at-home” {das Nicht-zuhause-sein), which for Heidegger is the existential- 
ontological mode of “uncanniness” {Unheimlichkeit). In saying this, it is important to note that 
while
“Fallenness” into the “world” means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as 
the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity....[This does not mean that] we 
take the fallenness of Dasein as a “fall” from a purer and higher “primal status”. Not only 
do we lack any experience of this ontically, but ontologically we lack any possibilities or 
clues for Interpreting it.^^
The distinction between uncanniness or “not-at-home-ness” as the primordially authentic mode 
of Being, and the “at-home” {Heimlichkeit) as the primordially inauthentic mode of Being, is 
thus not to be understood as a distinction between good and bad or higher and lower. Nor, for 
that matter, can these modes of Being be legitimately understood as being specific to various 
ontically-defined groups; as when, for example, Homi Bhabha would have us believe that
...the “unhomely” is a paradigmatic colonial and post-colonial condition, it has a 
resonance that can be heard distinctly, if erratically, in fictions that negotiate the powers 
of cultural difference in a range of transhistorical sites...[it] relates the traumatic 
ambivalences of a personal, psychic history to the wider disjunctions of political 
existence.
94 ibid., 1.6, p. 234.
ibid., 1.6, p. 233. 
ibid., 1.5, p. 220
Bhabha, Tntroduction’, The Location o f Culture, pp. 9, 11.
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Instead, “the not-at-home-ness” of anxiety and the “at-home” of its immersion in the “they”, as 
the fundamental modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world”, are necessarily universal.
But what is it about this “not-at-home-ness” which makes it so terrifying for Dasein? What is it 
about itself that Dasein flees from? For Heidegger, it is the fundamental “nullity” ®^ which is 
disclosed to it in its own “Being towards death”; the “nullity” that constitutes the basis of its 
own existence.
In this concernful fleeing lies a fleeing in the face of death -  that is, a looking-away from
the end of Being-in-the-world 99
As William Richardson concisely puts it, “It is about Non-being that There-being [Dasein] is 
anxious”.^ ™ And what is the disclosure of “Non-being” if not the disclosure of “Being-in- 
time”?^ °^  For in anxiety Dasein comes to grasp its own “Being-in-the-world” through its own 
“Non-being” and hence its “ Being-towards-the-end”. In this sense anxiety is essentially
futural. But at the same time, through the “call” of conscience, Dasein is made aware of what it 
has been. And as such it comports itself temporally towards the future and the past in the 
present. In other words, in anxiety Dasein comes to “presence” (anwesen), before itself, as itself, 
in “ecstatico-horizonal temporality”. But more importantly, as Heidegger would later argue, in 
anxiety, it is not just itself that Dasein encounters; it is not just the apprehension and disclosure 
that it itself is', for in the
...clear night of the nothing of anxiety, the original open-ness of beings as such arises;
that they are beings and not nothing.
This is the question which, as we have already seen in relation to boredom, is disclosed in the 
Dasein’s apprehension of being delivered over to its “there”. And thus, if Dasein resists the 
temptation to retreat, self-deceived and cowering, back into the “they”, in ‘Unheimlichkeit’ 
Dasein can encounter that “Non-being” which discloses the totality of all entities as they are:
Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein can the total strangeness of 
beings overwhelm us. Only when the strangeness of beings oppresses us does it arouse
“The “nothing” with which anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the nullity by which Dasein, in its 
very basis, is defined; and this basis itself is as thrownness into death” (Being and Time, 11,3, p. 356).
Being and Time, II.6, p. 477.
Richardson, Heidegger, p. 72
Indeed, Steiner maintains that it is “the Pascalian-Lutheran stress on Angst [in Being and Time], with 
its affirmation of the nearness and time-governing presentness of death, that fuse Sein und Zeit into 
necessary oneness” (Heidegger, p. 79).
Steiner rightly refers to this “Non-being” as “an active “nothingness” (das nicht-ende Nichts, Sartre’s 
le néant)” (Heidegger, p. 45), in other words, not in the sense of a passive, inert and natureless void.
Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’, p. 103.
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and evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder -  the revelation of the nothing -  does 
the “why?” loom before us...[T]he question of the nothing puts us, the questioners, in 
question.’®'^
5. Ontological heroism and ‘anticipatory resolution’
In the Epilogue to Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, William Richardson 
responds to the interpretations of Being and Time which have seen it as “a pure nihilism” (on 
account of its emphasis on “Non-being”); and, more importantly, have claimed that “an 
acceptance of anxiety as a privileged disposition is to raise cowardice to the level of 
philosophical virtue by which Being (sc. Non-being) is disclosed”. For Richardson:
The anxiety in question is not an emotional state on the ontic level of some psychological 
subject but the most fundamental modification of the ontological disposition... 
[Ajcquiescence to anxiety, thus understood, far from being a surrender to pusillanimity, 
constitutes that stout-hearted open-ness unto Being that alone can found genuine 
valour.
I will attempt to develop two aspects of Richardson’s defence: first, anxiety as a “fundamental 
modification of the ontological disposition” as opposed to an overtly simplistic psychological 
topic and, second, anxiety as “genuine valour”. It is only when we grasp the fundamental 
validity of the first of these statements that the full significance of Richardson’s second 
statement, concerning “valour”, will become apparent.
In Being and Time, Heidegger is conducting the existential-ontological analytic of Dasein; he is 
pursuing/thinking the meaning of Being and as such explicitly distinguishes his own enquiry 
from those of the positive sciences which are concerned with beings. The findings of 
Heidegger’s analysis are thus never to be confused with those of the ontical (positive) sciences. 
His phenomenological methodology, as the science of ontology, is only concerned with beings, 
in so far as it is, first and foremost, concerned with the Being of beings. As such, this Being, of 
which anxiety is a distinct mode, is precisely that which underpins the psychological mode of 
anxiety that is discussed by psychologists like F r e u d . A n y  analysis of Being and Time which
ibid., p. 109.
Richardson, Heidegger, p. 475
106 Heidegger points out other investigations of anxiety and dread in a footnote in Being and Time (1.6, p. 
235). In particular he singles out Spren Kiekegaard’s The Concept o f  Dread, which he calls a 
“psychological exposition of the problem of original sin”. Kierkegaard’s thesis, like Freud’s, is 
nonetheless primarily ontical and as such is underpinned by the structures and modes of Being outlined in 
Heidegger’s ontological thesis. This raises serious questions with regard to the excessive nature of 
Dreyfus’s comparison between Heidegger and Kierkegaard in Heidegger’s interpretation of fear and 
anxiety. Indeed Dreyfus contends that Heidegger “acknowledges...that his account of anxiety is a secular 
version of an explicitly Christian analysis developed by Kierkegaard” (Being-in-the-world, p. 304). See
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interprets Heidegger’s (ontological) anxiety as psychological anxiety has profoundly 
misunderstood the fundamental context, and fundamental objective, of Heidegger’s work as a 
whole.
But, if we take this observation a step further, precisely the same cautions must apply to the 
investigations that I will be conducting in my examination of colonial literature. It would be to 
miss the point entirely if it were to be imagined that the instances of ‘ Unheimlichkeif that we 
will be studying in the work of Haggard, Kipling and Conrad constitute merely ‘psychological’ 
disturbances. This investigation is not an attempt to highlight the arche typically ‘anxious’ 
psychological context or character of colonial literature and its protagonists as a whole. It is an 
attempt to attend to the ways in which the ontological modes of “Being-in-the-world” and 
“Being-in-time”, for example, “Being towards death” and ‘Unheimlichkeit’, are to be found in 
the works of certain authors during the colonial era.
Turning now to the question of “valour”, and following Richardson, we must insist, from the 
outset, that the “valour” that is inherent in Heidegger’s conception of Dasein’s “potentiality-for- 
Being” is an ontological “valour” which is never to be confused, at root, with that specific type 
of ontically defined heroism that is found in the martyrdom of national patriots like Horatio 
Nelson or James Connolly; religious martyrs like Thomas More; or indeed any other type of 
martyrdom, from Steve Biko to Emily Davison. (This is not to say that the two are not 
potentially related, indeed, as we shall see, the former can be seen as that which, in certain 
cases, underpins and informs the latter. It is, nevertheless, imperative that we consistently bear 
this fundamental distinction in mind throughout the following explication.)
We have already seen how Dasein can grasp its own “Being-in-the-world” through the 
disclosure of its own “Non-being” (“Being towards death”) in anxiety and its subsequent flight 
from itself back into the tranquillised security of the “they”. So we must now ask at which point 
in this series of events does Heidegger understand Dasein to have “valour”. In his Preliminary 
Sketch of the Existential-ontological Structure of Death, he notes:
With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This is a
possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.^”''
Now, if we can identify “Dasein’s Being-in-the-world” as the “issue” we should, perhaps, be 
able to extrapolate that it is in Dasein’s resolution to endure this standing before itself in anxiety
also, his Appendix, ‘Kierkegaard, Division II, and Later Heidegger’, co-written with Jane Rubin, pp. 283- 
340.
Being and Time, II. 1, p. 294.
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that its potential for “valour” is to be found. Given the immanence of Dasein’s potential flight 
“in the face o f ’ itself, from its authentic “Being-in-the-world” back to its inauthentic “Being-in- 
the-world” in the “they”, does Dasein’s “valour” thus depend upon its ability to resist this flight? 
Heidegger says as much when he maintains that:
Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being-towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being - 
that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety 
brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for (propensio in...) the authenticity of its 
Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.'”®
The disclosure/apprehension of authentic “Being-in-the-world” thus brings with it the choice 
between authenticity and inauthenticity. But this fundamental choice, as “Being-free for” 
(Freisein fur), is qualified by Heidegger as a “possibility” and this corresponds to the emphasis 
that he has placed upon “potentiality” throughout his analysis. The “potentiality” of “Being-free 
for” is, nonetheless, not something that may not be, in the sense of something that has the 
potential to happen but may not; it is the constant “potentiality” that Dasein may or may not 
choose its authenticity in its “Being-free-for” that Heidegger is acknowledging. Dasein may not 
accept its “Being-free-for” it may instead retreat “in the face o f ’ it back to the forgetfulness of 
the “they”; but that possibility itself “always is”.
As we have already seen, when Dasein accepts the authenticity of its own “Being-in-the-world”, 
when it resists the flight into the “they” and accepts its own “Being-towards-the-end”, its own 
finitude, it anticipates its own death and it is this acceptance and anticipation which Heidegger 
calls “anticipatory resoluteness”
Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost
potentiality-for-Being -  that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence. 110
It is thus, not just, as Montaigne would have it, that “Your life’s continual task is to build your 
death”; " '  or that, following Cicero, that philosophizing is a preparation for d e a t h . I t  is the 
resolute retention of the understanding of “one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for Being” 
in life, as a “Being towards death”, in anxiety that Heidegger is describing here.
'”® ibid., 1.6, p. 232.
In order to maintain the emphasis upon the continual significance of “presencing” in Heidegger’s 
thinking, it is useful to note Macquarrie and Robinson’s insistence that “The etymological connection 
between “Entschlossenheit” (“resoluteness”) and “Erschlossenheit” (“disclosedness”) is not to be 
overlooked” {Being and Time, II.2, p. 343n).
Being and Time, II. 1, p. 307.
Michel de Montaigne, The Essays: A  Selection (London: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 31.
"2 ibid., p. 17.
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In our earlier examination of the “ecstases” we saw that “anticipatory resoluteness” was Dasein’s 
ability to grasp its own temporality as “the unity of the horizonal schemata of future, Present, 
and having been”. But the “authentic existence” that Dasein chooses in “anticipatory 
resoluteness” is, more importantly, also that fully individualised existence which is Dasein’s 
own."® In other words, it is only in “anticipatory resoluteness” that Dasein is authentically 
“Being-one’S 'S e l f ’ as opposed to the inauthentic (collective) existence of the “they-self’:
Death does not just “belong” to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays 
claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in 
anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualising is a way in which 
the “there” is disclosed for existence.'"
And this individualisation of Dasein in its “anticipation” of death is, of course, especially 
significant in the context of our own study given the homogenisation of the coloniser as ‘the 
colonising subject’ that we discussed in the previous chapter. For it is in the face of death, that 
these ‘colonising subjects’ are most fundamentally disclosed to themselves as the individuals 
that they themselves are. We wiU examine several instances of this ontological individualisation 
in death, in the chapters that follow and in doing so, it is essential that we recognise the fact that 
Heidegger does not mean that this individualised Dasein is subsequently estranged from the 
world, removed from it, as it were, in its individuality:
Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor 
does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating “I”. And how should it, when 
resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the- 
worldf^^
Dasein’s authentic “Being-in-the-world” is thus not transferred to some transcendental or 
suprasensuous plain, outside of, or beyond Dasein -  Dasein itself is transcendent. Hence, its 
potential to be authentically “its-Self ’ is grounded in its existence in the world. For indeed:
116Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own self.
But let us not forget that this authentic “Being-in-the-world” is terrifying. Bound up in the 
disclosure of authentic “Being-in-the-world” in anxiety is the certainty (Gewissheit) of “Non- 
being”, the certainty of death. Hence, “anticipatory resoluteness” in the face of that certainty
113 transcendence of Dasein’s Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity
of the most radical individuation” {Being and Time, Introduction II, p. 62).
Being and Time, II. 1, p. 308. 
ibid., II.2, p. 344. 
ibid., II.5, p. 443.
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constitutes what Richardson called, “that stout-hearted open-ness unto Being that alone can 
found genuine valour”. Indeed, Heidegger goes further still and maintains that:
When Dasein is resolute, it can become the “conscience” of Others. Only by authentically 
Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another -  not by 
ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternising in the “they” and in what 
“they” want to undertake.'"
The heroism of “anticipatory resoluteness” has thus an extended significance in terms of a 
potentially authentic Being “with one another”. And by this he means that in resolutely keeping 
the authenticity of one’s own “Being-in-the-world” as “Being towards death” before one’s self, 
and thus “Being-one’s-Self’, Dasein can interact and commune with the Others with whom it is 
in the world in a genuinely authentic way. But we must be careful not to pursue this too far in 
case it become confused with the psychological notion of a conscious resolution. “Anticipatory 
resoluteness” can inform Dasein’s psychological resolution but it is not that resolution itself.
The various definitions from the previous three sections -  “Being in Time”, as authentic 
temporality, death as “Being-towards-the-end” and anxiety as the “state-of-mind” in which this 
is disclosed -  are now seen to culminate in the fact that, for Heidegger:
Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein’s authentic 
Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness."®
In White Mythologies, Robert Young makes the following observation about, and issues 
warning to, critics of English literature:
Every time a literary critic claims a universal ethical, moral, or emotional instance in a 
piece of English literature, he or she colludes in the violence of the colonial legacy in 
which the European value or truth is defined as the universal one.'"
Does this mean that my adoption of Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic of Dasein in the 
critique of colonial literature which follows, involves my collusion “in the violence of the 
colonial legacy”? Are all universals, when claimed by a European, then automatically colluding 
in this “violence”?'®” And what makes it collusion? The European-ness of the “value or
'" ib id ., II.2, pp. 344-345.
'" ibid ., ÏI.3, p. 351.
Young, White Mythologies, p. 124.
See, for example, Chinua Achebe’s 1975 essay ‘Colonialist criticism’ in which he famously 
announced that he “should like to see the word universal banned altogether from discussions of African 
literature until such time as people cease to use it as a synonym for the narrow, self-revealing 
parochialism of Europe”. From H opes and Impediments: Selected Essays 1965-1987  (London: 
Heinemann, 1988), in The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, pp. 57-61, p. 60. See also, Charles Larson’s
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truth”," '  the European-ness of the “universalism”, or the European-ness of the desire of the 
critic to make the claim? This type of warning, while effectively prohibiting certain modes of 
interpretation, can, more importantly, be seen to slam the door on an engagement with the Being 
that we ourselves are. And yet, such warnings and prohibitions are a commonplace in 
postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis; for example, Benita Parry insists that:
When critics discern in Kipbng’s work insights into an essential human nature and a 
permanent human condition, they reveal their own complicity in notions of universality 
and class orientation.'®®
What Young and Parry are concerned with here is not just the liberal critical tradition which 
they see as having failed to address the serious colonialist, racist and supremacist dimensions of 
colonial literature.'®® They are more specifically concerned with, what Bart Moore-Gilbert has 
called
...a  direct and material relation between the political processes and structures of 
(neo)colonialism on the one hand and, on the other. Western regimes of knowledge and 
modes of cultural representation.'®''
And, as Ania Loomba has observed:
By pointing out how deeply its knowledge systems were imbricated in racial and 
colonialist perspectives, scholars such as Bernal, Said, or Spivak have contributed to, 
indeed extended, the discrediting of the project of the European Enlightenment by post­
structuralists such as Foucault. The central figure of Western humanist and 
Enlightenment discourses, the humane knowing subject, now stands revealed as a white 
male colonialist.'®®
earlier ‘Heroic Ethnocentrism: The Idea of Universality in Literature’, in which he argues that “The time 
has come when we should avoid the use of the pejorative term “universal”. What we really mean when 
we talk about universal experiences in literature are cultural responses that have been shaped by our own 
Western tradition”. ‘Heroic Ethnocentrism’, The American Scholar 42, 3 (1973), in The Post-Colonial 
Studies Reader, pp. 62-65, p. 63.
'®' See, for example, Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin’s claim that, “European theories themselves emerge 
from particular cultural traditions which are hidden by false notions of “the universal”,” and that “The 
political and cultural monocentrism of the colonial enterprise was a natural result o f the philosophical 
traditions of the European World and the systems of representation which this privileged” (The Empire 
Writes Back, pp. 11-12).
'®® Parry, Delusions and Discoveries, p. 219.
'®® For further examples, see Parry’s critique of Alan Sandison’s The Wheel o f Empire in ‘The Contents 
and Discontents of Kipling’s Imperialism’, N ew Formations, 6, Winter 1988, pp. 49-64, p. 51, and 
JanMohamed’s description of the “humanistic closure” in M.M. Mahood’s The Colonial Encounter, 
which “requires the critic systematically to avoid an analysis of the domination, manipulation, 
exploitation, and disenfranchisement that are inevitably involved in the construction of any cultural 
artefact or relationship.” ‘The Manichean Allegory’, in “R ace”, Writing and Difference, p. 78. 
Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics, p. 22.
Loomba, ColonialismIPostcolonialism, p. 66.
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If this is the case, the question which presents itself is whether or not Heidegger’s Dasein is “a 
white male colonialist”? Certainly, as I explained in the previous chapter, Heidegger’s ontology 
should not be confused with conventional ‘humanism’: as he explained in his ‘Letter on 
Humanism’ :
126Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of man high enough.
Nor can his work, as a whole, be easily accommodated within “Enlightenment discourses” 
given that it is precisely these discourses which he explicitly sets out to “deconstruct” 
{uberwindenf^^ in Being and Time', in The Basic Problems o f Phenomenology; in his Nietzsche 
lectures; and in the series of essays collected in The Question Concerning T e c h n o lo g y The 
fact that Heidegger has himself played an important role in the “discrediting of the project of the 
European Enlightenment” does not, however, free us from the accusation that in choosing to 
attend to the ontological structures of Dasein in colonial literature we will automatically be 
suppressing and eliding the oppressive and exploitative ideological dimensions of that literature.
But, then again, this accusation -  which effectively amounts to a charge of neo-colonialism -  
cannot have any authority if it is issued from a theoretical position which elucidates these 
dimensions in terms of an “Enframed” colonial reality and (falsely ontologised) coloniser and 
colonised. “[AJuthority can, indeed must, be analysed”,"'® as Said has said. And 1 am not 
arguing that it can not or should not be analysed. The ways in which individuals are influenced 
by their culture, nationality and race must and can be studied. I am not arguing that these 
influences do not exist, should not be taken into consideration, or should be replaced by an 
ontological interpretation.
Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, pp. 232-233.
See, for example, Jürgen Habermas’ description of Heidegger’s attempt to “break out of the enchanted 
circle of the philosophy of the subject by setting its foundations aflow temporally”. ‘The Entry into 
Postmodernism’, from Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity (Cambridge [MA]: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 
83-8, 97-105, in Thomas Docherty (ed.), Postmodernism: A Reader (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1992), p. 59. See also, Abraham Mansbach’s more extensive, Beyond Subjectivism: Heidegger on 
Language and the Human Being (Westport [Conn]: Greenwood Pub Group, 2002). For a general 
discussion of some of the key themes associated with the ‘human’ in Being and Time, see, for example, 
Richard Schmitt, Martin H eidegger on Being Human: An Introduction to Sein Und Zeit (1969) (Parkland 
[FL]: Universal Publishers, 2000); and, on the possible ethical implications of Heidegger’s thinking on 
humanity, see, Joanna Hodge’s H eidegger and Ethics (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), Chapter 
4, ‘What is it to be human?’, pp. 102-133.
See, for example. Being and Time, Introduction II, 6, ‘The Task of Destroying the History of 
Ontology’, pp. 41-49; The Basic Problems o f  Phenomenology, Part One, ‘Critical Phenomenological 
Discussion of Some Traditional Theses about Being’; Nietzsche, 4 vols., ed. by David Farrell Krell (New  
York: Harper & Row, 1991), in particular. Nihilism  (Volume 4), trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi, Chapter 2, 
‘Nihilism as the “Devaluation of the Uppermost Values’” .
Orientalism, p. 20.
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What I am arguing here, is that the fact of these influences, the reality of injustice, the history of 
exploitation, the horror of brutality and oppression, does not mean that we can subsequently cut 
the ontological cloth to fit the theoretical coat in our attempts to understand them. In other 
words, the ordering and securing of colonialism and the coloniser as “structured image” 
(GeBild), though initiated under the auspices of an irreproachable desire to uncover and explain 
the nature of exploitation, brutality and oppression, is not irreproachable in itself. Nor can all 
criticism of it be dismissed as merely neo-colonial. The question which concerns us, and the 
question which I will continue to ask, is not whether these colonial dimensions are present, but 
whether or not we have truly uncovered and explained them when, in the process of uncovering 
and explaining, the subject matter has been fundamentally distorted and manipulated.
The existential-ontological interpretation of the fictional coloniser in colonial literature that will 
be conducted in the following chapters does not constitute a neo-colonial elision of political or 
racial difference simply because it fails to provide broad gauged judgements on colonialism or 
offer up instances of discursive functionality. Far less is it an endeavour to identify and promote 
that which Harold Bloom calls a ‘primal aesthetic value, free of history and ideology’."" What 
is undertaken is a reading of these fictional representations as “beings in the world” instead of 
the theoretically constructed and colonially-determined automatons of colonial discourse 
analysis: not as the only correct or legitimate reading of the literature in question, but as a 
reading which is opens up new horizons of meaning which have thus far been overlooked.
In short, it is a reading which attends to the ways in which these characters can be seen to 
exhibit those fundamental modes of “Being-in-the-world” that Heidegger understands as being 
determinative and constitutive of Dasein’s Being. For, if these characters are to be examined as 
reflections and articulations, representations or descriptions, of the historical coloniser, and 
therefore capable of offering us insights into colonialism as a whole, then any correlations 
which are drawn between the two can be seen to automatically involve the positing or 
presupposition of a plane o f correspondence. And in colonial discourse analysis, this plane of 
correspondence is founded upon that which Neil Lazarus has called “a tendency to collapse the 
social into the discursive” via a belief in
...the inherent susceptibility of all social practises, conceived as signifying systems, to 
structural linguistic analysis.
Harold Bloom, The Western Canon: The Books and School o f the Ages (London: Papermac, 1995), p.
65.
Neil Lazarus, ‘Doubting the New World Order: Marxism, Realism, and the Claims of Postmodernist 
Social Theory’, Differences: A Journal o f Feminist Cultural Studies 3, 3 (1991), pp. 94-138, p. 122, 
quoted by Parry in Delusions and Discoveries, p. 3.
81
In contrast, the plane of correspondence upon which the following reading is based, is defined 
in terms of Heidegger’s description of the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein. And as 
such, it is important to recognise that the fundamental structures of Dasein’s “Being-in-the- 
world”, though undoubtedly complex, are nonetheless founded in the everyday, and concern 
what, how and that the human subject is in the world. It would therefore be a mistake to imagine 
that they are beyond the descriptive capabilities of the writers that I will be examining. H. Rider 
Haggard, Rudyard Kipling and A.E.W. Mason write about human beings and in so doing, they 
describe, however crudely and unintentionally, the a priori structures of Being which are 
constitutive of these human beings."®
In making this point, I am consciously drawing a distinction between Haggard, Kipling and 
Mason and the more familiar authors of existentialism; for example, Proust, Rilke and Hdlderlin 
who have self-consciously attempted to write Being and have been analysed and praised by 
Heidegger and others for doing so."® So while the writers in the following chapters are not 
engaged in the same creative and philosophical endeavour, they are, nonetheless, as describers 
of men, inevitably describing the Being of men, however coarsely. And it is this that I shall be 
focusing upon.
Hence, I am not seeking to make a ludicrous comparison between Haggard and Proust, nor am I 
attempting to posit Haggard as a pre-cursor (even an unconscious precursor) of Heideggarian 
existential-ontology. I am attempting to demonstrate the ways in which the characters in these 
books comply with, and exhibit, the fundamental modes of “Being-in-the-world” that we have 
been examining, and that these modes of Being disclose important insights into the colonial 
experience itself. For if the colonial experience, encounter, or phenomenon is to be understood 
at all, then we must, as Heidegger says in The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics:
...precisely avoid losing ourselves in some particular sphere which has been artificially 
prepared or forced upon us by traditional perspectives that have ossified instead of 
preserving and maintaining the immediacy o f everyday DaseinP ‘^
"® Furthermore, these writers are themselves “beings in the world”, as are the reading public, and this is 
especially important when we come to consider the ways in which authors and their readership have been 
“Enframed” in postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis’ deliberations upon the cultural politics 
of colonial literature and cultural imperialism at large.
"® See, for example, Heidegger’s H olderlin’s Hymn "The Ister", trans. by William McNeill and Julia 
Davis (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1996); his short essay on Holderiin, ‘Poetically Man 
D wells’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); 
and ‘Language in the Poem: A  Discussion on Georg Trakl’s Work’, in On the Way to Language, trans. by 
Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, 1:2:22, p. 91 (my emphasis).
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In other words, it must be understood as having been initiated and directed by the human bemgs 
that the colonisers and the colonised were, and not the artificially homogenised, un-worlded and 
de-humanised theoretical construct of colonial discourse analysis.
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CHAPTER III; Being in Time and the fictional coloniser
In Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic, Dasein’s individuality is ontologically grounded 
and made manifest in its “authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self’ (eigentlichem Selbst-sein- 
konnen). This means, Dasein always already has the potential to be itself, and it is this 
“potentiality” that is overlooked, if not altogether negated, in colonial discourse analysis’ 
homogenising representation of the fictional and historical coloniser as ‘the colonising subject’. 
The validity of this postcolonial homogenisation is thus, I would argue, not primarily disproven 
in the documenting of instances of non-conformity, eccentricity and rebellion; though these are 
undoubtedly significant in themselves', it is always already disproven, at base, in the 
fundamental ontological constitution of Dasein itself.
This is not to say, however, that all of the fictional and historical colonisers examined in this 
chapter are always authentically themselves; as we saw in the previous chapter, Dasein 
oscillates between its authentic and inauthentic modes of Being, between its own “potentiality- 
for-Being” and its “they-self’:
Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concemful Being-alongside and 
solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather 
than upon the possibility o f the they-self}
It is in the world of the “they” that the fictional and historical coloniser, as “they-self’, occupies 
itself with all of the various concerns of the “they”. In other words, it is occupied with the 
‘publicness’ of colonial society, the politics of colonial administration, the conceits and 
prejudices of race consciousness; in fact, with every conceivable collective ‘colonial’ affiliation, 
bigotry and affectation. At the same time, the fictional and historical coloniser as “they-self’ 
must also be seen to occupy itself with, and be concerned by, the peculiarities of its own 
everyday relationships, its own health, its own sexuality, its own family, addictions and 
interests:
Dasein’s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] 
itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is 
indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, 
attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something 
up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, 
discussing, determining....All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of 
Being.®
' See, for example, Bernard Porter, Critics o f Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 
1895-1914  (London: Macmillan, 1968).
® Being and Time, II. 1, p,308 (my emphasis)
® ibid, 1.2, p. 83.
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All of these circumspective dealings/ involvements,® encounters, associations and opinions, 
colonial and otheiwise, are, for Heidegger, the always ambiguous, always various 
characteristics of Dasein’s ontical “concern” (Besorgen):
The everyday interpretation of the Self...has a tendency to understand itself in terms of 
the “world” with which it is concerned. When Dasein has itself in view ontically, it fails 
to see itself in relation to the kind of Being of that entity which is itself.^
And yet it is precisely the “everyday interpretation of the S elf’ as the coloniser, the ‘white man’ 
and the ‘European’ and all of its colonial concerns that has been ontologised in colonial 
discourse analysis; an ontologisation which, I would argue, is responsible for the negation of 
Dasein’s “potentiality-for-being-its-Self’. As we saw in Chapter One, in colonial discourse 
analysis’ theoretical “Enframing” of the coloniser as ‘the colonising subject’, each coloniser is 
regulated and secured in such a way as to render it always already, and at every level of its 
Being, archetypically representative of the whole. And the point that I am making here, is that 
that which is ontologised in this regulation and securing is the coloniser’s “everyday 
interpretation of the Self’; for example, the everyday interpretation of Cromer when he opines: 
“the European is a close reasoner”.
Or, to put it another way, colonial discourse analysis concerns itself with the theoretical 
explication of the operation of this everyday ‘colonial’ (‘white’, ‘European’) understanding, and 
the organisation of it as coherently distinctive strains of colonial discourse. But as we have 
already seen, this “everyday understanding”, as the Being of Dasein’s immersion in the 
manifold ontical concerns of the “they”, is fundamentally resistant to such quasi-ontological 
organisations and explications. The theoretical edifice of an “Enframed” racial, political or 
national homogeneity in colonial discourse analysis is thus, I would argue, artificially 
constructed upon that which is, by its very nature, the foundation of Dasein’s heterogeneity.
Against this artificial homogenisation, I will concentrate, in this chapter, upon some of the ways 
in which the historical coloniser can be recognised as always already having the “potentiality- 
for-being-its-Self’; a “potentiality” which is to be found in the ways in which that coloniser (as 
Dasein) understands his/herself and exists as a “being in Time”, More specifically, I will argue 
that, in colonial literature, the depiction of certain basic modes of Dasein’s Being make manifest 
Dasein’s own ‘temporality’ and illustrate its own “potentiality-for-being-its-Self’; a
See, ibid, 1.3, p. 95.
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®See, ibid, 1.3, p. 115. 
 ^ ibid, II.3, p. 368.
manifestation and illustration, moreover, which can be understood to reflect the fundamentally 
heterogeneous ways in which Dasein and the world are delivered over to Dasein’s own Being as 
“there”.
1. Being in Time
Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in
terms of tim e.. .what we shall call “Temporal” determinateness.®
Heidegger calls the “specific movements in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself 
along” in Time, “historizing”.® And Dasein’s “historizing” is itself to be understood in terms of 
the distinction between the inauthentic “historicality”" of the “they-self’ (in the everyday) and 
the authentic “historicality” of “anticipatory resoluteness”. This distinction constitutes the 
fundamental ontological differentiation in Dasein’s understanding of itself as itself, in Time. As 
Heidegger explains, inauthentic “historicality” is characterised by the dispassionate 
retrospective and futural everyday consideration of past and future events; and authentic 
“historicality” is characterised by the ‘resolute’ projection of oneself upon the horizon of the 
past and the horizon of the future in such a way that one’s own “Being towards death”, and thus, 
one’s own “Being-towards-the-end” and “non-Being”, is dramatically disclosed. In both cases, 
the fundamental disclosure, or unconcealment, of where, what and how one is, as well as the 
disclosure that one is, is always characterised by “mineness”. And what is more, it must be 
understood that, for Heidegger, “Entities are grasped in their Being as “presence””. In other 
words, they must be comprehended with regard to “a definite mode of time -  the “Present” 
[“die ‘Gegenwart’”]”
(a) “Idle Talk” and the Inauthentic Temporality o f the “They”
Our Fathers in a wondrous age.
Ere yet the Earth was small, 
Ensured to us an heritage,
And doubted not at all
That we, the children of their heart,
Which then did beat so high.
In later time should play like part
® ibid, Introduction II, p. 40n. For Heidegger’s discussion and definition of ‘The Primordial Phenomenon 
of Truth’, see, Being and Time, 1.6, pp.262-269. See also, his description of the “primordiality” of the 
existential-ontological analytic of Dasein, Being and Time, II, pp. 274-278.
ibid, II.5, p. 427.
® ibid, II.5, pp. 429-439. 
ibid, Introduction II, p. 47.
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For our posterity."
Here Kipling articulates his understanding of a national past and future coalescing in the 
collective responsibility of the national present. For Kipling, “we” are the children of our 
fathers, the fathers of our children, the holders of a precious legacy; this is what “we” a re ."  As 
a definition of collectivity and purpose, Kipling’s poem summons up those “myths of 
nationhood” which Graham Dawson has described as providing “a cultural focus around which 
the national community could cohere”,"  As such, in Heideggerian terms, these myths represent 
a distinctive mode of the inauthentic historicality of the “they”. As a collective understanding of 
purpose they serve to facilitate the everyday interpretation and understanding of the Self in 
Time as the “they-self’. In ontological terms, the concept and burden of this understanding can 
be seen to represent the self-deceptive belief in the continuation of the Self in Time after death. 
By this I mean that, Kipling’s (and nationalism’s) projection of the Self in relation to one’s real 
and hypothetical ancestors and descendants, in abstract continuity, is an understanding which 
manifests Dasein’s avoidance of the “non-Being” that it itself is. It constitutes one mode of 
Dasein’s flight from death;" the flight from death in which Dasein immerses itself in the 
rhetoric of, for example, the collective eternity, purpose and identity which is evoked in 
Tennyson’s ‘To India and the Colonies’:
May we find, as ages run,
The mother featured in the son;
And may yours forever be 
That old strength and constancy 
Which has made your fathers great 
In our ancient island State...
Shall we not thro’ good and ill 
Cleave to one another still?
Britons myriad voices call.
“Sons, be welded each and all.
Into one imperial whole,
One with Britain, heart and soul!
One Life, one Flag, one Fleet, one Throne,’
" Rudyard Kipling, ‘The Heritage’, Rudyard K ipling’s Verse: Definitive Edition (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton Ltd., 1948), pp. 565-566.
"  In the later poem ‘The Birthright’ {Debts and Credits), Kipling describes this same legacy as an 
inheritance of precious stones, which “We neither guard nor garner, but abuse; / So that our scholars -  
nay, our children -  fling / In sport or jest treasure to arm a King; / And the gross crowd, at feast or 
market, hold / Traffic perforce with dust of gems and gold!” {Definitive Verse, pp. 761-762). The analogy 
thus serves to underline the pricelessness of the legacy bequeathed and the carelessness with which it is 
being squandered.
" Dawson, Soldier Heroes, p. 1.
" It would be interesting to examine this definition of nationalism, and a national afterlife as a flight from 
death in the context of the growth of a more fervent European nationalism in late nineteenth-century 
industrial Europe.
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Britons, hold your own."
For, as Heidegger says, the “they” “provides a constant tranquilisation about death” and what is 
more, “does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death”."  In holding out the 
myth of a collective national posterity, nationalism can be seen to tranquilise and mask the 
authentic ontological meaning of death as “Being-towards-the-end”. And this tranquilising and 
masking of death by the “they” is, for Heidegger, to be found lurking in what he calls the 
“chatter” and “gossip” of “idle tallc” (Gerede).
From the very beginning of his explication of “idle talk”, Heidegger insists that “The expression 
“idle talk” is not to be used here in a “disparaging signification”,"  and this must necessarily and 
constantly be borne in mind in what follows in this chapter and this study as a whole.
For Heidegger, “The “they” prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one 
“sees”” and it does this through language;
In language, as a way things have been expressed or spoken out [Augesprochenheit], 
there is hidden a way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted...The 
way things have been expressed or spoken out is such that in the totality of contexts of 
signification into which it has been articulated, it preserves an understanding of the 
disclosed world and therewith, equiprimordially, an understanding of the Dasein-with of 
Others and of one’s own Being-in. "
And this clearly brings us back to the ontological presuppositions which invariably exist in the 
ontical sciences previously discussed in Chapter One. But, whereas before, these 
presuppositions were examined in relation to the constitution of the existential-ontological 
analytic as a whole, here Heidegger describes their more specific ontological significance in the 
context of Dasein’s authentic and inauthentic historicality:
Idle talk...is the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein’s understanding when that 
understanding has been uprooted...Ontologically this means that when Dasein maintains 
itself in idle talk, it is -  as Being-in-the-world -  cut off from its primary and primordially 
genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its 
very Being-in."
" Alfred Lord Tennyson, ‘To India and the Colonies’, in H. and L. Court, The Romance o f  the British 
Empire (London; Samson Low, Marston & Co. Ltd., 1957), p. 41,
"  Being and Time, II. 1,p. 298.
"  ibid, 1.5, p. 211 
" ibid, 1.5, p. 213.
" ibid, 1.5, p. 214.
What and how Dasein and its world is, is “covered up” (yerdecken) in “idle talk”/"  and from 
this we can begin to draw comparison with Heidegger’s later description of the “challenging 
revealing” of “Enframing”.®' In both cases, what we are dealing with is the way in which Dasein 
comes to understand itself and its world, the way in which Dasein and its world are disclosed in 
themselves in the present, and not as a peculiarity of a peculiarly scientific method, but as the 
“kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s understanding and interpreting”.®® The “Enframing” of 
colonial discourse analysts and the “idle talk” of Kipling’s understanding of “heritage” are thus 
shown to be the same; not because they are both fictions, in the sense of Hobsbawm and 
Ranger’s “invention of tradition”,®® but because they both constitute a peculiar kind of 
“revealing”, an understanding and interpretation of what and how things are.
In pointing out that the “they” “prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how 
one “sees””, it is essential that we do not confuse this ontological characterisation (and its “idle 
talk”) with colonial discourse analysis’ conception of colonial discourse or indeed Gramsci’s 
ideological description of the dominant class and its hegemonic manipulation of popular 
opinion in order to retain political power.®'' The “idle talk” of the “they” certainly includes, and 
is made manifest in, Kipling’s appeal to “heritage” and “posterity”; but it cannot be confined to 
Kipling, or indeed the various ideological positions from which he is held to speak.®®
What I am suggesting is an altogether different conception of the operation of ideology and 
discourse, one that is founded in the Being of Dasein. For Heidegger, the expression “idle talk” 
denotes the collective wisdom of every conceivable ideal, virtue, law, value, fad, rationale and 
‘world-view’ which circulates and has currency in the ‘public realm’. So while we must
As Heidegger explains in History o f  the Concept o f Time, “The deficient mode of disclosing the world 
is the disguising of it, and the corresponding mode of covering up disposition is inversion” {History o f the 
Concept o f Time, 1.4 p. 273).
®' See also, Heidegger’s description of “Curiosity” {Neugier) which, in conjunction with “idle talk” 
{Gerede) and “ambiguity” {zweideutigkeit), characterises the Being of Dasein’s every day ness: Curiosity 
“concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known. Both this not tarrying in the 
environment with which one concerns oneself and this distraction by new possibilities, are constitutive 
items for curiosity; and upon these is founded the third essential characteristic of this phenomenon, which 
we call the character of “never dwelling anywhere” {Aufenthaltslosigkeit). Curiosity is everywhere and 
nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein -  a kind 
which is constantly uprooted” {Being and Time, 1.5, p. 217, my emphasis).
®® Being and Time, 1.5, p. 211.
®® The “invention of tradition” is “taken to mean a set o f practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly 
accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature which seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
The Invention o f  Tradition, p. 1).
®'' See, for example. Selections from the Prison Notebooks o f Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. by Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), pp. 245-246.
See, for example, Martin Green’s rather conventional assertion that “Kipling served the master class of 
an empire...He was not himself of the aristo-military caste, by physique, temperament, or heritage. He 
was its hereditary bard”. The English Novel in the Twentieth Century: The Doom of Empire (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 31, 20.
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certainly recognise the existence and influence of those social, cultural, political and 
environmental factors which poststructuralists call “discourses”, these are, as the “idle talk” of 
‘beings’, in their essence, necessarily non-specific, various and ambivalent. In other words, they 
are non-generalisable. The distinction being made here is thus to be understood as a distinction 
founded in a recognition of the ways in which these things can be thought; and as such, is not a 
comment on the superficiality of the ontical over the authenticity and depth of the ontological. 
“Idle talk” is, after all, that which we most concern ourselves with, feel most passionately about, 
identify ourselves with or against; it is the “talk” which affected to justify the annexation of 
Basutoland in 1868 as well as that which inspired the Boxer Rebellion in 1900; it is the public 
outcry at the slaughter in Amritsar in 1919, and the rhetoric behind Gandhi’s campaigns of Civil 
Disobedience.
In the specific context of the inauthentic historicality of Kipling’s “heritage”, however, a yet 
more pertinent example of “idle talk” is provided by Jean-Paul Sartre in his Preface to Fanon’s 
The Wretched o f the Earth:
You know well enough that we are exploiters. You know too that we have laid our hands 
on first the gold and metals, then the petroleum of the “new continents”, and that we have 
brought them back to the old countries.®*’
Far from being noble and heroic, the imperial legacy bequeathed to us by “our” colonial 
forefathers is, for Sartre, one which brings with it universal shame and guilt:
It is true, you are not settlers, but you are no better. For the pioneers belonged to you; you 
sent them overseas, and it was you they enriched....With us, to be a man is to be an 
accomplice of colonialism, since all of us without exception have profited by colonial 
exploitation.®®
Sartre’s conception of our collective ‘heritage’ in Time is, in contrast to Kipling’s, constructed 
in terms of the indissoluble link which he understands to exist between (direct and indirect) 
economic gain and moral guilt. George Orwell concurs, “We all live by robbing Asiatic coolies”
...and those of us who are “enlightened” all maintain that those coolies ought to be set 
free; but our standard of living, and hence our “enlightenment”, demands that the robbery 
shall continue.®®
®^ Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Preface’ to The Wretched o f the Earth, Franz Fanon, (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 
1990), p. 21 (my emphasis).
®® ibid., pp. 12, 21-22 (my emphasis).
Orwell, ‘Rudyard Kipling’ from Dickens, D ali and Others (1942), in Kipling and the Critics, pp. 77.
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Nonetheless, it is clear that Sartre, like Kipling, interprets and understands what and how “we” 
fundamentally are, “the settler which is in every one of us”,®" in relation to a common past. In 
both cases what we are dealing with is “idle talk” as the call to self-realisation, the positing (as a 
“covering up”) of what and how “we” are in ourselves, towards each other and in the future.
In drawing this comparison, I want to emphasise the crucial fact that there is no ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ to “idle talk”. This is because it denotes an ontological as opposed to an ethical 
characterisation. Furthermore, what we must continue to emphasise is that the non-specificity 
and ambivalence of “idle talk” and the “totality of contexts of signification into which it has 
been articulated”, means that we cannot detach and promote one strain of “idle talk” as wholly 
dominant and therefore universally determinative. For, in doing so, we ourselves are engaging 
in “idle talk”; the “idle talk” of “Enframing”; the “Enframing” which characterises colonial 
discourse analysis.
(b) “Idle Talk” and the Fictional Coloniser
So, if the “idle talk” of the “they” is fundamentally constitutive of the inauthentic historicality 
of the historical coloniser’s “everydayness”, what does this mean in the context of our 
investigation of colonial literature? What does an analysis of the everyday dispersion in the 
“idle taUc” of the “they” in colonial literature tell us about the historical coloniser’s 
“potentiality-for-Being-itself and its ontologically grounded individualisation”? And if it is the 
“they” which “prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees””, then, 
are we not, by introducing “idle talk”, attempting to establish the individuality of the historical 
coloniser in that very mode of Dasein’s Being in which it is furthest from itself -  as the “they- 
se lf’?
In order to clarify more fully the terms under discussion, we will return briefly to Edward Said’s 
definition of Orientalism, in which he describes the “uneven exchange between various types of 
power”, and in particular, his assertion that “power cultural” designates the “orthodoxies and 
canons of taste, texts, values” and “power moral” denotes the “ideas about what “we” do and 
what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do”.®" For Said;
It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism 
the durability and strength that I have been speaking about so far...[T]he major 
component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in 
and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all
Sartre, ‘Preface’, p. 21. 
®" Orientalism, p. 12.
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the non-European peoples and culture. There is in addition the hegemony of European 
ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental 
backwardness, usually overriding, the possibility that a more independent, or more 
sceptical, thinker might have had different views on the matter.^’
And it is precisely this concluding emphasis upon the “overriding” of independent thinking 
which underpins Said’s homogenistic conception of an ontologically conditioned European 
racism, imperialism and eurocentrism.^^
In general terms, these modes of “power” (as “hegemony”) are representative of “idle talk”, but 
as we have already seen, it is not in general terms that Said understands “power cultural” and 
“power moral” to function and have meaning. For Said, these modes of “power” are posited in 
terms of an explicitly prioritised Orientalist (and colonial) meaningfulness and, what is more, a 
comprehensiveness of application, operation and influence which assumes ontological 
dimensions. In other words, Said understands these modes of “power” as being fundamentally 
constitutive of the ‘European’, ‘white’, coloniser’s Being and that “what is thought, said, or 
even done about the Orient” is ultimately founded in them.
This is the hegemony of colonialism and colonial discourse, and as such it encompasses 
everything from the manly values that are imbibed on the playing fields of Eton to the protestant 
work ethic; from the sexual proprieties of the middle classes to the myth of a civilising mission 
and the sanctity of free trade. More accurately, these are the characteristic auxiliary structures of 
‘Englishness’ as “structured image” (GeBild) discussed in Chapter One; the ideological, moral 
and social frameworks which define the thoughts, words and actions of the English. And while 
it is incontestable that these values, ethics and myths have exerted a powerful influence upon 
whole generations of English men and women, the question which must be asked is whether or 
not Said, and postcolonial studies in general, has accurately understood and interpreted the 
extent and character of this influence in his critical assessment of the fictional and historical 
coloniser. To put the question another way, does Said’s concept of a ‘colonising subject’ that is 
fundamentally and exclusively organised in terms of these influences, as the ground of an 
assumed or asserted homogeneity, actually reflect what and how the fictional and historical 
coloniser is, or what and how these influences arel Or are we merely dealing in the custom- 
built “structured images” (GeBild) of academic speculation?
As Said himself makes plain, this question must, in turn, be referred back to the age-old 
problem of how to
ibid, p. 7.
See, ibid, p. 203.
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...recognize individuality and [at the same time] to reconcile it with its intelligent, and by 
no means passive or merely dictatorial, general and hegemonic context?^^
Said’s equivocation and inconsistency on this issue has been noted by, among others, Robert 
Young:
[I]n the most traditional, indeed theological, manner. Said wants to hang on to the 
individual as agent and instigator while retaining a certain notion of system and historical 
determination.^'^
And indeed, it is open to question as to whether or not Said succeeds in this most delicate of 
balancing acts; on the one hand, he contends that:
No scholar, not even a Massignon, can resist the pressures on him of his nation or of a 
scholarly tradition in which he works.^^
While on the other hand, in his 1995 ‘Afterword’, in something like a complete U-turn, he 
argues that:
No one has convincingly shown that individual effort is not at some profoundly 
unteachable level both eccentric and, in Gerard Manley Hopkins’s sense, original, this is 
despite the systems of thought, discourses, and hegemonies (although none of them are 
seamless, perfect, or inevitable).
In Culture and Imperialism, however, Said seeks to reaffirm his former position when he 
maintains that one of his “principle operating assumptions” in Orientalism had been that
...both learned and imaginative writing are never free, but are limited in their imagery, 
assumptions, and intentions.^^
So, in the midst of these vacillations, how are we to understand the nature of the influence 
which this “dictatorial, general and hegemonic context” has upon the individual? Or indeed, as 
Robert Young has observed, how are we to make sense of the “interesting theoretical difficulty” 
which arises in the analysis and person of Said?:
ibid, p. 9.
Young, White Mythologies, p. 134.
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[F] or if Orientalism as a discursive structure is so determining on this long history of 
writers about the East, how can he [Said] escape himself?^^
In other words, how are we to account for the existence of the privileged “observation 
platform”^^  from which Said hands down his analysis; a “platform” which recalls Merleau- 
Ponty’s famous description of scientific ‘high-altitude thinking’? And, more importantly, what 
are the repercussions for the legitimacy of this analysis when Said’s supposed discursive 
immunity is taken into consideration?
In short, how are we to gain an understanding (and working definition) of these influences 
which actually acknowledges their fundamental ambivalence and recognises both the possibility 
of individual dissent and “the totality of contexts of signification” within which that dissent or 
compliance is exercised? In the context of our own examination, these questions necessitate an 
identification and understanding of the ways in which the “ideas about what “we” do” can be 
seen to affect the fictional coloniser and determine what he/she does. Our earlier clarification of 
Heidegger’s phenomenological definition of “idle talk”, as an alternative definition of how these 
“ideas” work, means that we must examine the ways in which these influences as “idle talk”, 
and the actions which they prescribe, are fundamentally grounded in Dasein’s temporal 
existence as a “being in Time”.
As we have noted, Kipling’s understanding of himself and his countrymen as fathers and sons in 
Time is representative of the way in which “idle talk” covers up the “primary and primordially 
genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very 
Being-in”. At its most basic and straightforward level, this type of “idle talk” can be seen to 
underpin and dictate the patriotic sacrifice of a character like John Buchan’s Lewis Haystoun in 
The Half-Hearted, and not just Haystoun, but imperial and national martyrs of a similar ilk. On 
the eve of his final stand we are told how Haystoun
...felt the joy of a greater kinship. He was kin to the men lordlier than himself, the true- 
hearted who had ridden the King’s path and trampled a little world under foot. To the old 
fighters in the Border wars, the religionists of the South, the Highland gentlemen of the 
Cause, he cried greeting over the abyss of time. He had lost no inch of his inheritance.'^®
Haystoun can thus be seen to talce up the burden of Kipling’s responsibility, that which Said 
would call “power moral”; and in addition, in laying down his life for the greater good, 
Haystoun can also be seen to embrace an heroic pragmatism over his former scepticism and
Young, White Mythologies, p. 138. 
ibid, p. 139.
John Buchan, The Half-Hearted (Bath: Cedric Chivers Ltd., 1975), p. 309.
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inactivity: an inactivity which had arisen following his earlier condemnation of himself as a 
coward when he had failed to save the woman he loves from a potentially dangerous fall. (As 
the aged rebel Fazir Kfian explains, a man either “talks and allies itself with Bengalis and 
swine” or “lives in hard places and loves war”.'^ )^ The logic of Kipling’s “heritage” is thus the 
logic which demands and in some way affects to legitimise a certain course of (heroic) action 
over another; this is, after all, what “idle talk” does. But more importantly, the logic of this 
identification of the self in time with one’s heritage is the ground for the conviction that this is 
what one is: a conviction which is all too evident in the comparable episode in Conrad’s 
Almayer’s Folly when the proudly swashbuckling Dain anxiously anticipates being discovered 
by his enemies:
He would wait for his enemies in the sunlight, where he could see the sky and feel the 
breeze. He knew how a Malay chief should die. The sombre and desperate fury, that 
peculiar inheritance o f his race, took possession o f him...He saw the bearded faces and 
the white jackets of the officers, the light on the levelled barrels of the rifles...He would 
walk towards them with a smiling face, with his hands held out in a sign of submission 
till he was very near them...with a shout and a leap he would be in the midst of them, 
kriss in hand, killing, killing, killing, and would die with the shouts of his enemies in his 
ears, their warm blood spurting before his eyes.'*^
When considered in the context of colonial adventure fiction as a whole, this definition of “idle 
talk” -  as that which affects to legitimise what people do and how people are -  complicates the 
shaip distinction between romance and realism drawn by Walter Besant when he maintains that: 
“Romance gives pride of place to action, whereas realism focuses on moral choices”. I n  other 
words, the doing of heroic deeds in the colonial romances of an author like H. Rider Haggard, 
are always already predicated upon the morality of some strain of “idle talk”. And nor is this 
logic peculiar to Haggard, Kipling or colonial adventure; the same logic underpins the argument 
which Krishna urges upon the dispirited Arjuna in The Bhagavad Gita:
Whence this lifeless dejection, Arjuna, in this hour, the hour of trial? Strong men know 
not despair, Arjuna, for this wins neither heaven nor earth.
ibid, p. 27. See also, Haystoun’s friend, Hoddam’s comparable, “I used to compare him with Raleigh or 
Henri IV -  the proud, confident man of action” (p. 44). Buchan plays on the dichotomy between talk and 
action throughout the book: a dichotomy which is most sharply drawn in the contrast between Haystoun 
and his rival for Alice, the radical politician and ebullient “talker” Stocks. Moreover, in Haystoun’s 
fateful failure to be elected to government (he naturally stands as a Tory), he shows himself to be wholly 
unsuited to a life of “talk”, and, as a result, the door remains open for him to pursue his destiny as a man 
of action.
Joseph Conrad, A lm ayer’s Folly (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1986), p. 136 (my emphasis).
Walter Besant, The Art o f Fiction (London, Chatto and Windus, 1902), pp. 5-6, quoted by Bristow in 
Empire Boys: Adventures in a M an’s World, p. 120.
The Bhagavad Gita, trans. by Juan Mascaro (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962), 2.2, p. 9.
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This is the rhetoric which affects to make sense of the slaughter and misery to come; it is that 
which sergeant-majors bawl out to their wavering troops in the heat of battle, whether in the 
trenches of the Somme, the jungles of Vietnam, or the mountains of Kashmir; and as such, it is 
an important example of what Conrad’s Marlow famously calls the
...idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in 
the idea -  something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to.
In The Half-Hearted, it is thus the “idea” of Haystoun’s birthright, of his heroic forefathers, 
which he himself sets up, bows down before, and ultimately offers himself as “sacrifice” to:
For an instant the extreme loneliness of the exile’s death smote him, but in a little he 
comforted himself. The heritage of his land and his people was in this ultimate moment a 
hundredfold more than ever.'*®
The “heritage of his land and people” is that which, in “this ultimate moment”, defines 
Haystoun’s understanding of who he is and vindicates his immanent martyrdom, but more 
importantly, it is his heritage which gives him comfort in the face of his own loneliness and his 
own death as anxiety. In other words, it is that which facilitates his own flight from his own 
“Being-in-the-world”.'*^  In his seemingly conventional adoption of a seemingly conventional 
strain of “idle talk”, Haystoun is thus nothing other than himself. For, it can only ever be 
himself that is delivered over to him, both in terms of his own idiosyncratic understanding of his 
own “heritage”, as “concern” (Besorgen), and more importantly, in terms of the fact that these 
temporal processes, as Dasein’s “historizing”, are always already characterised by “mineness”. 
Moreover, it is crucial that we do not allow the apparent straightforwardness of Haystoun’s 
adherence to the “idle talk” of his own heritage to undermine our previous observations on the 
always ambiguous, always various characteristics of Dasein’s ontical “concern” and the “totality 
of contexts of signification into which...[idle talk] can be articulated”. Despite the fact that 
Haystoun’s uncomplicated loyalty would appear to illustrate the inauthentic historicality of 
Dasein’s dispersion in the “they”, we must not make the mistake of supposing that this strain of 
“idle tallc” is predictable and always applicable in every instance, nor that it cannot, of itself 
result in an ‘authentic’ commitment on Haystoun’s part to the matter at hand. For as we shall 
see, Dasein’s engagement with the “idle talk” of the “they”, as the inauthentic “historicality” of 
its own temporality, is not straightforward.
Joseph Conrad, H eart o f Darkness in Youth, Heart o f Darkness and The End o f  the Tether (London: 
J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1967), p. 51.
Buchan, The Half-Hearted, p. 308.
I shall elaborate upon the role o f “idle talk” in colonial heroism in more depth in Chapter Six.
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In A.E.W. Mason’s'*^  The Four Feathers, the family legacy which has been passed down from 
father to son, can once again be seen to advance its defining claim:
Father and son, the Fevershams had been soldiers from the very birth of the family. 
Father and son in lace collars and bucket boots, in Ramilles wigs and steel breastplates, in 
velvet coats with powder on their hair, in shakos and swallow-tails, in high stocks and 
frog-coats, they looked down upon this last Feversham, summoning him to the like 
service.'*®
The family portrait, as the encapsulation and physical embodiment of the ‘heritage’ that we 
have been discussing, is of course a recurring theme in colonial adventure fiction. The 
splendidly melodramatic scene in Haggard’s The People o f the Mist, where Leonard Outram and 
his brother Tom swear an oath on the family Bible before the portraits of their fore-fathers, 
vowing to recover the ancestral seat or die in the attempt, is an extreme case in point.
(Thus in the home of their ancestors, in the presence of their Maker, and of their pictured 
dead who had gone before them, did Thomas and Leonard Outram devote their lives to 
this great purpose.®®)
The summons which is addressed to the young Harry Feversham is, however, drowned out by 
the greater claim that is laid upon him by his own fear;®* a fear which stems from an evening 
spent in the company of his father and his old Crimea war comrades, where he finds himself 
terrified by their “stories of death, of hazardous exploits”;®^ stories of a different type of “idle 
talk”, the “idle talk” of honour and bravery, cowardice and fear. That same night, the young boy
...turned over in his bed and lay shivering. He saw in his mind a broken officer slinking 
at night in the shadows of the London streets. He pushed back the flap of a tent and 
stooped over a man lying stone-dead in his blood, with an open lancet clenched in his 
right hand. And he saw that the face of the broken officer and the face of the dead 
surgeon were one; and that one face, the face of Harry Feversham.®®
”*** In his uninspired but respectful critique of The Four Feathers in Play Up and P lay the Game: The 
Heroes o f Popular Fiction, Patrick Howarth provides us with the following character-sketch of its author: 
“Mason himself was a man who sought adventure and was well equipped to cope with it when it came. 
Actor, playwright as well as novelist, war-time officer in the Royal Marines, actively engaged in secret 
service work in Spain, Morocco and Mexico, he found recreation in exploring, sailing and 
mountaineering...[and] even succeeded, where other novelists had failed, in being returned as a Liberal 
Member of Parliament.” Play Up and Play the Game: The Heroes o f Popular Fiction (London: Eyre 
Methuen Ltd., 1973), p. 126.
‘*® A.E.W. Mason, The Four Feathers (London: John Murray, 1902), p. 17.
®® H. Rider Haggard, The People o f the M ist (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897), p. 17.
See Heidegger’s description of “Death does not just “belong” to one’s own Dasein in an 
undifferentiated way; death lays claim  to it as an individual Dasein” {Being and Time, II. 1, p. 308).
Mason, The Four Feathers, p. 11. 
ibid, p. 19.
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It is not the flight of the officer or the doctor from their duties, nor their public disgrace that 
Feversham dwells upon; it is, very explicitly, their deaths and their corpses. And thus, in 
contrast to the retrospective temporal orientation of his family tradition, this disabling fear is 
founded in the futural projection of his own act of cowardice, a projection which means death, 
and not in any metaphorical or symbolic sense, but death itself, albeit couched in the terms of 
the “they”. On the subject of Feversham's cowardice and what it is that he is afraid of, we 
should of course bear in mind Heidegger’s insistence that:
That which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid -  Dasein. Only an entity for 
which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid. Fearing discloses this entity 
as endangered and abandoned to itself.®'*
Indeed, Feversham spells this out in his later confession to Etline Eustace, when he says:
“That was my trouble always. 1 foresaw. Any peril to be encountered, any risk to be run -  
1 foresaw them. 1 foresaw something else besides... 1 foresaw the possibility of 
cowardice...1 tried to get the best of my fears. 1 hunted, but with a map of the country­
side in my mind. 1 foresaw every hedge, every pit, every treacherous bank.”®®
Harry’s later captivity in Dongola bears further witness to this anticipatory fear; for, in contrast 
to “that fortnight in Berber [where] a hope of escape had sustained him” and “there was no time 
for fear or thought”, in Dongola
...there was time and too much of it. He had time to anticipate and foresee. He felt his 
heart sinking till he was faint, just as in those distant days when he had heard the hounds 
scuffling and whimpering in a covert and he himself had sat shaking upon his horse. He 
glanced furtively towards the gallows, and foresaw the vultures perched upon his 
shoulders, fluttering about his eyes.®®
Time, a surplus of time, thus enables Harry to “anticipate and foresee” and what he sees is his 
own death. Yet despite these fears, anxieties and premonitions, before his disgrace and the 
adventure which leads to his captivity in Dongola, the young Feversham appears to comply with 
the summons of his forefathers by joining the army.
After completing an uneventful tour in India he returns home, but on the day before his 
regiment is posted to the Sudan for active service, his fear seizes him again and he resigns his 
commission. The night before his wedding in Donegal, Feversham receives three white feathers 
from his former friends, and a fourth from his wife-to-be when she learns of his disgrace.
®'* Being and Time, 1.5, p. 180.
®® Mason, The Four Feathers, p. 41.
56 ibid, p. 170.
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Rejected and reviled as a coward by the woman he loves and his fellow officers, Feversham 
retreats from society, an outcast, before determining upon a scheme to travel to the Sudan and 
retrieve his honour.
Thus begins six years of solitary exile during which he endures all manner of hardship and 
privation while performing the various feats of heroism which will convince his accusers to 
withdraw their feathers. And, while Feversham, no doubt predictably, succeeds in his mission 
and returns home to reclaim a now repentant Etline, it would nonetheless be a mistake to assume 
that his success constitutes the uncomplicated affirmation of the value-system (i.e. the “idle 
talk” of military duty and family honour) which denounced him in the first place.®^
In the course of the book, a very significant shift in attitude takes place with regard to the 
validity of that value-system, and this is perhaps most explicitly articulated in the contempt with 
which Ethne receives and dismisses Captain Willoughby, its most unapologetic and obnoxious 
spokesperson. In fact, at the very beginning of his adventure, Feversham himself makes clear 
that his efforts are not to do with the demands of his heritage and those social and familial 
conventions which he has broken; they are more specifically directed towards the possibility of 
redeeming himself in the eyes of Ethne:
“1 have a hope that if -  this fault can be repaired... we might still, perhaps, see something
of one another -  afterwards.”®®
So, in contrast to Lewis Haystoun, Feversham interprets and understands himself and his 
actions, what and how he is in the present and his hopes of a more private future, in terms of a 
future (and indeed a past) that is peculiarly his own and not that of family, country or the 
empire. Indeed, at his greatest moment of crisis, before the walls of Berber, when “the great 
loneliness of the place smote upon him, so that his knees shook”,®® it is not, as it was for 
Haystoun, the fighting tradition of his family that he draws upon to steel himself for action, it is 
something altogether more personal:
He dropped upon the ground, and drawing his coat over his head lay, a brown spot 
indistinguishable from the sand about him, an irregularity in the great waste surface of the
Only Harry’s father views his efforts in this light but as we are told throughout, General Feversham 
never “understood” his son and certainly, he is not aware of the nature of those private anxieties which 
led his son to take such drastic measures in the first place. In chapter twenty six, entitled ‘General 
Feversham’s Portraits are Appeased’, we are told that, according to Harry’s father, “The dead 
Feversham’s in their uniforms would not be disgraced” (ibid, p. 220).
®® ibid, p. 56.
®^ In fact such is Feversham’s distress that he “faced about and commenced to run, leaping in a panic 
alone and unpursued across the naked desert under the sun, while from his throat feeble cries broke 
inarticulately” (ibid, p. 85).
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earth. He shut the prospect from his eyes, and over the thousands of miles of continent 
and sea he drew Ethne's face towards him. A little while and he was back again in 
Donegal. The summer night whispered through the open doorway in the hall; in a room 
near by people danced to the music. He saw the three feathers fluttering to the floor; he 
read the growing trouble in Ethne’s face.. .Towards the setting of the sun he rose from the 
ground, and walking down towards Berber, passed between the gates.®®
The depth of Feversham’s initial loneliness and vulnerability in the world is thus powerfully 
emphasised in the stark image of him cowering upon “the great waste surface of the earth”, 
desperately trying to shut out the reality of his present; that point at which, for Camus, “the 
universe [is] suddenly divested of illusions and light”:
[When] man feels an alien, a stranger...His exile is without remedy since he is deprived 
of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorce between man 
and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.®*
We shall return to crises of this sort in more detail in the following chapter, but here, what we 
must focus upon is the complex series of Feversham’s subsequent temporal associations and 
identifications: the futural fear of death; remembrance of the past; and the interpretation, in the 
present, of this past in terms of a possible future after death. Indeed, focus upon these 
associations and projections as reflecting that which Heidegger calls the “moment of vision”; 
the moment when Dasein grasps itself as itself and for itself. However, it is important to note 
that the peculiarity of these associations and projections, as the things of Feversham’s “concern” 
{Besorgen), does not necessarily mean that these temporal projections are any more authentic as 
a result.
If we remember Heidegger’s insistence that, “When Dasein has itself in view ontically, it fails 
to see itself in relation to the kind of Being of that entity which is itself,” then Feversham’s 
romantic futural projection of himself in terms of the possibility of an afterlife with his 
estranged lover, as a lover himself, constitutes a failure to see himself in terms of his “ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being”. Far from being an aberration, this failure is, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, the temporal meaning of Dasein’s “everydayness”, it is how Dasein maintains itself in 
the ecstasis of the horizontal schema of the future, the present and the “having been”. But more 
importantly, it is necessarily characterised by “mineness”, the same “mineness” in Time which 
characterises the romantic futural projection of John Geste in P.C. W ren’s Beau Geste:
Love was all and love was enough, until I should return, bronzed and decorated, 
successful and established, a distinguished Soldier of Fortune, to claim her hand....I
®® ibid, pp. 85-86.
®* Camus, The Myth o f Sisyphus and Other Essays, p. 6.
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would then take my bride to be the admired and beloved Pride of the Regiment, a soldiers 
star and stay and queen., ..(Twenty is a great age at which to be -  with love in your heart 
and life before you...).®^
Like Feversham, and indeed Martin Decoud’s self-conscious and grandiose portrait of himself 
as the architect of an independent Sulaco, in Nostromof^ Geste’s ambitions for the future 
constitute what and how he is to himself, and what he must do in the present, but it is caught up 
with, and founded in, his concern for another. In a related sense, it is interesting to note here the 
closing scenes of Buchan’s A Prince o f the Captivity -  a significantly more sophisticated work 
than The Half-Hearted -  in which a British hero is once again brought to the brink of certain 
death. Following his last great heroic exertion in the Italian Alps, in which he saves perhaps the 
only man who can prevent world war from falling into the hands of the fascists, Adam Melfort 
is cut off, and with no escape, awaits his enemies and the end:
His eyes were no longer looking at clammy rock and lowering cloud, or the icy shoulder 
of the Pomagognon lifting through a gap of cliff... .They were on blue water running out 
to where the afternoon sun made a great dazzle of gold. He knew that he had found the 
sea that had eluded him in all his dreams. He was in a bay of white sand, and, in front, 
crested with light foam, were the skerries where the grey seals lived. The scents of thyme 
and heather and salt were blent in a divine elemental freshness. Nigel had come back to 
him -  he saw him skipping by the edge of the tide -  he saw him running towards him -  he 
felt his hand in his -  he looked into eyes bright with trust and love. From those eyes he 
seemed to draw youth and peace and immortality.®'*
In contrast to the gung-ho visions of identification which reassure Lewis Haystoun, i.e. a 
patriotic martyrdom and warrior tradition, here, the vision is of a more personal time and place, 
the time and place of his Scottish boyhood, Eilean Ban, and the memory of his lost son.
So, in the face of these contradictory determinants, how are we to account for this “concern” 
{Besorgen), as a criteria for action in the context of Said’s “power moral” and the “ideas about 
what “we” do”? As Heidegger says:
®^ P.C. Wren, Beau Geste (London: John Murray, 1929), p. 147. Unlike many of his contemporaries, 
Wren had first hand experience of serving in a colonial army. After obtaining an M.A. from Oxford, he 
travelled the world for five years, working in a variety of different and sometimes lowly occupations. He 
then enlisted as a trooper in the British cavalry, moving on to further service with the French Foreign 
Legion. For ten years he worked in India for the Bombay government as assistant director of education 
and physical culture before returning to the military. During World War I he fought with the Indian army 
in East Africa, rising to the rank of major before being invalided back to England in 1917.
®® As Decoud tells Mrs Gould, “I am not deceiving myself about my motives. She won’t leave Sulaco for 
my sake, therefore Sulaco must leave the rest of the Republic to its fate. Nothing could be clearer than 
that. I like a clearly defined situation. I cannot part with Antonia, therefore the one and indivisible 
Republic of Costaguana must be made to part with its Western province”. Joseph Conrad, Nostromo 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974), p. 185. And while Decoud may not be deceiving himself 
about his motives, his miserable death testifies to the fact that he certainly deceives himself about the 
strength of his own heroic resolve.
®'* John Buchan, A Prmce o f the Captivity (Edinburgh: B & W Publishing, 1996), pp. 321-322.
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Factically, Dasein is constantly ahead o f itself, but inconstantly anticipatory with regard 
to its existentiell possibility.®®
This being “constantly ahead of itse lf’ cannot be confined to an exclusively colonial realm of 
meaning. Nor, for that matter, can it be confined to idealistic visions of romantic love, for it is 
that which can also be seen to characterise: Dick Linforth’s ambition to finish the road begun by 
his father in Mason’s The Broken Roatf^; Nostromo’s desire for fame and public repute® ;^ 
Danny Dravott’s and Peachy Carnehan’s dreams of kingship in Kafiristan®®; and, the greed of 
the “pilgrims” in Conrad’s middle station.®®
In all of these cases, regardless as to whether or not they conform to stereotypes, or constitute 
and collude in what colonial discourse analysis would call oppressive colonial practises, what 
we must recognise is the fundamental way in which the individuality of these characters is 
constituted in and through the peculiarity of their own “concernful” projections of themselves in 
Time. But, more importantly, these private projections, existential disclosures and temporal 
orientations in “idle talk” -  as the inauthentic historicality of, for example, Kipling’s “heritage” 
and the futural and fearful projection of “Being towards death” -  all together reflect and bear 
witness to the fundamentally complex and often contradictory way in which Dasein is 
“stretched along and stretches itself along” in Time. Hence, not only are the conventional 
projections and orientations of “idle talk”, or Said’s “power moral” and “power cultural”, cut 
across and undermined by those of an idiosyncratic personal “concern” (Besorgen)', the two 
together, as the way of Dasein’s Being, can ultimately be seen to undermine the validity of any 
generally applicable conception of colonial agency which is understood to function within an 
exclusively colonial field of meaning and significance. In fact, it is only now, in the light of 
these observations, that the fundamental problems involved in the “positing of a general
®® Being and Time, II.4, p. 386 (my emphasis).
®® Like Charles Gould and the San Tomé Concession in Nostromo (which appeared 3 years before), 
Linforth is consumed by the, albeit slightly less glamorous, legacy of his fathers unfinished Road, and 
unlike Feversham is consumed by what he believes is his destiny in trying to complete the job. As his 
distraught mother explains to a friend: “Dick feels that work upon that Road is his heritage, if he wants to 
follow in his father’s footsteps, I shall not say a single word to dissuade him”. A.E.W, Mason, The 
Broken Road  (London: John Murray, 1907), p. 51. Needless to say. Mason’s treatment of the theme of a 
family obsession is markedly more generous and significantly less critical than Conrad’s.
Despite the fact that his escape with the Gould silver was “performed in obscurity and without 
witnesses,” we are told that, for Nostromo himself, it nonetheless had “the characteristics of splendour 
and publicity” which were “in strict keeping with his reputation” (Nostromo, pp. 341-342).
“We shall go to those parts and say to any King we find -  “D ’you want to vanquish your foes?” and we 
will show him how to drill men; for that we know better than anything else. Then we will subvert that 
King and seize his throne and establish a Dy-nasty”. Rudyard Kipling, ‘The Man Who Would Be King’ in 
The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 252-253.
®® “The only real feeling was a desire to get appointed to a trading-post where ivory was to be had, so that 
they could earn percentages. They intrigued and slandered and hated each other only on that account” 
(Heart o f Darkness, p. 78).
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colonial subject...omI o f in colonial discourse analysis can be more fully appreciated.
For if the coloniser is always already individualised as a “being in Time” in “concern” 
(Besorgen), its theoretical removal from Time (coupled with the artificial theoretical restriction 
of its “concern” to a peculiarly colonial realm of interest) fundamentally strips it of that which 
always already facilitates and constitutes its inherent “potentiality-for-Being-itself’.
2. Dasein’s Temporality -  Memory and the “there”
At the begmning of this chapter, we noted that Dasein’s “historizing”, as the way in which 
Dasein and the world are delivered over to Dasein’s own Being as “there”, must be understood 
with regard to “a definite mode of time -  the “P resen f [“die ‘'Gegenwart’”f \  And while the 
“idle talk” of the “they” is an important factor in determining the character of this ‘delivery’ (as 
disclosure), it is, as we have just seen, not the only factor, nor is it wholly determinative when 
present. For, running across, undermining, and in some cases contradicting, the directives 
inscribed in the “idle talk” of Kipling’s “heritage”, and all the other comparable values, 
traditions and conventions of ‘colonial society’, are the private directives which are inscribed in 
the individual temporal orientations of characters like Harry Feversham and John Geste. 
Amongst all these various orientations, it is, however, the temporal orientation towards the past 
-  in the form of vivid memories and sudden flashbacks -  which is perhaps most significant. 
This is because, for Heidegger, “In its factical Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is 
“what” it already was”; in other words “It is its past, whether explicitly or not”:
And this is so not only in that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along “behind” it, and 
that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present-at-hand and which 
sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein “is” its past in the way of its own Being, 
which, to put it roughly, “historizes” out of its future on each occasion.^*
Hence, those instances in colonial literature in which characters recall past events, are not 
merely the incidental recollections or chance day-dreams of a dimly apprehended nostalgia; for 
as Heidegger says, the
...attempt to explain memory as no more than a capacity to retain shows that our ideas 
stop too soon and too restrictively with the immediate data.*"^
No. These memories constitute what those characters are themselves, in that they are their own
™ Young, White Mythologies, p. 152 (my emphasis).
Being and Time, Introduction II, p. 41, See also, Heidegger’s later discussion of memory as “the 
gathering of thought” in What is Called Thinking?, I.I, p. 1.
Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, II.IV, p. 151.
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pasts in the way of their own Being/® As Merleau-Ponty observes:
[T]he consciousness of my past which I now have seems to me to cover exactly the past 
as it was, the past which I claim to recapture is not the real past, but my past as I now see 
it/"
This said, the individualising significance of these episodes will only become apparent to us if 
we approach these characters (and their historical counterparts) as individual human beings in 
the world of their experiences and not, as Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin would have them, in a 
reading of Kipling’s ‘Christmas in India’, superfluous bystanders in a system of signifiers:
The evocative description of a Christmas day in the heat of India is contextualised by 
invoking its absent English counterpart. Apparently it is only through this absent and 
enabling signifier that the Indian daily reality can acquire legitimacy as a subject of 
literary discourse.^®
In their laboured effort to read into the poem the discursive functionality of a sort of politically 
meaningful spatial dynamic -  wherein the evocation of the centre (as home) is understood to 
legitimise the periphery (as India) -  Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin actually manage to de- 
temporalise the memory itself. Kipling’s poem is thus stripped of the very thing that it sets out 
to describe, the memory, and as a result, that which is signified and constituted in the act of 
remembering, “Being-in-the-world” as a “being in time”,®^® is simply and conveniently 
disregarded. (And it is discarded too, by T.E. Lawrence in his description of “Class two” of the 
Englishman in the Middle East, “the John Bull of the books”, who “became more rampantly 
English the longer he was away from England”:
He invented an Old Country for himself, a home of all remembered virtues, so splendid in 
the distance that, on return, he often found reality a sad falling off and withdrew his 
muddle-headed self into fractious advocacy of the good old times. Abroad, through his 
armoured certainty, he was a rounded sample of our traits.^*')
Of the many writers who have considered memory as being fundamentally constitutive for Being, Cf. 
Samuel Butler’s assertion that all life is “the being possessed of a memory -  the life of a thing at any 
moment is the memories which at that moment it retains”. Unconscious Memory (London, 1880), p. 272, 
quoted by Jerome Hamilton Buckley in The Triumph o f  Time: A Study o f the Victorian Concepts o f Time, 
History, Progress, and Decadence (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 103.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology o f Perception, p. 69-70.
Ashcroft et al, The Empire Strikes Back, p. 5.
Cf. Kipling’s ‘The Moon of Other Days’, and the following from ‘The Broken Men’: “Ah, God! One 
sniff of England -  / To greet our flesh and blood -  / To hear the traffic slurring / Once more through 
London mud! / Our towns of wasted honour -  / Our streets of lost delight! /  How stands the old Lord 
Warden? / Are Dover’s cliffs still white?” (Definitive Verse, pp. 96-97).
T.E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars o f Wisdom: A Triumph (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), 
pp. 354-355.
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But furthermore, when pursued to its natural conclusion, does the logic of Ashcroft, Griffiths 
and Tiffin’s reading mean that every comparable colonial remembrance is open to the same 
charge? In other words, does this mean that, for example, Richard Burton’s casual description of 
the Maghrabi leader "Maula Ali," as “a burly savage, in whom I detected a ridiculous 
resemblance to the Rev. Charles Delafosse, an old and well-remembered schoolmaster”,^ ® 
constitute the evocation of “the absent and enabling signifier” in order to legitimise “Maula Ali” 
as a “subject of literary discourse”? And if so, how then are we to understand the recollection of 
the Assistant Commissioner in Conrad’s The Secret Agentl:
His memory evoked a certain old fat and wealthy native chief in the distant colony whom 
it was a tradition for the successive Colonial Governors to trust and make much of as a 
friend and supporter of the order and legality established by white men...He was 
physically a big man, too, and (allowing for the difference of colour, of course) Chief 
Inspector Heat’s appearance recalled him to the memory of his superior.^®
Is the native chief invoked as an “absent and enabling signifier” to “legitimise” Chief Inspector 
Heat? Is the colony invoked as the periphery to “legitimise” London as the centre?
It is not just the ontological fact of “Being in Time” which is disclosed in the memories of 
fictional and historical colonisers; these memories can also be understood in terms of the 
ecstasis of Dasein’s horizonal schema and its own fundamental “potentiality-for-Being-itself’, 
As such, the disclosure and apprehension of one’s past as that which one was and is, is the 
fundamental disclosure and apprehension of what and how one is, as well as where one is (as 
“there”):
When a man is asleep, he has in a circle round him the chain of the hours, the sequence of 
the years, the order of the heavenly bodies. Instmctively he consults them when he 
awakes, and in an instant reads off his own position on the earth’s surface and the time 
that has elapsed during his slumber.. .®®
And in the same way, in colonial literature, as in ‘reality’, memory can serve to situate the 
character in space. In The Four Feathers, this situation, as an apprehension of the ‘where’ of the 
Self, brings with it the added apprehension of the consequences of past actions via the contrast 
between the ‘then’ and the ‘now’. For example, during Feversham and Trench’s imprisonment 
in Omdurman, the two manage, through bribery, to gain a night of respite from the horrors of 
the House of Stone and, as they lie beneath the stars:
Sir Richard Burton, Personal N arrative o f a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah, Memorial Edition, 
2 vols. (London: Tylston and Edwards, 1893), vol. 1, Chapter X, p. 191.
''® Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1994), p. 102.
Marcel Proust, Time Regained {Swann’s Way, vol. I), trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin (London: Vintage, 1996), pp. 3.
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They were no longer prisoners in that barbarous town which lay a murky stain upon the 
solitary wide spaces of sand; they were in their own land, following their own pursuits. 
They were standing outside clumps of trees, guns in their hands, while the sharp cry 
“Mark! mark!” came to their ears. Trench heard again the unmistakable rattle of the reel 
of his fishing-rod as he wound in his line upon the bank of his trout-stream.®*
The random everyday remembrances of the past, which, it should be said, underpin the 
prisoner’s futur ally orientated dream of escape and the exile’s anticipatory dream of return,®  ^
can thus be seen to underline and draw into sharper relief the desperate circumstances of their 
miserable and precarious present.
Again, it is through memory (as “having-been”), and the contrast it provides, that the young 
Waverley, in Scott’s classic, becomes conscious of
...the wild dress and appearance of his Highland associates, heard their whispers in an 
uncouth and unknown language, looked upon his own dress, so unlike that which he had 
worn from his infancy, and wished to awake from what seemed at the moment a dream, 
strange, horrible, and unnatural. “Good God!” he muttered, “am I then a traitor to my 
country, a renegade to my standard, and a foe...to my native England?”®®
Hitherto caught up in the romance and adventure of the Jacobite Rebellion, it is only when 
Waverley hears the English dialect of the troops across the field in Preston that he remembers 
who he is and thus the heavy consequences of what he has done.®" Indeed, this is precisely what 
happens to Mersault in Camus’ The Outsider.
Only one incident stands out; towards the end, while my counsel rambled on, 1 heard the 
tin trumpet of an ice-cream vendor in the street, a small, shrill sound cutting across the 
flow of words. And then a rush of memories went through my mind -  memories of a life 
which was mine no longer and had once provided me with the surest, humblest pleasures: 
warm smells of summer, my favourite streets, the sky at evening, Marie’s dress and her 
laugh. The futility of what was happening here seemed to take me by the throat, 1 felt like
Mason, The F o w  Feathers, p. 242.
See also, Trench’s somewhat melodramatic, “There will be a morning when we shall not drag ourselves 
out of the House of Stone. There will be nights when we shall sleep in beds -  actually beds. There will be 
. . .there will be -  something m ore.. (The Four Feathers, p. 239).
®® Sir Walter Scott, Waverley (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1985), pp. 333-334.
See, Theodore Adorno’s somewhat turgid account of a similar disclosure of self in memory, through 
language, in Minima Moralia: “One evening, in a mood of helpless sadness, I caught myself using a 
ridiculously wrong subjunctive verb that was in itself not entirely correct German, being part o f a dialect 
of my native town. I had not heard, let alone used, the endearing misconstruction since my first years at 
school. Melancholy, drawing me irresistibly into the abyss of childhood, awakened this old impotently 
yearning sound in its depths. Language sent back to me like an echo the humiliation which unhappiness 
had inflicted on me in forgetting what I am”. Minima Moralia: Reflections from D am aged Life, trans. by 
E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1987), pp. 110-111.
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vomiting, and I had only one idea: to get it over, to go back to my cell, and sleep...and 
sleep.®®
It is in these terms too that we must seek to understand the painful recollections of Kipling’s 
Learoyd in ‘On Greenhow HilT when he is reminded of the moors in Yorkshire by the stark 
sub-Himalayan spurs upon which Mulvaney, Ortheris, and himself are waiting to shoot a 
deserter.®® His story ends with the death of Liza, the woman he loved, his enlistment in the araiy 
and his own sad reflection that: “I was a young chap i’ them days, and had seen naught o ’ life, 
let alone death, as is alius a-waitin’”.®^ In describing himself in Time, in looking back to Liza 
from the present, “I’ve been forgettin’ her ever since”,®® he acknowledges that death is always 
waiting, and that he is “Being towards death”. And at this point, it is important to reiterate 
Heidegger’s description of Dasein’s temporality:
The future, the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal 
characteristics of the “towards-oneself’, the “back-to”, and the “letting-oneself-be- 
encowaX&xed-by” ...Temporality is the primordial “outside~of~itself’ in and for itself. We 
therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, 
the “ecstases” of temporality.®®
In literary terms, Learoyd’s memory of himself as a young man in love, is juxtaposed in the 
present with the older man, in his official function as a British soldier in India, waiting to kill 
another. The dramatic effect of this juxtaposition is that Learoyd is shown to be both of these 
people; both of these people are him, simultaneously fulfilling his duty and the will of the 
“they” whilst privately mourning his past loss.
And because of this I would argue that we must disagree with Abdul JanMohamed when he 
says that “the colonialist text...lacks the domestic novel’s inconclusive contact with an open-
Albert Camus, The Outsider, trans. by Stuart Gilbert (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1974), pp. 104-105.
®® See, for example, C.A. Bodelsen, in Aspects o f K ipling’s Art (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1964) and his description of the “frame” within which Learoyd’s Yorkshire reminiscences are 
sandwiched between the introduction and conclusion in the Himalayas (p. 103). This structure is, 
Bodelsen observes, repeated in a number of Kipling stories, for example, ‘With the Main Guard’ and ‘The 
Courting of Dinah Shad’, and is pre-eminently comparable to the narrative style o f Conrad’s Marlow 
stories.
®^ ICipling, ‘On Greenhow Hill’, in L ife’s Handicap  (Macmillan & Co Ltd.: London, 1925), p. 93.
®® ibid., p. 95. In Sir Hugh Clifford’s short story, ‘In the Heart of Kalamantan’, we are told of how “Every 
man east o f Suez who is doomed to a lonely life cherishes somewhere at the back of his heart the memory 
of a girl at home, often blurred by time, often buried deeply beneath the sods which years of ugly life 
have dumped down upon its grave, but lurking there none the less, and rising ever and anon to haunt and 
torture like a mocking wraith of a dear one dead. Few men amongst us speak of these things, though each 
of us knows by introspection the existence of his fellows secrets.” ‘In the heart of Kalamantan’, in 
“Blackwood” Tales from the Outposts: Jungle Tales, Volume VIII (Edinburgh and London: William 
Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1942), p. 95.
®® Being and Time, II.3, p. 377.
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ended present”/® For what is disclosed in Learoyd’s recollection is just that, the open-ended 
ecstasis of Dasein’s “Being in Time”, as both a “Being-towards-the-past” and a “Being towards 
death” in the present. Learoyd exhibits that which Proust called a “sensation of weariness and 
almost of terror at the thought of all this length of Time”.®* The remembrance of things past 
brings with it the possibility of an explicit awareness as to the fact that one is in Time; that Time 
passes and death approaches. For Francis Yeats-Brown, when he returns to his old regiment 
after fifteen years in London, this awareness, as the call of “conscience” (Gewissen), brings with 
it a bitter sadness and the discomfiting realisation as to what he is in the light of what might 
have been:
I am on the shelf as far as these kind people are concerned, and I must escape from them. 
I feel weighed down by “sorrow’s crown of sorrow.” What complex is this? Perhaps I am 
jealous of the life I might have lived. I don’t know. All I know is that I must escape 
quickly from these scenes of my youth.®^
In The Four Feathers, such remembrances can, all too often, be seen to deliver Feversham over 
to himself in regret, and regret constitutes one of the most harrowing modes of “Being-towards- 
the-past”; as Francesca da Rimini tells Dante in the second circle of hell:
.. .The bitterest woe of woes
Is to remember in our wretchedness
Old happy tim es.. .®®
But moreover, it is regret which brings one before one’s fundamental impotence to rewrite our 
past.®" Thus for Feversham, upon his escape from Omdurman:
JanMohamed, ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory’, p. 88. For JanMohamed, “the colonialist wants 
to maintain his privileges by preserving the status quo”, and as a result, “his representation of the world 
contains neither a sense of historical becoming, nor a concrete vision of a future different from the 
present, nor a teleology other than the infinitely postponed process of “civilising””. In short, for 
JanMohamed, the colonial text “does not contain any syncretic cultural possibility” and it is “this alone 
[which] would open up the historic once more” (ibid., p. 88). JanMohamed’s notion of history and Time 
is thus entirely predicated upon, on the one hand, his overtly simplistic diagnosis of what the colonialist 
“wants”; and on the other, the supposition that history is somehow dependent upon that which he calls 
“syncretic cultural possibility”. In the case of the latter, the question we must ask is, why “historical 
becoming” should rely upon the representation of cultural syncretism? Does history cease when cultures 
are represented as remaining apart?
®* Marcel Proust, Time Regained {In Search o f Lost Time, vol. VI), trans. by C.K. Scott Moncrieff and 
Terence Kilmartin (London: Vintage, 1996), p. 450.
®® Francis Yeats-Brown, Lancer at Large (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1936), p. 41.
Dante Alighieri, Divina Commedia, ‘Inferno’, trans. by Dorothy L. Sayers (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books Ltd., 1979), Canto V, lines 121-123, p. 100.
®" See also Conrad’s Marlow who observes that, in regret, “that mysterious arrangement of merciless 
logic for a futile purpose” is revealed for what it is: “The most you can hope from it is some knowledge of 
you rself- that comes too late -  a crop of unextinguishable regrets” {Heart o f Darkness, p. 150).
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It seemed to him now that there was nothing more wherewith to occupy his life...and 
there came upon him all at once a great bitterness of despair for that futile, unnecessary 
mistake made by him six years ago. He saw again the room in London overlooking the 
quiet trees and lawns of St. James’s Park, he heard the knock upon the door, he took the 
telegram from his servant’s hand.®®
The line which separates reality and imagination, the present and the past, the here and the 
there, becomes so blurred in the extremity of Feversham’s regret that the very sounds of those 
times and places seem to come to his ears.®® In Time Regained, Proust describes such 
“resurrections of the past” as being so complete that
...during the second that they last, that they not only oblige our eyes to cease to see the 
room which is near them in order to look instead at the railway bordered with trees or the 
rising tide, they even force our nostrils to breathe the air of places which are in fact a 
great distance away...they force our whole self to believe that it is surrounded by these 
places or at least to waver doubtfully between them and the places where we now are, in a 
dazed uncertainty such as we feel sometimes when an indescribably beautiful vision 
presents itself to us at the moment of our falling asleep. ®’
Indeed, in Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Ebb Tide, these dreams in Time, or “resurrections of 
the past”, assume a yet more impressive shape when the impoverished Herrick finds himself 
back in London while steering the ill-fated Farallone (far alone) in the Polynesian ocean:
...the quay rose before him and he knew it for the lamplit Embankment, and he saw the 
lights of Battersea bridge bestride the sullen river. All through the remainder of his trick, 
he stood entranced, reviewing the past.®®
For these characters the relationship which exists between the ‘then’ and ‘now’, the ‘here’ and 
‘there’, is not, as Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin would argue, one in which the former somehow 
justifies or legitimises the latter as a subject of literary discourse. They are bound up in the 
Being of Dasein, as the way in which Dasein is.
So, while on the one hand, what we are dealing with is a key mode of expressing, clarifying and 
emphasising desperate loneliness in the present, on the other, these memories can be seen to
Mason, The Four Feathers, p. 261.
®® See also, for example, Melfort’s similarly vivid recollections in The Prince o f the Captivity, while he is 
escaping from the retreating Turks at the end of the First World War: “It was a nightmare time, but he 
was not unhappy, for a veil seemed to be lifting from his horizon. He had recaptured his own country. 
The most alien sights and scents were translated into the idiom of home. As he lay in the hot tamarisk at 
midday he smelled thyme and bracken, and under a sky of glittering stars he could make believe that he 
was belated on some familiar moorland. Especially in rain could he retrieve these links, for the odour of 
wet earth seemed to recreate for him a whole world o f ancient comfortable things.. .the lapping of green 
water and the tang of salt had carried him over great tracts o f space and time. He had found Eilean Ban” 
(A Prince o f  the Captivity, p. 64, my emphasis).
Proust, Time Regained {In Search o f L ost Time, vol. VI), p. 227.
®® Robert Louis Stevenson, The Ebb-Tide (London: Everyman, 1993), pp. 47-48.
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constitute a key mode of refuge and escape from that present/® Furthermore, it is important to 
note that these memories need not always be symptomatic of, or dependent upon, distress; for as 
we have seen, Dasein’s “historizing” is the way in which it always already maintains itself in 
Time in the everyday. Thus, for Mr Creighton, the second mate in Conrad’s The Nigger o f the 
Narcissus, the memories of the past are merely the romantic memories of young love, the 
reaffirming and comforting memories of love which define what he has:
[He] stood leaning over the rail, and looked dreamily into the night of the East, And he 
saw in it a long country lane, a lane of waving leaves and dancing sunshine. He saw 
stirring boughs of old trees outspread, and framing in their arch the tender, the caressing 
blueness of an English sky. And through the arch a girl in a light dress, smiling under a 
sunshade, seemed to be stepping out of the tender sky.*®®
Like Feversham’s and Geste’s private ambitions for future happiness, Creighton’s private, 
recollection of his sweetheart, though no doubt superfluous to the requirements of colonial 
discourse analysis, provides an important snap-shot of the individual concerns of an individual 
existence and indeed this is a recurring trait in Conrad’s fiction. In the same tale, and in the very 
midst of one of the most superbly violent storms in English literature, Conrad depicts the 
collective wretchedness of the crew “waiting wearily for a violent death”,*®* but at the same 
time, he consistently makes reference to them as individuals, and he does this through drawing 
attention to the intimate random details of their private recollections:
Now and then, by an abrupt and startling exclamation, they answered the weird hail of 
some illusion; then, again, in silence, contemplated the vision of known faces and 
familiar things. They recalled the aspect of forgotten shipmates and heard the voice of 
dead and gone skippers. They remembered the noise of gaslit streets, the steamy heat of 
tap-rooms or the scorching sunshine of calm days at sea.*®^
Everyone has these memories because these memories constitute the way of everyone’s own 
Being, they are, in short, the fundamental structures of everyone’s “potential-for-Being-
Herrick’s Arabian Nights tale of a magic carpet ride to London is an exceptional case in point (ibid, pp. 
14-15) and H. Rider Haggard, in When the World Shook (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919), goes a 
step further still when the hero Humphrey Arbuthnot is actually transported back to London by the evil 
wizard Oro.
*®® Joseph Conrad, The N igger o f  the Narcissus in The Nigger o f the “N arcissus”, Typhoon, and other 
stories (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1982), p. 29. In a similar episode in The Four Feathers, 
Colonel Durrance, Feversham’s oldest friend and brief rival for Ethne’s affections, recalls how, when in 
the Sudan he had unexpectedly heard a strain of some familiar music from his past: “I listened again, and 
a sort of haunting melody began to emerge -  a weak thin thing with no soul in it, a ghost of a melody, and 
yet familiar. I stood listening in the street of sand, between the hovels fringed by a row of stunted trees, 
and I was carried away out of the East to Ramelton and to a summer night beneath a melting sky of 
Donegal, when you sat by the open window as you sit now and played the Melusine Overture, which you 
have played again tonight” (The Four Feathers, pp. 151-152).
'®* ibid, p. 59.
*®^ ibid., p. 71.
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themselves”. And not just Conrad’s sailors, or us ourselves, but each and every coloniser that 
inhabits colonial discourse analysis, as ‘the colonising (white western) subject’ from Rudyard 
Kipling to Richard Burton and Robert Clive to Edward Thompson.*®® For, behind the 
expeditious shorthand of cultural studies, which “Enframes” these colonisers and their fellows 
as ‘colonial subjects’, ‘white men’ and ‘Europeans’; which understands their thoughts, words 
and actions as being synecdochically expressive of ‘coloniality’, ‘whiteness’ and ‘European­
ness’; these characters remain always already possessed of the fundamental potentiality to be 
themselves in, and through, the nature of their own temporality.
What this means is that if we are to understand these people for what they are, even as 
‘colonisers’, ‘white men’ and ‘Europeans’, exposed to all of the various discourses and ideas of 
Said’s “power moral” and “power cultural”, then we must recognise the way in which these 
discourses and ideas are complemented (as with Haystoun), contradicted and eclipsed (as with 
Feversham) and complicated by their individual “concern” {Besorgen) as “beings in Time”. In 
short, we must never lose sight of the fact that they are always already capable of having 
memories like Conrad’s Creighton or Kipling’s Learoyd, Stevenson’s Herrick or Mason’s 
Feversham, and not in the sense that we must feel sympathy, or even empathy, for these men; 
what is important is that these examples are recognised as testifying to the complex way in 
which “idle talk”, as that which “prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how 
one “sees””, is grounded in the inconstancy of Dasein’s temporality and the manifold modes 
and objects of its “concern”. Or to put it another way, the individuality of the historical 
coloniser, as the fracturing of Said’s artificial colonial consensus, is not primarily proven in the 
documenting of instances of colonial non-conformity, eccentricity and rebellion; it is always 
already disproven, at base, in the fundamental ontological constitution of Dasein itself.
In the previous chapter, we saw how the disclosure of Dasein’s “non-Being” in anxiety brings 
Dasein before the questions “Why?” and “What for?”*®" and it is in relation to these questions 
that we must understand the role of “idle talk” in the lives and actions which are depicted in 
colonial fiction. For if Dasein is confronted by these questions and flees in the face of what they 
disclose, it seeks comfort, security, and most importantly, a sense of purpose and meaning, in 
the everyday realm of the “they”. It is the inauthentic understanding of Self expressed in “idle 
talk” that can provide this sense of purpose and meaning, and as we saw with Lewis Haystoun,
Author of The Other Side o f the M edal (London: Hogarth Press, 1925), which Edward Said calls “an 
impassioned statement against British rule and for Indian independence” ( ‘Introduction’ to IQm, p. 25). 
See also, Benita Parry’s chapter on Thompson (5) in Delusions and Discoveries, pp. 153-185.
*®" See, Heidegger ‘What is Metaphysics?’, in Basic Writings, p. 109. Questions which must be sharply 
disassociated from Bhabha’s theorization of the “colonialist” question; “Tell us why we are here”. A  
question which, Bhabha tells us, “reveals that the other side of narcissistic authority may be the paranoia 
of power.” ‘Sly Civility’, in The Location o f Culture, p. 100.
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it can also be seen to elicit a sense of obligation which underpins notions of duty and dictates 
what one must do; a sense of duty and obligation as the “they-self ’ which, for Heidegger, 
represents Dasein’s entanglement and “lostness” in the “they”.
If we are to understand these actions as being predicated upon various strains of “idle talk” then 
we must subsequently seek to understand them in terms of the inauthentic temporality which 
belongs to “idle talk”. This means that the actions must be understood and interpreted as being 
done because of something or for  something, past and future. For example, because of an 
English heritage or for the good of Queen and country, because of personal greed or for 
romantic love. In saying this, we must therefore be careful that we do not artificially restrict our 
understanding of the temporality of action (and “idle talk”) to a purely colonial realm of 
meaning, or, give the misleading impression that these processes are applicable for every 
coloniser in every instance.
On the contrary, what we must continue to remember is that, these processes are founded in 
Dasein’s temporality, and as we have seen, they are always already, and in every instance, 
characterised by “mineness”. What is more, in addition to the peculiarly colonial strains of “idle 
talk” that we have been concentrating upon, the multifarious contexts, concerns and ways of 
Dasein’s immersion in the “they” and the diverse strains of “idle talk” which pertain to these 
contexts and concerns, means that the past and the future projections of Dasein’s inauthentic 
historicality (which can underpin Dasein’s various actions) must be recognised as being 
necessarily heterogeneous themselves. In short, we must recognise the full range of possibilities 
which constitute Dasein’s various ontical concerns, concerns which, as we have already noted, 
encompass everything from the idiosyncratic to the conventional, the private to the public, and 
are always already constituted within the horizons of Dasein’s own temporality.
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CHAPTER IV; “Being-in-the-world” and Death in Kipling
Kipling is a jingo imperialist, he is morally insensitive and aesthetically disgusting. It is 
better to start by admitting that, and then to try to find out why it is that he survives while 
the refined people who have sniggered at him seem to wear so badly.
George Orwell, ‘Rudyard Kipling’*
In our on-going examination of the fictional and historical coloniser upon a plane of 
correspondence that is defined in terms of Heidegger’s description of the existential-ontological 
constitution of Dasein, no single phenomenon, theme or subject is more important or revealing 
than death.
As we saw in Chapter Two, Heidegger’s existential-ontological definition of death is “Being- 
towards-the-end ” :
\p\eath, as the end o f Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility -  non-relational, certain 
and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of 
this entity towards its end.®
Within the broader context of the ontological schema, death is, moreover, the key futural 
phenomenon “towards” which Dasein is existentially orientated; indeed, Dasein’s “Being 
towards death” is, for Heidegger, the most fundamental orientation in Dasein’s temporal 
existence and its “Being-in-the-world” in general. It is that which facilitates “anxiety” 
(Unheimlichkeit) as an authentic “state-of-mind” and, as we know, it is in anxiety that Dasein 
can grasp itself as itself in its “potentiality-for-Being-a-whole”. In short, it is in relation to the 
disclosure of its own “Being towards death” that Dasein can itself come to an authentic 
understanding as to what and how it is in its Being. And, it is in these terms, that I will, in this 
chapter, examine the significance of death, and the work of Rudyard Kipling.
Following our examination of ‘the colonising subject’ as an artificially homogenised, un- 
worlded and de-humanised theoretical construct in colonial discourse analysis (Chapter One), 
this explanation will, in addition, demonstrate the ways in which death, and the fictional 
coloniser’s encounter with death, serves to constitute that fictional coloniser in the world of its 
experiences. But more importantly, this demonstration must itself be understood within the 
context of the fact that, in the drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality in 
colonial discourse analysis, the ontological meaning of death has been lost; in other words, it 
has been ‘gathered’ into the system of colonial discourse as a colonially meaningful signifier
* Orwell, ‘Rudyard Kipling’, in Kipling and the Critics, pp. 74-75. 
® Being and Time, II. 1, p. 303.
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like any other. For example, in her reading of Fanny Parks’s 1852 Wanderings o f a Pilgrim in 
Search o f the Picturesque,^ Sara Suleri asserts that:
[T]he Anglo-Indian domestic space is itself infested with tiny but deadly literalizations of 
India’s power to inspire fear."
Death has become onticalised as India, fear has become onticalised as the fear of India, and 
instances of this fear have become synecdochical of Anglo-Indian fear in India, in general. An 
important example of this general colonial fear is, for Suleri, to be found in the Anglo-Indian’s 
problem with caste:
Rather than supply the invader with a key to a system of cultural control, caste represents 
the symbolic invisibility of the peoples of India, and the disempowering fear that the 
colonizer cannot function as the other to a colonized civilization that had long since 
learned to accommodate a multiplicity of alterities into the fabric of its cultures. ®
I shall examine this notion of an homogenous colonial fear in Chapter Five, but what I would 
suggest at this stage is that the plane of correspondence upon which Suleri assesses fear and 
death, and the Anglo-Indian’s experience of both, is one which is artificially determined by the 
“Enframing” structures of a colonially, and therefore ontically, prioritised meaningfulness. As a 
result, I would argue that the Anglo-Indian coloniser, as “the invader” (and ‘discursive subject’), 
is removed from the world of its experiences, and entirely understood within the confines of that 
artificially restricted realm of meaning. It is thus not just the ontological meaning of fear and 
death which is “covered up” (yerdecken) in Suleri’s reading, the ontological constitution of the 
coloniser is simultaneously “covered up” as well.
In the wake of these observations, my examination of the fictional coloniser as Dasein and death 
as “Being-towards-the-end”, can be understood as an attempt to return to the historical coloniser 
as a “return to the things themselves”, as they are in themselves. For as we have seen:
The more appropriately the Being of the entities to be explored is understood under the 
guidance of an understanding of Being...all the more secure will be the perspective for 
one’s methodological inquiry.®
® Fanny Parks, Wanderings o f  a Pilgrim in Search o f the Picturesque, during Four-and-Twenty Years in 
the East; with Revelations o f  Life in the Zenana, 2 vols. (Karachi and London: Oxford University Press, 
1975). Parks was the daughter of a Major in the British Army in India, and Wanderings o f a Pilgrim  are 
her memoirs of the time she spent there.
" Suleri, The Rhetoric o f English India, p. 90.
® ibid., p. 19, (my emphasis).
® Being and Time, II.4, p. 413.
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And I will argue, that it is “under the guidance of an understanding of Being” that the 
prevalence and immanence of death in colonial literature and colonial society as a whole, should 
be understood and interpreted. For, if our objective is to attend to what and how the coloniser is, 
then we cannot dilute or overlook the crucial role of death in determining the nature of that what 
and how; both as a profoundly significant environmental factor (for example, in the death of 
others) and as the fundamental temporal orientation (as “Being towards death”) of Dasein’s own 
“Being-in-the-world”. In making this observation, and following our discussion of “idle talk”, 
we should, however, bear in mind the various ways in which death can exist as an issue for the 
fictional coloniser as Dasein; for while Dasein’s authentic conception of its own death is in 
every case its own:
(Death does not just “belong” to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays 
claim to it as an individual Dasein...This individualising is a way in which the “there” is 
disclosed for existence.®)
Dasein can also come to understand death in terms of the inauthentic ontical (biological, 
psychological and patriotic) conception of the “they”: as such, we must once again remember 
Heidegger’s important stipulation that “the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are 
ultimately existentiell, that is ontical”.^
1. Death and Rudvard Kipling
In his 1977 critical biography, The Strange Ride o f Rudyard Kipling, Angus Wilson maintained 
that:
Few writers are more constantly apprehensive of death than Kipling...The fear of death 
among Western men seemed to him a paramount obsession.®
Wilson frames this observation within the context of the series of highly significant deaths 
which beset Kipling throughout his life stretching back to the death of his younger brother in 
India before Kipling and his sister were sent to England in 1870; the loss of his only ally in the 
House of Desolation, “Captain” Holloway, in 1874;*® his future wife’s brother and his closest
ibid., II.l, p. 308.
® ibid., Introduction I, p. 34.
® Angus Wilson, The Strange Ride o f Rudyard Kipling: His Life and Worlcs (London: Panther Books, 
1979), p. 57.
*® See, Kipling, Something o f M yself (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1981), where Kipling 
describes Holloway as being “the only person in that house as far as I can remember who ever threw me a 
kind word” (p. 10). See also. Uncle Harry in the story ‘Baa Baa, Black Sheep’, in The Man Who Would 
Be King and Other Stories.
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friend, Wolcott Balestier in 1891;** his daughter Josephine in New York in 1899;*® and perhaps 
most devastating of all, the loss of his son John at the battle of Loos in 1915. 13
For Wilson, these deaths and, the grief, depression and illnesses which came in their wake, 
marked Kipling the writer as much as it marked Kipling the man; and not only in stories such as 
‘They’ (Traffics and Discoveries), and ‘The Gardener’ (Debts and Credits), in which he 
explicitly addresses the deaths of his own children. But, more notably in his development of, 
and passionate adherence to, a series of necessarily stoical and resolntely pragmatic 
philosophies which he hoped would stem the tide of desolation and despair that threatened to 
engulf him;
Kipling doesn’t subordinate the individual to society, he invents a rigid social rule (The
Law) to shield the individual (and himself) from a constant nagging anxiety about his
ultimate fate.*"
And yet, despite maintaining that his book is an attempt “to suggest that Kipling’s art is 
suffused with a personal and mysterious despair and apprehension”,*® Wilson does not elaborate 
upon the more specific nature of the anxiety and apprehension that he has identified. He merely 
“suggests” that Kipling sought to counteract that anxiety through “The Law”.
In one important respect then, the current chapter can be seen as an attempt to provide a 
philosophical (ontological) clarification of the nature of Kipling’s anxiety; a clarification which 
is lacking in Wilson’s otheiwise astute analysis. But more significantly, and in the wake of our 
discussion of ‘heritage’ in the previous chapter, this clarification will also involve an 
interpretation of Kipling’s passionate belief in, and literary celebration of, hard work, duty and 
loyalty as a flight from, and a masking of, death in “idle talk”. In other words, Kipling’s 
invention of “a rigid social rule” is, I will argue, fundamentally indicative of the ontologically 
grounded need, drive or will to believe that there is meaning, purpose and togetherness in the 
world in the face of the questions “Why?” and “What for?”. As such, “The Law” can, to a
** Kipling heard of Balestier’s death while on what was to be his final tour of India, calling short his trip 
and hurrying home to Carrie whom he married soon afterwards. See, the letters o f Henry James which 
describe the funeral and wedding, in Charles Carrington’s Rudyard Kipling: His Life and Work 
(Harmondsworth; Penguin Books Ltd., 1986), pp. 238-241.
*® As his sister Trix later recalled; “After his almost fatal illness and Josephine’s death -  he was a sadder 
and a harder man”. Quoted by Harry Ricketts in The Unforgiving Minute: A Life o f Rudyard Kipling  
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1999), p. 251.
In his Epitaphs o f the War, written three years after John’s disappearance, Kipling bitterly confronted 
his own role in the death of his son in ‘Common Form’; ‘If any question why we died / Tell them, 
because their fathers lied’ (Definitive Verse, p. 390). It was through Kipling’s intervention with Lord 
Roberts that John, who had already been turned down by the army on account of his poor eyesight, finally 
obtained a commission in the Irish Guards.
*" Wilson, The Strange Ride o f Rudyard Kipling, p. 173. 
ibid, p. 173.
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certain extent, be seen to comply with the basic criterion of Freud’s description of the 
“Weltanschauung” (or world-view) as
...an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly 
on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question 
unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place.. .Believing in it 
one can feel secure in life, one can know what to strive for, and how one can deal most 
expediently with one’s emotions and interests.^*’
And with the possible exception of The Jungle Books, this “overriding hypothesis”, as “The 
Law”, is perhaps nowhere more deliberately set out in Kipling, than in his 1898 collection of 
stories written during his time in America, The D ay’s Work.
Published three years after the second Jungle Book, The D ay’s Work can be understood, at one 
important level, as Kipling’s attempt to relocate the fable-Law of the jungle to a modern, and 
thus perhaps more relevant, age and setting. Drawing together material from India, New 
England and Rottingdean, as well as the ships of which he had written in Captains Courageous 
in the previous year, Kipling assembles a diverse collection of stories which, nonetheless, all 
together articulate the fundamental tenets of his pragmatic faith. Moreover, the book’s 
appropriately straightforward and down-to-earth title -  determined, Carrington tells us, by the 
inscription from John 9:2, ‘The Night cometh when No Man can Work’,^ ® which Lockwood had 
carved into the chimneypiece of ‘Naulakha’^^  -  operates as an exceptionally powerful 
organising principle in relation to which the multi-faceted and apparently random elements of 
Kipling’s faith which are depicted in the book draw their ultimate meaning.
The collection opens with the monumental technical triumph of the engineer Findlayson, in 
‘The Bridge Builders’, and his opium-induced vision of a congregation of Indian gods. As “one 
of Kipling’s most successful allegories about the collision between new Western technology 
and old Eastern s p i r i t u a l i t y t h e  story is, I would argue, chiefly concerned with the heroism 
(and necessity) of human achievement in the face of and despite an inexorable cosmic 
transience which must ultimately bring that achievement to nought. In ‘A Walking Delegate’,
Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, No. 35, ‘The Question of a Weltanschauung’, p. 
117.
A  relocation which is repeated in the later Puck o fP o o k ’s H ill and Rewards and Fairies, when Kipling 
turns to Suffolk and episodes from the history of England; in this sense, it stands as a thematic and 
stylistic bridge between the two sets o f stories.
John 9:4.
Carrington, Rudyard Kipling, p. 258.
Harry Ricketts, The Unforgiving Minute, p. 247.
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one of the two stories in the book to be set in the United States,^^ Kipling reinforces and re- 
articulates the laws of disciplined^ and hierarchy in his depiction of the upstart “yellow horse” 
and his revolutionary trade-unionism, which is rejected and derided by his wiser and saner 
fellows. The importance of the part functioning within the whole is then celebrated in the 
explicitly didactic Disney-like parable, ‘The Ship that Found Herself’; and in ‘The Tomb of his 
Ancestors’, Young John Chinn, like Lewis Haystoun and Dick Linforth, takes up the 
responsibility of his heritage, by continuing the work of his forefathers in Mundesur, At the 
centre of the book is the two-part story of the selfless toil of British men and women in India in 
time of famine, ‘William the C o n q u e r o r a n d  this is followed by the class conscious fable on 
team work (or play), ‘The Maltese Cat’ in which a determined team of polo ponies beat the 
Archangels to win the Upper India Free For All Cup. ‘The Brushwood Boy’, where “There’s no 
place like England -  when you’ve done your work”.^ "^  brings the volume to a close: at once 
complimenting, and to a certain extent, extending, the significance of the opening opium- 
induced dream sequence and challenging night-world of ‘The Bridge Builders’.
It would, however, be a mistake to assume that “The Law” as it is prescribed here is merely a 
conscious, or only intellectual, contrivance. “Idle talk” constitutes a fundamental way in which 
Dasein understands, interprets and maintains itself in the everyday, and it is precisely this 
maintenance of the self in flight, as the way in which people are, that Wilson identifies (albeit in 
non-Heideggarian terms) in his incisive description of the companionship of Mulvaney, 
Learoyd and Ortheris in Soldiers Three:
Mulvaney may be saved from the knife-edge by his wife’s steadfastness, Learoyd by the 
numbness of a lost past, and Ortheris by the fierceness of lifelong empty loneliness; but 
what gets them through the days, apart from the mechanical work that is almost done by 8 
a.m., is their companionship. It has none of the vocal chirpiness of the schoolboy trio of 
Stalky. They know each other’s hopeless emptiness. No easy Victorian emotional, let 
alone, modern physical explanation fully describes the reality. Its something that grows 
wherever men need protection from the seemingly eternal and intolerable future in 
boarding schools and on foreign service and in immigrant bidonvilles.^^
Kipling had left Anerica and returned to England following the public quarrel with his brother-in-law, 
Beatty Balestier, two years before.
For G.K. Chesterton, discipline was Kipling’s “primary theme”: “The real poetry, the “true-romance” 
which Mr. Kipling has taught, is the romance of the division of labour and the discipline of all the trades”. 
‘G.K. Chesterton “On Mr. Rudyard Kipling’” (1905) in Roger Lancelyn Green (ed.), Kipling: The 
Critical Heritage (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1971), P. 294.
For a characteristically complex ‘postcolonial’ interpretation of William as “New Woman”, see Gayatri 
Spivak’s A Critique o f Postcolonial Reason  (Cambridge IMA] and London: Harvard University Press, 
1999), pp. 157-161.
Kipling, ‘The Brushwood B oy’, The D a y’s Work, p. 389.
Wilson, The Strange Ride o f  Rudyard Kipling, p. 120.
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It is thus, not just, as C.S. Lewis argues, that Kipling “loves work for the sake of professional 
brotherhood”.^ *’ Nor is the primary reason behind his adoption and espousal of “a rigid social 
rule” confined to his apprehension of the “brutal truth about the world” that, as Lewis says
...the whole everlasting business of keeping the human race protected and clothed and 
fed could not go on for twenty-four hours without the vast legion of hard-bitten, 
technically efficient, not-over-sympathetic men, and without the harsh processes of 
discipline by which this legion is made. [The].. .brutal truth that unless a great many 
people practiced the Kipling ethos there would be neither security nor leisure for any 
people to practise a finer ethos,
Of course Kipling’s portrayal of male companionship in the Indian Army, the mercantile navy, 
the trenches of the Western Front and the Masonic Lodge ‘Faith and Works B.C. 5837’, is 
concerned with trade-craft and exclusivity, technical know-how and solidarity in accountability; 
but this companionship and loyalty is, I would argue, more primordially grounded in the 
universal (ontological) need for some form of “protection from the seemingly eternal and 
intolerable future” that is death:
Heart may fail, and Strength outwear, and Purpose turn to Loathing,
But the everyday affair of business, meals, and clothing.
Builds a bulkhead ‘twixt Despair and the Edge of Nothing.^^
But what of the “everyday affair” of Empire? Does this mean that a character lilce Creighton in 
Kim is to be understood as somehow balancing on the “Edge of Nothing”? That his covert 
orchestration of the ‘Great Game’ is to be understood primarily as a way in which he manages 
to stave off his existential “Despair”? Certainly not. For as we know, in inauthenticity, Dasein 
immerses itself in the world of the “they” (“business, meals, and clothing”), and Creighton’s 
‘Great Game’, the everyday administration of India, colonial surveillance, tax collection, 
famine-relief, plantation management, sight-seeing trips, bridge parties and polo matches belong 
to this immersion. Kipling is himself immersed in these things, in his life and in his writing. 
And as a result, work is often incidental to his other concerns; in the Simla tales, for example.
C.S. Lewis, ‘Kipling’s World’, from They Asked for a Paper  (1963), 'm Kipling and the Critics, p. 112. 
See also, Lionel Trilling’s comparable assertion that Kipling “lusts for the exclusive circle, for the sect 
with the password...he profoundly admires the technical, secret-laden adults who run the world, the 
overalled people, majestic in their occupation”. ‘Kipling’ from The Liberal Imagination (1943), in 
Kipling and the Critics, p. 90. Kipling himself was no stranger to social exclusion or alienation; when 
working in Lahore he was especially distressed at finding himself black-balled from the club (“the whole 
of my outside world”) because of his paper’s stance on the Ilbert Bill (see, Something o f Myself, pp. 42-
f ) - ^ Lewis, ‘Kipling’s World’, pp. 106-107. Echoing Lewis, Orwell argues that Kipling “sees clearly that 
men can only be highly civilised while other men, inevitably less civilised, are there to guard and feed 
them”. And it was this understanding which underpinned that “sense of responsibility” which Orwell saw 
as having drawn down upon Kipling the hate of the middle-class Left ( ‘Rudyard Kipling’ pp. 77-78).
Kipling ‘The Supports’ {Debts and Credits), Definitive Verse, pp. 767-8.
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there is no sign of that “unforgiving minute” which, as Lewis observed “is upon us fourteen 
hundred and forty times a day” and which he called “the truest and finest element in Kipling; his 
version of Carlyle’s gospel of work”/^ On occasions in Kipling, work and the worker is 
romanticised along with technology, as in the Pyecroft and McAndrew stories, and on others, it 
is bound up in the myths of a national history, as with Hobden, the guardian of the land and 
“Briton of the Clay” °^ in the Puck stories. In fact, at times, Kipling can even be seen to 
undermine the supposedly indubitable laws of his own social order: how, for example, are we to 
reconcile K pling the extoller of effective action in ‘William the Conqueror’, with Kipling the 
loafer in Letters o f Marque'f^ How are we to square our conception of him as a disciplinarian 
with his gleeful depiction of Stalky and his friends as “inveterate breakers of discipline”^^ ?
Where now is the Kipling we thought we knew -  the prophet of work, the activist, the 
writer of I f . .
when, in ‘The Germ Destroyer’, Kipling plainly laughs at a man with “a marked passion for his 
work”?^ '^  In short, all of these variations, apparent contradictions and subversions on the theme
of work are possible in the everyday world of K pling’s “concern”:5J.35
36What man hears aught save what each instant brings?...
is thus as true of K pling as it is of anyone else. But when “Heart” fails, “Strength” outwears 
and “Purpose” turns to loathing, work, and the purpose and companionship that it provides, 
assumes a new, and altogether more vital, significance. For at these times, it is work and 
companionship which protects us from the knowledge of the death (“Despair and the Edge of 
Nothing”) that we ourselves are as “Being towards death”: it is at these times, that the Bull, in
Lewis, ‘Kipling’s World’, p. 109.
Kipling, ‘The Land’, in A D iversity o f  Creatures (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1922).
For a postcolonial analysis of the psychoanalytical and discursive significance of ‘the loafer’ in 
Kipling, see, Gail Ching-Liang Low, White Skins/Black Masks: Representations and Colonialism.
Lewis, ‘Kipling’s World’, p. 111.
ibid., p. 112.
ibid., p. 112.
See also, Daniel Bivona’s critique of Lewis’s emphasis upon Kipling as “England’s foremost poet of 
work” and his own characterisation of him as “a novelist who sets out to undermine the facilely 
ethnocentric privileging of work over play or the “serious” over the “non-serious”” (Desire and 
contradiction, p. 46). Bivona makes this observation largely in relation to Kim, but throughout Kipling’s 
life and work, play operates as a constant and crucial counterpoise to the work and toil of everyday life: 
from his own construction of a magic circle of play in the House of Desolation (recreated in ‘The Story of 
Muhammad Din’) to the enchanting month which was spent every year at the Burne-Jones’s {Something 
of Myself, pp. 13-14) where play shut out the trauma of his abuse; from the anti-authoritarian games and 
mawkish practical jokes of Stalky to Mowgli in The Jungle Book stories where it is intimately bound up 
with the exercise of “The Law”. The point that I am making is that the variousness of these themes in 
Kipling’s life and work testifies to the fact that he is not categorically the one nor the other, a prophet of 
work or play, but both, depending upon the nature of his “concern” at any given time.
Kipling, ‘The Fabulists’ ( Traffics and Discoveries), Definitive Verse, pp. 545-546.
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‘The Children of the Zodiac’, pulls the plough not because he loves the furrow but because it 
distracts him from thinking of the Scorpion/^ That said, even this protection may, indeed, must, 
fail us -  ‘The Night cometh when No Man can Work’ -  and as we shall see, when it does, 
Kipling is alive to the terrors which result. For far from wishing to sidestep the issue, it is in the 
documentation of such terror that the fundamental value and necessity of “The Law” is 
hammered home.
Moreover, it is in these moments of absolute crisis, in the face of death and in the face of one’s 
own death, more than anywhere else, that the superficial trappings of his own “idle talk” fall 
away and Kipling’s characters can be seen to apprehend their authentic “Being-in-the-world”: 
not as work, duty, nation or Empire, but as a “Being towards death” when “the universe [is] 
suddenly divested of illusions and light”.
The underlying dynamic of Kipling’s fictional treatment of work, can thus, at the most 
fundamental level, be seen to correspond with Dasein’s oscillation between its inauthentic and 
authentic modes of Being. And it is this oscillation which is similarly reflected in the work of 
Kipling as a whole: as Lewis observes:
[Kipling’s] doctrine of work and discipline, which is so clear and earnest and dogmatic at 
the periphery, hides at the centre a terrible vagueness, a frivolity or scepticism.^^
It would thus be a mistake to imagine that Kipling’s doctrine of work is simply comparable to 
the ‘cut-and-dry’ sentiments of, for example, the young Winston Churchill, when he maintains 
that:
1 am clearly of opinion that no man has a right to be idle, whoever he be or wherever he 
lives. He is bound to go forward and take an honest share in the general work of the 
world.'^”
For while Kipling is, on the one hand, the all too proficient ‘idle talker’, issuing forth his 
inauthentic understanding and interpretation of the world and work in poems lÜce ‘The White 
Man’s Burden’ and ‘The Galley-Slave’ or stories like ‘The Mother Hive’ {Actions and 
Reactions) and ‘Below the Mill Dam’ {Traffics and Discoveries)-, getting carried away with the
See, Bonamy Dobree, ‘Rudyard Kipling’, from The Lamp and the Lute (1964), pp. 38-64, in Kipling  
and the Critics, p. 38.
Camus, The Myth o f Sisyphus, p. 6.
C.S. Lewis, ‘Kipling’s World’ in Selected Literary Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969), pp. 232-250, p. 243.
Winston Churchill, M y African Journey: A rare episode in the life o f the young Winston Churchill 
(London: New English Library Ltd., 1972), p. 39.
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schoolboy japes of Stalky/^ the high jinks of Pyecroft in ‘The Horse Marines’ (A Diversity o f 
Creatures); the hustle and bustle and ‘Being-with-Others’ of the Grand Trunk Road, and the 
gossip and scandal of Plain Tales fi'om the Hills. On the other hand, Kipling is also capable of a 
more authentic understanding and interpretation of himself and the world in his writing, and 
this, I would argue, is fundamentally grounded in, and expressive of, his intimate familiarity 
with death.
It is not learning, grace nor gear. 
Nor easy meat and drink,
But bitter pinch of pain and fear 
That makes creation think.42
As such, the prevalence of death in Kipling’s stories -  when understood as an ontological 
phenomenon, temporal orientation, and that which fundamentally underpins the “idle talk” of 
imperial rhetoric -  can be seen to facilitate (and reflect) those essential modes of Being and 
“states-of-mind” which are synonymous with Being an individual human being in the world of 
one’s own experiences.
(a) ‘'Our near companion... ”
Kipling, like Freud, possessed an innate fear and loathing of biography and biographers,"^^ a 
practice which he called the “Higher Cannibalism” and which, on the establishment, in 1927, of 
the Kipling Society, elicited the following angry response:
[H]ow would you like to be turned into an anatomical specimen, before you were dead, 
and shown upon a table once a quarter? It makes me feel naked as well as 
ridiculous...The whole thing is unutterably repugnant."^"^
At the very beginning of his autobiography. Something o f Myself, Kipling recalls his mother’s 
distress at finding a child’s hand in their garden in Bombay -  presumably dropped by one of the 
vultures which fed off the corpses left on the Parsee Towers of Silence."^  ^This incident can be
On the role of japes and hoaxes in ICipling, see for example, Phillip Mallett’s interesting essay, ‘Kipling 
and the Hoax’ in Phillip Mallett (ed.), Kipling Considered (London: and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1989), pp. 98-114.
Kipling, ‘The Benefactors’, Definitive Verse, pp. 340-342.
Adam Phillips, in D arw in’s Worms (London: Faber & Faber, 1999), has argued that Freud was 
exceptionally uncooperative with his future biographers, but this was principally due to the fact that, for 
Freud, biography “denies the essentially unformulatable logic of life” (p. 82).
Quoted by Ricketts in The Unforgiving Minute, p. 361. On a more personal level, this is, perhaps, one 
of the reasons why Kipling had such an aversion to keeping old letters; for as he told Sir Percy Bates 
towards the end of his life, “I have made a rule, ever since I was a youngster, not to keep letters. They are 
as bad as old photographs for harrowing up the mind” (in The Unforgiving Minute, p. 371).
Kipling, Something o f Myself, p. 8.
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seen to mark the beginning of Kipling’s long and often traumatic relationship with death; and is 
thus conspicuously placed in his famously guarded story of his own life. Moreover, it is the 
suddenness of death’s intrusion upon the peace of our everyday existences that is so vividly 
reflected in this anecdote and which was to be harnessed as a recurring theme in Kipling’s 
fiction. As Angus Wilson observes, this relentless return to death was founded in, among other 
things, Kipling’s conscious determination to show the English reading public the reality of 
death itself. Throughout his book, Wilson maintains that, for Kipling: “what was wrong with 
English society was that it feared death too much and accepted death’s reality too little”; and 
that this “refusal to face death as inevitable is something that strikes him most forcibly, in 
contrast to India”.K ip l in g ’s consistent and sometimes ruthless portrayal of death in his Indian 
stories can thus be seen as an attempt to redress this societal flaw:
[I]n a score or more of his stories of Indian life...in the early nineties, he tells them of 
Death ever present, death of children, death of young men on the edge of attainment or at 
the peak of their powers.
The fundamental obseivations in this, and the previous, quotation from Wilson are echoed by 
Philip Mason is his reading of Plain Tales From the Hills, when he asserts that:
One overriding impression which they leave is that sudden death is never far away, 
another that creative work is the best remedy against loneliness, and a third theme is the 
remorse for lost innocence and lost opportunity that tolls like a bell throughout much of 
his early work."^^
Death forms the “ever present” horizon against which the characters in so much of Kipling’s 
fiction are set, and this is the same horizon against which Kipling places himself in his accounts 
of life in Lahore:
From the modern point of view I suppose the life was not fit for a dog, but my world was 
filled with boys...who lived utterly alone, and died from typhoid mostly at the regulation 
age of twenty-two....Deaf/i was always our near companion. When there was an 
outbreak of eleven cases of Typhoid in our white community of seventy, and professional 
nurses had not been invented, the men sat up with the men and the women with the 
women. We lost four of our invalids and thought we had done well. Otherwise, men and 
women dropped where they stood. Hence our custom of looking up anyone who did not 
appear at our daily gatherings.
Wilson, The Strange Ride o f  Rudyard Kipling, pp 203, 207.46
The Strange Ride o f Rudyard Kipling, pp 206-207.
Philip Mason, Rudyard Kipling: the Glass, the Shadow and the Fire (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975), p.
64 .
Kipling, Something o f Myself, pp. 35 -36 (my emphasis).
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Here Kipling depicts a community drawn together and enveloped in death, a community in 
which an empty seat at the dinner table signalled the worst, and a community in which the worst 
could strike at any time.^ *^  It is this matter-of-fact elaboration upon the everyday fatalities of 
colonial life, spoken with the superior blasé of a seasoned campaigner, which was employed by 
Kipling in many of his early Indian stories.
Y ear by year England sends our fresh drafts for the first fighting-line, which is officially 
called the Indian Civil Service. These die, or kill themselves by overwork, or are worried 
to death, or broken in health and hope in order that the land may be protected from death 
and sickness, famine and war, and may eventually become capable of standing alone.^’
And it is this same sense of near inevitable death which is made yet more explicit in the dying 
lament of Orde, the Deputy Commissioner of Kot-Kumharsen:
Lord! how many men I lie here and remember...Morten’s dead ~ he was of my year. 
Shaghnessy is dead, and he had children; I remember he used to read us their school- 
letters; what a bore we thought him! Evans is dead -  Kot-Kumharsen killed him! Ricketts 
of Myndonie is dead -  and I’m going too. “Man that is born of woman is small potatoes 
and few on the hill”.52
Like the Old Testament’s Job, Orde catalogues the frailty of human existence and our common 
fate; or more accurately, the frailty and fate of English civil servants in India.^^ But in addition, 
Kipling draws attention to that which he sees as the bitter irony of English men and women 
dying to prevent the deaths of Indians; and for Kipling, it is this self-sacrifice which constitutes 
and confirms the heroism of his compatriots.^"^ A  self-sacrifice, moreover, which purports to 
define both the fundamental essence of Empire and its selfless foot-soldiers:
...By the brand upon my shoulder, by the gall of clinging steel,
By the welts the whips have left me, by the scars that never heal;
By my eyes grown old with staring through the sunwash on the brine, 
I am paid in full for service. Would that seivice still were mine.^^
See also, Kipling’s poem ‘Possibilities’ {Departmental Ditties); “Ay, lay him ‘neath the Simla pine -  / 
A  fortnight fully to be missed, /  Behold, we lose our fourth at whist, /  A  chair is vacant where we dine” 
ÇDefinitive Verse, pp. 43-44).
 ^Kipling, ‘On the City Wall’, in Soldiers Three (London; Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964), p. 262.
Kipling, ‘Head of the District’ in L ife’s Handicap, pp. 119-120.
See also, Kipling’s comparable description of loss in the army, in ‘The Courting of Dinah Shad’ {Life’s 
Handicap); “Today, of all those jovial thieves who appropriated my commisariat and lay and laughed 
round that waterproof sheet, not one remains. They went to camps that were not of exercise and battles 
without umpires. Burmah, and the Soudan, and the frontier, -  fever and fight, -  took them in their time” 
(p. 44).
' On the development of the theme of sacrifice in Kipling’s later work (from Puck o f P ook’s Hill), see, 
John Coates, The D a y’s Work: Kipling and the Idea o f Sacrifice (London: Associated University Press, 
1997).
Kipling, ‘The Galley-Slave’, De/m/UVe Verse, pp. 73-75.
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Not surprisingly this grim strain of imperial self-flattery has drawn considerable fire from 
postcolonial critics; for example, Benita Parry argues that:
The Anglo-Indians held it an achievement to suivive India, and in producing a literature 
of bombastic self-advertisement and cloying self-pity in which they featured as supermen 
and exceptional women, as marvels of efficiency and endurance, probity and moral 
excellence, they were manufacturing their own legend and demanding adulation from the 
British at home.^*’
But if Kipling can be seen to provide us with a (protective) definition of death and the Anglo- 
Indian in “idle talk”, Parry, in her homogenization of Anglo-Indian opinion, as an 
ontologisation of the ontical, “Enframes” that death and “the Anglo-Indians” within a peculiarly 
colonial realm of meaningfulness: in both cases, then, the ontological meaning of death as 
“Being-towards-the-end” is effectively “covered over”.
K pling’s belief in the inherently noble and humanitarian self-sacrifice of the British in the 
colonies has received no angrier a response than that of Jonah Raskin in his militant and often 
scathing study of colonial literature, The Mythology o f Empire. For Raskin, K pling’s idea of the 
Empire as the “heroic endeavour of fraternal white men, enslaving themselves to free black men 
and brown men from poverty and tyranny,” is “The big lie”.^  ^ And indeed, as Bart Moore- 
Gilbert has noted:
The depredation caused by disease and military hazards contributes substantially to the 
note of elegy which is so common in the fiction [of Anglo-India].^®
But while there can be little doubt that KpHng repeatedly plays the sympathy card in this 
regard, we are, nonetheless, still confronted with the death-toll itself and the difficult question as 
to how it could be accommodated in everyday life. In other words, while we can recognise the 
self-stylisation of Anglo-Indian self-pity, we must also recognise that it is, perhaps, the 
inevitable logic of a community that sought to justify the validity of its presence to itself in the 
midst of sickness and death. It is, an example of, the logic of “idle talk”; the rationalisation of 
purpose and worth in the face of the questions, why? And what for? It is the logic exemplified 
in, Curzon’s private secretary. Sir Walter Lawrence’s celebration of those “splendid men”, who
... working like slaves, their wives encouraging them, telling them that it was the greatest 
of England’s mission and endeavours, well worth the exile, the separation from children.
Parry, Delusions and Discoveries, p. 55.
Jonah Raskin, The Mythology o f Empire (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 53.
Bart Moore-Gilbert, Kipling and Orientalism  (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1986), p. 39. For a good 
review of these themes in Anglo-Indian fiction in general, see Chapter Two (“‘Gorgeous East” Versus 
“Land of Regrets’”), pp. 30-67.
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and the certainty of the scrap heap at an age when many are at their best...Their mission 
was clear; it was to secure the welfare of the millions, to prevent corruption and tyranny, 
to prevent and to fight famine, plague and pestilence and to ensure that every Indian 
should have the free right to enjoy unmolested the rites and rules of his religion, his caste 
and his tribe.
A logic which is here combined with the doubly righteous Enlightenment ideal of a free and 
democratic citizenry.*’®
In noting these sentiments, it is thus not my intention to suggest that “cloying self-pity” did not 
exist: it is, in the first instance, that we cannot ontologise this sentiment and assume that every 
British colonial was animated by a spirit of altruistic selflessness; and in the second, that these 
sentiments can perhaps be understood in relation to the ontological structures that we have been 
discussing.
For Kipling, the tragic reality of Anglo-Indian self-sacrifice was not, as Parry suggests, confined 
to the indifference of the British public at home, or the ingratitude of those they were attempting 
to help; it was epitomised in the indifference of the Anglo-Indians themselves. India may well 
be peppered with English graves, the graves of “our fathers” who “ensured to us an heritage” 
( ‘The Heritage’), but these graves are all too frequently forgotten:
All India is full of neglected graves that date from the beginning of the eighteenth century 
-  tombs of forgotten colonels of corps long since disbanded; mates of East Indiamen who 
went on shooting expeditions and never came back; factors, agents, writers, and ensigns 
of the Honourable the East India Company by hundreds and thousands and tens of 
thousands. English folk forget quickly, but natives have long memories, and if a man has 
done good in his life it is remembered after his death.*’^
As an appropriately anonymous end for those who had been heroically engaged in an invaluable 
but thankless task, these neglected graves represent, for Kipling, the crowning irony of Anglo- 
Indian endeavour: those same Anglo-Indians who bemoan the indifference of the British at 
home are themselves guilty of not paying proper respect where respect is due. Yet, in the 
somewhat macabre early poem ‘A Vision of India’, even this last indignity is represented as 
being part and parcel of the Anglo-Indian’s lot:
Sir Walter Lawrence, The India We Served  (London, 1928), p. 122, quoted by Parry in Delusions and 
Discoveries, p. 45.
*’" A  logic and idealism which can also be seen to underpin Philip Mason’s somewhat partisan, but 
nonetheless honest, study of Anglo-Indian administrators and soldiers, The Men Who Ruled India (New  
Delhi: Rupa & Co., 1999).
Kipling, ‘The Tomb of His Ancestors’, pp. 129-130.
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Mother India, wan and thin,
Here is forage come your way;
Take the young Civilian in.
Kill him swiftly as you m ay...
Brown and Jones and Smith shall die;
We succeed to all their places,
Bear the badge of slavery,
Sunken eyes and pallid faces.
Laughter that is worse than tears 
Is our portion in the land,
And the tombstones of our peers 
Make the steps whereon we stand.®^
The intimacy of this juxtaposition of the living and the dead in Kipling’s India is not, however, 
always drawn in such a grimly, if mischievously, ironic light. As a pastiche on Tennyson’s ‘A 
Vision of Sin’ (IV), Kipling’s tone is perhaps less stark than Harry Ricketts would have us 
believe.^^ For there is, in the thinly-veiled bookishness, more than a little of the schoolboy smart 
alickiy which characterised Kipling’s early verse (including Departmental Ditties) and which 
was celebrated in ‘The Propagation of Knowledge’ (Debts and Credits). K pling’s translation of 
Tennyson’s “Wrinkled ostler, grim and thin!” into “Mother India, wan and thin,” is nonetheless 
cleverly drawn and worthy of more attention than I am able to grant it here.
To return to the juxtaposition of the living and the dead; in ‘At the Pit’s Mouth’, an Anglo- 
Indian graveyard in Simla actually serves as the backdrop for an adulterous liaison, and Kpling 
makes an example of one of the frivolous and superficial club set who flagrantly disregard and 
dishonour the memory of their heroic predecessors:
Occasionally folk tend the graves, but we in India shift and are transferred so often that, 
at the end of the second year, the Dead have no friends -  only acquaintances who are far 
too busy amusing themselves up the hill to attend to old partners...She [“the Man’s 
Wife”] and the Tertium Quid enjoyed each other’s society among the graves of men and 
women whom they had known and danced with aforetime.®"*
The suggestion from the start is that the lovers will shortly be taken to their graves and that 
those graves will be forgotten too. And this is precisely what happens when the same Quid who 
had been frolicking among the graves of his former friends, falls to his death from a cliff road 
and is subsequently “lowered into eighteen inches of water, instead of the twelve to which he
Kipling, ‘A  Vision of India’, Andrew Rutherford (ed.), Early Verse o f Rudyard Kipling 1879-1889 
(Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1986), 223-4.
Ricketts, The Unforgiving Minute, p. 66.
®"* Kipling, ‘At the Pit’s Mouth’ (The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories), p. 200-201.
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had first objected”.®® Like The Boy in ‘Thrown Away’, everyone will have forgotten Quid 
before a fortnight is over.®® Nor is he alone in his ignominy; for throughout these stories, and 
beneath the grandiose formal rhetoric of his more didactically imperialist work (for example, 
The Seven Seas^^) Kipling is not afraid to show his compatriots, acting out the grubby intrigues 
of their hypocritical, selfish and shallow little lives: giving us “little Kodak-glimpses” beneath 
the decorous façade of Anglo-Indian Rule at “the affairs of idle military men, savage soldiers, 
frisky wives and widows, and flippant civilians”.®^
In addition to the graves and the legacy of their own dead, it is, however, important to note that 
Kipling’s Anglo-Indians are also confronted by the graves and the legacies of their subjects; for 
as he recalls in Something o f Myself:
The dead of all times were about us -  in the vast and forgotten Muslim cemeteries round 
the Station, where one’s horse’s hoof of a morning might break through to the corpse 
below; skulls and bones tumbled out of our mud garden walls, and were turned up among 
the flowers by the Rains; and at every point were tombs of the dead. Our chief picnic 
rendezvous and some of our public offices had been memorials to desired dead women; 
and Fort Lahore, where Runjit Singh’s wives lay, was a mausoleum of ghosts. This was 
the setting in which my world revolved.
And from this, and indeed, the previous extract on “our constant companion”, it is not difficult 
to see the literal truth which hides behind Wilson’s observation that, “In the midst of life we are 
in death is ...[Kipling’s] constant assertion about man’s daily being”.^ ® These nonchalant 
descriptions of picnicking amongst tombs and stumbling over skulls clearly reinforce our earlier 
observations on death’s intrusion upon the everyday; but K pling’s apparent inurement to the
®® ibid., p.203.
®® Kipling, ‘Thrown Away’, in Plain Tales from the Hills (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1990), p. 49.
®^ Described by W.D. Howell’s upon its publication in 1897 as having the keynote of “a patriotism 
intense beyond anything expressed by other English poets...Its patriotism is not love of the little England, 
“encompassed by the inviolate seas” on the west coast o f Europe; but the great England whose far-strewn 
empire feels its mystical unity in every latitude and longitude of the globe”. ‘W.D. Howells on “The 
Laureate of the Larger England’” , in Kipling: The Critical Heritage, p. 192.
®^ Robert Buchanan, “ The Voice of the Hooligan’: A  Discussion of Kiplmgism’ (1900) in Kipling and 
the Critics, p. 21. Plain Tales from the Hills is of course exceptional in this regard with its grim depiction 
of mixed-race relations ( ‘Lispeth’, ‘Beyond the Pale’ and ‘Kidnapped’), adultery ( ‘The Other Man’), 
race-fixing ( ‘The Broken-Link Handicap’), opium addiction and “going native” ( ‘The Gate of the 
Hundred Sorrows’ and ‘To Be Filed for Reference’). See also, ‘The Big Drunk Draf’ (Soldiers Three) and 
‘A  Wayside Comedy’ (The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories), as well as Departmental Ditties; 
for example, ‘The Man Who Could Write’ and ‘Delilah’. As Peter Keating has observed, “In the world of 
Departmental Ditties, people get what they are ruthless enough to plan for, not what they deserve”. 
Kipling the Poet (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1994), p. 19.
®'* Kpling, Something o f Myself, p. 36 (my emphasis). It is interesting to compare this extract with 
K pling’s unusual contribution to Filson Young’s The Complete M otorist in which he says that “in 
England the dead, twelve coffin deep, clutch hold of my wheels at every turn, till I sometimes wonder that 
the road does not bleed. That is the real joy of motoring -  the exploration of this amazing England” 
(quoted by Ricketts in The Unforgiving Minute, p, 289).
® Wilson, The Strange Ride o f Rudyard Kipling, p. 186.
128
horror of such scenes can, in addition, be seen to serve as an illustration of the way in which 
Dasein comes to accommodate death in its tranquilised and inauthentic immersion in the “they”. 
Like Tertium Quid, Kipling is able to enjoy himself among the dead. However, this is not 
always the case; in ‘The City of Dreadful Night’, he encounters
...a  disused Mohamedan burial-ground, where the jawless skulls and rough-butted shank- 
bones, heartlessly exposed by the July rains, glimmered like mother o’pearl on the rain- 
channelled soil.’*
This time, there is no nonchalance and there are no picnics to be had, for the dead intrude upon 
the young Kipling in such a way that, lilce James Thompson in the original poem, he awakes 
“from daydreams to this real night”’  ^ and Lahore is revealed for what it is; a place of Death, a 
city of corpses;
[0]n either side of the road lay corpses disposed on beds in fantastic attitudes -  one 
hundred and seventy bodies of men. Some shrouded all in white with bound-up mouths; 
some naked and black as ebony in the strong light; and one -  that lay face upwards with 
dropped jaw, far away from the others -  silvery white and ashen gray.’®
But of course, as we read on, we realise that they are not dead, they are only sleeping. Our 
startling first impression nonetheless lingers with us, an impression which Kipling exploits to 
set and then maintain the appropriately eerie and solitary mood.
The living lie alongside the bones of their forefathers in the burial grounds, the former soon to 
be like the latter, and the latter once the former.’"* All around him, Kipling apprehends the truth 
of man’s mortahty, and in this apprehension the everyday distinction between the living and the 
dead is passed over. As the only one awake, Kipling is the only one alive. Beyond the obvious 
self-stylisation of this Orpheus-like descent into the Indian underworld, Kipling, the seer, is 
describing the realisation that he is “in the world”, as well as the nature of his engagement with 
it, “Stripped naked of all vesture that beguiles”’®; a world in which he is “Being towards death”; 
a world in which he is fundamentally alone. At the end of the story, as he stands upon the walls 
of the Mosque of Wazir Khan, he sees:
Kipling, ‘The City of Dreadful Night’ {Life’s Handicap), p. 370.
James Thompson, ‘The City of Dreadful Night’, in The City o f Dreadful Night and Other Poems
(London: P.J. & A.E. Dobell, 1922), XII: 28.
Kipling, ‘The City of Dreadful Night’, p. 371.
“I have seen phantoms there that were as men / A id  men that were as phantoms flit and roam ...”
Thompson, ‘The City of Dreadful Night’, VII: 15-16.
’® Thompson, ‘The City of Dreadful Night’, Proem: lines 8-11
129
A woman’s corpse going down to the buriiing-ghat, and a bystander says, “She died at 
midnight from the heat.”’®
The woman’s passing from life into death leads Kipling to end the story by confirming that 
which we have known all along; “the city was of Death as well as Night after all”” ; one in 
which the dead, the dying and the soon-to-die all lie side by side in the night.
Kipling’s descriptions of corpses littering the streets of Lahore in ‘The City of Dreadful Night’ 
is, in addition, a chilling early prelude to the descent into wholesale misery and loss that is 
described in his later tales of cholera. By this I mean that the arrival of cholera, and the 
thousands, often tens of thousands, of deaths that ensue, only seives to confirm, emphasise and 
accelerate that which was already there: Kipling’s description of a city of corpses needs only 
cholera to make it true:
[A]t each station they dragged out the dead and the dying. They died by the roadside, and 
the horses of the Englishmen shied at the coi-pses in the grass...The city below them was 
locked up in its own torments...They heard the wailing in the houses of the dead, and 
once the shriek of a mother who had lost a child and was calling for its return. In the gray 
dawn they saw the dead borne out through the city gates, each litter with its own little 
knot of mourners.’®
In Kipling’s India, no other hardship that need be endured is portrayed as being more 
devastating than cholera, not even war.’® But more specifically, in its unpredictability, its 
inescapability and its indiscrimination cholera perpetually serves to illustrate the common 
vulnerability and transience of man’s existence. Beneath the anonymity of death-counts and 
collective misery, in ‘Only a Subaltern’ Kipling can be seen to intuit the peculiarly intimate and 
personal bond which exists between the sick and those who nurse them. As Gerard Manley 
Hopkins says, “This seeing the sick endears them to us, us too it endears”.®® Echoing Hopkins’ 
grief at the wasting away of the “big-boned and hardy” farrier, Felix Randall, Kipling mourns 
the desperate fate of the common soldier who, despite his strength and spirit, is nonetheless laid 
low:
76 Kipling, ‘The City of Dreadful Night’, p.380
”  ibid, p. 380.
’® Kipling, ‘Without Benefit o f Clergy’ {Life’s Handicap), pp. 174-176. Cf. Kipling’s first-hand accounts 
of the devastating impact of typhoid and dysentery on British troops in the Boer War, Something o f  
Myself, pp. 116-117.
’® A id  not even famine. Kipling’s descriptions of famine in ‘William the Conqueror’ (The D a y’s Work), 
for example, as well as being offset by the emerging relationship between Scott and William, concentrates 
more upon the individual efforts of the Administration to bring relief than it does upon the human misery 
and devastation.
Gerard Manly Hopkins, ‘Felix Randal’ in James Reeves (ed.), Selected Poems o f G.M. Hopkins 
(London: Heinemann, 1982), p. 47.
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We’ve got the cholerer in the camp -  its worse than forty fights;
W e’re dyin’ in the wilderness the same as Isrulites.
Its before us, an’ be’ind us, an’ we cannot get away 
An’ the doctor’s just reported w e’ve ten more to-day!®*
Here in ‘Cholera Camp’, Kipling conveys, not just the tragic inability of strong men to defeat or 
escape the disease, but their isolation and a stultifying helplessness. The repetition of the closing 
refrain, “ten more to-day”, convinces us of the inevitable, remorseless, ever increasing, death- 
toll.
As Wilson has observed, K pling hammers home the point that no one is immune; officers, 
soldiers, natives and children of every race and creed. The ineffectual defences of faith and 
ritual,®  ^strength and race, are swept away. All are struck down and as they fall, the characters 
who are left -  whether it be Holden and Ameera in ‘Without Benefit of Clergy’; Porkiss, 
“overtaken with a great and chilly fear”®® in ‘Only a Subaltern’; or Miriam, the fearful wife of 
Ephraim, in ‘Jews in Shushun’ -  mourn their loss, assess their chances and fret over those they 
love. An outbreak of cholera in K pling is thus, much more than just an account of an horrific 
experience; an exaggerated metaphor for the unavoidability of man’s demise; or even a 
symbolic representation of India as the sickly carrier of death. It is, significantly, in the context 
of the current study, an example of those circumstances under which man can potentially come 
to apprehend his own “Being towards death” in anticipation. For Heidegger:
The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein 
down to itself. This individualising is a way in which the “there” is disclosed for 
existence.®"*
®* Kipling, ‘Cholera Camp’, Definitive Verse, pp. 440-441. This poem is among those cited by Charles 
Carrington as being a testament to the fact that, “No author in any literature has composed, in verse or 
prose, so full and varied and so relentlessly realistic a view of the soldier’s life, with its alternations of 
boredom and terror, its deadening routine, its characteristic vices and corruptions, its rare glories and its 
irrational fascination, as Rudyard K p lin g ...” (Rudyard Kipling: His Life and Work, pp. 263-4). This 
sympathetic reading of K pling’s depiction of the common soldier, must, however, be read alongside that 
of George Orwell, who contends that “K pling is almost unconscious of the class war that goes on in an 
army as much as elsewhere. It is not only that he thinks the soldier comic, but that he thinks him patriotic, 
feudal, a ready admirer of his officers, and proud to be a soldier of the Queen. Of course that is partly 
true, or battles could not be fought, but “What have I done for thee, England, my England?” is essentially 
a middle-class query. Almost any working man would follow it up immediately with “What has England 
done for me?”. In so far as K pling grasps this, he simply sets it down to “the intense selfishness of the 
lower classes” (his phrase)” ( ‘Rudyard K p lin g’, p. 80-81).
®® See, Eliot L. Gilbert, “ Without Benefit o f Clergy’: A  Farewell to Ritual’, in Kipling and the Critics, 
pp. 163-183.
K pling, ‘Only a Subaltern’ (The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories), p. 163.
Being and Time, II. 1, p. 308. As Safranski explains, for Heidegger, “Death individualises, even though 
dying takes place in huge numbers. The attempt to understand death as the absolute boundary must, at the 
same time, understand it as the boundary of understanding” (Martin Heidegger, p. 164).
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And it is to Kipling’s depiction of death as the individualising disclosure of one’s own “Being- 
in-the-world” as a “Being towards death”, that we now turn.
(b) “Being towards death”
Thus far, I have focused only upon how death in Anglo-India exists as the always present 
existential horizon against which Kipling’s characters are set and can be seen to proceed in their 
everyday lives. In this section, I will examine the responses of individual characters confronted 
with death, in all its many forms, and discuss the ways which they can be understood to reflect 
the existential-ontological structures of “Being towards death”.
As we have seen in ‘At the Pit’s Mouth’, by placing his characters in such a close and explicit 
proximity to the dead, K pling portrays an Anglo-Indian community that is always precariously 
on the brink; a community which adopts “the wisdom” of Conrad’s Marlow by “putting out of 
sight all the reminders of our folly, of our weakness, of our mortality”®® in an endless round of 
parties and amusements. Simla, like Lahore in ‘The City of Dreadful Night’, is a city of the 
living-soon-to-be-dead among the dead, but in ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’, Kpling 
goes one step further still and casts his hero into the “Village of the Dead” itself; “a town where 
the Dead who did not die, but may not live, have established their headquarters”.®® Here, the 
shocked and disbelieving Jukes is told by a former employee, Gunga Dass:
[Y]ou are dead, my dear friend. It is not your fault, of course, but none the less you are 
dead and buried.®’
But, of course, as we have already said, this disclosure can be understood as an accentuated 
confirmation of that which was already apparent in Simla. For in both cases the character is 
alive but as good as dead. Moreover, as Gunga Dass explains:
There are only two kinds of men, Sar -  the alive and the dead. When you are dead you are 
dead, but when you are alive you live.®®
And as such, death strips Jukes of his ‘Anglo-Indian-ness’ and his ‘whiteness’; in other words, it 
strips him of his ontical identity and all of that which he perceives to be the God-given rights of
®® Joseph Conrad, Lord Ji/n (London; Penguin Books Ltd., 1994), p. 134.
®® Kipling, T h e Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’ {The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories), p. 
3.
ibid., p. 12.
®® ibid., p. 8.
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his caste. In the “Village of the Dead”, Jukes is merely another body, and this is confirmed in 
his account of his first night in the hole that has been assigned to him:
The horrors of that night I shall never forget. My den was nearly as narrow as a coffin, 
and the sides had been worn smooth and greasy by the contact of innumerable naked 
bodies...®"’
These “innumerable naked bodies”, are not Indian or native bodies, they are the bodies of men 
like himself; or as Nora Crook has argued, in her interesting assessment of Kipling’s use of 
Chaucerian, Dantean and Swinburnian sources, Kipling’s My ths o f Love and Death, “The pagan 
beggar and the “white man” are brothers under the skin, and all inhabit coffins of clay”:
That is a laiowledge which Jukes cannot face, and which Kipling, the demon-boy writing 
ostensibly to entertain the white masters, tells only to those who have ears to hear. All 
have enlisted in the legion of the damned, all men are pigs, all partake of the dunghill.'’®
But this does not mean that Jukes himself is primarily horrified by the racial levelling of his 
predicament. What is far more pressing is the disclosure of his own mortality. Jukes has had a 
glimpse of the fact that he is certain to be one of their number, certain to die whether he escapes 
from this place or not. Indeed, it should be said that it is this crucial detail which reveals 
Wilson’s choice of The Strange Ride o f Rudyard Kipling for the title of his book, to be 
especially insightful. For Kipling too is alive to this certainty. In ‘The City of Dreadful Night’, 
for example, he emerges in the morning like the Ancient Mariner, carrying his knowledge of 
death back to the world of the living.
Jukes has been, as Gunga Dass implies, literally buried alive, and thus he is literally 
experiencing his own death and burial before he has died:
Yes, we were a Republic indeed! A Republic of wild beasts penned at the bottom of a pit, 
to eat and fight and sleep till we died. I attempted no protest of any kind, but sat down 
and stared at the hideous sight in front of me.®*
His alarm is further exacerbated when he learns of the death of the other Sahib: “He died”, 
Gunga Dass explains, “in the burrow as you will die, and as I will die, and as all these men and 
women and the one child will also die”.'”
ibid., p. 16.
Nora Crook, Kipling’s Myths o f Love and Death  (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1989), p. 107. 
®* Kipling, ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’, p. 18.
”  ibid., p. 19.
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...I thought of my wretched fellow-prisoner’s unspeakable misery among all these 
horrors for eighteen months, and the final agony of dying like a rat in a hole, with a 
bullet-wound in the stomach.. .1 was feeling sick and faint with horror now.®®
In this explicit act of empathy, Jukes anticipates his own demise, not as an Anglo-Indian, but as 
himself, delivered over to himself. Zohreh T. Sullivan is thus correct in her assertion that, 
“Jukes sees before him nightmare images of his mutilated self, first his horse and then the 
Englishman”.®"* But, then again, Sullivan understands the story as a ‘narrative of empire’ within 
the context of colonial discourse, and Jukes exclusively in terms of his colonial status. As a 
result, for her, ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’ is
A totalising vision of a democratised India as a city of the dead and as a black hole in 
imperial reality.®®
The story, its setting, its protagonists, and most importantly, the sentiments expressed on the 
subject of death, are thus entirely subsumed within an interpretative frame which emphasises 
the colonial to the exclusion of all else. Here, I would concur with Norah Crook when she 
suggests that readings of ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’, like that of Sullivan’s, which 
confine themselves to an appreciation of it as a metaphor for the anxieties of ‘the white ruling 
class’, constitute an actual underestimation of “the story’s artistic coherence”.®® For Crook, it is
A view which seems to me indubitable, but one-dimensional. The exclusively “colonial 
malaise” reading depends on one’s screening out certain elements, or negating them to 
the status of plot machinery.®’
A “screening” and “negating”, moreover, that involves the “covering up” (verdecken) of the 
ontological constitution of Dasein’s “Being towards death” and the ontological meaning of 
death itself.
This interpretational subsumption and “covering up” is even more apparent in Sullivan’s 
reading of ‘The Phantom Rickshaw’, an early Kipling story of death and terror, in which Jack 
Pansay is haunted by the ghost of the woman he had jilted. For while Pansay describes the 
presence of the rickshaw as filling
®® Kipling, ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’, pp. 19-20.
®"* Zohreh T. Sullivan, Narratives o f  Empire: The Fictions o f Rudyard Kipling  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p. 76.
®® ibid., p. 70. See also her insistence that the hole within which Jukes finds himself, constitutes “A  
metaphoric and gendered India as vaginalized space [which] has swallowed and unmanned the colonizer”
(P- 76).Crook, K ipling’s Myths o f Love and Death, p. 97.
®’ Ibid..
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...me by turns with horror, blind fear, a dim sort of pleasure, and utter despair...[And 
confesses] that I dread its advent more than any word can say... I torture myself nightly 
with a thousand speculations as to the manner of death.®®
Sullivan interprets Jack’s descent into madness and his terror at the approach of his own death 
as demonstrating
...the mechanism of self destruction ironically contained in the heart of the system, the 
Minotaur produced by the colonial system -  the colonised human mind that is the 
fragmented, all-too-human victim, rather than master, of all it sui-veys.®®
In considering this type of criticism, the most immediate question which presents itself is this: 
how has Sullivan reached such a conclusion from the evidence in the text? Her suggestion that 
Pansay’s madness signifies, or indeed constitutes, a “product” manufactured by the colonial 
system, is not, anywhere to be found in the narrative. For Sullivan:
The private fear made explicit in the story is the loss of control over a unified imperial 
self.*®®
As such, Pansay’s terrors are the terrors of this “imperial se lf’, his fears the “imperial” fears 
which are synecdochical of the fears of the colonial establishment as a whole. The logic of 
Sullivan’s interpretation, like that of Sara Suleri discussed in Chapter One, is the “Enframing” 
(and ‘gathering’) logic of her drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality. The 
most significant factor upon which any perceived functionality of this kind rests is not to be 
found in any thought, action or speech; it is extrapolated solely from the fact that Jack Pansay is 
a coloniser and, of course, that Kipling the author is first and foremost, as JanMohamed argues, 
“the champion of colonialism and British superiority”.*®* Moreover, this extrapolation, which 
concludes in a type of psychoanalytical cultural syncretism, can be seen to exist as the sole 
objective of Sullivan’s thesis. The drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality 
means that Pansay is, from the outset, always destined to lose his individuality; have the one­
dimensional mask of homogenous cultural membership slipped over his head; and be assessed 
exclusively in terms of that membership. The problems which arise from Sullivan’s thesis are 
thus the problems which arise in the wake of her obvious desire to read into and, very 
occasionally, out of, individual fictional characters, the broad cultural trends that have already 
been plotted in the canons of colonial discourse analysis. As a result, Pansay, the individual
Kipling, ‘The Phantom Rickshaw’ {The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories), p. 47. 
®® Sullivan, Narratives o f Empire, p. 64.
*®® ibid., p. 70.
*®* JanMohamed, ‘The Economy of Manichean A legory ’, p. 96.
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fictional character, exists as simply another vehicle for the elaboration and explication of these 
trends.
In proceeding now to examine ‘The Story of the Gadsbys; A Tale Without a Plot’, it should be 
obvious from the above that I will not be attempting to transmogrify Gadsby’s “funk” into a 
metaphor for colonial paranoia. I will, instead, be conducting the examination in order to 
identify what it is that he is actually afraid of. And that can only be achieved by attending to 
what he actually says:
It never passes with me. Jack. I’m always thinking about it. Me funking a fall on 
parade...W ait till you’ve got a wife and a youngster of your own, and then you’ll know 
how the roar of the squadron behind you turns you cold all up the back.*®’
Here, Gadsby is explaining to his friend Mafflin why he has decided to quit the regiment and 
return to England. In lines which recall Harry Feversham’s descriptions of foreseeing “every 
hedge, every pit, every treacherous bank”,*®® Gadsby articulates his anticipatory fear of his own 
death, and the consequences that would have for his wife and child. “For the past three months, 
I’ve felt every hoof of the squadron in the small of my back every time that I’ve led,”’®"* he says; 
a vivid premonition, as the futural orientation of oneself as a “being in Time”, bringing with it 
the disclosure of the “there” of Gadsby’s present. As Mafflin attempts to understand how this 
could be the same man who had faced death on the battle field without fear, it becomes clear 
that Gadsby has not arrived at this crisis because he is, or might become, a coward, but because 
he now sees that others are dependent upon his survival. His fear of death has been precipitated 
by his love for his wife and child and this illustrates the point already noted regarding the 
multifarious ways in which Dasein’s death can be disclosed to it. There are no ghosts or corpses 
here, nobody has died and there are no graveyards in the vicinity; yet death, Gadsby’s own 
death, has nonetheless been disclosed to him. But then again, is this fear not peculiarly un- 
English and even cowardly? Are Gadsby, and Pansay for that matter, not examples of what 
Edward Said has called “Kipling’s White Man”?:
Being a White Man was...an idea and a reality...It meant -  in the colonies -  speaking in 
a certain way, behaving according to a code of regulations, and even feeling certain 
things and not others. It meant specific judgements, evaluations, gestures. It was a form 
of authority before which nonwhites and even whites themselves, were expected to 
bend...Being a White Man, in short, was a very concrete manner of Being-in-the-world, a 
way of taking hold of reality, and thought.*®®
*®’ Kipling, ‘The Story of the Gadsby’s: A  Tale Without a Plot’ {Soldiers Three), p. 179. 
*®® Mason, The Four Feathers, p. 41.
*®"* Kipling, ‘The Story of the Gadsbys’, p. 180.
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*®® Orientalism, p. 227.
The “White Man” that is ontologically constituted (as “a very concrete manner of Being-in-the- 
world”) as the self-assured and fearless paragon of imperial manhood? Or as Benita Parry would 
have it, a marvel “of efficiency and endurance, probity and moral excellence”.’®®
On the contrary, in ‘The Story of the Gadsbys’ and ‘The Phantom Rickshaw’, “Kipling’s White 
Man” is shown to be that which he is, in his “potentiality-for-Being-himself’, afraid for himself 
within the private context of the world of his “concern”. It is that same “potentiality-for-Being- 
oneself ’ which can, to a certain extent and in addition, be seen to result in the individual acts of 
violent insubordination and cowardice, which as Kipling says, sometimes means that
...one hears strange and horrible stories of men not following their officers, of orders 
being given by those who had no right to give them.’®’
Not the stories that “England told itself as it went to sleep at night”,’®® but the “horrible stories” 
which haunted the young Harry Feversham at the beginning of The Four Feathers. Stories like 
‘The Drums of the Fore and Aft’ (considered by Conan Doyle to be among the classic short 
stories of the English language’®®) in which an entire British regiment flies in the face of enemy 
fire; ‘In the matter of a Private’, ‘Love-O-Women’ and ‘Black Jack’, where soldiers run amok 
and try to kill their colleagues; or ‘The Mutiny of the Mavericks’ which tells how a young Irish- 
American conspirator “dreaded death” and
...remembered certain things that the priests had said in his infancy, and his 
mother...starting from her sleep with shrieks to pray for a husband’s soul in 
torment...[He] could see himself, as he lay on the earth in the night, dying by various 
causes. They were all horrible...” ®
The individual vulnerability depicted here can thus be taken to reaffirm our earlier conclusions 
on K pling’s acumen in recognising the point at which the “idle talk” of imperial self-flattery 
gives way to fear and despair in the face of death. In other words, while there is, on the one 
hand, the “idle talk” of a poem like ‘The Young British Soldier’ with its council to “go to your 
Gawd like a soldier”’” ; on the other, in ‘That Day’, another young British soldier tells us:
I ‘eard the loiives be’ind me, but I dursn’t face my man,
Nor I don’t know where I went to, ‘cause I didn’t ‘alt to see,
’®® Parry, Delusions and Discoveries, p. 55.
’®’ Kipling, ‘The Drums of the Fore and A ft’, in Wee Willie Winkie and Other Stories (London: 
Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1923), p. 328.
’®® Martin Green, Dreams o f Adventure, D eeds o f Empire (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1980), p. 1.
’®® See ‘Conan Doyle on “Kipling’s Best Story’” in Kipling: The Critical Heritage, pp. 302-303.
” ® Kipling, ‘The Mutiny of the Mavericks’ {Life’s Handicap), p. 232.
Kipling, ‘The Young British Soldier’ {Barrack-Room Ballads), Definitive Verse, pp. 416-418.
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Till I ‘eard a beggar squealin’ out for quarter as ‘e ran,
A n’ I thought I knew the voice an’ -  it was me!*”
Indeed, in ‘Thrown Away’ and ‘At the End of the Passage’ this fear and despair results in Said’s 
and Parry’s self-same “White Men” taking their own lives. As the narrator in the latter tale 
explains:
There was no cholera near Hummil’s section even fever gives a man at least a week’s 
grace, and sudden death generally implied self-slaughter.**®
A “self-slaughter” which, as the Anglo-Indian Civil Servant, Alan Butteiworth recalls often 
lacked reason or discernible motive:
[0]nly too many of my European acquaintances in India have died by their own hands, 
and I do not remember a single case where a motive could be assigned; always the deed 
was done in response to the muttered promptings of that nescio quid doloris which lurks 
in our souls.**"*
But of course, Hummü himself does not take action to commit suicide. Like Duncan Barrenness 
in ‘The Dream of Duncan Barrenness’ and Dostoyevsky’s Mr Golyadkin, he is confronted with 
his own doppelganger, and dies from sheer terror. It is thus interesting to note that the same 
epigraph from ‘The Phantom Rickshaw’ (which mns,
May no ill dreams disturb my rest, 
Nor powers of Darkness me molest.
Evening Hymn^^^ )
**^  Kipling, ‘That Day’ {Barrack-Room Ballads), Definitive Verse, pp. 437-438. See also, ‘The Coward’ 
{Epigraphs o f the War 1914-18); “1 could not look on Death, which being known, / Men led me to him, 
blindfold and alone” {Definitive Verse, p. 387).
**® Kipling, ‘At the End of the Passage’ {Life’s Handicap), p. 190.
**"* A an  Butterworth, The Southlands o f Siva: Some Reminiscences o f Southern India (London, 1923), p. 
116, quoted by Parry in Delusions and Discoveries, p. 54.
**® Kipling, ‘The Phantom Rickshaw’, p. 26.
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is sung by the four “lonely folk who understood the dread meaning of loneliness,”**® in ‘At the 
End of the Passage’. Hummil and Pansay are both disturbed and molested by the “ill dreams” 
and the “powers of Darkness”. And, as Harry Ricketts has noted, Kipling was himself only too 
familiar with these dreams; indeed, on occasions, he even made these thoughts the subject of 
public lectures, as in his speech at McGill University in 1907, entitled ‘Values in Life’, when he 
warned an audience of young students:
There is a certain darkness into which the soul of the young man sometimes descends -  a 
horror of desolation, abandonment, and realised worthlessness, which is one of the most 
real of the hells in which we are compelled to walk.**’
For Philip Mason, “Kipling was intuitive; he felt the dramatic force of the loneliness and heat, 
of panic and nightmare”.**® And as we saw above, this was, to a very great extent, because he 
was writing from personal experience when he described the minds and behaviours of men in 
India who, like Hummil, were breaking under the pressure of solitude, heat and sickness:
I felt each succeeding hot weather more and more, and cowered in my soul as it 
returned...It happened one hot-weather evening, in ‘86 or thereabouts, when I felt that I 
had come to the edge of all endurance. As I entered my empty house in the dusk there 
was no more in me except the horror of a great darkness, that I must have been fighting 
for some days.**®
It is here, at these moments of crisis, that the companionship mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter becomes so important; the companionship which Wilson describes as providing 
“protection from the seemingly eternal and intolerable future”. And nowhere is the value of this 
“protection” more in evidence than in the steadying and diversionary efforts of Mulvaney when 
the three friends are suffering on a sweltering June night at Fort Amara, the “most desolate and 
least desirable of all fortresses in India” :*^®
Kipling, ‘At the End of the Passage’, p. 185.
*”  Kipling, A Book o f Words (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1928), p. 20. For Shamsul Islam, “Almost 
the whole of Kipling’s philosophy can be discussed from this text: realisation of the meaninglessness of 
life, disinterested suffering and the need for positive action form the crux of Kipling’s thought”. K ipling’s 
“L aw ”: A study o f his philosophy o f life (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1975), p. 86.
**® Philip Mason, Rudyard Kipling, p. 104. Angus Wilson can be seen to draw the same conclusions in 
citing an unsigned article of K p lin g’s from the Civil and M ilitary Gazette o f September 1886 in which 
Kipling makes reference to those “elusive thoughts that like Chinese guards will not let you rest” {The 
Strange Ride o f  Rudyard Kipling, p. 62).
**®Kpling, Something o f Myself, p. 52. This, and indeed, any number of the other extracts that we have 
been looking at in Kipling’s fiction certainly serves to contradict Frank O’Connor’s bizarre suggestion 
that “K pling cannot write about the one subject a story teller must write about -  human loneliness.” 
Quoted by Raskin in The M ythology o f Empire, p. 77.
Kipling, ‘With the Main Guard’ {Soldiers Three), p. 49.
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[H]alf mad with the fear of death presaged in the swelling veins of his neck, [Learoyd] 
was begging his Maker to strike him dead, and fighting for more air between his 
prayers.*’*
In his “blood and thunder” tale of the Black Tyrone, Mulvaney succeeds in helping his friend 
through the night, and as such, succeeds in drawing him back into the tranquilised inauthenticity 
of the “they”. But in his closing remark;
“Eyah!” said he “Eve blandandhered thim through the night somehow, but can thim that
helps others help themselves? Answer me that, sorr!’ 122
Mulvaney is himself shown to be devoid of that “protection” which he can provide for others. 
But more importantly, Kipling deliberately draws an explicit parallel between Mulvaney and 
Christ -  “He saved others, but He cannot save Himself!”*’® -  and in so doing, emphatically 
underlines both the fundamental nobility and the inherent tragedy of Mulvaney’s self-sacrifice.
In a later Mulvaney story, which charts the shambolic progress of his seduction of his future 
wife, the reasons for Mulvaney’s despair at the end of ‘With the Main Guard’ are laid bare in 
the account of the terrifyingly comprehensive curse of Mother Sheehy;
“May your eyes see clear evry step av the dark path you take till the hot cindhers av hell 
put thim out...an’ may ye die quick in a strange land, watchin’ your death before ut takes 
you, an’ onable to stir hand or foot.”*’"*
It is a curse which condemns Mulvaney to the consciousness of “Being towards death”: a life 
lived in a perpetual state of awareness as to the certainty and immanence of his inevitable “non- 
Being”. These, then, are the vultures that tear at Mulvaney’s liver, these and the memory of his 
son whose early death Mother Sheehy had also foretold.*’® But Mulvaney is no different from 
any number of other characters in Kipling who have lost their children. Nearly a decade before 
the tragic loss of his own child, Josephine, Kipling describes an Anglo-India which is populated 
by grieving, and often desolate, parents: from Holden in ‘Without Benefit of Clergy’ to Mr and 
Mrs Jim in ‘William the Conqueror’; the Cusack-Bremmils in ‘Three and an Extra’ and of 
course Mulvaney himself; all can be seen to suffer
*’* ibid., p. 51.
*”  ibid., p. 65.
*’® Matthew 27:42.
*’"* Kipling, ‘The Courting of Dinah Shad’, p. 64.
*’® See also, ‘The Incarnation of Krishna Mulvaney’ (Life’s Handicap); “He [Mulvaney] was silent for a 
moment, thinking of his little son, dead many years ago” (p. 32).
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...the hell of self-questioning reproach which is reserved for those who have lost a child, 
and believe that with a little — just a little more care -  it might have been saved.*’®
In her discussion on child deaths in the work of Anne Tytler, Sara Suleri describes what she 
sees as “the picturesque’s ability to embalm the violence of Anglo-India” wherein “Children in 
particular are eminently killable” and can be seen to function as “a parable for the extreme 
vulnerability of Anglo-India”.*”  And as such, Suleri’s analysis once again subjugates the 
specificity and ontological significance of individual loss (discussed in the previous chapter) to 
the homogenised structures of a colonially determined discursive functionality.*’®
As Angus Wilson observes, the overall effect of this infant death-toll, which includes the deaths 
of Indian children like Muhammid Din and the sister of little Tobrah, is to remind us that
Death...was always round the corner, and children seemed to be the most frequent 
victims -  or was it, one asks, because they were the most tragic?*’®
Intentionally tragic or not, their loss is a crucial factor in, and painful illustration of, the ways in 
which their parents come to understand themselves in relation to Time: Time which, Henry 
Havelock, writing shortly after the death of his third son Ettrick in 1834, was only too 
consciously trying to fill:
I have been favoured in having been actively preoccupied with rather a troublesome 
court-martial, and it is probable that its proceedings will keep me at work to-day and part 
of to-morrow. This is better than having, in such seasons, too much leisure for recalling 
past events and images.*®®
For Havelock and the others we have noted, the past is a past in which their child was alive; 
their present is marked by the child’s absence and their own “self-questioning reproach”; and 
their future is destined to be only a perpetuation of that absence and reproach. Moreover, and as 
we saw with Learoyd in ‘On Greenhow Hill’, these remembered deaths, and the act of 
remembering, can, in addition, be seen to constitute and dramatise the way of Dasein’s own 
Being, as a “being in Time”.
*’® Kipling, ‘Without Benefit of Clergy’, p. 169.
*”  Suleri, The Rhetoric o f English India, p. 99.
On the subject of children in Kipling, see Roger Lancelyn Green’s Kipling and the Children (London: 
Elek, 1965); for a postcolonial perspective, see, for example, S.P. Mohanty’s more general observation 
that “the separate world of childhood registers and refracts crucial political anxieties of imperial Britain.” 
‘Kipling’s Children and the Colour Line’, Race and Class 31, 1 (July/Sep 1989), p. 21.
*’® Wilson, The Strange Ride o f Rudyard Kipling, p. 40.
Quoted by John Clark Marshman in The Memoirs o f  M ajor-General Sir Henry Havelock (London: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902), p. 44..
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As illustrations of the way in which Dasein is “stretched along and stretches itself along” in 
Time/^^ these acts of remembrance, are however, as nothing when compared to Kipling’s most 
conspicuous “being in Time”, John Hay, ‘The Wandering Jew’. For it is Hay, more than any 
other character in Kipling, who stands out as the literal embodiment of Dasein’s flight in the 
face of its own “Being towards death”:
[T]he ghost of his relative stood in the hall of his house...shouting up the stairway that 
life was short, that there was no hope of increase of days, and that the undertakers were 
already roughing out his nephew’s coffin...The shadow inside his brain grew larger and 
blacker. His fear of death was driving John Hay mad.^^^
Hay is, however, diverted from the peculiar madness which threatens to engulf him by the 
further, and entirely mischievous, disclosure, from “a shriller voice”, that “Who goes round the 
world once easterly, gains one day”.^ ^^  And thus begins Hay’s deluded progress around the 
globe in which “he noted in his pocket-book every minute that he had railed or screwed out of 
remorseless eternity”. T h e s e  single-minded circuits of the world, which are in sharp contrast 
with the purposeful circuits of McAndrew and his “one million mile o’ sea”,^ ^^  continue until 
“another Hay” attempts to prevent him from wasting his entire fortune and obtaining some of it 
for him or her self. A stop to the wandering is thus finally called and Hay is fooled into hanging 
by ropes from the roof of a room “in a whitewashed little bungalow” on the southern coast of 
India, letting “the round earth swing free beneath him”.’^^  The surreal closing image, more 
reminiscent of Samuel Beckett than Rudyard Kipling, of, “an old worn man who forever faces 
the rising sun, a stop-watch in his hand, racing against eternity”,u n d o u b te d ly  serves to 
emphasise the foolishness of Hay’s efforts, but it also confirms the point made by Philip Mason 
that throughout Kipling’s writing:
...from beginning to end...there is a consciousness of death, of the smallness of man in 
the face of eternity, of a vastness and a power beyond man’s comprehension.
An incomprehension which is implicit in Hay’s question, “Why does not the sun always remain
Being and Time, II.5, p. 427.
Kipling, ‘The Wandering Jew’ {Life's Handicap), p. 314. In a comparable scene in ‘The Dream of 
Duncan Barrenness’ (from the same volume), the terrified Barrenness is confronted by a ghostly 
apparition, albeit an apparition of his own scarred and aged self, and informed of the fact that “there is no 
return” (p. 404).
Kipling, ‘The Wandering Jew’, p. 314. 
ibid., p. 316.
Kipling, ‘McAndrew’s Hymn’, Definitive Verse, pp. 120-127.
Kipling, ‘The Wandering Jew’, p. 317. 
ibid., p. 317.
Mason, RudyardKipling, p. 248.
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over my head?”;^ ^^  a question, which resonates with Heidegger’s “Why are there beings at all 
instead of nothing?” '^^ ® For in both cases, it is the absence of an answer which defines the human 
condition: an absence which draws the self before itself in the face of an answer which “remains 
in its very origin withdrawn into oblivion”
So, while the story of Hay is, on one level, a story o f lunacy and delusion, the m essage 
is both sobering and revealing w ithin the context o f the role o f death in K ipling’s work. 
If we recall W ilson’s assertion regarding K ipling’s didacticism  on death, we can see this 
story as K ipling’s m ost explicit portrait o f W estern m an’s failure to face up to and 
accept the fundam ental nature of his own existence as a “Being towards death”. W hile 
the lesson of H ay’s wasted life thus points us towards the only available alternative, a 
stoical devotion to work, at the sam e time, and as J. M. S. Tom pkins has observed, for 
Kipling, “M an is a creature o f Tim e, and there can be no absolute value in his 
p r o d u c t i o n s . Y e t  those productions m ust nonetheless continue and the great Kashi 
Bridge across the Ganges must still be built despite the fact that, as Krishna explains to 
the M ugger, “They come all to thee at the last” .^ '^^
With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This is a 
possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.^'^'^
In this chapter 1 have sought to demonstrate the ways in which certain characters in Kipling’s 
Indian fiction can be seen to stand before themselves, in the face of death, and in their ownmost 
“potentiality-for-Being”. In isolating and examining instances of, and modes of “Being- 
towards”, death in Kpling 1 have, moreover, sought to emphasise the fact that the presence of 
death in Kipling’s fiction, is founded in his own personal engagement with death as the “being 
in the world” of his experiences, that he himself is. And as such, that it can he seen to reflect 
(and in reflecting underline) the fundamentally individualised, worlded and human character of 
those experiences.
Kipling, ‘The Wandering Jew’, p. 318. “There is no place where death cannot find us -  even if we 
constantly twist our heads about in all directions as in a suspect land: “Quae quasi saxum Tantalo semper 
impendet. ” [It is like the rock for ever hanging over the head of Tantalus.]” Montaigne, The Essays, p. 20. 
Heidegger, Introduction to M etaphysics, p. 2.
Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, II.IV, p. 151.
J.M.S. Tompkins, The A rt o f Rudyard Kipling  (Methuen & Co. Ltd.: London, 1959), p. 213.
Kipling, ‘The Bridge Builders’, p. 37.
Being and Time, II. 1, p. 294.
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More importantly, in arguing that death constitutes the existential horizon against which certain 
characters in Kipling’s fiction come to understand what, how and that they are, I have explained 
the significance of death in the “idle talk” (that which “prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and 
determines what and how one “sees”” of imperial rhetoric, self-flattery, self-pity and work. 
And in demonstrating the fact that it is in death, and “Being towards death”, that “idle talk” falls 
away, 1 have shown that the “structured image” of an homogenised ‘colonising subject’ which 
is advanced in colonial discourse analysis, can itself be seen to fracture.
In addition, it is important to stress that this concentration upon death in Kipling should not be 
taken as an elision or negation of the significance of colonialism in Kipling’s life and work. It 
is, on the contrary, founded in the belief that we can only come to a clearer understanding as to 
the specific nature of Kipling’s engagement with, and depiction of, the Empire when we grasp, 
and adhere to, the fundamental significance of death. Kipling’s imperialism is not laid bare in 
the artificial prioritisation (and ontologisation) of imperial themes and structures; indeed, it is 
distorted. Nor, for that matter, does the interpretation of Kipling’s imperialism in terms of an 
exclusively colonial meaningfulness, necessarily mean that we get close to that imperialism. For 
despite the fact that, Kipling was, as Said would have it
.. .writing not just from the dominating viewpoint of a white man in a colonial possession 
but from the perspective of a massive colonial system whose economy, functioning, and 
history had acquired the status of a virtual fact of nature...
in restricting ourselves to an interpretation that is exclusively founded upon this “dominating 
viewpoint” and “perspective”, Kipling and the characters in his books, will only ever be the 
homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised ‘colonising subjects’ of a “challenging revealing”. 
As I have continually argued, we can only hope to understand the Empire as it was, when we 
recognise the colonisers as individual human beings in the world of their experiences. Beings 
for whom death is their ownmost possibility, and not just a subject for self pity, or a metaphor 
for colonial guilt and paranoia.
ibid., 1.5, p. 213.
Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 162.
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CHAPTER V: Anxiety and Boredom
In the two previous chapters I have examined important aspects of Martin Heidegger’s 
existential-ontological analytic of Dasein -  “Being in Time” and “Being towards death” -  and 
demonstrated the ways in which these aspects are reflected in the thoughts, speeches and actions 
of fictional colonisers. In this chapter, 1 will narrow the focus again and concentrate upon how 
“Being in Time” and “Being towards death” come together and are made manifest in the 
ontological “states-of-mind” {Befindlichkeit ) or “moods” (Stimmungen) of “anxiety” (Angst, 
Unheimlichkeit) and “boredom” (Langeweile).
As we saw in Chapter Two, for Heidegger:
...a  state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out o f which we can 
encounter something that matters to us. Indeed, from the ontological point o f view we 
must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to “bare mood”/
It is primarily from this “ontological point of view” that I will be discussing anxiety and 
boredom in colonial literature. But following my critique of the “Enframing” and de­
humanising psychoanalytical methodologies of colonial discourse analysis in Chapter One, I 
will, in addition, argue that this ontological definition can be seen to draw the deficiencies of 
postcolonial psychology and psychoanalysis -  and its notion of the ‘colonising psyche’ in 
particular -  into sharper focus. By this 1 mean that, Heidegger’s ontological definition of 
anxiety and boredom as the “bare moods” in which Dasein is delivered over to itself as itself, 
can be seen to radically undermine the various colonial neuroses that are unilaterally ascribed to 
individuals as the a priori psychic structure of the ‘colonising subject’ in colonial discourse 
analysis.
As we have seen, the positing of a ‘colonial psyche’ -  and all of its archetypal manifestations; 
‘colonial guilt’, ‘colonial anxiety’ and ‘colonial fear’  ^-  constitutes the artificial containment of 
human and emotional heterogeneity within artificially ontologised and onticalised categories. 
As such, it is an important way in which colonial discourse analysis, in its drive towards the 
establishment of discursive functionality, ‘gathers’ the individual and its emotions, thoughts, 
words and actions, into the “structured image” (GeBild), or simulacrum, that is the ‘colonial 
subject’ . In contrast to the “challenging revealing” (herausfordern) of these formulations, 
Heidegger’s phenomenological description of the intentional comportments of human
 ^Being and Time, 1.5, p. 177.
 ^ See, for example, Suleri’s description of how “an economy of complicity and guilt is in operation 
between each actor on the colonial stage” (The Rhetoric o f  English India, p. 3).
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consciousness and his ontological definition of Dasein’s “states-of-mind”, facilitate an 
understanding and interpretation which holds out the possibility of entering “into a more 
original revealing,”  ^ wherein anxiety and boredom are understood as instances of the most 
explicit disclosure of what and how Dasein is as an individual human being in the world of its 
experiences. In short, anxiety and boredom can be seen to reveal Dasein’s fundamental 
“potentiality-for-Being-itself’. But in addition, and in the wake of our analysis of imperial 
rhetoric as a strain of “idle talk”, these “moods” can also be seen to signal both the point of 
Dasein’s fundamental withdrawal/rom its immersion in the “they”, and the point of its potential 
return to the “they” as it flies in the face of that which anxiety and boredom disclose. A flight 
from self which is, as we saw in relation to Kipling, nowhere more plainly made manifest than 
in Dasein’s immersion in work: or, as Marlow explains in Heart o f Darkness:
When you attend to things of that sort, to the mere incidents of the surface, the reality -
the reality, 1 tell you -  fades. The inner truth is hidden -  luckily, luckily."^
The “inner truth” that Marlow hides from is the “inner truth” of his own Being -  the “inner 
truth” that he is. In making this observation it is important to stress that we have resisted the 
temptation to draw any easy correlation between Marlow’s anxiety and the ‘African-ness’ of the 
river along which he is travelling; in other words, we have resisted the temptation to interpret 
this anxiety in terms of a general theory of colonial or African anxiety. For, given that we are 
discussing anxiety as an ontological (and therefore universal) “state-of-mind”, it cannot be 
determined by the ontical specificity of any given set of material circumstances; if it were, then 
the “mood” itself would become artificially onticalised.
When considered within the context of the intentional comportments of Dasein’s “Being-in-the- 
world”, that which is determinative for Dasein’s anxiety and boredom is the ontological 
constitution of Dasein itself -  as opposed to its national, racial or colonial characteristics -  in 
equiprimordial {gleichchurspriinglich) conjunction with the “threatening” (bedrohen) and 
boring character of the environment within which it finds itself. So, while we can speculate 
upon the various circumstantial factors which may be conducive for this “threatening” and 
boredom -  such as, isolation, the immanence of death, monotony and strangeness -  we cannot 
prioritise the ontical specificity of, for example, their geographical location, for in doing so we 
would automatically forfeit its ontological, and therefore universal, validity. Hence, while we 
may speculate upon the fact that these circumstantial factors are more prevalent in the colonial 
realm, and indeed this is what 1 will be arguing, the crucial point to emphasise is that this
 ^Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 28. 
 ^Conrad, Heart o f Darkness, p. 93.
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prevalence does not in itself mean that they are somehow innately and peculiarly colonial as a 
result.
In our ongoing examination of the fictional coloniser, the depiction of anxiety and boredom -  as
(1) the disclosure of the “there” of Being; (2) the site of the oscillation between Dasein’s 
authentic and inauthentic modes of Being; and (3) an important indicator as to the nature of the 
intentional relation which pertains between Dasein and its material circumstances -  can be 
understood as two of the most importmt fictional reflections of the way in which the historical 
coloniser is, as an individual human being in the world of its experiences.
1. Anxietv
(a) D read and Uncanniness
Between the 14* December 1887 and the 28* February 1888 a series of articles by Rudyard 
Kipling appeared in the Allahabad Pioneer under the title ‘Letters of Marque’. The collection 
documented Kipling’s adventures in the Native States of Rajputna and, taken as a whole, the 
nineteen articles constitute a relatively accomplished work of descriptive travel writing; albeit, 
on occasions, too self-consciously quirky and, no doubt, exhibiting that which Robert Buchanan 
called “the spirit of ephemeral journalism” which is characterised by “its vulgarity, its 
flippancy, and its radical unintelligence” .^ “Verily”, ICipling tells us, “there is no life like life on 
the Road” :^
And now that the train has reached Ajmir, the Crewe of Rajputna, whither shall a tramp 
turn his feet? The Englishman set his stick on end, and it fell with its point North-west as 
nearly as might be.^
In the midst of such fripperies, however, lies an account of his visit to the ruined city of Chitor -  
the second section (number 11) Kipling claims, ‘Proves Conclusively the existence of the Dark 
Tower visited by Childe Rolande, and of the “Bogey” who frightens Children’. And in the 
following extract, Kipling describes how he (the “Englishman”) descends the ancient Tower of 
Victory into the Gau-Mukh (an underground water tank) “which is nothing more terrible than a 
little spring, falling into a reservoir, in the side of the hill” :^
 ^Buchanan, “ The Voice of the Hooligan” , pp. 26-27.
 ^Kipling, ‘Letters of Marque’, 9, in From Sea to Sea, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1922), p. 
81.
 ^ibid., 12, p. 108.
 ^ibid., 11, p. 99.
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[BJehind him, the Gau-Mukh guggled and choked like a man in his death-throe.. .Then it 
came upon him that he must go quickly out of this place of years and blood -  must get 
back to the afternoon sunshine, and Gerowlia, and the dak-bungalow with the French 
bedstead...he did not care to look behind him, where stood the reminder that he was no 
better than the beasts that perish ...As  soon as the steps gave refuge, he floundered up 
them, and so came out of the Gau-Mukh, bedewed with that perspiration which follows 
alike on honest toil or -  childish fear.^
What Kipling is describing here is anxiety. He is anxious about his own death; he has been 
made aware of his own immanent “non-Being” by this place of “years and blood”; made aware 
that he is “no better than the beasts that perish”. T h e  plane upon which this fear is thus based, 
is not the abstract plane of colonial status or national membership, it is the literal plane of the 
temporality which Kipling is himself as a “being in Time”. Harry Ricketts is therefore correct 
when he describes Kipling’s shock as a “moment of existential panic”; however, his following 
assertion that it
...anticipated the defining episode in E M Forster’s A Passage to India, in which the two 
English visitors, Mrs Moore and Adela Quested, were overcome by the echo in the 
Marabar Caves... ^ ^
requires some qualification. And this is because, in arguing that
In each case the overwhelming panic took place in a primordial Indian setting and was 
accompanied by acute feelings of entrapment, engulfment and psychological panic...
Ricketts fundamentally overlooks the crucial distinction (noted in Chapter Two) between 
“existential panic” and “psychological panic” (as ‘colonial anxiety’): for whereas the former can 
underpin the latter, they are not, as Ricketts has it, the same thing. To reiterate, it is not the 
nationality of Chitor as Indian or Kipling as ‘English’ which precipitates this crisis, it is their 
temporality and, in the case of Chitor, its “pastness” (Vergangenheit).^^ That this is indeed the 
case is plainly reflected on a number of occasions in the ‘Letters of Marque’, where Kipling can 
be seen to articulate the nature of his engagement with the land through which he is travelling in 
terms of Time. In Jodhpur, for example, he describes how:
If you look long enough across the sands, while a voice in your ear is telling you of half­
buried cities, old as old Time, and wholly unvisited by Sahibs, of districts where the
ibid., 11, p. 101 (my emphasis).
Cf. Ecclesiastes 3: 19-20; “After all, the same fate awaits human beings and animals alike. One dies 
just like the other. They are the same kind of creature. A  human being is no better off than an animal, 
because life has no meaning for either. They are both going to the same place— the dust. They both came 
from it; they will both go back to it.”
Ricketts, The Unforgiving Minute, p. 106.
Ibid.
See, Being and Time, II.3, p. 373.
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white man is unknown... y on will, if it happen that you are of a sedentary and civilised 
nature, experience a new emotion -  will be conscious of a great desire to take one of the 
lobbing camels and get away into the desert, away from the last touch o f Today, to meet 
the Past face toface}"^
It is this explicit temporal sensibility which manifests itself in Kipling’s dizzying and intricate 
historical catalogue -  lifted, we presume, from his trusty Baedeker^^ -  of Chitor’s sieges, 
suicides, battles and massacres. Indeed, it is this disorientating account of the sheer magnitude 
of all that is past which is mirrored in the effect of the city itself, an effect which is responsible 
for that which he calls the discomforting “Genius of the Place”. For Kipling loses himself in 
the labyrinthine corridors and staircases just as we lose ourselves in the annals of Chitor’s 
bloody and heroic past. And this sense of Time and Place as being frighteningly labyrinthine is 
again, perfectly expressed by Kipling in a later letter (number 13) when he describes the city of 
Jodhpur:
It would be a week’s work to pick out even roughly the names of the dead who have 
added to the buildings, or to describe the bewildering multiplicity of courts and ranges of 
rooms; and, in the end, the result would be as satisfactory as an attempt to describe a 
nightmare.^^
It is, however, his consideration of the passing of Chitor’s formerly corporeal inhabitants which, 
more than anything else, evokes for him the fact of his own mortality:
[H]e tripped and fell, and as he put out his hands, he felt the stairs had been worn hollow 
and smooth by the tread of innumerable naked feet. Then he was afraid and came away 
very quickly, stepping over fallen friezes and bits of sculptured men, so as not to offend 
the Dead.^^
In the same way, it is his realisation that below the Gau-Mukli the “fair Pudmini and her 
handmaidens had slain themselves” which brings about Kipling’s final crisis of “childish 
fear”.^  ^ Unlike his impassive descriptions of the skulls and bones, cemeteries and mausoleums
*  Kipling, ‘Letters of Marque’, 11, p. 125 (my emphasis).
On the significance of the Baedeker “rereading” or “prereading” of the cities Kipling visits in The 
Letters o f  Marque, see Sullivan, Narratives o f Empire, pp. 19-20.
ibid., 11, p. 103.
Kipling, ‘Letters of Marque’, 13, p. 123.
ibid., 11, pp. 96-7 (my emphasis).
In her reading of this episode, Sullivan concentrates upon the significance of Kipling’s encounter with 
the phallus, “the loathsome Emblem of Creation” (11, p. 100), and obseives; “Although this piece of 
writing was written about twenty years before Freud’s essay on ‘The Uncanny’ (1919), it is remarkable 
for its precise anticipation of the term: what the Englishman sees in the phallus dismembered and 
enclosed by water is the return of the repressed fear of absence, castration, and self-loss” {Narratives o f  
Empire, p. 21). In contrast, ray own emphasis upon the Heideggarian definition of “the uncanny” is based 
upon Kipling’s description of his encounter with Chitor as a whole and an understanding of his own 
ontological constitution as a “being in the world” and a “being in Time”.
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which surrounded him in Lahore and to which he had become accustomed; here, the place is
strange and instils, or rather the time of the place instils, dread (Grauen):
In dread Being-in-the-world as such discloses itself, and that not as this definite fact but
in its facticity... Dread is nothing but the disposition to uncanniness
Indeed, when Kipling remarks that “there was something very uncanny about the Genius of the 
Place”; he is articulating the uncanniness of “Being-in-the-world” as “Being towards death”. 
For it is this which is disclosed in the rock upon which he stumbles, the rock which has been 
worn down, like Morrowbie Jukes’s hole, by the bodies of others who are now dead. For what 
else is there to be afraid of? Certainly not some abstracted essence of primordial Tndian-ness’.^ ’ 
No, Kipling retreats in the face of himself and his own uncanniness^^ -  in retreating, he seeks 
the comforting certainty of the everyday -  “the afternoon sunshine, and Gerowlia, and the dak- 
bungalow with the French bedstead”.^ ^
Despite this unnerving experience, Kipling is nonetheless, on the same day, drawn back to the 
city and, in the gathering twilight as he sits on a tomb overlooking the ruins, the moon turns 
“the city of dead into a city of scurrying ghouls”, a n d  “the sense of desolation”^^  descends 
again. Kipling would continue to be drawn back to the place: in his conclusion to the collection, 
he singles Chitor out for special mention:
One perfect month of loaferdom, to be remembered above all others, and the night of the 
visit to Chitor, to be remembered even when the month is forgotten.^^
These experiences at Chitor would also later serve as both the thinly-veiled template for 
Tarvin’s exploration of Gunnaur’s Ruins in The Naulahka (written with Wolcott Balestier) and 
the chilling descriptions of the “Cold Lairs” in the Jungle Boolcs.
Following this ontological interpretation of Kipling’s fearful experience at Chitor, it is useful to 
contrast the understanding of anxiety which undeipins such interpretation with the definition 
provided by Nigel Le ask in British Romantic Writers and the East: Anxieties o f Empire. A
Heidegger, History o f the Concept o f Time, pp. 290- 291.
^^Cf. Suleri’s description of “the subcontinent” as “a tropological repository from which colonial and 
postcolonial imaginations have drawn -  and continue to draw -  their most basic figures for the anxiety of 
empire” (The Rhetoric o f English India, pp. 4-5).
Cf. Heidegger’s; “Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face o f which anxiety is anxious” (Being and 
Time, 1.6, p. 232).
“Shrinking back in the face of what fear discloses - in the face of something threatening - is founded 
upon fear; and this shrinking back has the character of fleeing” (Being and Time, 1.6, p. 230).
 ^ Kipling, ‘Letters of Marque’, 11, p. 104. 
ibid., 11, p. 103. 
ibid., 19, pp. 203-204.
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definition which, in many ways, is characteristic of colonial discourse analysis’ understanding 
of a peculiarly ‘colonial anxiety’;
Although to be “anxious” is a state which normally defines itself in our culture with 
reference to Kierkegaard or Freud, a glance at the standard dictionary definition (OED) 
may be sufficient to show why it is germane to ray thesis in this book: “(1) Troubled or 
uneasy in mind about some uncertain event; being in painful or disturbing suspense; 
concerned, solicitous. (2) Fraught with trouble or solicitude, distressing, worrying. (3) 
Full of desire and endeavour; solicitous; earnestly desirous (to ejfect some purpose).” The 
anxieties discussed in this book partake of the full semantic range of these definitions; the 
third in particular shows that if the anxieties which 1 am addressing sometimes block or 
disable the positivities of power, they are just as often productive in furthering the 
imperial will.^^
The first point to note here is that, in citing Kierkegaard and Freud, Leask overlooks the crucial 
fact that for both these thinkers anxiety is not dependent upon the nature of one’s political 
beliefs, ethnicity or nationality. Yet it is precisely these factors which characterise Leask’s 
adoption of Freud and Kierkegaard in his analysis of ‘colonial anxiety’ in the work of Byron, 
Shelley, Coleridge and De Quincey. In addition, by arguing that anxiety furthers “the imperial 
will”, Leask successfully draws the ambivalent and therefore frankly unhelpful (for his 
purposes) “anti-imperial” concerns and opinions of these writers into the hegemonic machinery 
of colonial discourse. And it is the ‘gathering’ of meaning into discursive functionality that is 
exemplified in the quasi-dialectical logic of this formulation; a ‘gathering’ which is also evident 
in Sara Suleri’s comparable assertion that:
[0]ne of the manifestations of the anxiety of empire is a repression of the conflictual 
model even where economic and political conflict is at its most keenly operative.^^
For Suieri, colonial anxiety is to be found in the absence of conflict which, interpreted 
catachrestically, is understood as proof of colonial repression.^^ Taken together, it is not difficult 
to see that when we adopt a “full [and therefore sufficiently adaptable] semantic range” of 
dictionary definitions and combine this with a catachrestic interpretative methodology, all
Nigel Leask, British Romantic Writers and the East: Anxieties o f Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), p. 3.
^  Suieri, The Rhetoric o f  English India, p. 115.
^  See also, for example. Said in his ‘Introduction’ to Kim  and his insistence that “There is no resolution 
to the conflict between Kim’s colonial service and his loyalty to his Indian companions not because 
Kipling could not face it, but because for Kipling there was no conflict and, one should add immediately, 
one of the purposes of the novel was, in fact, to show the absence of conflict once Kim is cured of his 
doubts and the lama of his longing for the River, and India of a couple of upstarts and foreign agents.” 
‘Introduction’ to Kim, (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1989), p. 23. Said also draws attention to Francis 
Hutchins’ description of how “an India of the imagination was created which contained no elements of 
either social change or political menace.” Francis G. Hutchins, The Illusion o f Permanence: British 
Imperialism in India (Princeton [NJ]: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 28.
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socio-psychoiogical roads can be made to lead to colonial anxiety and everything can 
potentially be seen to further “the Imperial will”.
Bearing this distinction, and the definitions provided by Leask and Suieri in mind, let us 
proceed to another, and indeed comparable, example of anxiety in colonial literature, H. Rider 
Haggard’s depiction of Allan Quatermain at the ruins of Kôr, in the late romance She and Allan:
Everywhere around me stretched the ruins of the great city, now fallen and as deserted as 
Babylon herself. The majestic loneliness of the place was something awful...! looked and 
thrilled, though oppressed by the drear and desolate beauty of the scene around me, 
descended the wall and the ruined slope and made my way homewards, afraid even of my 
shadow. For I seemed to be the only living thing among the dead habitations of 
immemorial Kôr.^ ®
Like Kipling, Quatermain cannot explain his unreasonable nervousness; the night, the ruins, the 
silence, and his own solitude conspire to bring him out of his reverie, and before himself as 
“there”. That which was formerly the innocuous backdrop of Quatermain’s more immediate 
concerns is suddenly “there” in all its fallen glory and desolate “pastness”, and Quatermain 
literally “flees” in the face of it. But it is in the seemingly incidental remark that he was “afraid 
even o f ’ his own “shadow” that the true character of this fear becomes apparent: it is not the 
city that he wants to escape from, it is the feeling that he is the only one alive in it.^ ^
Quatermain’s frightening glimpse of his own mortality can be seen to relate to, and understood 
as an expression of, that fundamental melancholy which Graham Greene, in his short 1951 
essay ‘Rider Haggard’s Secret’, emphasised as being at the core of Haggard’s life and work. 
Reflecting upon the books which had “seemed so straightforward to us once”, Greene opines:
We did not notice the melancholy end of every adventure or know that the battle scenes 
took their tension from the fear of death which so haunted Haggard from one night in his 
childhood when he woke in the moonlight: “He put out his hand...how odd it looked in 
the moonlight, dead -  dead. Then it happened. He realised that one day that hand would 
be limp also, that he could not lift it any more -  it would be dead -  he would be dead. The 
awful, inescapable certainty hung over him like a pall of misery. Fie felt it would be 
better if he had died at once -  he wished he were dead, rather than have to live with that 
in front of him.”^^
Haggard, She and Allan  (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1921) pp. 195-197.30
Cf. the experience of Mope in Nada the Lily before the vision of the Inkosazana-y-Zulu which instructs 
him to Kill Chaka: “I looked, and my heart grew afraid. The lightening died away, the silence deepened 
till I could hear it, no leaf moved, no bird called, the world seemed dead -  I alone lived in the dead 
world”. Nada the Lily (London: Macdonald & Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 174.
Graham Greene, Collected Essays (London: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 160 (my emphasis).
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Following Greene, D. S. Higgins, in his biography Rider Haggard: The Great Storyteller, 
emphasises what he defines as, Haggard’s “terrifying understanding of the reality of death” and 
again locates it in a specific childhood episode:
It was on 21 July 1869, the day of his sister Ella’s wedding.. .Fear o f the unknown made 
him hysterical. “I shivered, I prayed, I wept. I thought I saw Death waiting for me by the 
library door.” His experience was “the most terrifying remembrance of my childhood...as 
I lay there I realised -  for the first time -  that I myself must die -  must cease to play and 
eat and sleep, and pass away into the dark of nothingness.” At last he did fall asleep, only 
to dream “that I was already in this hell and the peculiar form of punishment allotted to 
me was to be continually eaten alive by rats”.^ ^
So, while these stories of childhood fear and personal reflections on life are undoubtedly 
revealing in the context of Haggard’s anxiety about death, and indeed his preoccupation with 
the themes of mortality and reincarnation in works like She, Cleopatra, ‘Smith and the 
Pharaohs’, The Ancient Allan and the later novella The Mahatma & the Hare', they can also be 
seen to reflect important aspects of Heidegger’s description of the sudden disclosure and 
apprehension of one’s own “Being towards death” in ‘Unheimlichkeit’. Thus, to a certain extent, 
they can also be seen to correspond with Quatermain’s apprehension of his own “Being towards 
death” before the ruins of Kôr.
That being so, the fear of death which Greene and Higgins identify in Haggard is, perhaps, more 
conventionally expressed in those passages which the postcolonial critic Wendy Katz rather 
dismissively describes as Haggard’s “rambling about the great questions of ‘Life, Death, and 
E t e r n i t y K a t z  cites examples Idee the following from Allan Quatermain, in which 
Quatermain again finds himself before the ruins of a deserted city; but, in contrast to the 
previous extract from She and Allan, here there is only the dispassionate and ponderous 
description of “a symbol of the universal destiny”:
Gone! quite gone! the way that everything must go. Like the nobles and the ladies who 
lived within their gates, these cities have had their day, and now they are as Babylon and 
Nineveh, and as London and Paris will one day be. Nothing may endure. That is the 
inexorable law... For this system of ours allows no room for standing still - nothing can 
loiter on the road ...The stern policeman Fate moves us and them on, uphill and downhill 
and across the level; there is no resting place for weary feet, till at last the abyss swallows 
us, and we are hurled into the sea of the eternal.
D. S. Higgins, Rider Haggard: The Great Storyteller (London: Cassell Ltd., 1981.) p. 7 (my emphasis). 
Higgins goes on to note that, “Jottings in his notebooks testify that he frequently referred to The Book o f  
the D ead  by E. W. Budge, who was to become a close friend. His own stories are often littered with the 
well-preserved dead” (p. 8).
Wendy Katz, Rider H aggard and the Fiction o f Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), p. 67.
Haggard, A//«n Quatermain (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1994), pp. 30-31, (my emphasis).
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With strong echoes of Shelley’s ‘Ozymandias’ Quatermain surveys the ruins of Charra and 
philosophizes upon the common fate of humanity. Here there is none of the oppressiveness or 
“anxiety in the face of death” which so alarms him at Kôr; like a Victorian Marcus Aurelius, 
Quatermain would appear to accept this fate passively and as his destiny.^*’ In these terms the 
account can be understood as the inauthentic “revealing” of “idle talk”, wherein one’s 
engagement with the certainty of one’s own “Being towards death” is diluted in the more 
general logic that “everything must go”, that “Nothing may endure”. A more general logic 
which is given a Poe-like gloss^^ is the following from Haggard’s autobiography. The Days o f 
My Life:
Unless we have lived before, or the grotesque incongruities of life are to be a explained in 
some way unknown to us, our present existence, to my mind, resembles...a great ball­
room wherein a Puck-like Death acts as a Master of Ceremonies. Here the highly born, 
the gifted and the successful are welcomed with shouts of praise, while the plain, the 
poorly dressed, the halt, are trodden underfoot; here partners, chosen at hazard, often 
enough seem to be dancing to a different time and step, till they are snatched asunder to 
meet no more; here one by one the revellers of all degrees are touched upon the shoulder 
by the Puck-like Death who calls the tune, and drop down, down into an impenetrable 
darkness, while others who knew them not are called to take their place.
More importantly, when understood as “a symbol of the universal destiny”, Quatermain’s 
experience of Ghana, as an understanding of his own “being in Time”, is consumed in the 
everyday inauthentic “historicality” of the “they”. And, it is this universalising in Haggard that 
Katz, in her chapter on racism, takes issue with:
Few formulations are more convenient than that of human nature. Innate and fixed, it is a 
ready abstraction used to convince us of our limitations, to confine us willingly to the 
boundaries we know, and to prevent us from crossing to those that are unexplored. Not 
only, then are all people equal by dint of their subjection to the design of fate; they are 
also by dint of their subjection to their changeless nature .. .The immutable “truths” of life 
which he [Haggard] sees in this society obscure its reality by veiling objective and 
substantially different differences with subjective philosophical abstractions. The result is
36 Katz compares this heroic stoicism with that which Jerome Hamilton Buckley called the “counter­
decadence” of “Invictus” (the “inversion of Victorian pessimism”) of W. E. Henley. William Ernest 
Henley, A study in “Counter-Decadence” o f the Nineties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 
26. “To equate the spirit o f romance with a healthy and virile optimism” Katz argues “is inaccurate. 
Although instinctively antipathetic to pessimism, the romance enthusiasts were not, after all, immune to 
the seemingly endemic malady of doubt that so affected the period. They merely chose not to be disabled 
by it. While pessimism was rejected out of hand, stoicism and its near relative, fatalism, were heartily 
endorsed” (Rider Haggard and the Fiction o f Empire, p. 84).
Half-akin to Poe’s ‘The Masque of the Red Death’, in Selected Tales (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 
1994).
Haggard, The D ays o f M y Life, 2 vols., ed. by C.J. Longman (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1926), 
p. 137. On the subject of death in Haggard, see also, Peter Beresford Ellis’s H. Rider Haggard: A Voice 
from the Infinite (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 121.
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a distorted vision of Empire which precludes the possibility of distinguishing between, for 
one thing, the fears of a subject people and the fears of its ruler ....Can one endorse this 
notion of a universal human nature without making too little of the fact that whites ruled 
and blacks seived, whites employed and blacks were employed, and whites were 
educated and skilled and blacks were uneducated and unskilled
For Katz, these abstract themes in Haggard’s fiction are thus understood to mask or bypass the 
actual colonial division of people into masters and subjects: a masking and bypassing on the 
part of the author which corresponds with Robert Young’s assertion (discussed in Chapter 
Two), regarding critics who claim “a universal ethical, moral, or emotional instance” in English 
literature as necessarily “colluding in the violence of the colonial legacy”.'^  ^ In both cases, the 
articulation of the universal is held to elide the reality of colonial rule. This is all very well, 
except, the imperative underpinning such observations is that authors and critics are obliged to 
engage with the material facts of imperialism before all else or to the exclusion of all else. It 
implies that the world itself is, first and foremost, constituted in terms of, and must be 
understood in relation to, these facts; and, that a failure to respect such stipulations in every 
instance renders one morally, politically and discursively culpable. We must ask, why should 
this be the case? Are we to assume that individuals only engage with, interpret and understand 
themselves and their world, in terms of colonialism or the facts of colonial administration? Of 
course not. So how then, can we insist that a failure to comply with these strictures necessarily 
precipitates “a distorted vision of Empire” or collusion in “the violence of the colonial legacy”?
The answer to this important question must be sought in relation to the fact that the accusatory 
burden of both formulations is grounded in the now familiar ‘gathering’ logic of postcolonial 
theory and colonial discourse analysis’ “Enframing”. An “Enframing” which draws everything 
into the (in this instance, morally constituted) “structured image” and “does not seem to allow 
for either waste or incoherence”.'^ ’ In other words, this ‘gathering’ draws the way in which 
people are at every level of their being, and the full spectrum of their colonial and non-colonial 
ontical concerns, into an all-encompassing realm of an artificially prioritised colonial and racial 
meaningfulness. A colonial meaningfulness wherein, what is said (or is not said), thought (or is 
not thought) and done (or is not done), is always destined to be discursively functional.
It is this insistence upon the catachrestical meaningfulness of every statement, thought and 
action which underpins Katz’s criticism of Haggard: for, in having Quatermain say one thing.
Katz, Rider H aggard and the Fiction o f Empire, p. 139 
Young, White Mythologies, p. 124.
Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method, pp. 324 -  325.
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Haggard is always liable to be guilty of not having him say another/^ This is why Quatermain’s 
meditations upon the transience of all human life is interpretable as a preclusion of “the 
possibility of distinguishing between, for one thing, the fears of a subject people and the fears of 
its ruler”. At the same time, what is ironic here is that, whilst rejecting Haggard’s “notion of a 
universal human nature” defined in terms of our collective “Being towards death”, Katz can still 
hold out for the possibility of identifying a generalisable “fear” that is predicated upon a quasi- 
ontological division of humanity along the lines of colonial status. And this brings us back to 
my own argument regarding how, anxiety as ‘Unheimlichkeit’ is the only generalisable anxiety 
because it is grounded in the ontological constitution of the beings that we ourselves are.
In the previous chapter we saw that for Kipling, the English “refusal to face death as inevitable 
is something that strikes him most forcibly, in contrast to India”. I n  a similar manner, and in 
opposition to Katz’s reading of an absolute levelling, 1 would argue that the theme of a 
“universal human nature” in Haggard can, on occasions, be seen to stage an important contrast 
between Haggard’s ‘white’ and ‘black’ characters. For example, in a speech resonant of that 
made by Quatermain at Charra, in King Solomon’s Mines Umbopa invokes the universal to 
highlight the arrogance and conceit of his ‘white’ listeners:
What is life? Tell me, O white men, who are wise, who know the secrets of the world, 
and the world of stars ...tell me, white men, the secret of our life - whither it goes and 
whence it comes! Ye cannot answer; ye know not. Listen, 1 will answer. Out of the dark 
we came, into the dark we go. Like a storm-driven bird at night we fly out of the 
Nowhere; for a moment our wings are seen in the light of the fire, and, lo! we are gone 
again into the Nowhere. Life is nothing. Life is all. It is the hand with which we hold off 
death.'’'’
In this surprisingly bleak peroration, Umbopa describes, however crudely, “Being-in-the-world” 
as “Being towards death”. But it is his description of life as “the hand with which we hold off 
death”, which has the deepest significance in the story which follows, and indeed, in our
In other words, in not referring to the conflict between rulers and ruled, Quatermain can apparently be 
seen to evince the anxious repression of the true nature of that conflict, referred to earlier in relation to 
Suleri’s conception of colonial repression. See also, Jameson and the relation between “manifest 
structure” and “subtext”, The Political Unconscious, pp. 48-49.
Wilson, The Strange Ride o f  Rudyard Kipling, p. 203.
Haggard, King Solomon’s Mines, pp. 66-7. See also, Mopo, in Nada the Lily, who in a comparable 
outburst stops short of an explanation and in so doing extends and emphasises that which Umbopa has 
attempted to clarify; our ignorance as to the meaning of our own existence; “[Y]ou tamed white people. 
You know many things, but of these you do not know: you cannot tell us what we were an hour before 
birth, nor what we shall be an hour after death, nor why we were born, nor why we die. You can only 
hope and believe”. Nada the Lily (London: Macdonald & Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 216. And, Quatermain’s 
opening reflections to Child o f Storm (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921), “We white people think 
that we know everything. For instance, we think that we understand human nature. And so we do, as 
human nature appears to us, with all its trappings and accessories seen dimly through the glass of our 
conventions, leaving out those aspects of it which we have forgotten or do not think it polite to mention” 
(p. 1).
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interpretation of the genre of colonial adventure fiction. For, in the almost always dangerous, 
trying, and precarious progress of the fictional adventure hero, his life is, first and foremost, that 
which holds off death, a death that is all around.
In colonial adventure fiction, the environmental immanence of death noted in ICipling is, in 
short, always more constantly made manifest. This, 1 would suggest, is one of the main reasons 
why Haggard’s heroes, in contrast to Kipling’s, are, as Katz observes, of “a more exhilarating 
sort”.'’^  But in saying this, the crucial point that Katz overlooks is the important connection 
which exists between the increased environmental immanence of death and that which we have 
already seen her describe as Haggard’s “rambling about the great questions of ‘Life, Death, and 
Eternity’.” This is because, Katz reads speeches like that made by Quatermain at Charra (or 
indeed, his anxieties at Kôr) in isolation from the circumstances in which the character actually 
finds himself. When we return Quatermain to the material circumstances of his experiences, and 
understand him as “an entity for which in [his] Being this very Being is an issue,”'’^  these 
circumstances, and Quatermain’s “Being-in-the-world” can be seen to combine and precipitate 
in anxiety and the questions “Why?” and “What for?”. Nor is it even necessary for the material 
circumstances to be so blatantly appropriate, for example, a ruined city, in order for such 
questions and anxieties to manifest themselves. In Allan Quatermain, on “a beautiful moonht 
night” in the wilderness, Quatermain describes how, all at once, and “in the most unaccountable 
way”;
1 had suddenly become nervous. There was no particular reason why I  should be, beyond 
the ordinary reasons which surround the Central African traveller, and yet undoubtedly 1 
was ...Worse and worse I grew, my pulse fluttered like a dying man’s, my nerves thrilled 
with the horrible sense o f impotent terror which anybody who is subject to nightmare 
will be familiar with .. .Above was the black bosom of the cloud, and beneath me swept 
the black flood of the water, and I  felt as though I  and Death were utterly alone between 
them. It was very desolate.'’^
So, while with hindsight, this episode can be seen to constitute the appropriately ominous 
prelude to a Masai attack, what is important to note, is the fact that the sense of desolation and 
Quatermain’s confusion at the onset of an inexplicable dread, when understood in ontological 
terms, replicates the fundamental character of his anxiety at Kôr. It is this confusion which 
reflects what Heidegger, in History o f the Concept o f Time, describes as the way in which 
Dasein comes to be aware of the world in “oriented concern”:
Katz, Rider H aggard and the Fiction o f Empire, p. 67. 
Being and Time, 1.5, p. 180
Haggard, A//an Quatermain, pp. 36-8, (my emphasis).
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This embattled sense of not being up to the situation is typified by the tumult of running 
around in panic, in which the stable relations of orientation within the referential contexts 
of the familiar environment are disturbed. This is the sense of the confusion which more 
or less accompanies fear, naturally in varying degrees according to the situation.'’^
Quatermain’s panic can thus be understood as the fictional representation of the fact that the 
formerly “stable relations of orientation within the referential contexts of the familiar 
environment are disturbed”. In his anxiety, Quatermain is radically delivered over to himself as 
himself as a “Being-in-the-world”, a “Being-in-the-world” that is perfectly articulated in his 
fearful description of “the black bosom of the cloud,” above, “the black flood of the water,” 
below and “1 and Death...utterly alone between them”.'’*’ In addition, it is this being alone and 
being close to death, as a “Being towards death” -  which recalls the earlier account of his 
seeming to be “the only living thing among the dead habitations of immemorial Kôr” -  that 
discloses the radical, and hitherto unrealised, precariousness of Quatermain’s predicament. In an 
almost identical incident in Finished, the significance of this disclosure is all the more striking, 
in ontological terms, in that it is not followed by an attack or disaster of any kind:
[Tjowards dawn a great horror took hold of me. I  did not know o f what I  was afraid, but 
I was much afraid of something. Nothing was passing in either Heda’s or our room, of 
that 1 made sure by personal examination. Therefore it would seem that my terrors were 
unnecessary, and yet they grew and grew. 1 felt sure that something was happening 
somewhere, a dread occurrence which it was beyond my power to prevent, though 
whether it were in this house or at the other end of Africa 1 did not know ... The mental 
depression increased and culminated. Then of a sudden it passed completely away, and 
as 1 mopped the sweat from off my brow 1 noticed that dawn was breaking.^”
In both extracts, Quatermain reiterates his inability to explain what is happening and what it is 
that he is afraid of; this is because, as Heidegger says, anxiety is itself
...characterisedby the fact that what threatens is nowhere. Anxiety “does not know” what 
that in the face of which it is anxious is.^’
Heidegger, History o f the Concept o f  Time, p. 287. Cf. Quatermain’s laments on the death of his only 
son, “The great wheel of Fate rolls on like a Juggernaut, and crushes all in turn .. .we fly hither and thither 
- we cry for mercy; but it is of no u se ...” (Allan Quatermain, p. 9).
Cf. Heidegger’s; “[T]he world as world is d i s c l o s e d and foremost by anxiety, as a state-of-mind” 
(Being and Time, 1.6, p. 232).
Haggard, Finished (London: Macdonald & Co. Ltd., 1962), p. 37. Cf. with the comparable episode in 
E. M. Forster’s ‘Story of a Panic’ in which the narrator describes how, “I suppose I had slept for about 
four hours, when I woke suddenly thinking I heard a noise in the garden. A id , immediately, before my 
eyes were open, cold terrible fear seized me -  not fear of something that was happening, like the fear in 
the wood, but fear of something that might happen.” ‘The Story of a Panic’, in Collected Short Stories 
(London: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 24.
Being and Time, 1.6, p. 231. Steiner brilliantly summarises this type of experience when he notes how, 
“there arises from within us a sense of the uncanny. We feel literally unheimlich, “homeless,” 
“unhoused.” As we flail about emptily, the familiarity of the everyday shatters. It is as if we had been 
caught, all of a sudden, in the interstices of the busy mesh of being, and stood face to face with the 
ontological, with Daseinsfrage” (Heidegger, pp. 99-100).
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As with Kipling’s bewilderment before the Gau Mukh which was “nothing more terrible than a 
little spring, falling into a reservoir, in the side of the hill”; Quatermain is simply baffled as to 
why this “terror” has descended upon him; there is, in his own words, “no particular reason” 
why he should feel so threatened: and, for Heidegger, this is related to the fact that “When dread 
has run its course we say, Tt was really nothing’”:
[T]his kind of talk strikes the very heart of the matter. It was nothing; the o f  which o f 
dread is nothing, that is to say, nothing that takes place in the world, nothing definite, 
nothing worldly....That o f which dread is in dread is the in-which o f Being-in-the-world, 
and that about which one is in dread is this very same Being-in-the-world..
The “of-which” and the “about-which” of Quatermain’s dread is thus nothing less than his own 
“Being-in-the-world;” and not in the sense of his being in a boat at night on a river in Africa 
(“as a definite fact”), it is his “Being-in-the-world” in “its facticity”
Furthermore, Heidegger’s important qualification that this happens “in varying degrees 
according to the situation” illustrates the fact that ‘ Unheimlichkeif does not always necessarily 
imply, or result in, the fullest possible existential apprehension of one’s own authentic “Being 
towards death.” Indeed, as he explains, anxiety can be identified by, and is made manifest in, 
everyday disorientation and confusion:
We then say: one feels uncanny [or in more idiomatic English: “Things look so weird all
54of a sudden” or “I’m getting this eerie feeling”].
And this is, of course, especially revealing in the context of the work of an author like Haggard 
given that the characters, landscapes and plots of his stories are all too frequently weird and, to 
say the least, not a little “uncanny”. But alongside the supernatural beings and fantastical
Heidegger, History o f the Concept o f Time, pp. 290-291. See also Harrison Hall’s Tntentionality and 
world: Division I of Being and Time’, in which he explains that, “Anxiety for human beings is analogous 
to breaking down for pieces of equipment. Just as the breaking of equipment can show its worldly 
character by revealing its place in a network of relations in which it has become dysfunctional, so anxiety 
can show the groundless character of human being by revealing the contingency of the network of 
purposes and projects and their background o f intelligibility in which we are no longer involved by virtue 
of our having become “dysfunctional”.” Tntentionality and world: Division I of Being and Time’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, p. 138.
“The “fact” that Dasein “is” at all and “is not not” is not a mere property in it, but can be experienced 
by Dasein itself in an original experience...Facticity of Dasein means: It is in a manner of its being this 
being, that it is; more accurately: It is its very “there” and “in”” (History o f the Concept o f Time, p. 291).
Heidegger, H istory o f the Concept o f  Time, p. 289. See also, Michael E. Zimmerman’s description of 
how, “A ixiety tears us out of everyday absorption in things; it reveals them to be useless in the face of 
the radical mortality, finitude, and nothingness at the heart of human existence. Why is human existence 
weird? Because humans are not things, but the clearing in which things appear.” ‘Heidegger, Buddhism, 
and deep ecology’, in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, p. 244.
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cities/^ there is the uncanniness of Quatermain’s encounter with the plainly unfamiliar, and an 
encounter with the Masai warrior near the beginning of Allan Quatermain makes an interesting 
case in point:
[W]hat a figure he presented as he stood there in his savage war-gear!...ferocious and 
awe-inspiring. To begin with, the man was enormously tall...and beautifully, though 
somewhat slightly, shaped; but with the face of a devil. In his right hand he held a spear 
about five and a half feet long...On his left arm was a large and well-made elliptical 
shield of buffalo-hide, on which were painted strange heraldic-looking devices. On his 
shoulders was a huge cape of hawks feathers, and round his neck was a naibere, or strip 
of cotton...The tanned goat-skin robe...was tied lightly around his waist...and through it 
were stuck, on the right and left sides respectively, his short pear-shaped sime, or 
sword...and an enormous knobkerrie. But perhaps the most remarkable feature of his 
attire consisted of a headdress of ostrich feathers, which was fixed on the chin, and passed 
in front of the ears to the forehead, and, being shaped like an ellipse, completely framed 
the face, so that the diabolical countenance appeared to project from a sort of feather fire­
screen.^®
Quatermain’s elaborately detailed obseivations are, he tells us, gathered from his later 
encounters; but he does not miss the opportunity to illustrate them in at this stage so as to more 
fully dramatise and refine the impressively strange affects of this first meeting.
In the analogous account of Edward’s unsettling encounter with the Highlander, Evan Dhu 
Maccombich, in Waverley, it is the narrator who provides us with the detail: and if we can 
overlook the obvious circumstantial differences between a Lowland Scottish drawing room and 
the South African wilderness, the scenario is, nonetheless, almost exactly the same:
[T]he door suddenly opened, and, ushered by Saunders Saunderson, a Highlander, fully 
armed and equipped, entered the apartment...Had it not been that...neither Mr 
Bradwardine nor Rose exhibited any emotion, Edward would certainly have thought the 
intrusion hostile. As it was, he started at the sight of what he had not yet happened to see, 
a mountaineer in his full national costume. The individual Gael was a stout, dark, young 
man, of low stature, the ample folds of whose plaid added to the appearance of strength 
which his person exhibited. The short kilt, or petticoat, showed his sinewy and clean- 
made limbs; the goat-skin purse, flanked by the usual defences, a dirk and steel-wrought 
pistol, hung before him; his bonnet had a short feather, which indicated his claim to be 
treated as a Duinhéwassel, or sort of gentleman; a broadsword dangled by his side, a 
target hung upon his shoulder, and a long Spanish fowling piece occupied one of his 
hands.
In addition to She and Kôr, see for example, the Zulu wizard Zikali in the trilogy Marie, Child o f  Storm 
and Finished, and Oro in When the World Shook; the Viking heroes of Eric Brighteyes and The 
Wanderer’s Necklace; and, the various gods who direct the proceedings in the Egyptian stories Cleopatra, 
Morning Star and The W orld’s Desire, written with Andrew Lang.
Haggard, AZ/an Quatermain, pp. 33-34.
Scott, Waverley, p. 133.
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In both cases, it is the suddenness of the encounter and the unfamiliarity of appearance, as much 
as the martial air and battle accoutrements, which Quatermain and Waverley find so threatening. 
Nor, in colonial literature, is this alarm necessarily restricted to the coloniser: for do not the two 
old Burmese women stare at the “Ingaleikma”, Elizabeth Lackersteen, “as English yokels might 
gaze at a Zulu warrior in full regalia”®®; does Mungo Park not have his fingers and toes counted 
by the Africans he visits;®  ^ and are not Quatermain and his companions inspected and 
scrutinised by the people they encounter? Indeed, is it not this mutual potential to shock in 
strangeness which Haggard employs, with an only moderate comic effect, in the disorderly 
person of Good upon the group’s arrival in Kukuanaland?®°
The weirdness of the characters that Quatermain encounters and the uncanniness of the 
landscapes and plots that he finds himself in, are all crucial ways in which his formerly “stable 
relations of orientation” can be seen to have become disturbed. What is more, the instances of 
his recognition of them as such, can be understood as moments in which he becomes aware of 
himself:
It certainly was a curious, and indeed almost a weird, position to be placed in -  rushing 
along, as we were, through the bowels of the earth on the bosom of a Stygian river, 
something after the fashion of souls being ferried by Charron, as Curtis said.®’
Then again, in the midst of all these ontological parallels and qualifications, would a more 
legitimate reading of this, and similar episodes in Haggard, not perhaps be that this anxiety 
merely complies with the formal requirements of an exciting adventure plot? To a certain 
extent, yes. But only to a certain extent, for even if we accept that Haggard is intentionally 
manufacturing suspense for his reader (and that it is thus an authorial construct), the 
fundamental details of the incident can still be seen to coincide with the elementary criteria of 
Heidegger’s description of ‘Unheimlichkeif.
In fact, not only are the two not mutually exclusive, but this basic ontological ebb and flow 
between the existential states of familiarity and unfamiliarity, between everydayness and 
anxiety describes perhaps the most important dynamic at work in the adventure novel. As 1 will 
go on to argue in more detail in the following chapter, the depiction of these ontological modes
®® George Orwell, Burmese D ays  (London: Seeker & Warburgh, 1949), p. 86.
®'^  Mungo Park, Travels in the Interior D istricts o f Africa (1799), p. 109, quoted by Louise-Pratt in 
‘Scratches on the Face of the Country’ in “R ace”, Writing and Difference, p. 151.
®® See, for example, the questions of their future ally, Infadoos: “How is it, O strangers...that this fat man 
(pointing to Good, who was clad in nothing but boots and a flannel shirt, and had only half finished his 
shaving) whose body is clothed, and whose legs are bare, who grows hair on one side of his sickly face 
and not the other, and who wears one shining and transparent eye, has his teeth that move of themselves, 
coming away from the jaws and returning of their own free will?” (King Solomon’s Mines, p. 103).
®’ Haggard, A/Zan Quatermain, p. 125.
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of “Being-in-the-world” in colonial literature forms a cmcial plane of correspondence upon 
which the reading public can potentially relate to characters like Allan Quatermain, And it 
interesting to consider this point in relation to Haggard’s own observations regarding the innate 
existential appeal of Romance in ‘About Fiction’:
The love of romance is probably coeval with the existence of humanity. So far as we can 
follow the history of the world we find traces of it and its effects among every people, 
and those who are acquainted with the habits and ways of thought of savage races will 
know that it flourishes as strongly in barbarian as in the cultured brats, In short, it is like 
the passions, an innate quality of mankind.
Indeed, it is the correspondence constituted by this “innate quality of mankind” which is 
explicitly solicited by Quatermain himself in his earlier description of “the horrible sense o f 
impotent terror which anybody who is subject to nightmare will be familiar with”.®® And 
irrespective of the reality or unreality of the scenario, it is this correspondence which necessarily 
undeipins and defines the anxiety of any number of exhilarating, desperate and nightmarish 
incidents in Haggard. As J.G. Cawelti has argued, the formulaic narratives of adventure fiction 
constitute
...an imaginary world in which the audience can encounter a maximum of excitement 
without being confronted with an overpowering sense of insecurity and danger that 
accompanies such forms of excitement in reality.®'’
But more importantly, this vaguely defined “sense of insecurity and danger” is grounded in the 
ontological constitution of the reader as being susceptible to “insecurity and danger” in the 
Being that he/she is. It is this which underpins and defines the anxiety we may feel when we 
read of the witch smelling in King Solomon’s Mines or of the aging of Ayesha in She. And, of 
course, not just in Haggard, but in adventure and horror fiction in general; from Kipling’s Indian 
ghost stories to Conan-Doyle’s The Lost World’, from Edgar Allen Poe’s The Pit and the 
Pendulum to Crusoe’s discovery of footprints in the sand and Richard Hannay’s escape across 
the heather in The Thirty-Nine Steps.
Haggard, ‘About Fiction’, Contemporary Review, 52 (1887), p. 172.
As Heidegger says, “In [anxiety] There-being [Dasein] finds itself before the Non-being of the 
potential impotence of its existence”. Being and Time, 1.6, p. 266, trans. by W. J. Richardson, in 
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 79.
®'’ J.G. Cawelti, Adventure, M ystery and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and Popular Culture (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976) p. 16. See also, Cawelti's summary of adventure as 
a literary formula, pp. 19-41.
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(b) Loneliness
At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that isolation was one of the most important 
circumstantial factors which facilitates Dasein’s anxiety in the colonial realm. In the cases we 
have been examining thus far, an overwhelming sense of isolation and loneliness has been a 
consistently recurring theme, both as a cause, and as a consequence, of ‘Unheimlichkeif. And, 
as such, I would argue that the depiction of loneliness and isolation in colonial fiction can be 
seen to represent another crucial plane of potential correspondence between the historical and 
fictional coloniser on the one hand, and between the fictional character and the reader on the 
other.
Bearing these correspondences in mind, we can now turn to Louis-Ferdinand Celine’s 
misanthropic and irreverential semi-autobiographical Journey to the End o f the Night; here the 
book’s narrator travels to the African colonies aboard the Admiral Bragueton shortly after 
World War One. As the temperature rises, he relates how:
In that bubbling cauldron, the sweat of those scalded beings is concentrated, the 
presentiment of the vast colonial solitude that will soon bury them and their destinies and 
make them groan like the dying. They cling, they bite, they rend, they froth at the 
mouth.®®
From the perspective of Dasein’s temporality, discussed in Chapter Three, it is clear that, in this 
largely unsympathetic account of his fellow-passenger’s anxieties, Céline is describing the 
fearful futural projections of “beings in Time”. But more importantly, it is the combination of a 
claustrophobic monotony and a relentless heat that casts these “scalded beings” before 
themselves and their future loneliness. Unlike the situation of Marlow in Heart o f Darkness and 
the officers in Kipling’s district outposts, where “the isolation that weighs upon the waking 
eyelids and drives you by force headlong into the labours of the day”;®® here there is no work for 
these “beings” to distract themselves with and as a result, “the entire human content of the ship 
congealed into massive drunkenness”;®^ the drunkenness which, for Orwell’s John Florry, is 
taken as a matter of course:
®® Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Journey to the End o f the Night (London: Calder Publications Ltd., 1997), P. 
110. Céline was born Louis-Ferdinand Destouches in 1894. After being severely injured and decorated 
for bravery in World War I (he was awarded the Médaille militaire and a seventy-five percent disability 
pension), he lived and worked for a short time in London before taking a post with a lumber company in 
the Cameroons. Suffering from malaria and dysentery, he returned to France. After World War II he was 
accused of collaborating with the Nazis and condemned for his anti-semitism which resulted in his being 
imprisoned in Germany, France and Denmark. After his final release, he returned to France and continued 
writing until his death in 1961.
®® Kipling, T h e Judgement at Dungara’, in Soldiers Three, p. 201.
® Céline, Journey to the End o f the Night, p. 106.
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[DJrink is what keeps the machine going. We should all go mad and kill one another in a 
week if it weren’t for that. There’s a subject for one of your uplift essayists, doctor. 
Booze as the cement of empire.®®
Offering up his own little piece of “Enframing”, Céline maintains that, for “the European”, it is 
in the face of an unremitting heat that
...the frantic unbuttoning sets in, when filth triumphs and covers us entirely. It’s a 
biological confession. Once work and cold weather cease to constrain us, once they relax 
theii' grip, the white man shows you the same spectacle as a beautiful beach when the tide 
goes out: the truth, fetid pools, crabs, carrion and turds.®’’
If the would-be colonials in Céline are terrified at the prospect of a loneliness that would “bury 
them”, then the first-hand report of an old-stager like George Lawrence, in Beau Geste, would 
have done little to reassure them:
[Djisappointment, worry, frustration, anxiety, heat, sand-flies, mosquitoes, dust, fatigue, 
fever, dysentery, malarial ulcers, and that great depression which comes of monotony 
indescribable, weariness unutterable, and loneliness unspeakable. And the greatest of 
these is loneliness.^®
In this grim catalogue of woes, Kipling’s “idle talk” about ‘our’ great imperial sacrifice is 
conspicuous in its absence; the trauma and suffering of life in a colonial army is simply 
endured; as is borne out in the story of the Gestes which follows. It is neither glamorous nor 
directed towards any identifiable end. It is the same feeling which pervades Conrad’s viciously 
ironic portrait of the Western civilising mission, ‘An Outpost of Progress’, in which the isolated 
traders Kayerts and Carlier slowly go out of their minds in the back of beyond.^’ In contrast to 
those occasional episodes and seasonal periods of loneliness and anxiety already noted in 
Kipling and Quatermain, here the loneliness is perpetual; and it is exacerbated, Conrad tells us, 
by “the contact with pure unmitigated savagery”:
[T]he contact with primitive nature and primitive man...brings sudden and profound 
trouble into the heart. To the sentiment of being alone of one’s kind, to the clear 
perception of the loneliness of one’s thoughts, of one’s sensations -  to the negation of the 
habitual, which is safe, there is added the affirmation of the unusual, which is dangerous; 
a suggestion of things vague, uncontrollable, and repulsive, whose discomposing
Orwell, Burmese Days, P. 39.68
Céline, Journey to the End o f the Night, p. 106.
™ Wren, Beau Geste, pp. 10-11 (my emphasis).
In her uninspired and trivial book Joseph Conrad as I  Knew Him, Conrad’s wife, Jesse, recalls that ‘An 
Outpost of Progress’ had been written in a “somewhat savage mood”, and upon completion, we are told 
that he wanted it out of the house as soon as possible. Jesse Conrad, Joseph Conrad as I  Knew Him 
(London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1926), p. 109.
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intrusion excites the imagination and tries the civüized nerves of the foolish and the wise 
alike/^
Over and above the somewhat conventional contrasting of the primitive and the civilised/® and 
indeed, the onticalisation of “nerves” (as “civilised”), what is especially striking in this starkly 
detailed synopsis of Kayerts and Carlier's predicament is the intimacy of the connection which 
Conrad makes between isolation and “the negation of the habitual”. It is a combination of 
isolation and the strange which is similarly conveyed by Conrad’s friend Sir Hugh Clifford'’'’ 
(himself a Colonial Civil Servant) in, Tn the Heart of Kalamantan’:
It was not only the utter loneliness which those ramparts of blue mountains emphasised, 
not only the sense of awful isolation, of entire self-dependence cut off from human aid, 
which numbed and paralysed him, it was the looks, the habits, the savagery of the wild 
creatures by whom he was surrounded that filled him with disgust, with unconquerable 
revulsion, with ungovernable fear.
Here too, the increased sensibility of self is framed, on the one hand, by the negation (and hence 
not just the disruption) of the “stable relations of orientation”, or the habitual; and on the other, 
by the perpetual affirmation of the unstable “relations of orientation”, or the strange. When 
added to the already powerful “loneliness of one’s thoughts, of one’s sensations”, these 
environmental circumstances precipitate in the “suggestion of things vague, uncontrollable, and 
repulsive”; a vagueness and uncontrollability which recalls Quatermain’s nightmarish “sense of 
impotent terror” in Allan Quatermain; the madness of Dowse at the Flores Strait in Kipling’s ‘A 
Disturber of Traffic’ {Many Inventions'); and the desperate case of the missionary, young David 
of St. Bees in ‘The Judgement of Dungarra’:
Conrad, ‘An Outpost of Progress’, in The Complete Short Stories o f Joseph Conrad, p. 348.
®^ As an articulation of “the myth of the Dark Continent”, this extract can no doubt be seen to contain that 
which Patrick Brantiinger has called “the submerged fear of falling out of the light into the abyss of social 
and moral regression” (Rule o f Darkness, p. 194); and Balachandra Raj an calls “the deep fear of being 
lost in the other, that has been pervasive in imperial discourse” {Under Western Eyes, p. 13).
In his informative biographical study ‘Difference-Gap-Abyss’, H.M.J. Maier numbers Clifford among 
the many idiosyncratic civil servants in the straits settlements, Malay Peninsula and Borneo in the late 
19* century. After holding posts in Trinidad and Tobago, Gold Coast, Nigeria and Ceylon, Clifford 
tragically “went mad” shortly before the Japanese seized control. ‘Difference-Gap-Abyss: The Work of 
Hugh Clifford (1866-1941)’, in C.C. Barfoot and Theo D ’haen (eds.), Shades o f Empire: in Colonial and 
Post-Colonial Literatures (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993), pp. 91-108. For further information 
on Clifford, see Harry A. Gailey, Clifford: Imperial Proconsul (London: Collings, 1982). For Conrad’s 
correspondence with Clifford, see Jean Aubry (ed.), Joseph Conrad: Life and Letters, 2 vols. (London: 
William Heinemann Ltd., 1927). In the modern collection of Conrad’s letters, which does not cover the 
whole period of this correspondence, Laurence Davies notes that the friendship had begun in “spring 
1899, just when Lord Jim, that study of values and loyalties in a colonial setting, was staring to grow out 
of ‘Tuan Jim: A  Sketch’”. Frederick R Karl and Laurence Davies (eds.), The Collected Letters o f Joseph  
Conrad, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983-), vol. 2, p. xxv.
Clifford, ‘In the Heart of Kalamantan’, in “Blackwood” Tales from the Outposts, p. 75.
165
[S]et apart for the Lord’s work, [he] broke down in the utter desolation, and returned half 
distraught to the Head Mission, crying, “There is no God, but I have walked with the 
Devil!” ®^
But, more than anything else, Kayerts and Carlier’s loneliness manifests itself in a desperate and 
all-consuming paranoia, and it is this, in conjunction with the delay of the steamer, which 
finally brings about the crisis that sees the former shoot the latter before hanging himself/^
The sorry tale of Kayerts and Carlier stands as one of Conrad’s most scathing commentaries 
upon the hypocrisy, greed and sheer ludicrousness of European colonialism. As the portrait of 
an exercise in colonial absurdity, it certainly compares to that famous scene in Heart o f 
Darkness, where “in the empty immensity of earth, sky and water” a French ship 
incomprehensibly fires shells “into a continent” .^ ® As Ian Watt has argued:
In his earlier Malayan fiction, and ‘An Outpost of Progress’, Conrad was primarily 
concerned with the colonisers, and there the general purport of his fiction is consistent 
and unequivocal: imperial or colonial experience is disastrous for the whites; it makes 
them lazy; it reveals their weaknesses; it puffs them up with empty vanity at being white; 
and it fortifies the intolerable hypocrisy with which Europeans in general conceal their 
selfish aims.^®
For our purposes, however, I would emphasise that like Martin Decoud in Nostromo, neither 
Kayerts nor Carlier is “fit to grapple with himself single-handed,” and both can be seen to have 
“died from solitude”:
[T]he enemy loiown but to few on this earth, and whom only the simplest of us are fit to 
withstand.®®
They too evince the fact that “solitude from mere outward condition of existence becomes very 
swiftly a state of soul”; they too are “swallowed up in the immense indifference of things”,®^ 
and as Otto Bohlmann has observed, it is the indifference of “circumambient being” in Conrad, 
that produces “a sense of cosmic alienation”.®^
Kipling, ‘The Judgement of Dungarra’, p. 202.
For some historical accounts of suicide and madness among district officers in Africa, see Tales From  
The D ark Continent, pp. 90-91.
®^ Conrad, Heart o f Darkness, pp. 61-62.
Ian Watt, ‘Ideological Perspectives: Kurtz and the Fate of Victorian Progress’, in Elaine Jordan (ed.), 
Joseph Conrad (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 37. On loneliness in Conrad, see, Paul L. 
W iley’s ‘Conrad’s Solitaries’, in Marvin Mudrick (ed.), Conrad: A Collection o f Critical Essays 
(Englewood Cliffs [N.J]: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 63-73.
®® Conrad, Nostromo, p. 408. 
ibid., pp. 408-409, 412.
®® Otto Bohlmann, Conrad’s Existentialism  (Basingstoke: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 
1991), p. 9.
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But, not just in Conrad, for as we have seen, this “cosmic alienation” also underpins the 
overwhelming sense of vulnerability which manifests itself at Chitor and Kôr. That said, it is 
important to note that whereas the ‘realism’ of much of Conrad’s (and indeed Kipling’s) fiction 
frequently allows for the depiction of long periods of uninterrupted stagnation and loneliness, 
the fundamental requirements and momentum of Haggard’s most exciting romances mean he 
rarely permits such periods of stasis. Quatermain thus only ever has glimpses of his own 
loneliness -  as the disclosure of what, how and that he is — for he is always on the cusp of some 
new adventure; forever on the point of being re-immersed in the concerns of the “they”. Yet, as 
an important indication of the nature of Quatermain’s engagement with the world, these 
glimpses represent another crucial plane of correspondence upon which the reading public can 
potentially relate to what, how, and where he is.
For that which is disclosed, in these glimpses of loneliness, is the “potentiality” of the 
environment (whether jungle, desert, mountain or veldt) to evoke loneliness; a potentiality that 
was in especially sharp contrast to the claustrophobia of nineteenth-century industrial Britain. 
This is not to underestimate or negate the significance of the loneliness of the crowd, nor to 
offer up this claustrophobia as universally prevalent in the Britain of that time, but to recognise 
it as providing possible criteria by which the reader’s understanding of Haggard’s evocation of 
loneliness may have been conducted.
In colonial discourse analysis, however, the connection between mood and landscape is of 
course understood within the context of an exclusively colonial realm of meaning. For example, 
in ‘Scratches on the Face of the Country’, Mary Louise Pratt argues that the depiction of 
landscape in colonial discourse must be grasped in terms of that which she calls the imperial 
codification of “difference”. For Pratt, landscape is
...textualized mainly as a source of comfort or discomfort, danger or safety for the 
protagonist or as a trigger for the outpouring of emotion.®^
Pratt, ‘Scratches on the Face of the Country’, in “R ace”, Writing and Difference, pp. 151. See also, 
Graham Dawson’s description of Melanie Klein’s theory that “Far-off lands function “in explorer’s 
unconscious mind” as metaphorical substitutes for the lost mother, expressing a reparative wish to “re­
create her and to find her again in whatever he undertakes”.” Melanie Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation  
and Other Worlcs 1921-1945 (New York: Virago, 1988), pp. 102-5, quoted by Dawson in Soldier Heroes, 
p. 45.
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As an example of this textualisation she cites the following “famous and highly conventional 
scene” from Mungo Park’s Travels in the Interior Districts o f Africa in which he describes his 
distress and loneliness after has been beaten and robbed by native thieves:
After they were gone I sat for some time looking around me with amazement and terror. 
Whichever way I turned, nothing appeared but danger and difficulty. I saw myself in the 
midst of a vast wilderness in the depth of the rainy season, naked and alone; surrounded 
by savage animals, and men still more savage. I was five hundred miles from the nearest 
European settlement. All these circumstances crowded at once on my recollection, and I 
confess that my spirits began to fail me.^^
Like Harry Feversham, Park finds himself “an irregularity in the great waste surface of the 
earth”.^  ^The desperate circumstances of his predicament, as the “threatening” disclosure of his 
“Being-in-the-world” as a “Being towards death”, crowd in upon him, and he is brought close to 
despair. For Pratt, what is important here is the ideological and discursive function of such a 
scene within colonial discourse as a whole, and the discourse of explorer narratives in particular. 
As a result. Park, as the ‘discursive subject’ in the middle of a “commercial assignment”, is 
“Enframed” as the archetypal “European”, and his description of his crisis “Enframed” as the 
archetypical textualisation of landscape as a “source” of “discomfort”. In other words, the 
interpretational movement of Pratt’s analysis is such that the radical individualisation of Park 
himself is effectively dissolved :
If the land-scanning, self-effacing producer of information is associated with the state, 
then this sentimental, experiential voice must be associated with that critical sector of the 
bourgeois world, the private sphere, home of the solitary, introspecting Individual.^*^
In short, Park himself is “covered up” (verdecken) in the delineation of his various roles 
(explorer and “bourgeois” writer): Park’s description of his own loneliness ~ as a manifestation 
of his engagement with the material circumstances within which he finds himself -  gets lost in 
the translation of Park, ‘the historical subject’, into Park ‘the narrative subject’ via Park ‘the 
imperial writer’. Park, the human being in the world of his experiences is nowhere to be seen.
Park, Travels in the Interior D istricts o f  Africa, p. 225, quoted by Pratt in ‘Scratches on the Face of the 
Country’, pp. 151-152. Cf., the experience of David Livingstone upon his arrival in Ujiji and his 
discovery that all of his stores have been sold: “I felt in my destitution as if I were the man who went 
down from Jerusalem to Jerico and fell among thieves. I could not hope for a priest, Levite, or Good 
Samaratin to come by on either side.” Quoted by Basil Mathews in Livingstone the Pathfinder (London: 
Wyman and Sons Ltd., 1928).
^  Mason, The Four Feathers, p. 85.
^  Pratt, ‘Scratches on the Face of the Country’, pp. 152.
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(c) Fear
As both a fundamental cause and an inevitable effect of anxiety, loneliness can thus be 
understood as a determining factor in Dasein’s feelings of vulnerability and paranoia. It is in 
vulnerability and paranoia, among other things, that fear can be seen to manifest itself. 
However, this does not mean that fear and anxiety are the same; for as Heidegger explains, 
anxiety is a “state-of-mind” and fear (Furcht) is a “mode of state-of-mind” and this distinction 
is dependent upon the fact that “anxiety “does not know” what that in the face of which it is 
anxious is”,^  ^whereas:
That in the face o f which we fear, the “fearsome”, is in every case something which we 
encounter within-the-world and which may have either readiness-to-hand, presence-at- 
hand, or Dasein-with as its kind of Being.®^
In order to more fully understand what Heidegger is getting at here, we now turn to a 
conspicuous example of fear in Haggard: the witch-smelling in King Solomon's Mines. “As for 
myself,” Quatermain says
...when I saw that old fiend dancing nearer, my heart positively sank in my boots. I 
glanced behind us at the long rows of corpses, and shivered .. .Nearer she came, and yet 
nearer, every creature in that vast assemblage watching her movements with intense 
anxiety.®^
That ‘in face of which’ Quatermain is afraid would thus appear to be Gagool, but this does not 
automatically mean that Gagool is also that which Quatermain is afraid about, for as Heidegger 
explains:
That which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid -  Dasein...Fearing 
discloses this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself.
Hence, despite the important difference between anxiety and fear in terms of what “that in the 
face of which” one is anxious and afraid is; in both cases, that which anxiety and fear is anxious 
and fearful about, is always that entity which is anxious and afraid. It is always Dasein itself. 
And following this definition of the ontological meaning of fear, we can look behind Gagool 
and her henchmen as “that in the face of which” Quatermain is afraid and, recognise instead
Being and Time, 1.6, p. 231.
ibid., 1.5, p. 179. Safranski describes this important distinction more simply when he says; “Fear is 
directed toward something definite, it focuses on detail. Anxiety, on the other hand, is vague and 
boundless as the world” {Martin Heidegger, p. 152).
Haggard, King Solomon's Mines, p. 152 
Being and Time, 1.5, p. 180.
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that, that which is disclosed to, and apprehended by, Quatermain in his terrifying encounter with 
her is the fragility of his own existence. In short, Gagool is that which facilitates Quatermain’s 
apprehension of his own “Being-in-the-world” as he glances “at the long rows of corpses” and 
apprehends his own “Being towards death”.
This understanding of Gagool in terms of Heidegger’s phenomenological description of the 
ontological meaning of fear is, however, a far cry from the postcolonial interpretation of this 
character as a ‘discursive subject’. Laura Chrisman, for example, has argued that:
It is through Gagool that imperialism’s ambivalence about rationality and knowledge, as 
well as about Africa and the feminine, are best dramatised....[For] Gagool may, like 
Ayesha, be seen as a product of imperial discourse’s own bad faith. She is its bad mirror, 
engendered by the conflicting desires, fears and self-knowledges that imperialism cannot 
acknowledge to itself.
Gagool is thus seen as the discursive product (and prooQ of imperialism’s “conflicting desires, 
fears and self-knowledges” and Haggard is seen as the synecdoche of imperialism itself:
Haggard is an apologist of Empire, a writer not noted for his sophistication. Precisely 
because of this he serves as an example of how imperialism even at its most basic is 
capable of constructing itself as a contradictory process, of commenting upon its own 
self-mythologising, and economic, imperatives, while in the course of pursuing them; is 
able, in sum, to reveal a great deal of self-knowledge but doesn’t know what to do with 
this knowledge.^^
As a result, for Chrisman, Gagool is the discursive concretion of the (repressive) 
psychopathology of Haggard’s imperialism'^'^; a concretion in which imperialism itself is
See Heidegger’s description of what he calls, the “four essential moments” of fear in History o f  the 
Concept o f Time: (1) “the o f which of being afraid”; (2) “the way of being toward that of which one is 
afraid”; (3) “the about which of fearing” wherein, “being afraid is not only being afraid of, but at the same 
time always afraid about,” and finally; (4) “the ways of being toward that about which fear is in fear” 
(History o f  the Concept o f Time, p. 285).
Laura Chrisman, ‘The Imperial Unconscious?’, in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, pp. 
510-511. In saying this, Chrisman is not writing form a narrowly feminist perspective: for indeed this is 
precisely her own criticism of Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s No M an’s Land: The p lace o f the woman 
writer in the twentieth century, Sexchanges (vol. II.). According to Chrisman, the imperial romance is, for 
Gilbert and Gubar, “no more and no less than an allegory for the penetration and fear of the (eternal and 
white) feminine” (p. 501). And as a result, Chrisman argues, they fail to address the fundamental 
importance of race, black Africa and the material processes of imperialism. Furthermore, as Sara Suleri 
has argued, in her discussion of Edmund Burke’s evocation of “rape as a figure for colonial practise”; 
“When the colonial dynamic is metaphorically represented as a violated female body that can be mourned 
over with sentimentality’s greatest excess, its rape is less an event than a deflection from a contemplation 
of male embattlement, the figure of which more authentically dictates the boundaries o f colonial power” 
(The Rhetoric o f English India, p. 61).
ibid., pp. 500-501.
As we noted in Chapter One, this psychopathological concretion/projection is an all too common 
formulation in postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis. See for example, Kaja Silverman’s 
suggestion that, “Lawrence clearly projects his homosexuality and masochism onto the Arabs he fights
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effectively anthropomorphised. In summarising the theory behind these approaches, 
Balachandra Raj an has argued:
Freudian-influenced views of the self-other relationship always stress the complicity (or, 
even more telling, the fear of complicity) that underlies the oppositional staging and that 
can be a root cause of imperial anxiety. That anxiety is typically allayed by an intensified 
energy of repudiation, through which the self is reassured of its stability and of the 
protection of its identity from the purged elements it has made marginal or monstrous.^^
And this is, of course, especially relevant given the “monstrous” depiction of Gagool.^^ But then 
again, is it valid to talk about a phenomenon like imperialism as though it were a thinking 
subject with all of its own desires, repressions and anxieties? And what must happen to 
Haggard, as the author, and as the individual human being that he himself is, in order for this 
talk to take place at all?
In the wake of Chrisman’s single-minded drive towards the establishment of Gagool’s 
discursive functionality, these questions are never addressed. And this is because, as the 
“standing-reserve” (Bestand) of Chrisman's “challenging revealing”, both imperialism and 
Haggard are necessarily regulated and secured in such a way as to exhibit and ensure the 
structural unity of colonial discourse as “structured image” {GeBild)?^ In other words, it is not 
just that, as Raj an says:
Some of the complexities of a mind can be rubbed away when it is put into position as the 
mainspring of a discourse.^®
It is that Haggard and imperialism can be whatever the “structured image”, as the “ground plan 
of the objective-sphere”,^  ^requires them to be.
And in this regard, it is perhaps useful for us to note Abdul JanMohamed’s adoption of 
Northrop Frye’s distinction between the novel and the romance; for Frye:
with, so that the sexuality he finds within them, and with which he identifies, represents a mirror image of 
his own”. ‘White Skin, Brown Masks: The Double Mimesis, or With Lawrence in Arabia,’ differences: A 
Journal o f Feminist Cultural Studies 1, 3 (1989), pp. 3-54, p. 48. And Benita Parry’s insistence that “The 
repressed thoughts of these irreproachable matrons [Aiglo-Indian memsahibs] were brought to the 
surface by India and were projected onto Indians as proof of their depravity” {Delusions and Discoveries,
p. 102).
 ^Raj an. Under Western Eyes, p. 17.
For a more extensive analysis of “the monstrous” in colonial discourse, and a critique of Western 
assessments of Indian art and culture over the last 700 years, see, Fartha Mitter, Much Maligned 
Monsters: A History o f European Reactions to Indian Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
“Where Enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-reserve mark all revealing” 
( ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 27).
From Rajan’s discussion of James M ill’s TheH istoty o f British India in Under Western Eyes, p. 90. 
Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, p. 121.
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The essential difference between novel and romance lies in the conception of 
characterization. The romancer does not attempt to create “real people” so much as 
styhzed figures which expand into psychological archetypes. It is in romance that we find 
Jung’s libido, anima, and shadow reflected in the hero, heroine, and villain 
respectively
When this distinction is applied in postcolonial theory, however, I would argue that the colonial 
figure in the colonial romance can be interpreted as an expansion of a colonial psychological 
archetype. This is, as we have seen, the case in Chrisman’s analysis of Gagool. But, it is vital to 
recognise that the burden of Chrisman’s argument is not confined to Gagool or King Solomon’s 
Mines; for in positing Haggard as synechdochic of imperialism, Chrisman is simultaneously 
positing Gagool as the literal concretion of The imperialist’s’ “conflicting desires, fears and 
self-knowledges”: that is, the “conflicting desires, fears and self-knowledges” of the historical 
coloniser in general. So while, in a roundabout way, Chrisman can still be seen to argue, with 
Heidegger, that that about which Dasein is anxious and afraid is Dasein itself; for Chrisman, it 
is an anxiety, fear and self that is not only read out of the characters of colonial romance but is 
simultaneously constituted in terms of imperial status and translated into the historical realm as 
such.
As a result, Chrisman’s analysis can be seen as an expression of that crucial “tendency” in 
colonial discourse analysis “to collapse the social into the discursive” noted previously. A 
collapse that is founded in a belief in “the inherent susceptibility of all social practises, 
conceived as signifying systems, to structural linguistic analysis”. A n d  this is because her 
peculiar theory of colonial fear and anxiety is drawn from imperialism and personified by 
Haggard before being brought to bear upon the text. Hence, even if we leave aside the details of 
Chrisman’s psychoanalytical diagnosis, we are still dealing with the problems which adhere to a 
culturally, racially and nationally generalised and discursively constituted pathology; the 
problems which I have outlined in Chapter Two in reference to the work of Homi Bhabha; and, 
the same problems which adhere to Sara Suleri’s insistence that “the physiognomy of racial 
difference can evoke only a colonial fear of the greater cultural alternatives it symbolically 
represents” and, Benita Parry’s confident assertion that “Indians...were not only feared as
Northrop Frye, Anatomy o f Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 
304, quoted by JanMohamed in ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory', p. 91.
Neil Lazarus, ‘Doubting the New World Order’, quoted by Parry m D elusions and Discoveries, p. 3.
Suleri, The Rhetoric o f  English India, p. 109. See also, Suleri’s bizarre reading of the Anglo-Indian 
woman’s encounter with Kali: “The goddess’s bodily demeanour suggests a frenzy beyond the 
heterosexual, converting her into an icon for the unlocatable aura of colonial threat. When the Anglo- 
Indian woman confronts the laboring glee that Kali represents, her confinement in imperial calm is 
suspended into a momentary recognition: both Kali’s ecstasy and the colonizing woman’s composure
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subjects who had once rebelled and could do so again, but as perverts threatening to invade and 
seduce the white world”. T h e  same is true of the argument advanced by Pathak, Sengupta and 
Purkayastha, in their analysis of the significance of the Marabar caves in Forster’s A to
India:
“Primal”, “dark”, “fists and fingers”, “unspeakable”, fearsomely advancing to the town 
with the sunset - these phrases signal the fear and insecurity the imperialist experienced, 
confronted with what they could not master; to reduce it to stasis was to contain that fear 
and hold it at bay.^ '^^
What we have, in each of these examples, is the archetypically abstract coloniser, or imperialist, 
functioning in discourse as The discursive subject’ and not the individual human being in the 
world of its experiences for whom, as Heidegger says:
Fearing discloses this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself. Fear always reveals 
Dasein in the Being of its “there”, even if it does so in varying degrees of explicitness.
Rather than being the site, or signifier, of a colonial homogeneity, when understood in terms of 
the Being that the historical coloniser as Dasein is, fear constitutes one of the most radically 
individualised modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” in that the disclosure of its Being as 
“there” is always characterised by “mineness”. But in addition, this “mineness” can also be seen 
to necessarily characterise the object of Dasein’s fear as that which it itself is afraid of. And this 
is precisely what the examples quoted above singularly fail to recognise: for, in each case, the 
object of fear -  whether it is “the physiognomy of racial difference”, “Indians” or the Marabar 
caves -  is generically inflated to the level of a quasi-ontological predeterminacy. In other words, 
the implication in each of these formulations is that Europeans or colonials are ontologically 
programmed in such a way as to be afraid of these things in their being Europeans and 
colonials; an implication which is fundamentally unsustainable if those same Europeans and 
colonials are understood under the guidance of an understanding of the Being that they 
themselves are.
become even in their opposition uncanny replications of each other, or mythological and historical 
repositories of the costs of omnivorous power” (The Rhetoric o f English India, p. 96).
Parry, Delusions and Discoveries, p. 31.
Zakia Pathak, Saswati Sengupta and Sharmila Purkayastha, ‘The Prisonhouse of Orientalism’, Textual 
Practice 5, 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 195-218, p. 200 (my emphasis).
Being and Time, 1.5, p. 180.
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2. Boredom
In 1924, Heidegger read Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain with Hannah Arendt, and, while 
we can only speculate upon the philosophical influence that this book had upon him, in his 
exhaustive study of boredom in the 1929-30 lecture series on metaphysics the shade of Hans 
Castorp looms large. For it is into the heart of those “great spaces of time” passing “in unbroken 
uniformity” and shrinking together “in a way to make the heart stop beating for fear”,^ “  that 
Heidegger takes his classes; and it is here that “the fundamental roar of existence” is to be 
heard. In the International Sanatorium Berghof, where “all the days are nothing but the same 
day repeating itself’, C a s t o r p  is confronted (and entranced) by that boredom which, for 
Heidegger, brings Dasein before itself as a “being in the world” in its purest essence. It is this 
same boredom which can also be seen to permeate and oppress so much of the literature of 
Empire. For, in conjunction with anxiety, loneliness, uncanniness and fear, boredom represents 
one of the most crucial ways in which the fictional (and by extension the historical) coloniser 
can be seen to come to the potentially critical apprehension of itself as “Being in Time” and 
“Being-in-the-world”. As such, it signals that point at which the “idle tallc” of the “they” falls 
away, and “the question resonates once again: Why are there beings at all instead of 
nothing?”;^ ”'"’ that point at which, as Céline says:
Men, days, things -  they passed before you knew it in this hotbed of vegetation, heat, 
humidity and mosquitoes. Everything passed, disgustingly, in little pieces, in phrases, 
particles of flesh and bone, in regrets and corpuscles; demolished by the sun, they melted 
away in a torrent of light and colours, and taste and time went with them, everything 
went. Nothing remained but shimmering dread.
This is the “Nothing” and the “dread” of Being being brought to its “there”; the “regrets” and 
indifference of an habitual sameness where “Being has becomes manifest as a burden”;*" the 
same “burden” of Being which means that Kayerts and Carlier, in “An Outpost of Progress”, 
“could only live on condition of being machines”:
They lived like blind men in a large room...The river, the forest, all the great land 
throbbing with life, were like a great emptiness...Things appeared and disappeared before
***'’ Thomas Mann, The M agic Mountain, trans. by H.T. Lowe-Porter (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 
Ltd., 1979), p. 104.
The phrase is Safranski's, Martin Heidegger, p. 192.
Mann, The M agic Mountain, p. 183.
Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 2. See also, Safranski; “In the face of the abysses 
of...boredom we are, as a rule, seized by the horror vacui. But this horror has to be endured because it 
makes us intimately acquainted with that Nothing that raises the old metaphysical question, Why is there 
Something and not, rather, Nothing?” {Martin Heidegger, p. 192).
**" Céline, Journey to the End of the Night, p. 138.
**' Being and Time, 1.5, p. 173.
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their eyes in an unconnected and aimless kind of way. The river seemed to come from 
nowhere and flow nowhither. It flowed through a void.
In both accounts, everything is consumed by a never-changing present, lost in the “total absence 
of any fulfilled or fulfilling time”.**^  For what else is left? In both stories the commercial returns 
are so negligible as to fundamentally call into question the very purpose of their being there at 
all;**'* and it is the daily perpetuation of this state of affairs, the daily perpetuation of a 
seemingly pointless existence which means that the outposts of progress become outposts of 
stagnation. Like Beckett’s Vladimir and Estragon, the two traders are trapped in a seemingly 
never-ending cycle of pointlessness:
ESTRAGON: We came too soon.
VLADIMIR; It’s always nightfall.
ESTRAGON: But night doesn’t fall.
VLADIMIR: It’ll fall all of a sudden, like yesterday.
ESTRAGON: Then it’ll be night.
VLADIMIR: And we can go.
ESTRAGON: Then it’ll be day again. [Pause. Despairing.]
What’ll we do, what’ll we do!**^
With nothing to do, there is nothing left but one’s self and the fact of one’s self. And it is this 
same sense of existential self-subsistence which is reflected in the concluding comments in H, 
B. Henderson’s The Bengalee:
“Life in India!” -  Tis a strange misnomer; there is no life there, - it is mere existence, as 
we all know.**®
For Kayerts and Carlier in Africa, this stagnation, as “mere existence”, is perhaps most 
powerfully made manifest in the fact that the conventional units of time cease to mean anything 
at all; they are like the native station hands who had “engaged themselves to the company for 
six months” but “without having any idea of a month in particular and only a very faint notion 
of time in general” had been working for two years.**^ As is explained in The Magic Mountain, 
this is because:
**^  Conrad, ‘An Outpost of Progress’, pp. 350-351.
**^  SdLÎmnski, M artin Heidegger, p. 194.
**"* Céline arrives at his trading post to find that all the stock is gone and his predecessor on the verge of 
absconding. Kayerts and Carlier endure months of fruitless inactivity manning a trading-post which does 
no trade.
**® Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot, in Samuel Beckett: The Complete Dramatic Works (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1990), Act Two, p.66.
**® H.B. Henderson, The Bengalee: Or, Sketches o f Society and Manners in the East (London, 1829), p. 
213, quoted by Moore-Gilbert \n Kipling and “Orientalism”, p. 60.
**^  Conrad, ‘An Outpost of Progress’, p. 356.
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Vacuity [and] monotony have...the property of lingering out the moment and the hour 
and of making them tiresome. But they are capable of contracting and dissipating the 
larger, the very large time-units, to the point of reducing them to nothing at all.**®
In Beau Geste, this stagnation is once again in evidence, but here the drudgery of the daily 
routine combines with the claustrophobia of a boiling fort, a tyrannical commanding officer and 
the maddening effects of absinthe:
[I]solated in the illimitable desert like a tiny island in the midst of a vast ocean....life at 
Zinderneuf was not really life so much as the avoidance of death -  death from sunstroke, 
heat-stroke, monotony, madness, or Adjutant Lejaune.**^
Like Conrad’s ships helplessly adrift in the doldrums,*^** Zinderneuf is adrift in the desert, and 
the desert’s changelessness both reflects and exacerbates the oppressive sameness of the 
legionnaire’s everyday.*^* As Heidegger says “the stubborn ordinariness of beings lays open a 
wasteland”.*^  ^A wasteland that is here, both literal and existential. But at the same time, there 
is, in the boredom of Conrad’s ships and jungle outposts, Wren’s desert forts and Kipling’s 
district stations, an underlying sense of enclosure and entrapment, both literal and existential.*^® 
For, on the one hand, there is the purgatorial and Sisyphean repetitiveness of worthless toil*^ '* 
and on the other, the prison-like physical character of the environment within which they find 
themselves. As such, they become like Crusoe who was “locked up with the eternal bars and 
bolts of the ocean, in an uninhabited wilderness, without redemption”;*^® or Gervase in Tn the 
Heart of Kalamantan’, for whom:
[T]he valley had become to him a prison-house, the mountains rows of inexorable 
warders shutting him off from life, from human beings, from all the civilised world. *^®
**® Mann, The M agic Mountain, p. 104.
**‘* Wren, Beau Geste, p. 260.
*^ ® See, for example, Falk’s descriptions of the terrors upon the broken-down ship the Borgmester D ahl in 
Falk; a reminiscence in The Nigger o f the “N arcissus”, Typhoon and other stories, pp. 321-326.
*^ * And alongside the barren monotony, there is, as Burton describes, the ever-constant presence of death: 
“In the Desert, even more than upon the ocean, there is present death: hardship is there, and piracies, and 
shipwreck, solitary, not in crowds, where, as the Persians say, “Death is a Festival”;-and this sense of 
danger, never absent, invests the scene of travel with an interest not its own” {Personal Narrative o f  a 
Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah, vol. 1, pp. 148-9).
*^  ^ Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 2. See also. The Fundamental Concepts o f  Metaphysics, 
1:2:23, ‘Being held in limbo by time as it drags’, pp. 99-101.
*^® See also, the literal entrapment of Gordon in Khartoum and the daily apprehension of disaster: 
“Weariness of heart oppressed him; things looked “very black”; he had almost given up all hope of saving 
the town, and could look back over nine months of “continuous misery and anxiety,” while the day-after- 
day delay had a most disheartening effect on every one.” Quoted by Annie E. Keeling, in General 
Gordon: Hero and Saint (London: Charles H. Kelly, 1892), p. 250.
*^ '* On the purgatorial symbolism in Kipling, see Moore-Gilbert in Kipling and “Orientalism ”, pp. 40-41. 
*^® Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2001), p. 144.
*^® Clifford, In the Heart of Kalamantan’, p. 71. See also, Kipling’s ‘A  Wayside Comedy’ and the 
description of the Station of Kashima as “a prison...bounded on all sides by the rock-tipped circle of the 
Doshri hills” (p. 58).
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Or those solitary traders Marlow encounters on his journey up the river to find Kurtz;
Sometimes we came upon a station close by the bank, clinging to the skirts of the 
unknown, and the white men rushing out of a tumble-down hovel, with great gestures of 
joy and surprise and welcome, seemed very strange -  had the appearance of being held 
there captive by a spell}^^
Once again, I would argue that we can only understand the significance of these landscapes as 
prisons and voids when we understand Dasein as “openness for Being”. For it is only because 
Dasein is constituted as “an entity for which in [his] Being this very Being is a issue” that the 
mountains imprison Gei-vase, that “the interminable miles of silence”*^® evoke dread and fear in 
Marlow; that Céline finds himself in a great Nothingness; and Kayerts and Carlier, in a void. In 
boredom, as in anxiety, the world and one’s Being is disclosed as “there”, and not as an 
‘African’ world or as an ‘English’ Being -  the ‘African-ness’ and the ‘English-ness’ is merely 
added, both by the coloniser and the postcolonial critic, in the “idle talk” of “Enframing”*^  ^-  it 
is the “Being-in-the-world” that is stripped of ontical specificity that Dasein is in its Being in 
boredom. It is here that it is snatched back from its dispersion in the everyday, back to itself, as 
itself:
[T]his “it is boring for one” first brings the self in all its nakedness to itself ?ls the self that 
is there and has taken over the being-there of its Da-sein."°
And yet, as Safranski explains:
The irritating aspect of boredom is that, in the situations in question, one begins to be 
bored with oneself One does not know what to do with oneself, and the result is that it is 
now the Nothing that does something with one.*®*
This perhaps is what Kipling meant when he said that “the night got into my head”;*®^ when the 
drudgery of work and heat began to play tricks with his sanity and he joined everyone else in 
the Club because he was afraid to be on his own. But even then, at the Club
*^  ^Conrad, Heart o f  Darkness, pp. 94-95 (my emphasis).
*®® ibid., p. 98
*®^ As Heidegger says, “We transfer subsequently those attunements which things cause in us onto the 
things themselves” (The Fundamental Concepts o f M etaphysics,, 1:2:21, p. 85).
*®° Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f  M etaphysics,, 1:4:31, p. 143.
*®* Safranski, Martin Heidegger, p. 193 (my emphasis).
*®® Kipling, Something o f Myself, p. 44. Cf. the description of ‘cafard’ which the sergeant in Marseilles 
relates to John Geste before he leaves for Africa, “We call it le cafard. The cockroach. It crawls round 
and round the brain, and the greater the heat, the monotony, the hardship, the overwork, the over­
marching, and the drink -  the faster goes the beetle and the more it tickles...Then the man...runs amok, 
or commits suicide, or deserts, or defies a Sergeant” (Beau Geste, p. 180).
177
.. .sudden causeless hates flared up between friends and died down like straw fires; old 
grievances were recalled and brooded over aloud; the complaint-book bristled with 
accusations and inventions.*®®
And this is because the “Nothing that does something with one” in boredom can also be seen to 
do “something” with one’s “Being-with-Others”. In other words, Dasein’s attempts to escape its 
own boredom in the tranquilised “everydayness” of the “they” fails. It is driven back to itself by 
the “desolating Club chatter”*®'* which so frustrated John Florry. Not always, and certainly not 
for everyone, but as Safranski says: “Boredom lurks in the measures of diversion”,*®® and this is 
as true of Kipling’s (and Orwell’s) Anglo-Indians as it is of Huysmans’ late nineteenth century 
decadent hero, Due Jean Floressas des Esseintes and his extravagant efforts to escape “the 
universal contempt that was taking hold of him”:
He felt irritable and ill at ease; exasperated by the triviality of the ideas normally bandied 
about, he came to resemble those people mentioned by Nicole who are sensitive to 
anything and everything.*®®
So, while Kipling can, in retrospect, put his own survival under such conditions down to “the 
pressure of work, a capacity for being able to read, and the pleasure of writing what my head 
was filled witli”,*®^ others are not so fortunate. The stifling and unrelenting boredom of the 
Indian summer may only have resulted in “sudden causeless hates” to flare up in the Club in 
Lahore, but in Beau Geste and ‘An Outpost of Progress’ this same boredom results in mutiny.
*®® ibid. p. 51. “One must set these things against the taste of fever in one’s mouth, and the buzz of 
quinine in one’s ears; the temper frayed by heat to breaking point but for sanity’s sake held back from the 
break; the descending darkness of intolerable dusks; and the less supportable dawns of fierce, stale heat 
through one half of the year” (pp. 50-51).
*®'* OvNeW, Burmese Days, p. 124.
*®® Safranski, Martin Heidegger, p. 194.
*®® Joris-Karl Hrxysmsins,, Against Nature (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1971), p. 22. In making 
this comparison, however, it is important that we distinguish Heidegger’s definition of boredom from the 
historical period of cultural and spiritual malaise and “world weariness” that manifested itself in the 
decadent movement. For while the latter can be understood as an especially potent expression of the 
former, Heidegger’s ontological definition transcends, and is not dependent upon, the specificity of the 
social, cultural and spiritual factors of any given time. For more conventional analysis of boredom and 
culture, see Patricia Meyer Spacks, Boredom: The Literary History o f Boredom as a State o f  Mind 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Sean Desmond Healy, Boredom, Self, and 
Culture (Rutherford [N.J]: Farleigh Dickinson University Press., 1984); and, Reinhard Kuhn, The Demon  
of Noontide: Ennui in Western Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
*®^ Kipling, Something o f Myself, p. 52. See George Orwell’s disparaging comments on Kipling’s Anglo- 
Indian contemporaries who did not “like or approve of him” for precisely these reasons; “They said, no 
doubt truly, that he knew nothing about India, and on the other hand, he was from their point of view too 
much of a highbrow” ( ‘Rudyard Kipling’, p. 78). See also, Robert Graves’s assertion that Kipling “was 
looked on with the greatest suspicion and even detestation by the Anglo-Indians of the Mutiny tradition”, 
quoted by André Maurois in Poets and Prophets, trans. by Hamish Miles (London: Cassel & Co. Ltd., 
1936), p. 6.
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murder and suicide; in ‘A Wayside Comedy’, it convenes the adultery of Boulte and Mrs 
Vansythen; and at Fort Amara in ‘With the Main Guard’, it provokes the diversionary heroics of 
Terence Mulvaney.
“In having a mood”, Heidegger says, “Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to 
which it has been delivered over in its Being.*®® In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate the 
ways in which the depiction of the fictional coloniser in the loneliness of anxiety, uncanniness, 
fear and boredom, can be understood to reflect the fundamental characteristics of this delivery.
I have argued that, when understood in terms of Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic, the 
depiction of anxiety and boredom in particular works of colonial literature can be seen to reflect 
those potential instances when the coloniser, as Dasein, is detached from its immersion in the 
“they”; and, detached from its enslavement to imperial and non-imperial “idle talk”, and 
delivered over to itself in its “potentiality-for-Being-itself’. In fact, we could say that, in a 
number of the stories we have been examining in this chapter, the ontological crisis that is 
signalled in anxiety and boredom, can be seen to result in an almost complete bankruptcy of the 
imperial strain of “idle talk” insofar as it is obliterated in the terrifying disclosure of the “Why?” 
and the “What for?”. Then again, it is not just imperialism that is called into question when the 
heart fails, the strength outwears and “Purpose turn[s] to Loathing”;*®'® it is existence itself.
As we saw in the previous chapter in relation to Kipling, the identification of these crises, 
depressions and periods of boredom, loneliness and anxiety in no way denies the everyday 
carefree concerns of the coloniser in work and play. I am not suggesting that the historical 
coloniser existed in a perpetual state of anxiety or boredom. Rather, I am suggesting that the 
presence of these moods must always be understood within the context of Dasein’s everyday 
oscillation between its authentic and inauthentic modes of Being. For every Mrs Hauksbee 
caught up in the petty intrigues of Anglo-India there is a Mulvaney struggling with the heat and 
loneliness; for every Tertium Quid flirting with another man’s wife, there is a Findlay son 
immersed in his work.
So, far from being an exercise in philosophical obscurantism or the wilful avoidance of the issue 
at hand, this phenomenological analysis of anxiety and boredom in these colonial texts has 
enabled us to attend to the ways in which the historical coloniser potentially responded to the 
world of his/her experience: a world in which he/she potentially experienced fear, boredom and 
anxiety. Not as the symbolic manifestations of an abstract and artificially ontologised colonial
*®® Being and Time, 1.5, p. 173.
*®'* Kipling, ‘The Supports’, Definitive Verse, pp. 767-8.
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guilt, but as the manifestations of “Being-in-the-world” as the being that he/she is. As such, this 
phenomenological analysis has enabled us to speculate upon that plane of correspondence upon 
which the reading public can potentially relate to these characters as the “beings in the world” 




Many of the fictional and historical colonisers examined in the course of this study are 
recognisable as heroes -  ‘colonial heroes’. And given that ‘the colonial hero’ is perhaps the 
most conspicuous coloniser in that his/her actions transcend the ordinary, it is not surprising 
that, in colonial discourse analysis, he/she is held to be among the most discursively functional. 
More accurately, it is in the figure of ‘the colonial hero’, and his/her heroism, that many of the 
most fundamental aspects of colonial discourse are seen to be located and expressed. As 
Graham Dawson has argued, in Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining o f 
Masculinities, this can be understood in relation to the fact that:
[D]uring the growth of popular imperialism in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, heroic 
masculinity became fused in an especially potent configuration with representations of 
British imperial identity. This linked together the new imperialist patriotism, the virtues 
of manhood, and war as its ultimate test and opportunity. A “real man” would henceforth 
be defined and recognized as one who was prepared to fight (and if necessary, to sacrifice 
his life) for Queen, Country and Empire.*
Concentrating upon the “soldier heroes” Sir Henry Havelock and T.E. Lawrence®, Dawson 
examines the more precise nature of this “potent configuration” in terms of, among other things, 
Melanie Klein’s psychoanalytical theories of psychic splitting, integration and composure,® 
before discussing the ways in which these structures and processes determine the “cultural 
imaginaries” of imperial masculinity:
The cultural imaginaries of British colonialism furnished the ways of seeing and making 
sense of colonized worlds such as Ireland, British India or Africa, available to explorers 
and other British people at any given historical moment. In mapping the significant 
features of these worlds, and finding them variously attractive or threatening in 
qualitatively distinct ways, the Irish, Indian and African imaginaries provided the cultural 
forms that enabled British people to inhabit them and to know themselves in relation to 
their other inhabitants. They constituted what it meant to “be British” in these contexts.'*
* Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining o f Masculinities, p. 1.
® See, for example, Dawson’s assertion that “The blond Bedouin...represents the management in phantasy 
of the threat to British identity posed by Arab otherness. Integrating those threatening qualities within the 
soldier hero both divests the colonized and subordinated other of its disturbing power and reaffirms the 
unproblematic superiority of a strengthened Britishness. Neither the Turks who are triumphantly 
destroyed, nor the Arabs who become wild and childlike helpers, present any serious threat to Lawrence’s 
superiority, either morally, physically or psychically” (ibid., p. 187).
® More specifically, Dawson maintains that, “the Kleinian tradition of psychoanalysis...offers a potential 
solution to the problem of how the psychic and the social may be brought together without reducing one 
to the other” (ibid., p. 29).
'* ibid., p. 48.
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The “cultural imaginaries of British colonialism” are thus offered up as something lilce the 
psychic counterparts of various colonial and Orientalist discourses. Drawing these themes 
together, Dawson explains that he is seeking to bring to light
....the complex dialectical process whereby the idealized masculinities of adventure are 
produced, circulated and used in everyday life, being at once psychic fantasy and a 
cultural commodity, the product of the unconscious as well as of culture industries.®
In other words, if we recall Barthes’ description of the structuralist project, Dawson is 
attempting to “reconstruct” the ‘colonial hero’ in such a way as to “manifest the rules of its 
functioning”.® But what is this idealised “imperial masculinity” and how is it understood to 
relate to the characters that we have been examining? How is it “produced, circulated and used 
in everyday life”, and by whom? Who “defines” and “recognises” this “real man”? In order to 
answer these important questions — questions which, it must be said, pertain to the broad 
assumptions of colonial discourse analysis and cultural theory in general -  1 would argue that 
we must first and foremost seek to clarify the nature of its constituent parts or players. And in 
doing so, we can begin with: the heroic act as historical event and the hero as him/herself. This 
is followed by the depiction of historical heroism and the historical hero, by the writer as 
reporter, biographer and historian; in the case of Burton and Lawrence, the writer as 
autobiographer.®' But because these depictions include the fictional embellishments of 
propaganda, hagiography and myth-making, they can also be considered alongside and 
compared to original fictional creations. Hence, we must include here the writer as novelist, 
poet and playwright. Finally, we come to the hero-worship and cultural currency of the 
historical hero, and the appreciation of the fictional hero by the nation or public as reader: if we 
include radio and film, listener and watcher.
So, where are we to locate Dawson’s “heroic masculinity” and “British imperial identity” in all 
of this? Are we to understand that it is along these lines and in the communication between 
these parts and players that “the new imperialist patriotism, the virtues of manhood, and war” 
become joined and “a real man” becomes “defined and recognized”? Or again, do these sexual, 
psychic and ideological structures exist above and beyond such clearly defined groupings; 
founded in, relating to, and affecting to explain them, but in effect, functioning independently of 
any individual hero, writer or reader as the structures of culture and cultural discourse? If so, the 
question which presents itself is, does the classification and investigation of these people -  be it 
Lawrence as hero; Sir Walter Scott as writer; or Dawson himself as reader -  in terms of these
® ibid., p. 7.
® Barthes, ‘The Structuralist Activity’, quoted in Past the Last Post, p. 129.
® For a more elaborate explication of the discursive structures of autobiography, see Laura Marcus’s 
Autolbio graphical discourses: Theory, criticism, practice  (Manchester UP: Manchester, 1994),
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theoretical structures and processes actually “bury over” (yerschilttet), what and how these 
people are as heroes, writers and readers? Indeed, precisely “bury” them over while affecting to 
lay them bare?
Indeed, this is just the point which Heidegger raises in his lecture series, The Fundamental 
Concepts o f Metaphysics, in the winter semester of 1929-30. In his discussion of “the 
classification of man in culture” in the work of Oswald Spengler, Ludwig Klages, Max Scheler 
and Leopold Ziegler -  a classification grounded in “expression”, “symbol”, and “symbolic 
forms”® -  Heidegger asks if the “view of man” that is provided by this type of cultural 
philosophy is in fact an “essential one”:
Man, perhaps even contemporary man, is in this way set out in terms of the expression of 
his achievements. And yet the question remains as to whether setting man out in this way 
concerns and grips his Da-sein, or indeed brings it to being, whether this setting-out that 
is oriented toward expression not only factically misses the essence of man, but must 
necessarily miss it, quite irrespective of all aesthetics. In other words, such philosophy 
attains merely the setting-out [Dar-steUung] of man, but never his Da-sein. Not only does 
it factically fail to attain it, but it is of necessity unable to attain it, because in itself it 
blocks the path to doing so. ^
And of course it is this “setting-out” which Heidegger would later go on to describe as the 
“challenging revealing” of the “technological consciousness”*® which dominates our thinking in 
the modern age. But more importantly, if, as he maintained in Being and Time, that
The existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology or anthropology, and 
certainly before any biology...*’
then here, he can be seen to argue that it must come before any cultural philosophy as well. In 
other words, the interpretation of culture and man’s place in it must, for Heidegger, be 
conducted under “the guidance of an understanding of Being”*®:
We may not, therefore, flee from ourselves in some convoluted idle talk about culture, 
nor pursue ourselves in a psychology motivated by curiosity. Rather we must find
® And this is of course especially pertinent when we consider the character and influence of more recent 
works of cultural theory; for example, Franco Moretti’s Signs Taken fo r Wonders: Essays in the 
Sociology o f Literary Forms, trans. by Susan Fischer (London: Verso, 1983) and Frederic Jameson’s The 
Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act.
Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f M etaphysics, 1.1.18 (c), pp. 75-76.
*** Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 48.
** Being and Time, I .l, p. 71.
*® ibid., II.4, p. 413. “[T]he more the totality of entities has been Articulated in its basic attributes as a 
possible area of subject-matter for science, all the more secure will be the perspective for one’s 
methodological inquiry” (ibid.).
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ourselves by binding ourselves to our being-there [Dasein] and by letting such being- 
there [Da-sein] become what is singularly binding for us."
In the context of an investigation of ‘colonial heroism’, I would argue that this call to bind 
“ourselves to our being-there” can be understood as a call to adhere to the “being-there” that we 
ourselves are, and an adherence to the “being-there” of those involved; namely, the historical 
hero, the writer and the reader. For, if we are to achieve an essential understanding of this, or 
indeed any other cultural phenomenon, as opposed to a mere “setting-out” of our subject matter 
as the “standing reserve”, then we must conduct an analysis which fundamentally recognises the 
ontologically grounded what and how of that subject matter.
The first, and perhaps most important, consequence of this recognition involves our rejection of 
the theoretical objectives which characterise and determine the methodology of an analysis such 
as that of Graham Dawson (or indeed Laura Chrisman, Sara Suleri or Edward Said); an analysis 
which deals in, and seeks to define, among other things, the artificially ontologised categories of 
an identifiable national and imperial heroism, masculinity and consciousness. For over and 
above the specific psychoanalytical-cum-sociological conclusions which he draws in his 
analysis, the most fundamental problem in Dawson’s analytic concerns his un-written 
assumption that the production, circulation and use of the “idealized masculinities of adventure” 
-  as both “the product of the unconscious” and “culture industries” -  can be followed and 
mapped along “distinct and intellectually knowable lines”.*'* As we have repeatedly shown, this 
assumption can be seen to precipitate both the ordering, regulation and securing of reality as 
“structured image” (GeBild) and the expediential adoption of a whole series of abstract 
theoretical structures and entities. Structures and entities which, in Dawson’s case, include, for 
example, “British Imperial identity”, “British manhood”, “the British colonial imaginary” and a 
“collective national imagining”.*® In fact, it is precisely the theoretical clarification of these 
structures and entities (and the interrelations between them) which takes centre stage; a 
clarification, moreover, which forms the basis for Dawson’s subsequent analysis of the relation 
between “textual representations of masculinity” and “its lived forms”.*® Indeed, it is this 
methodological progression (from discourse to subject matter and back again) which can be 
seen to characterise the work of any number of postcolonial theorists and colonial discourse 
analysts from Said to Sara Suleri. But, whereas before I have largely concentrated upon the
" Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, 1.1.18 (c), p. 77. For Heidegger, “curiosity” 
(Neugier) is a “peculiar tendency-of-Being which belongs to everyday ness... [and] expresses the tendency 
towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception” {Being and Time, 1.5, p., 
214). See also, History o f the Concept o f Time, 1.4, pp. 274-277.
*'* Orientalism, pp. 13.
*® DasNSon, Soldier Heroes, pp. 1, 63, 87, 98.
*® ibid., p. 7.
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problems which adhere to this methodology in terms of the ways in which it can be seen to posit 
an homogenised, un-worlded, and de-humanised ‘discursive subject’; here, I am arguing that 
these problems must also be understood to compromise the interpretation of a cultural 
phenomenon lilce heroism. And this is primarily because of the way in which each of the groups 
that we have identified as being caught up in Dawson’s “configuration” of “heroic masculinity” 
-  the hero, the writer and the reader -  are constituted in terms of their peculiar function within 
that “configuration”. If we accept that, as Dawson says, “Heroes are made not by their deeds but 
by the stories that are told about them”,*^  then the meaningfulness of the hero and the heroic act 
is effectively dispersed into a system of signs; and what is more, filtered through the abstract 
components of a theoretical construction like the “social imaginary”. What we are discussing, 
then, is an analytical movement away from the ‘things themselves’ (and the world of the things 
themselves) and the “Enframing” of these things within the “intellectually knowable lines” of 
the “structured image”. That “Enframing” which
...challenges forth into the frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view into the 
coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically endangers the relation to the essence of 
truth.*®
This, in turn, requires the author as the “standing reserve” (Bestand) to be regulated and secured 
in such a way as to maximise the facilitatation of the cultural, psychoanalytical, theoretical or 
sociological configurations which are being mapped. Hence, at various times it can be 
expediential for him/her to function as a self conscious didact; at others, as the unconscious 
channel for the transmission of hegemonic propaganda and ideology; or as we saw in the 
previous chapter in Laura Chrisman’s reading of Haggard, the author can simply be posited as 
the synecdoche of imperialism itself.*** Indeed, these variations can, to a greater or lesser extent, 
be understood within the context of a more general belief that:
The concept of an “author” as a free creative source of the meaning of a book belongs to 
the legal and educational forms of the liberal humanist discourse that emerged in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; it is not a concept that exists within discourses 
that have developed recently.®®
In each case, what is important is that the author is fundamentally constituted in terms of a role 
within the system as spokesperson, channel or manifestation of meaning. And as such, it is
"  ibid., p. 188.
Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 33.
" See also, for example, Pratt’s assertion that, “The task of Barrow and the others was to invent Africa 
for the domestic subjects of the British Empire, Humboldt’s discursive challenge was to reinvent Spanish 
America for a Europe well aware that Spanish control over the region was coming to an end” ( ‘Scratches 
on the Face of the Country’, p. 147).
Diane Macdonnell, Theories o f Discourse (Qxford: Blackwell, 1986) p. 3.
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perhaps interesting to note Said’s early observations on the subject in Beginnings: Intention and 
Method:
In his Logical Investigations, Husserl makes a useful distinction between meaning- 
conferring acts (or meaning intention) and meaning-fulfilling acts: for the writer, 
conferring meaning is essential “to the expression as such,” whereas fulfilling the 
meaning, “confirming, realising it more or less accurately, and so actualising its relation 
to its object,” is something he only hopes to achieve.
And this can be set alongside the following quotation from Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy o f 
Morals which Said discusses in the context of the analytical discourse of Sigmund Freud:
The cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place 
in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into 
being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and 
redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a 
becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, 
an adaptation through which any previous “meaning” and “purpose” are necessarily 
obscured or even obliterated....The form is fluid, but the “meaning” is even more so.®®
But of course this early concurrence with Husserl on the fundamental arbitrariness of meaning- 
fulfilment, and Nietzsche on the perpetual transformation and reinterpretation of meaning is 
forgotten, or at least seriously compromised, in Said’s later explication of Orientalism and 
cultural imperialism. For in his mapping of “the intellectually knowable lines” of Oriental and 
colonial discourse, the indeterminacy of the meaning-fulfilling acts of authorial intention and 
reader response, not to mention the fundamental fluidity of “meaning” in general, are 
supplanted by an altogether more rigid conception of the way in which “meaning” is 
constructed, transferred and maintained at every level of society. And it is precisely this rigid 
conceptualisation of the construction, transference and maintenance of meaning that is in 
evidence in Dawson’s analysis of the “the circuit of imagining”®® which surrounded ‘the 
colonial hero’ in colonial society. In order for this “circuit” to exist as a coherent theoretical 
field of enquiry, I would argue that the fundamental arbitrariness of authorial meaning- 
fulfilment and the perpetual transformation and reinterpretation of meaning must be severely 
regulated and, on occasions, suspended altogether.
So where does this leave us in our investigation of ‘colonial heroism’? Are we to assume that 
because colonial discourse analysis fails to attain an essential view of man, and as a result, the 
heroism of man, then no such view is possible? Certainly not. What it does mean however, is
®* Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method, p. 250, (my emphasis).
®® Frederich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f Morals, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Vintage, 1969), pp. 77-78, m Beginnings, pp. 174-175.
®® Dawson, Soldier Heroes, p. 7.
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that an essential view of heroism is never to be obtained in the explication of an artificially 
ontologised national or ‘imperial heroism’ that is dependent upon an artificially ontologised 
conception of a ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ masculinity and consciousness. For, if the very notion 
of an homogenised ‘national’ or ‘imperial heroism’ is an artificial theoretical construction, then 
its clarification is only ever meaningful within the parameters of its own theoretical artificiality.
1. Towards an Ontological definition of Heroism
If the existential analytic of Dasein comes before the analysis of culture, then it must also come 
before the analysis of a cultural phenomenon like ‘colonial heroism’. In other words, in order to 
achieve an essential view of ‘colonial heroism’ we must proceed in our analysis under the 
guidance of an understanding of Being. And in the wake of our brief examination of the 
problems which adhere to Dawson’s approach, the fundamental criteria of this understanding 
can be summarised as follows: firstly, we must necessarily dispense with the theoretical fiction 
of an homogenisable ‘British’, ‘colonial’ or ‘imperial’ hero or heroism; secondly, the 
(homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised) historical hero, writer and reader of colonial 
discourse analysis must be returned to the world of their experiences and understood as the 
“beings in the world” that they themselves are; and thirdly, we must return to the things 
themselves, and in particular, the heroic act.
In short, I am proposing that we must attend to ‘the colonial hero’ as Dasein, and the heroic 
deed in terms of the intentional comportments of Dasein’s “care” (Sorgef or “concern” 
(Besorgen). Far from providing us with an exhaustive or definitive account of the subject as a 
whole, this ontological approach is, more specifically, intended as a speculative preliminary 
investigation of the essential nature of the hero and its heroism prior to their dispersal, distortion 
and manipulation in the “idle talk” of the “they”. Following the precedent of previous chapters, 
I will once again attempt to develop this argument in relation to colonial literature. And as a 
result, I will argue that by obtaining an essential understanding of the hero in these terms, we 
can subsequently begin to speculate upon the existence of a further plane of possible 
correspondence upon which the reader (as Dasein) can potentially respond.
Before we proceed however, we must attempt to achieve a more precise understanding and 
definition of this general term, ‘heroism’. In particular, we must ask, what is heroic about 
‘colonial heroism’, and can we isolate something like a universally applicable criterion for 
‘colonial heroes’? When we consider the many heroes and their heroic deeds; all the various 
feats of bravery, virtue, stamina, sacrifice and strength which mark them out; all the many 
aspects of class, race, faith and nationalism which they reflect; can we achieve a unified
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definition which encompasses each configuration? In short, how are we to find the heroic 
common denominator in a list of British ‘colonial heroes’ which includes, for example: Rajah 
Brooke, General Gordon, Richard Burton, Cecil Rhodes, Frederick Selous, T.E. Lawrence, Earl 
Kitchener, David Livingstone, General Roberts and the defenders of Rorkes Drift? Are they all 
unproblematical examples of what Dawson calls “exemplary lives”; all “figures for 
identification”?®'* Can we even assume that they were necessarily and collectively ‘good’ for the 
Empire when figures like Hastings and Dyer were heroes to some and villains to others? And 
how is this difference of opinion to be accounted for?
The further we proceed in this line of questioning, the more problematic the concept of heroism 
appears to become. And this ambivalence is, I would argue, primarily due to the fact that that 
which ultimately defines the heroic character of each individual hero (British, colonial or 
otherwise) is the “idle talk” and the multifarious concerns of the “they”. For how else are we to 
explain the hero-worship of a Wellington which was not only not unanimous, but was also 
fundamentally fickle; how else explain that point “when the wind changes, and the silly crowd 
is in another and possibly saner temper”?®® How else are we to account for the perception of a 
Dyer, a hero for some and a butcher for others? Certainly, we might attempt to classify and 
contain our subject matter in the invention and sub-division of conventions and discourses of 
various types; for example, ‘the Soldier hero’, ‘the Christian hero’®®, ‘the explorer’®® and ‘the 
imperial martyr’.®^ But will this proliferation of types enable us to clarify the differences which 
exist between a Gordon and a Havelock®**? A Burton and a Livingston? And can we, or should 
we, simply overlook the shortfall which inevitably results in deference to the perhaps more
®'* ibid., pp. 7, 4.
®® Robert Buchanan speaking of his anticipation of Kipling’s fall from favour, from “ The Voice of the 
Hooligan” , p. 27.
®® See, for example, Dawson’s analysis o f Havelock as the exemplary Christian soldier and as exhibiting 
that which he calls “Christian composure” {Soldier Heroes, pp. 128-144).
®® See, for example, Mary Louise Pratt; “Exploration certainly lends itself to heroic narrative paradigms 
of adventure, personal prowess, obstacles overcome and prizes won, and explorers in the nineteenth 
century were certainly seen as heroes”. ‘Scratches on the Face of the Country’, p. 146.
®** See also, Dawson’s recognition of the fact that “Colonial” militaristic masculinities co-existed in the 
early 19'*’ century alongside the Methodist working man, the Byronic hero, the Jacobin radical and 
Cowper’s domestic contemplative as masculine heroic forms {Soldier Heroes, p. 62).
®** Compare, for example, Lieut.-Colonel Seton Churchill’s conventional hagiography of Gordon, General 
Gordon: A Christian Hero (London; James Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1907), which concludes, “No titles precede 
his name, nor do any decorations of importance follow it, but his simple and yet heroic self-sacrificing 
life have fascinated his countrymen, and helped to make the world better by setting before it a higher 
ideal” (pp. 277-278); and Lytton Strachey’s rather less flattering portrait in Eminent Victorians which 
ends with the following reflection on Kitchener’s victory at Omdurman thirteen years after Gordon’s 
death; “Everyone agreed that General Gordon had been avenged at last. Who could doubt it? General 
Gordon himself, possibly, fluttering, in some remote Nirvana, the pages of a phantasmal Bible, might 
have ventured on a satirical remark. But General Gordon had always been a contradictious person -  even 
a little off his head, perhaps, though a hero.” Eminent Victorians (Bungay; The Chaucer Press Ltd., 1967), 
pp. 284-285.
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attractive alternative of constructing a neatly coherent psychoanalytical, sociological and 
cultural theory?
For even when we acknowledge, and attempt to trace, the discursive continuities and 
discontinuities between such figures and, in so doing, attempt to plug them into larger 
cultural/psychoanalytical/semiotic systems of meaning, the fundamental artificiality of such 
generic categories and types (as the regulation and securement of “the standing-reserve”®** ) 
must always already compromise the validity of our results. In other words, it is not just the 
validity of the results of our analysis of fictional and historical heroes as ‘discursive subjects’ 
which must be compromised here; the fundamental inadequacy of these discursive categories 
must always already compromise our understanding and interpretation of the ways in which 
these heroes function in culture as a whole.
And, in relation to the ways in which the hero is understood to function in culture and society, it 
is perhaps useful for us to consider Rousseau’s emphasis upon the difficulties that heroism 
raised in 18*® century France, in his essay ‘Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero’: 
difficulties which were, I would argue, just as relevant in late 19**’ century imperial Britain. 
Responding to the question “Which is the virtue most necessary for a hero and which are the 
heroes who lacked this virtue?”, and worldng from the premise that heroism is a universal 
historical phenomenon, Rousseau argues that heroism expresses, and hero-worship instils an 
individual “strength o f soul” as a strictly non-moral virtue.®* But at the same time, Rousseau 
insists that heroism can also be seen to undermine individual independence, and it is this which 
raises a number of important difficulties for liberal and conservative democrats. In particular, 
Rousseau maintains that heroism is itself a far more organic, far less controllable and 
predictable phenomenon than those who would understand it as a tool of the establishment 
would have us believe. In fact, in going on to note that heroes are not always strictly virtuous 
but are instead more closely affiliated or concerned with the public good, and indeed, all too 
often, the even more unpredictable desire for “personal glory”,®® Rousseau effectively dislocates 
the joint by which heroism is conventionally attached to morality. In other words, he 
problematizes the idea that heroes are easily exploitable as straightfoiwardly instructive moral 
paragons. And, this is especially interesting in the context of our earlier comments on the 
difficulties surrounding the public reception of Dyer and Hastings. But more importantly, and as
®** Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 27 (my emphasis).
®* Rousseau’s “strength of soul” can thus, I would argue, be compared with Carlyle’s robustly heroic 
“earnestness”; that which, for Carlyle, characterised the heroic lives and deeds of Mohammed and Dante, 
Samuel Johnson and Qiiver Cromwell. ‘Lectures on Heroes’, Sartor Resartus: Lectures on Heroes: 
Chartism: Past and Present (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1865).
®® Jean Jacques Rousseau, Collected Writings o f Rousseau, Roger D. Maters and Christopher Kelly (eds.) 
(Hanover [NH]: University Press of New England, 1990-), vol. IV, p. 3.
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Christopher Kelly outlines in ‘Rousseau’s case for and against heroes’, following an 
examination of the cardinal virtues of courage, justice, prudence, and temperance, Rousseau 
concludes that:
[Ejach in turn is unnecessary for heroism. Even courage, which might seem to be the
most necessary virtue, sometimes abandons heroes without their becoming unheroic,®®
And as such, the waters of any easily generalisable conception of heroic endeavour are 
significantly muddied. That which is singularly decisive for Rousseau is the far more 
ambiguous “strength of soul”; that is, “the possessor’s ability to avoid being dominated by 
fortune”.®"* It is this ability more than anything else which means that “heroism is more closely 
connected with effectiveness than with morality”;®® an “effectiveness” which transcends and 
potentially displaces the artificially restrictive confines of, for example, a purely colonial 
meaningfulness. So, while he can be seen to acknowledge the ways in which heroism can foster 
and enhance ideals of a unitary sense of community and citizenship within democratic societies, 
Rousseau can also be seen to stress the necessity for consistent vigilance as to the dangers this 
fostering and enhancement involves. What is more, it is important to note that he locates these 
dangers, not in the ideological deception of a gullible citizenry but in the possible implications 
that hero-worship has for the independence of the individual; implications like dependence and 
imitation which have the adverse effect of precipitating that weakness of the soul which, for 
Rousseau, can only lead to civic vice.
In conjunction with earlier observations concerning how the ambivalence of heroism is founded 
in the ambivalence of “idle talk”; Rousseau’s reservations about the operation of hero-worship 
in society and his description of the necessarily non-specific nature of heroism, can thus be seen 
to further undermine the validity and coherence of the expediential heroic categories and 
concepts which are employed in the “Enframing” accounts of colonial discourse analysts like 
Dawson.
2. “Being-in-the-world” and the “Demand”
As we have noted in previous chapters, the material circumstances of ‘the colonial experience’ 
are frequently such that they can be seen to facilitate, or involve, the coloniser’s encounter with 
death, fear and anxiety. If we accept that it is primarily in the midst of these circumstances that
®® Christopher Kelly, ‘Rousseau’s case for and against heroes’. Polity 30, 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 347-367, p. 
351.
ibid., p. 351.
®® ibid., p. 351.
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The colonial hero’ comes to the fore, then it would seem obvious that these circumstances play 
an important role in the essential character of that heroism. But what is the character of this role 
and how are we to bring it to light?
Can we assume that the former (circumstances) simply evoke the latter (heroism)? Without 
doubt, heroic acts cannot materialise in a vacuum; but then again, nor can they be seen to rely 
entirely upon circumstantial determinants -  for why else should some run and others stand firm 
when confronted with the same threat? At the other extreme, can we assume that heroism is 
somehow ontologically predetermined? Always already present in The colonial hero’ or 
coloniser, by simple virtue of his/her being a coloniser?
Of course not; some will run and others stand firm. In any case, what we are discussing in both 
of these formulations is the pre-deterministic mapping of an heroic predictability that is 
structured in terms of the causality of a subject/object dualism. A dualism wherein the hero, as 
‘subject’, is seen to respond to the external influences of an ‘objective’ circumstance. As we 
have already noted (in Chapter One), it is this subject/object dualism which Heidegger rejects in 
his phenomenological explication of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” as “care” {Sorge). For 
Heidegger, “all the relations of life are intrinsically defined” by “intentionality,” and all acts 
(“perception, judgement, love hate”) “have the character of intentionality”.®® As such, I would 
suggest that the relations which constitute the heroic act are necessarily intentional as well. But, 
before we go on to elaborate upon these relations in detail, we must seek to more fully clarify 
the nature of its components, and in particular, the nature of the circumstances within, towards, 
and “in the face of which” ‘the colonial hero’ (as Dasein) can be seen to comport itself.
We must ask, how is this clarification to take place when the infinite variability of the 
circumstantial contexts within which ‘the colonial hero’ functions as a hero -  i.e., the 
fundamental differences which exist between each and every threatening scenario, challenging 
environment, and hostile adversary -  would appear to make it almost impossible for us to 
achieve a general definition as to just what these circumstances are? This difficulty does not, 
however, mean that the essential nature of these circumstances is subsequently inaccessible to 
us, or that we are somehow not in a position to describe it. We can instead attempt to grasp the 
how of these circumstances. In other words, if we can leave aside the specificity of each and 
every individual circumstance, the common characteristic that they can all be seen to exhibit is 
their capacity to “demand” (Zumutung) that which is subsequently understood in “idle talk” as 
an heroic, or non-heroic, response.
®*’ Heidegger, History o f  the Concept o f  Time, p. 36.
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Although I have taken this word, Zumutung, from Heidegger, he does not of course use it to 
describe the nature of (that which we will provisionally call) the heroic relation. For Heidegger, 
Zumutung describes the “announcement” (ansagen) of Dasein’s Being in the emptiness of 
profound boredom:
Commensurate with that emptiness as a whole, the most extreme demand must be 
announced to man, not some arbitrary demand, not this or that one, but the demand pure 
and simple made upon man. And what is that? It is that Dasein as such is demanded o f 
man, that it is given to him -  to be there.
Despite the different appUcation, my employment of the word is intended to capture the same 
“questioning” and “challenging” in announcing that is implied here. A “demanding” which is, in 
addition, (and in both contexts) only possible because Dasein is constituted in such a way as to 
be receptive to this “demand” as “openness to Being”. As such, the charging Pathan, the raging 
torrent and the cholera epidemic can all be understood to present themselves to 'the colonial 
hero’ (as Dasein), in such a way as to bring him/her into confrontation with the self as one who 
is, in the language of “idle talk”, courageous or cowardly, strong or weak. Which is not to say 
that, at this level, there is anything essentially or inherently good or bad, right or wrong in this 
confrontation: such moral identifications are, we must remember, firmly located in the ensuing 
diagnosis of the “they”.
Nor is this being brought before oneself in confrontation only to be understood in the sense of a 
conscious deliberation on Dasein’s part: it is, instead, primarily to be understood in the sense of 
the bringing to light (as the unconcealment of cdgtheia) of what it in fact is. Heidegger himself 
explains the more precise nature of this mode of the unconcealment of Being as confrontation 
when discussing a fragment (53) from Heraclitus in his Introduction to Metaphysics. He 
translates the fragment as follows:
Confrontation is indeed for all (that comes to presence) the sire (who lets emerge), but 
(also) for all the preserver that holds sway. For it lets some appear as gods, others as 
human beings, some it produces (sets forth) as slaves, but others as free.^^
Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, 1.5.37 (b), p. 165.
Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 2, p. 65. Fried and Folt provide the following, "more 
conventional translation” in a footnote; “War is the father of all and the king of all, and it has shown some 
as gods and others as human beings, made some slaves and others free” (p. 65n). On the subject of the 
questionable validity of Heidegger’s translations and etymologies, see, for example, Walter Kaufmann’s 
‘Heidegger’s Castle’, in From Shakespeare to Existentialism  (New York: Anchor Books, 1960), pp. 339- 
369.
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In its most originary sense, “confrontation” (polemos) means struggle {Kampf, bestampfung), 
and for Heidegger it is struggle which
...first and foremost allows what essentially unfolds to step apart in opposition, first 
allows position and status and rank to establish themselves in coming into presence.
The “position and status and rank” (gods, slaves, human beings and freemen) that Heidegger 
refers to here is not, as it is with Heraclitus, primarily a description of social class and public 
standing; for Heidegger these things are not ontologically determinable. He is instead, taking 
Heraclitus’ fragment as an articulation of the fundamental way in which man comes to presence 
(as the unconcealedness of Being) in strnggle.*^® And in the light of this illustration, 1 suggest 
that this struggle can also be understood to characterise the “demand” which manifests itself in 
what we are calling the heroic relation.
In addition to the “demand” that is made by the material circumstance upon the coloniser there 
is also, to a greater or lesser extent, a disclosure. For in conjunction with the confrontational 
struggle of the “demand”, there is in danger, the potential for the equiprimordial 
(gleichchurspriinglich) disclosure and apprehension of Dasein’s own “Being towards death”. 
Indeed, it is precisely this “Being towards death” which can, in certain contexts, be seen to mark 
the occasion as one of heroic potentiality; for example, when the possibility of losing one’s life 
does not prevent one from proceeding. But what does “potentiality” mean in this context? It 
means that Dasein, as prospective hero, can be brought to light before itself as being, for 
example, either brave or cowardly; and that this is accompanied by a second and more 
fundamental possibility that it shall, on the one hand, grasp its authentic “Being-in-the-world” 
(as a “Being towards death”) in anticipatory resoluteness; or, on the other, retreat back into the 
inauthenticity of the “they”. It is in relation to this second mode of possibility that William 
Richardson has argued that anticipatory resoluteness can be seen to constitute, “that stout­
hearted open-ness unto Being that alone can found genuine valour”."^^
But, is this necessarily the case? Can it be presumed, as Richardson implies, that anticipatory 
resoluteness corresponds with “genuine valour” in every instance? Could the apprehension of 
one’s own authentic “Being-in-the-world” not just as easily result in a wish to preserve that 
Being at all costs? Similarly, could the retreat back into the “they” not provide one with the 
justificatory rationale for the enactment of life-endangering feats of bravery? In fact, as we saw
ibid, 2, p. 65.
See also, Nietzsche’s “All events, all motion, all becoming as a determination of degrees and relations 
of force, as a struggle”. Frederich Nietzsche, Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 299.
Richardson, Heidegger, p. 475.
193
in Chapter Three, the ontical concerns of the “they” -  which involves, we must remember, the 
worldly ideologies of religion and nationalism, race and class -  are precisely those concerns 
which most frequently provide the prospective hero with the logic he/she requires in order to 
steel the self for heroic endeavour. More pointedly, we must ask, is it not possible that an 
'ontological coward’ (as he who flies in the face of his own authentic “Being-in-the-world”) can 
simultaneously be an 'ontical hero’, and visa versa?
It is this last question which can be seen to bring our ontological examination of heroism before 
the fundamentally unpredictable nature of the historical coloniser’s propensity to be a hero. For 
it is this fundamental ontological indeterminacy that always already forms the pre-heroic 
context within which both heroic and non-heroic actions are possible: this indeterminacy which 
can be seen to explain the varied and wholly unpredictable character of heroic endeavour as it 
occurs (or does not occur) in the history of the colonial period. As Heidegger says, “Such 
ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth”. I n  this light, I would argue that, 
if our objective is to understand the hero in everything that constitutes its heroic experiences -  a 
significant portion of which involves an understanding of “idle talk” and its role in heroism as a 
social, ideological and political phenomenon -  this understanding must be grounded in an 
acknowledgement of the fundamental indeterminacy of these cultural processes and individual 
heroic experiences. This is particularly important when we come to speculate upon the various 
ways in which the hero and its experiences are absorbed into, understood, celebrated and/or 
neglected by the public at home. For, above and beyond the perception and apprehension, 
appreciation and celebration of the hero’s endeavours in terms of political, racial or nationalistic 
(i.e., ontical) significance, there is the additional possibility that ‘the colonial hero’ can bring 
before the general public the immediacy of their own existence. Such a possibility is not, of 
course, dependent upon the general public being familiar with the intricacies of Heideggarian 
ontology, but upon their ability to conceptualise empathetically (and not just sympathetically),"^^ 
the circumstances under which 'the colonial hero’, or indeed any hero, came forth as a hero, a 
possibility which, in fictional terms, is not only, or even necessarily, dependent upon what 
Cawelti calls 'the writer’s ability to evoke in us a temporary sense of fear and uncertainty about 
the fate of a character we care a b o u t b u t  is instead dependent upon the public’s ability to 
comprehend a simple 'question’: namely, whether they themselves would be capable of doing 
the same; whether they are the sort of person who would be capable of undertaking an heroic 
act should they find themselves in similar circumstances. Whether they would walk into
Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 33. See also, Heidegger’s discussion of the fact 
that “everything that lies before us is ambiguous” in What is Called Thinking?, II.VIII, p. 201.
On Heidegger’s description of empathy as “a relationship of Being [Seinsverhaltnisj from Dasein to 
Dasein”, see Being and Time, 1.4, p. 162.
CmieXii, Adventure, M ystery and Romance, p. 17.
194
Kafiristan like Dravot and Carnehan; set off across Arabia for Mecca like Burton; hold firm in 
the face of certain death, like Lewis Haystoun; or, for that matter, assassinate a V i c e r o y t a k e  
on the might of the British Empire in the Easter Rising of 1916, or stand in front of a tank in 
Tianenmen Square.
The fundamental “demand” which is asked of the coloniser by the material circumstances in the 
heroic relation is transferred, by proxy, and in an obviously diluted form, to the general public 
in the person of the triumphant hero. And while it would be ludicrous to suggest that this 
“demand” is either universally apprehended in every instance, or that it is the only possible 
context within which an engagement may take place; I would argue that it can, nonetheless, be 
seen to constitute an essential horizon of meaning against which the complex relationship 
between the hero and the public is potentially played out. For, in contrast to an horizon of 
meaning which is founded exclusively upon certain strains of “idle talk”, for example, a 
political or racial identification,'^^ this horizon is founded upon the ontological constitution of 
the Being that we ourselves are. Not as the only viable, or acceptable horizon to the exception of 
all else, but as the most fundamental horizon.
It is this final observation which brings us back to those crucial planes of potential 
correspondence that I have been referring to in previous chapters. More accurately, by clarifying 
the ontological nature of the heroic “demand”, a cmcial new pomt of correlation between the 
nature of the public’s engagement with ‘the colonial hero’ of material reality and the nature of 
its engagement with ‘the colonial hero’ of colonial literature, can be seen to emerge. In order to 
draw this correlation into sharper focus, I will now turn to that literature and investigate the 
ways in which its portrayal of heroic endeavour can be seen to reflect the ontological processes 
and structures we have discussed.
3. The “Demand” in Colonial Fiction
In Chapter Three, I drew attention to the ways in which the fictional coloniser can be seen to 
reflect those modes of Dasein’s temporality (as the inauthentic and authentic temporal 
projections of its own “historicality”) which are constitutive of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” 
as a “Being in Time”. In doing so, I used the example of Buchan’s Lewis Haystoun, in The 
Half-Hearted, to emphasise the important role that is played by “idle talk” in the formation of 
the hero’s heroic resolve. At the same time, I argued that, when understood in these terms,
Lord Mayo was assassinated during a tour of the Andaman islands penal colony in 1872.
Cf., for example, Frederic Jameson’s insistence that “the “political interpretation” of literary texts is not 
merely a competitor or an optional extra to the other current methods available today but constitutes “the 
absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation”" {The Political Unconscious, p. 17).
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Haystoun's recourse to the “idle talk” of “a greater kinship”"^  ^ with his heroic forefathers is 
necessarily characterised by “mineness”. This is the crucial point: for it is precisely the fictional 
representation of this type of understanding, this type of character and this type of situation 
which postcolonial commentators hold to epitomise the idealisation of ‘colonial manhood’. The 
victory of Haystoun’s sense of national and imperial responsibility over his personal fears; his 
single-handed defence of the British dominion in India against a whole army; and the homage of 
the rebel Fazir Khan in his, “This man...was of the race of Idngs’Y^ all of these no doubt 
comply with the conventional discursive requirements of colonial adventure fiction. However, 
the question here is not to do with whether or not these things exist in the text; but how they are 
subsequently understood to operate as colonial discourse in colonial culture and society. It is to 
do with the methodologies which are employed in the explication and extrapolation of this 
operation. In other words, it is to do with the theoretical regulation and securement of the 
fictional “standing reseiwe” in order to make sense of reality.
Let us not forget, that in colonial discourse analysis, the explication of the heroism of a 
character like Lewis Haystoun, is not only, or even mainly, confined to a fictional or merely 
textual realm of meaning and significance. As Dawson’s study shows, the delineation of a 
particular strain of “colonial masculinity” in colonial fiction is read in parallel with the 
“masculinities” of colonial reality. They are both seen to stem from the same “social 
imaginary”; both seen to exhibit, make manifest and appease the same psychoanalytical 
processes; both seen to function discursively in society as “figures for identification” in the 
same way. It is precisely these presumed correspondences which are, I would argue, most 
fundamentally problematized by the ontological structures described by Martin Heidegger.
It is in contrast to these discursively constituted correspondences then, that I will now conduct 
an alternative reading of the fictional ‘colonial hero’; a reading that is founded in an 
understanding of the ontological constitution of the historical ‘colonial hero’ as Dasein. In doing 
so, I will suggest that not only can the fictional hero be seen to reflect the basic modes of 
“Being-in-the-world” in its acts of heroism, but that, when considered in this light, a series of 
alternative correspondences can be brought to the fore -  correspondences which are not only 
grounded in the Being that the historical coloniser is, but which, in drawing the ambivalent 
nature of the heroism of the historical coloniser into sharper relief, can subsequently be seen to 
complicate and undermine the “Enframing” strategies and “intellectually knowable lines” of 
colonial discourse analysis.
Buchan, The Half-Hearted, p. 309. 
ibid., p. 317.
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Once again, the important point to emphasise is that the validity of an homogenised historical 
‘colonial hero’ (as ‘discursive subject’) in colonial discourse analysis, is not primarily disproven 
in the documentation of instances of non-conformity, eccentricity and rebellion; it is always 
already disproven, at base, in the fundamental ontological constitution of the historical coloniser 
itself. And following our examination of the ambivalence of ‘colonial heroism’ in history in 
relation to the hero, the writer and the reader, the notion of an homogenous ‘colonial heroism’ 
in literature is problematized; problematized in the fact that heroism as a cultural phenomenon is 
determined by the always already ambivalent, fickle and arbitrary concerns of “idle talk”.
(a) The heroic cowardice o f Lord Jim
If the heroism of ‘colonial heroism’ is only understandable in relation to the ambivalent 
concerns of “idle talk”, then so too is its supposed antithesis, ‘colonial cowardice’. In perhaps 
the most famous act of cowardice in colonial literature, Lord Jim’s leap from the Patna, the 
complex nature of this relation is nowhere more plainly brought to light. But more importantly, 
the circumstances surrounding Jim ’s crisis can also be seen to reflect the fundamental 
characteristics of the (heroic/non-heroic) “demand”, and in particular, its indeterminacy. For it 
is precisely this indeterminacy which is so emphatically exhibited in Jim’s actions, this 
indeterminacy in the face of the “demand” which is so unexpected and so unexplainable:
“I had jumped...It seems...I knew nothing about it till I looked up...There was no going 
back. It was as if I had jumped into a well -  into an everlasting deep hole.
And, in having jumped, Marlow explains, “he was partly stunned by the discovery he had made 
“  the discovery about h i m s e l f Y e s ,  the realisation that he had abandoned his post and 
betrayed the codes of his craft; that he had abandoned eight hundred dependents to their deaths; 
but more significantly, Jim discovers that he is this person and no other.
This discovery has most frequently been interpreted by critics as in conflict with the romantic 
image of himself which Jim had cultivated as a boy.^^ When training to be an officer of the 
mercantile marine:
[He would] live in his mind the sea-life of light literature. He saw himself saving people 
from sinking ships, cutting away masts in a hurricane, swimming through a surf with a 
line; or as a lonely castaway, bare-footed and half-naked, walking on uncovered reefs in
Conrad, Lord Jim, 9, p. 89. 
ibid., 7, p. 67.
See, for example, John A. McClure, Kipling and Conrad, pp. 121-122; Martin Green, Dreams o f  
Adventure, pp. 313-314.
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search of shell-fish to stave off starvation. He confronted savages on tropical shores, 
quelled mutinies on the high seas, and in a small boat upon the ocean kept up the hearts of 
despairing men -  always an example of devotion to duty, and as unflinching as a hero in a 
book.^^
But after his leap from the Patna, is it enough to say that Jim is “stunned” simply by the fact 
that he is not like a romantic hero in a book? That his shock, shame and distress can be 
understood in relation to, and as an expression of, “a degraded image of “legendary” 
heroism”^^ ? Or can it be construed that he sees himself as a traitor to some abstract notion of 
“fidelity” "^^ ? If, as Benita Parry has suggested, these “fantasies of surpassing heroism” must be 
viewed within the context of British imperialism -  wherein they “ironically anticipate his 
abysmal failure and preview his magnificent achievement, the first violating his nation’s 
imperialist creed and the other realising its colonial dream”^^  -  does this mean that Jim’s 
distress should be understood to reflect a sense of ‘colonial failure’? In short, is it as a sailor, as 
a romantic hero, or as a colonialist that Jim interprets his own disgrace? Or is it, perhaps, 
precisely none of these?
In order to comprehend what is at stake here, let us again call to mind Lewis Haystoun at that 
moment when “the extreme loneliness of the exile’s death smote him”.^ ® For it is at this moment 
of crisis that Haystoun understands himself most explicitly in terms of his role as an imperial 
defender and fighting Briton; when he takes on all of the sacrificial responsibilities that that 
such understanding implicitly involves. In vivid contrast, Jim, on hearing the “wild screech”, 
“Geo-o-o-orge! Oh, jump!”,^  ^ from the boat below, finds none of his prospective roles forcing 
themselves upon him. He jumps, in the anxious apprehension of his own “Being towards death”, 
as that which has been disclosed to him in the material circumstances within which he finds 
himself. That “certain combination of circumstances” in which, as the French Lieutenant 
maintains:
Conrad, Lord Jim, 1, p. 11,
The phrase is Frederic Jameson’s, from ‘Romance and Reification: Plot Construction and Ideological 
Closure in Nostromo" in Joseph Conrad (Elaine Jordan ed.), p. 119 (my emphasis).
In his preface to A Personal Record, Conrad had written that, “Those who read me know my conviction 
that the world, the temporal world, rests on a very few simple ideas: so simple that they must be as old as 
the hills. It rests notably, among others, on the idea of Fidelity.” Quoted by Walter Allen in The English 
Novel: A Short Critical History (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978), p. 304. For a longer discussion of 
this theme in Lord Jim, see Douglas Flewitt’s ‘Lord Jim: Conrad and the “Few Simple Notions’” , in 
Conrad: A Collection o f Critical Essays, pp. 55-62.
Benita Parry, Conrad and Imperialism: Ideological Boundaries and Visionary Frontiers (London: 
Macmillan, 1983), pp. 79.
Buchan, The Half-Hearted, p. 308.
Conrad, Lord Jim, 9, p. 88.
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“[F]ear is sure to come. Abominable funk {un trac épouvantable). And even for those 
who do not believe this truth there is fear all the same -  the fear of themselves.” ®^
Just as it is not as ‘a European’, ‘a white man’, or even as a ship’s captain, that Falk recalls and 
recoils from his own cannibalism; not as ‘a European’ or ‘white man’ that Kurtz describes the 
“horror” that is himself; Jim jumps not as a bad sailor, a fallen hero or failed colonialist, but as 
the man who jumps. In other words, Jim is brought before, and delivered over to himself in the 
unconcealment (as cdgtkeid) of what he in fact is. This unconcealment, as the “presencing” 
{anwesen) of himself before himself, can thus be seen to constitute the unequivocal bankruptcy 
of those codes and laws of caste, race, craft and creed which are presumed to define him. The 
fiction of an ontologised understanding of one’s race, caste, craft and creed is laid bare; and this 
is the crucial point, for is he not still, a ‘white man’? A ‘colonialist’? Of course he is. But in 
leaping it becomes clear that these things do not determine his Being.^^
In trying to make sense of what he is, or rather, make sense of the fact that he is what he is, Jim 
strives to preserve the “strange illusion” that had appeased his doubts following an earlier 
mistake while training to be an officer. The illusion that
...he had not acted but had suffered himself to be handled by the infernal powers who had 
selected him for the victim of their practical joke.^°
And this is the logic of Jim’s flight from self; the logic which defers responsibility and agency,'’^  
and corresponds with Marlow’s earlier point that:
[Tjhere appears on the face of facts a sinister violence of intention -  that indefinable 
something which forces it upon the mind and the heart of a man, that this complication of 
accidents or these elemental furies are coming at him with a purpose of malice, with a 
strength beyond control, with an unbridled cruelty that means to tear out of him his hope 
and his fear..
ibid., p. 114.
And as such, it is perhaps interesting to consider Jim’s leap within the context of those “culturally 
unassimilable words and scenes of nonsense” which Homi Bhabha identifies in his essay ‘Articulating the 
Archaic’: for Bhabha “the Horror, the Horror [in H eart o f Darkness], the ow l’s death call [in Nostromo, 
and] the Marabar Caves [in A Passage to /nt/ia]...suture the colonial text in a hybrid time and truth that 
survives and subverts the generalizations of literature and history”. ‘Articulating the Archaic’, in Peter 
Collier and Helga Geyer-Ryan (eds.). Literary Theory Today (Cornell University press: Ithaca, 1990), p. 
208.
Comad, Lord Jim, 9, p. 86.
“[A]s a threatened man may look fearfully at his own face in the glass, formulating to himself 
reassuring excuses for his appearance marked by the taint of some insidious hereditary disease.” Conrad, 
Under Western Eyes (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1966), p. 181.
Comad, Lord Jim, 2, p. 14.
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In contrast then, to the alienation of man as irrelevant in the face of “the immense indifference 
of things”,'’® here we encounter the alienation of man, as victim, in the face of what appears to 
be a “sinister violence of intention”. As we saw in the previous chapter, this attribution of 
moods and intents to nature is founded in the fact that Dasein is fundamentally constituted in 
such a way to be susceptible to them, both in itself, and in the essential structures of its 
intentional comportments in the world. But while this sense of persecution is an important 
characteristic of Jim’s early self-examination, it does not mean that we can, like John McClure, 
straightforwardly conclude that Jim is henceforth and unproblematically in a state of childish 
denial regarding his leap.'’"^ For as Marlow says, it is precisely Jim’s refusal to avoid, deflect or 
“minimize its importance”,'’® that marks him out:
“I don’t want to excuse myself; but I would like to explain — I would like somebody to 
understand -  somebody -  one person at least !”“
Why is it important for one person to understand? And understand what? His jump? Himself? 
Or himself jumping? Certainly we cannot fault Marlow in his efforts to get to the root of the 
matter, but as he says:
He was not — if I may say so -  clear to me. He was not clear. And there is a suspicion he 
was not clear to himself either.'’^
Jim ’s attempts to explain himself and Marlow’s commentary upon him are, however, only two 
perspectives in a book which is both structured around and necessarily complicated by the 
hypotheses and speculations of a host of secondary characters. As Parry rightly observes:
Through the perceptions of other protagonists who act as his judges or confessors, his 
motives and actions are expounded from a spectrum of subjective positions on matters of 
theory and belief, so that what Jim is, and the fiction is concerned to present him as an 
enigma to be decoded through the exercise of an innovatory system of analysis, is not the 
same as how he is seen.'’®
But, in her concluding remark that “it is how he is seen that is of significance”®^ -  an 
observation which facilitates her own emphasis upon what she sees as Jim’s “outward image as
'’® Conmd, Nostromo, pp. 408-409, 412.
McClure explains that his main focus will be upon “Jim’s stubborn cultivation of his Jim-myth” and on 
the disastrous results of this husbandry”(kTfp/ing and Conrad, p. 121).
'’® Lord Jim, 7, p. 67.
'’® ibid., 7, p. 66. 
ibid., 16, p. 136.
Parry, Conrad and Imperialism, pp. 77-78. 
ibid..
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the very model of colonial manhood” *^® -  Parry nonetheless misses the mark. For as Conrad 
famously explains in his “artistic manifesto”/® the Preface to The Nigger o f the Narcissus, his 
primary intention is to “reach the secret spring of responsive emotions”:
To snatch in a moment of courage, from the remorseless rush of time, a passing phase of 
life...to show its vibration, its colour, its form; and through its movement, its form, and 
its colour, reveal the substance o f its truth — disclose its inspiring secret: the stress and 
passion within the core of each convincing moment.®'^
In addition, when discussing Falk in his Author’s Note to Typhoon and Other Stories, Conrad 
maintains; “I insist not on the events but on the effect upon the persons in the tale”.''® And 
reading these extracts together, the crucial point to emerge is, that for Conrad, the faithful 
depiction of the moment and its effect upon those concerned takes centre stage.®""® In Lord Jim  
and Falk, it is the effect of Jim ’s leap upon Jim and Falk’s cannibalism upon Falk that is of 
importance to Conrad. Or as Edward Crankshaw has argued, in Lord Jim  Conrad’s main 
concern is with “rendering a complete personality in relation to his environment”.®"® The 
secondary opinions and effects upon the narrators of both tales, are thus always secondaiy to 
Conrad’s main artistic objective; to disclose “the stress and passion within the core of each 
convincing moment”. Hence, it is not what Jim seems that is of concern or significance to those 
like Marlow, Stein, Brierly, the French Lieutenant and even Jewel in their discussions on him; it 
is what Jim is. At the same time, “what Jim is'’ is paradoxically that which must always elude 
them in their “idle talk” about codes of honour, moral precepts and love. It is an elusiveness 
which functions, in formal terms, in precisely the same way as that quest for a “focus for 
authority” that Douglas Brown has identified as the fundamental structural dynamic in 
Nostromo.^^
™ ibid., p. 80.
The phrase is Douglas Brown’s, ‘From H eart o f  Darkness to Nostromo: An Approach to Conrad’, in 
Boris Ford (ed.), The Modern Age  (Flarmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964), p. 120.
Conrad, ‘Preface’ to The N igger o f  the Narcissus, pp. 12, 13 (my emphasis). He goes on, “[I]f one be 
deserving and fortunate, one may perchance attain to such clearness of sincerity that at last the presented 
vision of regret or pity, o f terror or mirth, shall awaken in the hearts of the beholders that feeling of 
unavoidable solidarity; of the solidarity in mysterious origin, in toil, in joy, in hope, in uncertain fate, 
which binds men to each other and all mankind to the visible world” (p. 13, my emphasis).
®^ Conrad, The Nigger o f the “N arcissus”, Typhoon and other stories, p. 148,
And these are indeed the terms with which Conrad, in an especially self-deprecating letter to Edward 
Garnett in 1900, complained that Lord Jim  had failed: “What is fundamentally wrong with the book -  the 
cause of the effect -  is want of power. I do not mean the “power” of reviewers’ jargon. I mean the want of 
illuminating imagination. I wanted to obtain a sort o f lurid light out * the very events. You know what I 
have done - alas! I haven’t been strong enough to breath the right sort of life into my clay -  the revealing  
life..../i'm a lump of clay.” Conrad to Garnett, 12 November 1900, The Collected Letters o f Joseph  
Conrad, volume 2 (1898-1902), pp. 302-3.
®^ Edward Crankshaw, Joseph Conrad: some aspects o f the art o f the novel (London: William Clowes & 
Sons Ltd, 1936), p. 53.
Brown, ‘From Heart of Darkness to Nostromo’, p. 120.
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Despite Parry’s notion of “an innovatory system of analysis” the enigma that is Jim is never 
“decoded” by the characters in the book. And I would argue that this is chiefly due to the fact 
that the inauthentic understanding and interpretation of the “they-self ’ in “idle talk” which is 
employed by these characters in their attempts to make sense of Jim, is precisely that which is 
cast away in the moment and fact of Jim’s leaping. The moment when “the few simple 
notions”’  ^ collapse and “in the light of day the inner worth of a man, the edge of his 
temper...the fibre of his stuff...and the secret truth of his pretences” is laid bare to “him self’®"®; 
to himself, and not, as Marlow would mistakenly have us believe, “to others”.®"^ For, as the story 
progresses it becomes increasingly apparent that Jim’s “secret truth” remains a mystery to 
Marlow:
It seemed to me I was bemg made to comprehend the Inconceivable— and I know of 
nothing to compare with the discomfort of such a sensation. I was made to look at the 
convention that lurks in all truth and on the essential sincerity of falsehood.®®®
He is, as Douglas Hewitt puts it, plainly “muddled” and this confusion is expressed in his 
“vague and rather pretentious playing with abstractions”, which, Hewitt rightly says, “give 
across the impression rather of a man who is ruminating to obscure the issue rather than one 
thinking to clarify it”.®®
But what clarification is possible about Jim? What can be known about Jim and his cowardice; 
about Jim and his heroism? What judgement would be appropriate; and on what grounds? As 
Parry observes; the famous leaps -  the first from the Patna and the second from the Rajah’s 
compound in Patusan -  defy conventional classification, “cowardice does not adequately 
describe the one”, she says, “nor courage the other”.®^ Indeed, as I have shown above in my 
examination of the heroic “demand” (p. 192), it is not a case of saying, like André Maurois, that 
“Jim ought not to have jumped into the boat”,®® For as Marlow maintains, “These were issues 
beyond the competency of a court of enquiry”;®"® in other words, they were beyond the purview 
of right and wrong, truth and falsehood.®® And this indeterminacy can ultimately be seen to stem
Conrad, Lord Jim, 5, p. 39, 
ibid., 2, p. 14.
''ib id .. 
ibid., 8, p. 75.
Hewitt, ‘Lord Jim: Conrad and the “Few Simple Notions’” , p. 60.
Parry, Conrad and Imperialism, p. 80.
André Maurois, Poets and Prophets, trans. by Hamish Miles, (London: Cassel & Co. Ltd., 1936), p. 
141.
®"® Conrad, Lord Jim, 8, p. 75.
As Patrick Brantlinger has observed in his reading of Heart o f Darkness, Conrad “establishes as one of 
his themes the problem of rendering any judgement whatsoever - moral, political, metaphysical - about 
Marlow’s narrative” (Rule o f Darkness, p.264).
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from the fact that while, as Crankshaw has astutely observed. Lord Jim  “certainly has to do with 
the problem of honour”:
[I]t is not so much a thesis on the theme of honour as a fantasia. And this fact kills it as a 
didactic essay while making it as a work of art...[For] in spite of the golden opportunity 
at hand for improving the hour with an allegorical exposition of his moral views he 
[Conrad] is here, as usual, engaged in rendering, not preaching.®^
This is the crucial point that is missed by critics like Parry, and others, in their search for, a 
neatly coherent and monological didactic; a search which fails to recognise or accept both the 
inscrutability of Jim himself and that which Crankshaw calls Conrad’s “personal restraint”.®' 
For example, in her reading of Marlow’s habitual refrain, “he was one of us”, as a strictly 
geographical and racial identification,®® Parry maintains that Conrad
.. .recovers the idea of a moral consensus and locates this as immanent in the idea of the 
eternal nation, where a continuing tradition embodied in unchanging mores commanding 
fidelity to agreed purposes is binding on all classes and through the ages.®"®
But, it is precisely this “tradition” which is so emphatically exposed as bogus in Jim ’s leap; 
precisely this exposure which so unhinges Marlow’s conventional thinking (his “redeeming 
idea”); it precipitates the moral confusion which he never tires of articulating. In her single- 
minded determination to draw Jim, Marlow and Conrad into a realm of artificially inflated 
colonial meaningfulness, Parry nonetheless insists that he is
...concerned to prove is how Jim’s fidelity to imperialism’s saving ideals establishes him, 
despite his defection, as “one of us” ...[And that] by hailing Jim ’s triumph in bringing 
peace and prosperity to Patusan as evidence of the white man’s energy, enterprise and 
ingenuity, he represents Jim as heir to the tradition of colonial chivalry.'®®
Is this an adequate assessment of the complexity of Marlow’s concern for, and depiction of, 
Jim? Can these things be legitimately detached from the confusion and advanced as the
Crankshaw, Conrad, pp. 50-51, 52.
ibid., p. 54. Crankshaw goes on, “It is plane enough that Jim has fallen. The task of the artist is to show  
you the man and his fall, not to measure heights and depths” (ibid.).
“[H]e came from the right place; he was one of us. He stood there for all the parentage of his kind, for 
men and women by no means clever or amusing, but whose very existence is based upon honest faith, and 
upon the instinct of courage...’’{Lord Jim, 5, p. 38).
Parry, Conrad and Imperialism, p. 88. On the opposition between home (as the parsonage) and abroad 
(as Patusan) in Lord Jim, see also, Rosemary Marangoly George’s The politics o f home: Postcolonial 
relocations and twentieth-century fiction  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 80-83. See 
also, Dawson’s assertion that “If adventure and domestic narratives are seen, not just as simple narratives, 
but as dynamically inter-related through the splitting of cultural imaginaries, then the domestic imaginary 
may be read as adventure’s political unconscious, and the adventure quest as a strategy of containment for 
underlying anxieties and contradictions” {Soldier Heroes, p. 76); and, Daniel Bivon’s D esire and 
contradiction: Imperial visions and domestic debates in Victorian literature.
"  Parry, Conrad and Imperialism, pp. 89-90.
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dominant factor? And, following the previous extract, is Parry covertly suggesting that this 
reflects some conscious or subconscious intention or complicity on Conrad’s part? These 
questions must be set alongside the fact that Parry’s analysis effectively stops short with Jim ’s 
attainment of the nation’s “colonial dream”; and, set alongside the fact that Parry can be seen to 
avoid the difficult repercussions which his final fall from grace must have upon the coherence 
and validity of her general argument. For example, can Marlow’s flamboyant description of 
Jim’s ethnic superiority and colonial prowess be detached from his description of the disaster 
which follows in the wake of his solidarity with Brown? And what part is Gentleman Brown 
supposed to play in the “colonial dream”? How does he impact upon the “saving ideals of 
imperialism”?
Far from sidestepping the issues which arise in the wake of Jim ’s acquiescence to Brown, John 
McClure argues that this acquiescence can be understood in terms of Octave Mannoni’s theory 
that “the colonial” seeks financial and psychological satisfactions:
Jim’s great need is for some confirmation of his sense of power and superiority. To attain 
it he must rob the Patusan community of some of its most precious resources.'®
And while McClure acknowledges that the “test” that begins with Brown’s appearance
...reveals the failure of Jim ’s resistance, the unconscious hypocrisy of his pretences, and 
the fundamental unsoundness of the colonial society he has established..."
he is at a loss to explain the rationale behind Jim ’s decision to offer himself up to his colonial 
dependents for execntion at the end; at a loss to explain why Jim walks calmly to the death 
which had so terrified him when standing on the deck of the Patna. Instead, Mannoni’s social 
psychology is deftly laid aside and the laboriousness of the grief-stricken, and heirless, Doramin 
is read as “epitomizing Conrad’s view of colonial rebellions in general”."
In contrast to both of these readings, I would argue that the disaster at the end of Lord Jim  
fundamentally exposes the spuriousness and fragility of the ideas and conventions upon which 
such readings depend. In other words, Jim ’s naive belief in Brown, and Brown’s betrayal of 
him, is yet further evidence that the sham logic of civic virtue underlying Razumov’s “act of 
conscience” in Under Western Eyes^'^ the self-assured arguments and ideals of “idle talk”, and
McClure, Kipling and Conrad, p. 125. See, Octave Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology 
o f Colonization (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990).
ibid, p. 126.
"  ibid., p. 130.
Conrad, Under Western Eyes, p. 39.
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the quasi-ontological understanding of racial excellence in particular, must ultimately fail to 
account for the way we are.
Parry and McClure’s insistence that something like a colonially specific and coherent meaning 
is securable in Lord Jim, and their analysis of that meaning within a set of appropriately specific 
interpretational horizons and thematic fields, is thus fractured by the radical instability of this 
meaning within the text itself. That instability becomes yet more pronounced when we examine, 
perhaps the most significant factor upon which Parry and McClure’s readings depend, namely 
Marlow’s repeated insistence that Jim “was one of us”.
That this recurring phrase must be understood as a racially, politically and nationally defined 
articulation of solidarity would appear indisputable. After all, Marlow is addressing his tale to a 
‘white’ ‘European’ audience (on a veranda after dinner), and in one particular instance, 
specifically differentiates between Jim as “one of us" and Dain Waris as one of But
again, it is, as I have argued, precisely this notion of an ontically defined communality and 
fidelity that is paradoxically undermined by the actions and persons described in the book. As 
such, I would argue that the phrase itself becomes the noose with which Marlow’s concept of 
solidarity slowly hangs itself. More accurately, as the story progresses, it becomes both more 
paranoid and more ambiguous. That which begins as an explicit affirmation and clarification is 
that which simultaneously, and increasingly, serves to highlight and stage the fundamental 
precariousness of both affirmation and clarification. Taken literally, it must either drag Marlow 
and his listeners down to the level of Jim’s ignominy, or artificially cover up that ignominy by 
drawing Jim into the fold.
In another context, I would suggest that Marlow’s continued insistence that Jim “was one of us" 
can be seen to signify and request a more essential identification on the part of his listeners and 
readers. This is because the phrase is vague enough to mask its intended, and radically 
malfunctioning, meaning. It can, simultaneously, be seen to ‘challenge forth’ and announce a 
potential identification with Jim on the level of the Being that is “wx”, and that we ourselves are. 
So, while on the one hand, the phrase precariously points to the ambivalent solidarity of the 
ontical in “idle talk” (as ‘white’); on the other, it points towards the more fundamental solidarity 
of the ontological (as Dasein). If we can allow the luxury of an analogy, this dual significance is 
reflected in Marlow’s description of how Jim “appealed to all sides at once”:
"  “Beloved, trusted, and admired as he was, he was still one of them, while Jim was one of us" (Lord Jim, 
39, p. 272.
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...to the side turned perpetually to the light of day, and to that side of us which, like the 
other hemisphere of the moon, exists stealthily in perpetual darkness, with only a fearful 
ashy light falling at times on the edge."
This means then, that he appeals to a specific strain of the Being of everyday inauthenticity, 
and, at the same time, to the universal Being of fearful authenticity. It is upon the plane of 
correspondence that is constituted by the latter identification, and in the latter appeal, that we 
are potentially confronted by the hypothetical question, what would yow have done? Not just as 
a ‘white man’, or as ‘a European’, or as ‘a colonial’, but as the Being that we ourselves are. The 
Being which emerges in Marlow’s conversation with Stein, when he says “the question is not 
how to get cured, but how to live,” and Stein responds, “That is the question....How to be! Ach! 
How to be”."  More importantly, this is the Being which underpins Conrad’s own artistic 
emphasis upon the “spring of responsive emotions”; those responsive emotions which are 
directly solicited in Marlow’s question:
Which one of us here has not observed this, or maybe experienced something of that 
feeling in his own person -  this extreme weariness of emotions, the vanity of effort, the 
yearning for rest?'®
For if Jim is only “one of us”, as ‘a white man’, ‘a European’ and ‘a colonial’, must we then be 
‘white’, ‘European’ or ‘colonial’ to empathise with this “feeling”, this “yearning for rest”? 
Certainly not. And so we reach the nub of the matter; that fundamental ambivalence which is 
signified and paraded in the phrase “he was one of us”. It is the doubly ambivalent significance 
of the simultaneous selectivity and universality of our potential engagement with the hero -  
British, colonial or otherwise. The two possible planes of correspondence upon which we can 
potentially identify with the heroic.
Following my critique of colonial discourse analysis’ assessment of ‘the colonial hero’ and my 
ontological investigation of the heroic relation. Lord Jim  can, at base, be seen to dramatise the 
fundamentally complex and ambivalent ways in which people encounter themselves and others 
in the world of their experiences. More importantly, in the inscrutability of Jim himself, and the 
diversity and inadequacy of all of the various attempts to describe and explain what he is, 
Conrad captures the essential character of the “kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s 
understanding and interpreting”"  -  “idle taUc”. From Marlow’s metaphysics to Stein’s
"  Conrad, Lord.Jim, 8, p. 75.
"  ibid., 20, p. 162. For a detailed examination of the analogy which exists here, and more generally, 
between Lord Jim  and Hamlet, see. Chapter Eight of John Batchelor’s ‘“Honour”, “Dream” and 
“Tragedy”: Hamlet, La Vida Es Sueno and Lord Jim ’, Lord Jim  (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
"  Conrad, Lord Jim, 7, p. 71.
"  Being and Time, 1.5, p. 211.
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romanticism, the inauthentic and uprooted logic of “idle talk” fails to account for Jim and the 
things he does. And far from being unique, or in some way dependent upon the eccentricity of 
Jim himself, this failure to reach certainty and consensus reflects the essentially ambiguous 
nature of the “idle talk” of Dasein in general:
[A]mbiguity [Zweideutigkeit] does not first arise from aiming explicitly at disguise or 
distortion, and... is not something which the individual Dasein first conjures up. It is 
already implied in Being with one another, as thrown Being-with-one-another in a 
world.®100
Indeed, this failure to reach certainty and consensus by the characters in Lord Jim  is 
fundamentally reflected in the diverse and contradictory range of critical opinions that we have 
been examining. When considered in terms of the ambiguity of “idle talk”, Stein’s romantic 
interpretation of Jim, founded as it is in his own romantic inclinations, is thus no different from 
Parry’s colonial interpretation oî Lord Jim, and her colonial concerns; Marlow’s metaphysical 
endeavours are no different from McClure’s social psychology; Brierly’s outraged 
professionalism no different from Cornelius’s festering envy or Jesse Conrad’s wifely lack of 
interest.®'® It is this diverse range of perspective and persuasion, interest and inclination which 
always already complicates and undermines the “regulated and secured” cultural theories of 
‘colonial heroism’ discussed in section one. It is this diversity, and polyphony, which explains 
the reception and rejection of a Gordon and a Dyer. It is this “idle talk” which reflects and 
constitutes the ambivalent Being that we ourselves are in our everyday, and which always 
already disrupts the neatly constructed “cultural imaginaries” and “heroic masculinities” of 
cultural theory and discourse analysis.
Just as it is
.. .easy enough to talk of Master Jim, after a good spread, two hundred feet above the sea-
level, with a box of decent cigars handy...®"
I would argue that, by the same measure, it is easy enough to map the “intellectually knowable 
lines” of human “concern”. “[Tjhere are men here and there to whom the whole of life is like an
ibid., 1.5, p. 219.100
®'®® Jesse Conrad’s opinion of Lord Jim  covers all o f half a page in her memoirs and is largely concerned 
with her role as the copier of her husband’s manuscripts and the worried spectator of his writer!y toil. In 
contrast, her account of a trap accident they had shortly after the book was finished takes up a good three 
pages, and this imbalance in many ways sums up the nature of her book. See, Joseph Conrad as I  Knew  
Him, pp. 110.
Conrad, Lord Jim, 5, p. 32.
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after-dinner hour with a cigar”/'® and their “idle talk” about characters like Lord Jim no doubt 




In this study I have questioned the theory and praxis of colonial discourse analysis and, in 
particular, the validity of its conception of ‘the colonising (white, European, Western) subject’. 
In so doing, I have focused upon the serious problems which adhere to its theoretical 
employment in colonial discourse analysis’ reading of the fictional coloniser in colonial 
literature, and the discursively constituted plane of correspondence upon which conclnsions are 
posited on the historical coloniser and colonialism as a whole. In this conclusion, I will 
summarise the progressive stages of my argument, chapter by chapter, before addressing the 
broader issues which the study has raised.
Following Martin Heidegger’s description of “Enframing” as that mode of “challenging 
revealing” which characterises the understanding and interpretation of the technological 
consciousness in the modern age; I have argued that colonial discourse analysis posits both 
colonial reality and the coloniser as the “structured image” (GeBild). In Chapter One, I have 
explored how, in the course of colonial discourse analysis’ drive towards the establishment of 
discursive functionality, the historical (and fictional) coloniser as the ‘discursive subject’ of 
colonial discourse, is homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised; and how colonial reality, as 
the discursively constituted ‘house’ of the ‘discursive subject’, is “Enframed” in such a way as 
to facilitate and corroborate that functionality.
As a result, and in order for this “Enframed” reality and ‘subject’ to comply with the theoretical 
criterion of this “objective sphere” as discourse, I have explained how, on the one hand, the 
ontological factors of Dasein’s existence (e.g. death and time) are onticalised and posited as 
being somehow ontically determinable; and on the other, how the ontical factors of Dasein’s 
existence (e.g. its race and nationality) are ontologised and posited as being universally 
generalisable. This ontologisation of the ontical and onticalisation of the ontological constitutes 
the ‘regulation and securement’ of colonial reality and the coloniser, as the “standing reserve”, 
as well as the ‘gathering’ of that “standing resei-ve” into a theoretical system of artificially 
prioritised ontical (colonial, national or racial) meaningfulness.
When understood within the context of colonial discourse analysis’ interpretation of colonial 
literature, this “Enframing” drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality can, 
more specifically, be seen to result in the establishment of a discursively constituted plane of 
correspondence: a plane of correspondence upon which the fictional and historical coloniser and 
fiction and history themselves, are interpreted and understood in relation to one another within a 
discursively constituted field of equivalence. It is this discursively constituted plane of
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correspondence, with its homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised ‘colonising subject’, 
which to the most important question in the context of this study; namely, whether or not the 
“view of man” which is advanced in colonial discourse analysis is in fact an “essential one”?®
Heidegger’s stipulation that
The more appropriately the Being of the entities to be explored is understood under the 
guidance of an understanding of Being...all the more secure will be the perspective for 
one’s methodological inquiry...^
reveals how an alternative plane of correspondence can be established in the examination and 
interpretation of the fictional coloniser and historical coloniser, colonial literature and colonial 
reality. A plane of correspondence which is constituted in terms of an understanding of “the 
Being of the entities to be explored”. In contrast to the artificially homogenised, un-worlded and 
de-humanised theoretical construct of ‘the colonising subject’ that is advanced in colonial 
discourse analysis, I have explained, that my adoption of an ontologically grounded conception 
of the historical coloniser constitutes a “return to the things themselves”, and the clearing of 
dogma and system.
In Chapter Two, I have summarised some of the fundamental aspects of that Being, as described 
by Martin Heidegger in his existential-ontological analytic of Dasein. This summaiy has the 
double significance of, on the one hand, more fully drawing the problems of colonial discourse 
analysis’ conception of the “colonising subject” into focus, for example, its ontologisation of the 
ontical in terms of the “ontological difference”; and on the other, clarifying the ontological 
criteria of my subsequent investigation of fictional characters like Terence Mnlvaney, Lord Jim, 
Alan Quatermain and Harry Feversham; and not just the fictional colonisers, but explorers, 
soldiers, civilians, authors and their reading public as well.
Accompanying this redefined understanding of the coloniser as Dasein is a redefined 
understanding of discourse as “idle talk”. As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, for Heidegger, 
“The “they” prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees””,® and it 
does this in, among other things, “idle talk”. But, unlike the unsatisfactorily absolutist (Said) or 
ambivalent (Bhabha) theorisation of this “prescription” as discourse -  a theorisation which 
precipitates the expediential “Enframing” of Dasein as the ‘discursive subject’ -  Heidegger’s 
description of “idle talk”, founded as it is, in the ontological nature of Dasein itself, recognises
® See, Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts o f Metaphysics, 1.1.18 (c), p. 75. 
' Being and Time, II.4, p. 413.
® Being and Time, 1.5, p. 213.
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the fundamental arbitrariness of this ‘prescription’ and ‘determination’, in that it is concerned 
with, and expressive of, beings, that is, the ontical. What this means is that this redefinition can 
be seen to account for the blindest of blind spots in colonial discourse analysis; the possibility of 
individual (and collective) compliance and dissent in the face of that which is called discourse 
or hegemony, ideology or propaganda: a possible dissent and compliance which is necessarily 
founded in the variousness of Dasein’s ontical “concern”.
In response to the un-worlding of the coloniser in colonial discourse analysis, and the theoretical 
transferral of that coloniser from the world of its experiences to an artificially restricted realm of 
colonial meaningfulness, I have (in Chapter Four) focused upon the theme of death in the life 
and work of Rudyard Kipling. As both a crucially significant environmental factor in the 
everyday and as the fundamental temporal orientation (“Being towards death”) of Dasein’s own 
“Being-in-the-world”, I have argued that death can be seen to constitute the ever present 
existential horizon against which the characters in so much of Kipling’s Anglo-Indian fiction 
are set. The existential horizon which brings these characters before themselves and their own 
“Being-in-the-world” as a “Being towards death”;"® the horizon before which, in “idle talk”, 
Kipling sings of the noble self-sacrifice of the Anglo-Indian civil servant; and, the fundamental 
existential horizon in terms of which, work, companionship and duty take on an unparalleled, if 
not altogether decisive, significance.
But more than anything, as evidenced by Morrowbie Jukes and Gadsby, Jack Pansay and 
Kipling, it is before death and in the awareness of one’s own “Being towards death” that the 
‘prescriptions’ and ‘determinations' of the “they”, the ‘everyday’ trappings of, for example, the 
‘imperial’, ‘white’, ‘English’, ‘colonising’ “they-self’, can fall away. And, despite the fact that 
this falling away is neither guaranteed, nor necessarily irreversible -  given Dasein’s oscillation 
between its inauthentic and authentic modes of Being -  I have shown that, in the episodes in 
question, the fact of this falling away can be seen to problematize the conceptually restricted 
(‘regulated and secured’) interpretations of the coloniser in colonial discourse analysis and, 
what is more, its colonially-prioritised readings of Kipling’s Anglo Indian fiction.
Continuing in this vein, I have examined, in Chapter Five, the ways in which the moods and 
experiences of fictional colonisers in colonial literature can be understood to reflect those basic 
ontological states-of-mind which disclose the world to Dasein and delivers Dasein over to its
“Death does not just “belong” to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim  to it as 
an individual Dasein...This individualising is a way in which the “there” is disclosed for existence” 
{Being and Time, II. 1, p. 308).
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Being, as where, how, what and that, it is.^ More specifically, and in contrast to the “Enframed” 
and artificially onticalised moods of colonial discourse analysis, I have argued that these 
ontological “states-of-mind” must be recognised as the only legitimately generalisable psychic 
phenomena in the colonial context. As such, the depiction of anxiety and boredom, uncanniness, 
loneliness and fear, in colonial literature, can be seen to constitute a fundamentally important, 
and ontologically grounded, plane of correspondence upon which the reader can potentially 
relate to the experiences of the fictional and, as we saw with Kipling, Parks and Havelock, the 
historical character.
Drawing together the arguments raised in Chapters One to Five, I have examined, in Chapter 
Six, the ways in which a cultural and historical phenomenon like colonial heroism can be 
understood and interpreted if considered in relation to the existential-ontological constitution of 
the author, the reader, and most importantly, the hero, as Dasein. In so doing, I have concluded 
that when we speculate upon the ‘circulation’ of the historical hero as icon in society, we must 
do so under the guidance of an understanding of the beings that the historical hero and the 
public (readers, watchers or listeners) fundamentally are.
I also emphasised the importance of resisting the temptation to “Enframe” the human 
participants involved in the phenomenon of colonial heroism within the homogenising, un- 
worlding and de-humanising theoretical systems of colonial discourse. An “Enframing” which, 
as we saw with Laura Chrisman’s treatment of H. Rider Haggard, posits and interprets these 
constituents solely in terms of the role that they are understood to play within that system. The 
validity of the various cultural, social and socio-psychological characteristics which are 
extrapolated from this systemisation of heroism is thus, I have argued, entirely and necessarily 
compromised by the distortions upon which that system is based. This is a crucial point; for if 
we recall the always already ambivalent character of Dasein’s engagement with “idle tallc”, as 
that which “prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees””, then we 
must recognise the fundamentally ambivalent and fickle nature of the public’s engagement with 
the fictional and historical colonial hero: a fickleness and ambivalence that is founded in the 
inherent variousness of Dasein’s ontical “concern” (Besorgen).
In the light of Heidegger’s phenomenological description of Dasein’s engagement with the 
world in the “confrontation” (polemos) or “struggle” (Kampf) of its intentional relations, I have 
suggested that the fundamental characteristic they can all be seen to exhibit is their capacity to 
“demand” (Zumutung) that which is subsequently understood in “idle talk” as an heroic, or non-
® See, Being and Time, 1.5, p. 173.
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heroic, response. Under the guidance of this phenomenological understanding of the 
fundamental ambivalence of the heroic act, I then proceeded to examine the various levels upon 
which the colonial hero and its experiences are absorbed into, understood, celebrated and/or 
neglected by the public at home. In so doing, I again emphasised that, the nature of the hero’s 
circulation in society as a public icon is dependent upon the ontologically constituted 
arbitrariness of that public’s ontical (political, national, regional) “concern”. At the same time, I 
argued that, there exists the possibility of a more fundamental identification on the part of that 
public: an identification which now “demands” from them an empathy: an answer as to whether 
they too are the sort of person who would be capable of such a triumph. It is a “demand” which 
is carried in the narrative of the hero’s heroism, and which can be seen to constitute an essential 
horizon of meaning before which the interpretation of heroism is potentially conducted.
And, it is the interpretation of heroism in the public and critical realm which informed my 
analysis of Conrad’s Lord Jim. For, in addition to my examination of the crucial ways in which 
Jim can be understood to have been delivered over to himself as the being that he himself is, I 
have argued that this delivery can be understood as a crisis of those heroic conventions, racial 
myths and professional codes which were meant to define who and what he is, and how he is 
supposed to act. As a result, the plethora of different perspectives on Jim, which are provided by 
the other characters in the book, and which are constituted almost entirely in terms of those 
same conventions, myths and codes, are simply incapable of accounting for who and what he is. 
In addition, I have concluded that Marlow’s repeated insistence that, Jim was “one of us”, can 
be understood within the context of that plane of correspondence which is constituted in terms 
the Being that we ourselves are, in conjunction with the plane which is constituted in terms of 
the ontical specificity of Jim’s professional, racial or national character.
Moreover, as a fictional account of one hero’s/coward’s ‘circulation’ in society through “idle 
talk”, Lord Jim  can be seen to dramatise the fundamentally complicated co-existence of these 
two potential planes of correspondence and identification: in other words, it dramatises the 
essential confusion and the lack of anything lilce a coherent consensus which must come in the 
wake of those potential correspondences. A confusion and lack of consensus which is, I 
conclude, perfectly reflected in an equally broad range of critical opinion which has followed 
the book and which is, in itself, symptomatic of the fundamental diversity of Dasein’s ontical 
“concern”.
The most important question which requires to be addressed in the wake of this study is, 
whether or not this ontologically grounded interpretation of the fictional and historical coloniser 
constitutes an elision of the material history of colonial injustice. Or, does the argument that, the
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historical coloniser is always already ontologically constituted as a “being in Time”, and my 
focus upon its inauthentic and authentic modes of “Being-in-the-world”, constitute the issuing 
of an ontological ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ card.
In response I would insist that none of the arguments advanced in this study deny the fact of the 
1859 Indian Mutiny/Rebellion reprisals, or the fact of the massacre at Amritsar; nor can an 
ontological focus be read as an effacement of the barbarity and inhumanity of the slave trade, 
the genocide of the Aborigines in Australia, the ruthless economic exploitation of the colonial 
era, nor the problems that on-going Western exploitation causes in former colonies. Rather, it 
examines the problems which attend the theoretical positing of a ‘colonising’ (and ‘colonised’), 
‘white’ (and ‘black’) ‘European’ (and ‘African’) ‘discursive subject’ in the interpretation and 
understanding of these things.
But then again, how can this interpretation of the fictional depiction of, for example, anxiety, as 
the individualisation of Dasein in Time, help us understand the effects of colonialism in real 
terms? It might be asked, is this individualisation merely the product of an elaborate 
philosophical hair-splitting, and therefore only of tokenistic significance? Indeed, could it not be 
argued that in focusing upon the coloniser’s ontological “potentiality-for-Being-itself’, we are 
simultaneously “covering up” (yerdecken) and eliding the fact that the majority did, historically, 
hold certain views and engage in certain activities?
The existence of the views and activities of the majority is not in question. What is being 
questioned is the validity of the post-structuralist, deconstructionist and psychoanalytical 
theorisation of this majority and its opinions. Pointing this out does not deny the existence of 
that majority, the consequences of its activities or the opinions it held. What it does deny is the 
artificial ontologisation of this majority as a national, racial or political collective, and the 
theorisation of its opinions as discourse. This interpretation draws attention to colonial discourse 
analysis’ inability to account for the existence (and the possibility) of dissent within ‘white’, 
‘Western’ colonial society, the fact of collaboration and exploitation within ‘black’, ‘Eastern’ 
colonised society; and the diversely competing loyalties, factors and dynamics which exist in 
each society in relation to sexual, regional, class, religious and racial differences. And it does 
this without reverting to theoretical subterfiiges of ‘ counter-discourse ’ and the psychoanalytical 
contortionism of, for example, Bhabha’s notions of “hybridity” and “mimicry”.
It is only when we suspend the drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality, and 
the artificial ontologisation of the ontical, in our attempt to make sense of these things, and 
adopt instead, an understanding of the ideas and opinions of the majority as “idle talk”, that
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these exceptions and diversities can be accounted for and explained. The cost of this suspension 
and adoption can perhaps, most liberally be defined, as the rejection of broad-gauged 
judgements.
Saying this, it is nonetheless crucial for us to be clear as to why the suspension of these 
theoretical practises and the issuing of these broad-gauged judgements -  from Said’s and 
Bhabha’s “Enframing” of colonial reality to Sullivan and Suleri’s drive towards the 
establishment of discursive functionality in their reading of colonial literature -  is of such 
importance. It is because these judgements, this “Enframing” and these readings presuppose and 
involve the “Enframing” of our own reality and we ourselves: the ‘white European neo- 
colonial’; the ‘white post-colonial settler’, or the ‘African, Indian, West Indian postcoloniaT: 
those who are academics and those who are not. It is because the ordering and regulation of 
reality along discursive lines turns us and our reality into the “standing reserve”; and we 
ourselves become the homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised inhabitants of a reality that 
has become discourse. In the process, we ourselves are accorded our role as victims, 
collaborators, spectators, inheritors and agitators.
What I have engaged with in this study is the shortfall between reality and theory, between 
“what is” and “what applies”; a shortfall which stems from the quasi-scientific conceit of a 
series of methodologies which are not only illustrative of that which Heidegger calls “a no 
longer customary modesty”, ' but which are founded in and evince the belief that
...nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and
that it remains orderable as a system of information.'
In other words, methodologies which, in their refusal to accept the fundamental ambivalence of 
nature, the variousness of Dasein’s ontical “concern” and “the essentially unformulatable logic 
of life”,® are indicative of that mode of “challenging revealing” which characterises the 
“technological consciousness”. Methodologies which enact a “challenging revealing” and, in 
tracing “the intellectually knowable lines” of what is “thought, said, or even done”,' satisfy that 
which Heidegger calls, “the demands of common speech in usual communication”, wherein no 
time is lost “tarrying over the sense of individual words”.®' Words which combine in cultural 
theory in formulations like ‘the colonising subject’ and “the colonising imagination”: 
formulations in which
Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, II. IV, p. 159.
'  Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 23. 
® Phillips, D arwin’s Worms, p. 82.
'  Orientalism, pp. 12-13.
Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, II.II, p. 127.
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...everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just 
so that it may be on call for a further ordering.®®
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